CHAPTER XXI

CHAPTER XXI

BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG • LOSS OF OUR ARMY • INCIDENTS • CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT • RECROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, December 13th-Early on the 12th, we marched down to the lower pontoons, and at eleven A.M., crossed, halted and formed in line of battle on the bottom land beneath the elevated plain. Here the men commenced making coffee and eating dinner, as no one could tell when they would have an opportunity to build fires again. While they were thus engaged and everyone was expecting in a short time to go into battle, four young boys were quietly seated, playing cards upon a blanket. For two of them it was their last game. Soon after we were moved up on the plateau, and the whole army was formed into line of battle, with the artillery and cavalry all posted. It was one of the most magnificent sights the eyes of man ever rested upon.

Some slight picket skirmishing took place in our front, and on the right, the enemy opened with artillery, but soon retired. The "Bucktails" were ordered to the extreme left for picket duty, and our regiment sent to occupy the buildings and outhouses at Smithfield, and to hold the bridge across Deep Run, near where it emptied into the river. The main building was Dr. Thomas Platt's large brick house, which, being unoccupied, we entered through a window, and found it very handsomely furnished. Around this building the men were posted, and it was occupied by us during the night. Upon our arrival, Colonel McCandless caused the arrest of the overseer and two other white men, and sent them to General Meade's headquarters, who caused them to be detained until the battle was over. With the exception of the exchange of a few shots everything passed quietly through the night.

The field upon which the battle of Fredericksburg was fought, consisted of a plateau, extending from the bluffs of the river to a range of heavily wooded heights, commencing on the Rappahannock, above and in the rear of Fredericksburg, and extending to the valley

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of Massaponax, a distance of between four and five miles, its greatest breadth being two miles. On this plateau was drawn up the Union army, Major-General E. V Sumner, commanding the right grand division, Major-General Joseph Hooker commanding the centre grand division, and Major-General William B. Franklin commanding the left grand division.

Early on the morning of the 13th, the enemy threw out foot and mounted skirmishers, on our left, and Colonel McCandless ordered Companies B, Captain McDonough, and H, Captain Mealey, to the support of the "Bucktails," and it soon after becoming evident that the enemy meditated an attack upon that point, the balance of the regiment was moved up. Soon after the remainder of the Pennsylvania Reserves, under General Meade, moved forward, and Doubleday's division passing to our left, we advanced and formed the first line of battle with Gibbons' division on our right. Crossing the Bowling Green Road, we advanced to within about one thousand yards of the base of the mountain and lay down on the crest of the field, behind the batteries we were, to support.

Our division formation was, the First Brigade in line of battle, with the Sixth Regiment deployed as skirmishers; the Second Brigade in rear of the First, three hundred paces; the Third Brigade by the flank, its right flank being a few yards to the rear of the First Brigade, having the Ninth Regiment deployed on its flanks as skirmishers and flankers; the batteries between the First and Second Brigades.

This disposition had scarcely been made, when the enemy opened a brisk fire from a battery posted on the Bowling Green Road, the shot from which took the division from the left and rear. As there were indications of an attack from that quarter, the Third Brigade was faced to the left, thus forming, with the First, two sides of a square. Simpson's battery was advanced to the front and left of the Third Brigade, and Cooper's and Ransom's batteries moved to the knoll on the left of the First Brigade. These batteries immediately opened on the enemy's battery, and, in conjunction with some of the Doubleday's batteries in our rear, on the other side of the Bowling Green Road, after some twenty minutes' firing, silenced and compelled the withdrawal of the guns.

During this artillery duel, the enemy advanced a body of sharpshooters along the Bowling Green Road, under cover of the hedges and trees at the roadside. General Jackson, commanding the Third Brigade, promptly sent out two companies of marksmen from his brigade, who drove the enemy back, and no further demonstrations were made on our left and rear.

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During this time a dense fog, which had hung over the field, was dispelled by the rays of the sun, and revealed to the enemy our magnificent lines drawn up in battle array. As our division had been chosen by General Reynolds, who commanded our corps, to storm the heights, Ransom's battery was moved to the right and front of the First Brigade, and Amsden's battery was posted on the right of Cooper's, and the Third Brigade changed front, and formed in line of battle on the left of the First Brigade, its left extending so as to be nearly opposite to the end of the ridge to be attacked. The formation was barely executed before the enemy opened a sharp fire from a battery posted on the heights to our extreme left. Cooper's, Amsden's and Ransom's batteries were immediately turned on it, and, after about thirty minutes rapid firing, the enemy abandoned the guns, having had two of his limbers or caissons blown up, the explosions from which were plainly visible.

It was now twelve o'clock P.M., and we had been laying under a terrific fire of round shot and shell for over three hours, which plowed up the earth in deep furrows, or went howling and bursting over our heads, filling the air with iron hail and sulphur. Though this is the most trying position soldiers can be placed in, there is little danger from it, not a man of our regiment being hurt, though the flagstaff was cut in two. But we were tired of lying still and being shot at without returning the fire, and when the order came for us to advance, it was received with joy by all. Upon the explosion of the caissons, the order to advance was given and received with loud cheers, the First Brigade advancing over the field into the woods, driving the enemy before them. Having passed through a severe flanking fire from a rifle pit, which lined the base of the woods and mountains, we crossed the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad and drove the enemy from behind the embankments, and then making a half wheel to the left, gained the rear of the pit, and poured into its occupants a most destructive fire, by which they were slaughtered like sheep. Many of them attempted to escape by running the gauntlet in front of our regiment, they becoming perfectly wild with fright, not heeding our calls to halt, but with their arms up to shield their heads, some of them staggered to and fro up the hill, within a few yards of us, meeting certain death. The balance of our brigade being on our right, and a heavy fire being received from that direction, they obliqued over to that side, and our regiment pushed on to the front.

In the meantime, about one company of scattered men were pouring into the rifle pit, at the distance of fifty yards, a murderous fire, to which no response was given, but unfortunately the Seventh

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Reserve were in the field in front of the pit, and pouring into it a heavy fire, which harmed not the foe, but was received by our men, who in the excitement of the battle supposed the shots came from the pit. It was therefore almost impossible to stop the fire of our boys, until at last the Adjutant cased his sword, and taking off his cap advanced between the two lines, and asked the enemy if "they wished to fight or surrender." "We will surrender, if you will let us," was the reply. This stopped the fire of our regiment. The Adjutant, not wishing to weaken his own regiment by sending men with them to the rear, and to prevent treachery from the enemy, took several of them with him, and advancing in front of the rifle pit, succeeded in stopping the fire of the Seventh, upon which he got the rest of the prisoners, numbering over three hundred, out, and sent them over to the Seventh.* At least one hundred men lay dead or wounded in the pit and immediately in its rear. When the men left the pit to go into our lines, from their dirty and ragged appearance, they resembled the emptying of an almshouse more than anything else, but under these soiled and torn jackets, there were many brave hearts, fighting for what they believed a holy and just cause. They were the Nineteenth Georgia infantry. Our regiment numbered but one hundred and ninety-five muskets.

In the meantime our brigade pressed vigorously on, and continued forcing the enemy back until the crest of the heights was crowned, we crossing the main road that runs along there, breaking down a fence and entering the open ground or plateau, across which we swept, passing rows of the enemy's muskets stacked, taking them by utter surprise and reaching their reserve and getting within sight of their ambulances. So vigorous and sudden was the attack, that the enemy in some instances had not time to get under arms before we were upon them. At this point we were assailed by a very severe fire from a large force in front, and a battery opened upon us from the right, completely enfilading us, and a few moments afterwards we received a heavy fire on our left flank. After holding the ground here for a considerable time under these withering fires, and finding no support was coming to us, we were compelled to fall back to the railroad.

The Second Brigade, which advanced in our rear, after reaching the railroad, received so severe a fire on their right flank that the Fourth Regiment halted, formed and faced to the right, to repel

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* In the official report of General Meade of the battle, doubtlessly by mistake, the Seventh Regiment is wrongfully credited with the capture of the rifle pits, prisoners, and a standard.

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this attack. The other regiments, in passing through the woods, being assailed from the left, inclining in that direction and ascended the heights, the Third Regiment going up as the One Hundred and Twenty-First, then attached to our brigade, was retiring. The Third continued to advance until they met the balance of our brigade, when all retired together. The Seventh engaged the enemy on the left, and continued to advance until they encountered the enemy's reinforcements, when they were driven back.

The Third Brigade had not advanced over one hundred yards when the battery on the heights on its left was remanned, and poured a destructive fire into its ranks. General Jackson attempted to outflank the battery on the right, and succeeded so far that some of the regiments advanced across the railroad, and ascended the heights in their front, but here the gallant Jackson was killed, and so severe a fire of both artillery and infantry was opened upon them, that they were compelled to withdraw.

Upon our reaching the open ground General Meade requested Colonel McCandless, who was now in command of our brigade, as Colonel Sinclair had been severely wounded, to rally the men. Our flag and that of another regiment was brought to the front, and we partially reformed and maintained our ground for some twenty minutes, but such was the severity of the artillery and infantry fire concentrated upon us, we were again forced to retire. Moving on across the field we reached our batteries, behind which we found General Birney's troops. The enemy did not follow us but a short distance from the woods, when they retired to their original position.

General Gibbons, whose division lay on our right, ordered his First Brigade forward when he saw us advancing. Finding they faltered, he shortly afterwards ordered up the Second Brigade, but such was the severity of the fire he could not get them to charge. He then ordered the Third Brigade to form in column on the right of his line, and they went in on the bayonet and advanced as far as the railroad, the enemy's outer line, at the base of the heights, but this was not until we were being driven back by the concentrated force of the enemy on our front and flanks.

General Meade stated, prior to the assault, that he could take the heights, but could not hold them without support, which he fully expected. He sent three different times to General Birney by three staff officers, twice requesting him to advance to his support, and the third time ordering him to advance, and then he came up. To the first request he answered, he was under the orders of General Reynolds, and could not move without his orders. When he received the order to advance he sent four regiments under General Hobart

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Ward, who arrived just as we had retired from the woods, and they, with a portion of the Reserves and Gibbons' division, prevented the enemy from advancing beyond the edge of the woods.

General Birney, in his testimony before the "Committee on the Conduct of the War," states that he only received one message from General Meade requesting support; that the enemy charged within fifty yards of his guns; that General Ward, with his four regiments, advanced beyond where the Reserves had; that his command was immediately in the rear of General Meade's during the attack, and that he was requested to try and stop the rout, and deployed two regiments for that purpose, but the fugitives broke through his lines. These statements would not be noticed if they were not in so direct variance with those of General Meade and other officers, and with what is known to be the facts by the majority of the officers and men of our division who were present upon the field.

Birney ordered to stop the fugitive "Pennsylvania Reserves" from running!!! No one was ever ordered to do that, for when they retired no troops ever went in after them!

General Franklin, who commanded the left grand division, received orders from General Burnside "to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open ... Holding these heights (on the right of our line), with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points." The troops under his command to accomplish this, were his own grand division numbering forty thousand men, and two divisions from Hooker's grand division under the command of General Stoneman, numbering from fifteen to twenty thousand men, making a grand total of from fifty-five to sixty thousand men. He also had twenty-three batteries, one hundred and sixteen guns, besides sixty-one guns, some of them of very large calibre, stationed on the north bank of the river to protect the bridges. A portion of these guns under Captain De Russy, had obtained complete control of the Massaponax, from its mouth up to the position occupied by the enemy. With all this force at his disposal, General Franklin saw proper to order the attack to be made by two divisions, the Reserves numbering four thousand five hundred, and Gibbon's division something over five thousand men, in all at the outside ten thousand men. This was the force it was contemplated to make the attack with, though our own division was in reality the only one that crossed the railroad, and we reached a point almost three-quarters of a mile beyond. General Franklin deemed it necessary to keep between forty-five and fifty thousand infantry and a large number

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of guns to hold the bridges, that were two miles from the enemy, when twenty-thousand men would have been amply sufficient, and if the heights had been held no infantry whatever would have been required for the purpose.

But the General in his testimony before the "Committee" states, "I never dreamed that this was considered as a strong attack at all until since the battle took place. At that time I had no idea that it was the main attack, but supposed it was an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was. That night," the General continues, "General Burnside sent for me, and I supposed his object in sending for me was to tell me what kind of attack was to come off the next day." It is rather surprising that General Franklin with all his known and admitted ability, should have fought through the memorable battle of Fredericksburg without "dreaming" that anything more than "an armed reconnoissance" had taken place. He was subsequently suspended from his command for not being a better dreamer.

The position held by the Confederates, and which our division attacked, was very faulty, as shown by our own maps afterwards, and the one captured from General Jackson. Jackson was thrown down on our left much too far, and if General Meade had received sufficient support to have enabled him to have had his position, it is believed that a portion of Jackson's forces and six or seven batteries could never have retired. And it is the unanimous opinion of the officers of the army, that being in the rear of the enemy's left, they would have been so shaken on the ridge, that the position in front could have been easily stormed and carried.

But the crown of victory was snatched from the brow of the Reserves.

While these operations were transpiring on the extreme left, the right was busily engaged, but with less success. General Sumner having received orders to storm the enemy's works on the extreme right immediately in the rear of Fredericksburg, selected the corps of Generals French and Hancock for that purpose. The works to be taken consisted of three tiers, the first an embanked stone wall, four or five hundred yards long, behind which infantry were posted, and with artillery enfilading it. The next tier was a more formidable row of fortifications, situated one mile in the rear on a higher position still. Between these were large masses of infantry. In the rear of this were other fortifications on still higher positions. The first line of works was repeatedly assaulted, but in spite of all the efforts of the officers our men were driven back. The enemy held their fire until our troops arrived close up to the wall when they rose up and poured

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into them a fearful volley, their artillery enfilading the column at the same time on both sides. No troops could stand such a fire as they received.

At two P.M., General Hooker was ordered to assault the same position and after trying to dissuade General Burnside from making the attack, he brought up all his available batteries, with a view to break away the barriers by the use of artillery. With these he continued to play with great vigor until sunset upon one point, but with no apparent effect upon the enemy or their works. About this time General Humphrey's division was ordered to form in column of assault. The men took off their knapsacks, overcoats and haversacks, as all troops do upon such occasions, and at the word "Forward," they moved up to the works with empty muskets and with great impetuosity. The head of the column arrived within fifteen or twenty yards of the wall, when they were hurled back as quickly as they advanced, leaving one thousand seven hundred and sixty of their number out of about four thousand upon the field. The whole of the advance and retiring did not occupy fifteen minutes, and they probably did not kill a man.

In addition to the musketry fire that the men were exposed to, the crest of the hills surrounding Fredericksburg form almost a semicircle, and these were filled with artillery, and the focus was the column that moved up to this assault, and it was within good canister range. This was the favorite point of assault of General Burnside, and he persisted in butting against it all day long.

More or less artillery fighting was kept up all along the line through the day.

After remaining behind the batteries for some time our division was marched to the ground occupied the night before, where it was held in reserve.

The loss of the army during the day was:

Killed .....................................................................	1,152
Wounded ...............................................................	9,101 3.234
Missing ..................................................................	13,487
Total ..............................................................
Treated in hospital ...............................................	1,630
Killed .....................................................................	1.152
Total ..............................................................	2,782

There is little doubt that the aggregate of cases returned as treated in hospital and the returns of killed will very nearly cover the whole amount of disabling casualties occurring at the battle.

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The return of killed may be too small, but the amount returned as treated in hospital is nearly sufficiently liberal to compensate for any such deficiency.

The loss of the First Corps was:*

FIRST DIVISION - GENERAL A. DOUBLEDAY
Officers ......................................................................	12
Men ...........................................................................	199
Total ..................................................................	211
SECOND DIVISION - GENERAL JOHN GIBBON
Officers ......................................................................	76
Men ...........................................................................	1,180
Total ..................................................................	1,256
THIRD DIVISION - GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE
Killed
Officers ......................................................................	13
Men ...........................................................................	158
Total ..................................................................	171
Wounded
Officers ......................................................................	52
Men ...........................................................................	1,150
Total ..................................................................	1,202
Missing
Officers ......................................................................	12
Men ...........................................................................	457
Total ..................................................................	469
Aggregate
Officers ......................................................................	77
Men ...........................................................................	1.765
Total ..................................................................	1,842
Recapitulation
First Division ...........................................................	2,11
Second Division .......................................................	1,256
Third Division..........................................................	1.842
Total .............................................................	3,309

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*Taken from the official report of Major-General John F. Reynolds commanding the First Army Corps

INCIDENTS 191

It will be observed that our division lost more than both the others added together.*

There are some incidents that occurred during the battle that are worth relating. When we lay under a terrific shelling, prior to the charge, Private John A. Camp, Company A, Eleventh Reserves, was killed in the rear of our regiment, and General Meade, through some queer fancy, ordered one of our officers to have him buried. A grave was dug with bayonets and hands, and wrapping the soldier in his blanket he was laid in his honorable grave, while the shells were singing his requiem over head. Nearly eighty dollars was found upon his person, which was turned over to the officer commanding his company.

Young Charles Upjohn, Company K, captured the Nineteenth Georgia's flag, but the Captain of Camp's company unjustly and ungenerously took it from him, and claimed the honor himself.

A boy of about fifteen shot a Union soldier, and dropping his rifle, ran, but was pursued by two men, who were on the point of bayonetting him, when an officer interfered and saved his life. It was some time before the boy could comprehend what the intention of the officer was, and so thoroughly convinced was he that the Yankees would kill him, that he followed the officer through the hottest portion of the battle, preferring to run his risk with him, than to trusting himself with anyone else.

An amusing incident occurred during the charge. A captain of the regiment received a slight wound on his knee, and down he went to the ground, but fortunately a stretcher was near, and he was lifted helplessly upon it, and started for the rear. They had not proceeded far, with their precious charge, before a shell exploded in close proximity, when the wounded officer, springing to his feet, cried out, "Hike out, boy, that's too hot for me," and, suiting his action to his words, ran like a deer, leaving the amazed carriers far in the rear.**

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*See Appendix A.

**No one is more entitled to our pity than he who, having entered the army without consulting his own heart, discovers in the hour of danger, that he is deficient in courage. If he continues in the service, he will assuredly be covered with disgrace; and if the army regulations would permit him to resign, except for disability, the reason will be discovered, whatever pains he may take to conceal it; thus in either case he will find himself exposed to the derision and contempt of his comrades. A clergyman may impose upon the world by the exterior of gravity, and may feign a piety which he does not feel, but the coward cannot long maintain with success that of bravery, for the trial is too severe.

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Color Sergeant William Derr, who was as brave a boy as ever wore a blue coat, was shot on the plateau as we were crossing the fence. Colonel McCandless ordered a couple of men to carry him to the rear, but he refused to permit them, telling them to "take the flag and go on."

Our flagstaff was cut in two, by a round shot, when we were lying down. The boys, jumping to their feet, gave three cheers and then laid down again.

Dr. Donnelly having been detailed to division field hospital, Dr. Coleman was left in charge of our regiment, and before night all our wounded men were collected together in one house, where they received all the kindness that could be bestowed upon them. Coffee and gruel was soon furnished them, and hardly a groan escaped their lips.

Everything passed off quietly through the night, and the next day, although we were under arms several times, and cannonading continued off and on all day. Colonel William Sinclair, having been severely wounded, the command of our brigade devolved upon Colonel McCandless, and Captain McDonough having received an injury in his eye the day before, Captain Mealey took command of the regiment.

On Saturday night, General Burnside determined upon the insane renewal of the assault upon the works in the rear of Fredericksburg, on the following morning, and the column of attack was formed, but through the urgent solicitation of General Sumner, who represented that he did not know of any general officer who approved it, he countermanded the order. Through Sunday night there was considerable picket firing, and on Monday a flag of truce was agreed upon, to bring off the wounded and bury the dead, for which purpose details were made from the various regiments.

On Monday night, the 15th, soon after dark, we were got under arms, and leaving our camp fires brightly burning, moved slowly and noiseless towards the river, which we crossed on muffled pontoons, and moved back about a mile. The crossing on the right was soon afterwards commenced, and by morning the whole army was safely over, without the loss of a man or a gun. A more complete or successful evacuation of a position had not been made during the war.

The battle of Fredericksburg was lost, the bright hopes of the Nation and the army were blasted, and the victory that was within our grasp was gone forever. Let us review briefly some of the causes of it. On the 17th of November, General Sumner arrived at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, which at that time was garrisoned by about five hundred Confederate troops. The General expected to find the

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pontoons there when he arrived, or very soon afterwards. If such had been the case, he would have seized the crest in the rear of the

town, and the enemy would have been forced to have given battle at some other point nearer Richmond. The pontoons did not arrive for over three weeks afterwards, thus enabling the enemy to concentrate his forces and to fortify his extraordinarily strong position.

If General Burnside had kept himself properly posted as to the whereabouts of the pontoons, and had not advanced on Fredericksburg, thereby divulging to the enemy his plan of campaign, until the time of their arrival, and had made feint movements towards Culpeper, he might have taken the enemy by surprise at Fredericksburg, and have accomplished the same end.

It has been shown if General Franklin had properly supported Meade's charge, a victory was almost certain to have resulted to our arms.

While these faults are apparent on our side, it is equally clear that the enemy did not make proper use of his victory. If he had set fire to Fredericksburg, at any time between the close of the battle on the 13th and the night of the 15th, and have opened with all his guns and made a grand charge with his infantry, the result must have been most fearful to the Union army.

The Union force upon the south side of the river was about one hundred thousand men, not more than fifty thousand of whom were engaged in battle. The Confederate forces have been variously estimated at from one hundred to two hundred thousand men, but probably eighty-five thousand is nearer the mark. The Union army never went into battle in better spirits than they did that day, they being confident of victory and believing it would be the last great battle of the war.