CHAPTER XIV

 

 

CHANGE OF BASE • MARCH TO THE JAMES RIVER • BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM • BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION • A NIGHT ON PICKET • BATTLE OF GLENDALE • THE RIVER REACHED

 

WHILE the battle of Gaines' Mills or Chickahominy was progressing on the left bank of the river, the enemy were not idle on the right bank, they having a large force between our left wing and Rich­mond showing their numerical superiority. Sharp musketry and artillery fighting took place there, along nearly the whole of the line, which was threatened by such heavy masses that the corps commanders deemed their forces were smaller than were adequate to the emergency. Therefore, to have sent more reinforcements to Porter would have imperilled the movement across the Peninsula. After the battle it was necessary to unite the two wings of the army which could have been done on either bank of the river, but if it had been on the left bank, although our united force would have defeated the enemy and have marched to White House, as they held the roads leading there, our supply trains could not have been sent in advance of the army, but would have had to follow us, and the guarding of these trains would have seriously embarrassed our operations in battle. We would have been immediately followed by the enemy on the Richmond side of the river, who would have operated on our rear, and if we had been defeated, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House and probably to Fort Monroe; and, as both our flanks and rear would then have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the army, might have been lost. The enemy anticipated this movement on our part and were prepared to take advantage of it, but they were disappointed. When our army was concentrated on the Richmond side of the Chickahominy, and a large portion of the enemy were drawn away and separated from them by the river, we could have marched directly upon the city with very reasonable hopes of capturing it, but as the amount of rations we had with us was very limited and the

 

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enemy could at any time have served our communications with the supply depot at the White House, our victory might have been turned into disaster. It is therefore clear that the movements of General McClellan were dictated by sound military judgment.

During the day, rations, of which we were greatly in need, as some of the men had been forty-eight hours without food, were received and issued, but as we had left every thing in our camp near Mechanicsville, which was subsequently burnt by order of General McCall, we had no haversacks. However, as soldiers are never at a loss for ways and means, they substituted the extremities of their shirts which answered most admirably. The same day our most efficient Quartermaster, Dr. Chas. F. Hoyt, was promoted Captain and Commissary of Subsistence of the brigade vice Captain Jas. B. Clow.

We remained on an open field under a broiling sun during the 28th, which really afforded but indifferent rest, as we could not sleep, except as Montezuma on his bed of roses, and at nine o'clock that night, during a drenching rain, we moved off towards White Oak Creek. Our division took with it Hunt's Reserve Artillery, consisting of thirteen batteries, which with our own trains extended the column many miles in length, and as our flanks were constantly exposed to attacks, the Third Brigade was placed by regiments between the batteries, to afford them support.

Our movement, owing to narrow and bad roads, was necessarily slow, and all night long we toiled through dark woods and swamps unable to see but a few feet on either side of us. While thus moving, one of the wagon guard of the Fourth Reserve, stepped into the woods a little way and his musket being accidentally discharged he was mistaken for a foe, and a number of shots fired at him. This frightening some of the teams, they dashed in among us, which, with the unexplained firing, for a time created considerable excitement.

About daybreak we reached Savage's Station, on the York River and Richmond Railroad, where we found hundreds of wagons and ambulances almost choking the roads and covering the fields in every direction. Here were collected vast piles of commissary and quartermaster's stores, where were opened and the men allowed to take whatever they wanted. We also found here a large number of wounded of the preceding battles, and among them were our own, many of whom were subsequently taken prisoners. The boys went to see them and did all they could for them, improvising crutches for such as could hobble off, and giving water and money to those who had to remain. There was also a large amount of ammunition here which was later in the day loaded on twelve cars and with an engine run into the Chickahominy, a fuse being attached, and so well timed

 

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as to blow the whole up at the proper instant. Moving on past the station, we met a large number of prisoners captured during the battles, and about noon we crossed White Oak Creek Bridge, some distance beyond which General McCall was ordered to place his division in position to repel any attack by the enemy from the direction of Richmond. It was here we learned that General McClellan had caused to be read to the army a complimentary return of thanks to the Pennsylvania Reserves for their conduct at Mechanicsville, in defeating and holding a vastly superior force in check, until he could perfect his arrangements for the withdrawal from the left bank of the river.

Before proceeding further, we will detail the general events of the day. The essential operation was the passage of our trains across the swamp, and their protection against attack from the direction of Richmond, and the establishment of our communication with the gunboats on James River. For this purpose the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and the division of Smith were ordered to an interior line, with their right resting on Savage's Station.

 

BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM, June 29th - General Sumner evacuated his works at Fair Oaks at daylight, and marched his com­mand to Orchard Station, halting at Allen's field, between Orchard and Savage Stations. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the railroad, facing towards Richmond, Richardson holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's corps. The first line of Richardson's division was held by General French; General Caldwell supporting the second. A log building in front of Richardson's division was held by Colonel Brook with the Fifty-Third Pennsylvania volunteers, with Hazard's battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little in the rear.

At nine o'clock A.M., the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooks. Captain Hazard's battery, and Pettit's battery, which afterwards replaced it, were served with great effect, while the Fifty-Third Pennsylvania Volunteers kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the attack three times, but were as often repulsed.

 

BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION, June 29th - During the morning, General Franklin hearing that the enemy, after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force,

 

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and advancing towards Savage's Station, moved Smith's division to that point, and communicated the intelligence to General Sumner. A little after noon, General Sumner reached the station, and united his troops with those of Franklin, and assumed command. The troops were posted in line of battle, in the large open field to the left of the railroad, fronting Richmond, the left resting on the edge of the woods, and the right extending down to the railroad. General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left of the field, where he did excellent service. General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on the right and front. About four in the afternoon, the enemy advance upon the Williamsburgh Road and commenced the attack in large force. They were gallantly met by General Burns' brigade, supported and reinforced by the reserve, and the Sixty-Ninth New York Volunteers and Hazard's and Pettit's batteries. The other batteries were also brought into play, and the battle, which was fought with great obstinacy until nearly nine o'clock at night, terminated in the enemy being driven from the field.

Our division remained in its position on high open ground in the hot sun until four o'clock, when we were ordered to proceed to the Quaker Road crossing of the New Market Road, and take a position to repel any attack from Richmond. The object of this movement was to cover the Turkey Bridge Road, leading to the James River, along which trains were moving all night. On our march the road was nearly blocked up with innumerable wagon trains and artillery, besides a drove of twenty-five hundred cattle, through which we wound our way, and arrived at the designated point about six o'clock. We halted on Nelson's farm, the battlefield of the next day, and where a sharp skirmish had taken place with the enemy's cavalry early in the morning, showing that their efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our progress to the river. General McCall made his headquarters at the farm house during the night.

Leaving the Second and Third Brigades in reserve, at dark our brigade and a battery of artillery, under the command of Colonel Simmons, silently moved off to the front, about a mile, crossing a small creek and turning to the left through a deep woods, where we were posted on picket, on a byroad. The night was intensely dark, and we were unable to see but a short distance from us. The men were laid down on the edge of the road with orders for no one to speak or sleep, but to be ready to spring into line at an instant's notice. In front of us, at the distance of fifty paces, pickets were posted under command of Lieutenant Clendining. The countersign was   to bare the right arm and raise and lower it twice. When all was the stillness of death, a rapid fire of musketry opened a few

 

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hundred yards in our rear, and we were unable to tell whether it was an attack of the foe, or our friends firing upon one another. We found out afterwards it was our own men.

About the middle of the night, a number of the battery horses got loose, and came dashing down the rear of our line, like a charge of cavalry, and several shots were fired into them in rapid succession. One of the horses being wounded, kept up a most unearthly cry through the night, making the most distressing noise possible to imagine, and the farm dogs far and near were continually barking, indicating the proximity of the foe. In fact, and we strongly suspected it at the time, we were surrounded on all sides by the enemy, who knew our exact position, and had it in their power to cut in pieces or capture us, but they wished to bag the whole division, and were waiting for the arrival of one of their columns in the position assigned to it. Fortunately it was delayed on its march, for which the general commanding was severely censured by his Government. The tedious hours of watching at last passed away, and the welcomed light of day broke in upon us, and with it, we withdrew our line and returned to the field where we halted the preceding afternoon, and which before the setting sun was drenched with our blood.

During the night all the troops fell back and crossed White Oak Swamp, and by five A.M. on the 30th, General French commanding the rearguard, crossed the bridge over the creek and destroyed it. General Keyes, having been ordered to move to the James River, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flank, arrived there in safety early in the morning with all his artillery and baggage. Other troops and long trains had also passed to the left.

 

BATTLE OF CHARLES CITY CROSSROADS OR GLENDALE, June 30th - It being the 30th of June, the regiments were formed for muster, and while this was being gone through with, the pickets commenced exchanging shots, and so close were they to us, that Corporal John Collins, Company H, received a bone wound in his arm, and we had hardly time to get through with the muster before the division was moved a short distance, and assigned its position for the battle.

General McCall was ordered to take up a position on the left of the New Market or Long Bridge Road, near its crossing with the Charles City Road, in front of the Quaker Road leading to Malvern Hill and Turkey Bridge, and to maintain it until the whole of the immense supply trains of the army, then slowly advancing from White Oak Creek, had passed towards James River, and to repel any at-­

 

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tack on it. For this purpose General Meade's brigade was posted on the right, General Seymour's on the left, and Reynold's, now Colonel Simmons', held in reserve. The artillery was placed in front of the line, Randall's on the right, Cooper's and Kern's opposite the centre, and Dietrich and Kennerheim's, German batteries, accidentally with the division, on the left of the line. The Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Colonel Childs, was drawn up on the left and rear, but not being called into action, were subsequently ordered to fall back.

The field was a large open plain, with a front of about eight hundred yards, and depth of one thousand yards, intersected on the right by the New Market Road and a narrow strip of timber, parallel to it, and on the left, near the centre, with a marshy woods, near which was Nelson's small farm house. In the rear of the plain was a steep wooded hill running to a broad plateau or table land, across which run the Quaker Road leading to the river. Upon the upper edge of the woods lay the First Brigade in reserve.

On the right of the Reserves was posted Kearney's division, and on the left and somewhat retired was Sumner, and farther to the left, and slightly advanced, was Hooker.

About half past two o'clock PM., the cavalry and infantry pickets of the Reserve were driven in, and soon after the enemy opened a heavy fire of shell upon our centre, under cover of which they sent forward two regiments at different points to feel the line. These were driven back, one by the Third Regiment, Colonel Sickel, and the other by the Seventh Regiment, Colonel Harvey.

Our division being too small to occupy the plain, both our flanks were exposed, and soon after a furious attack was made on the left by a heavy column of infantry. This advance was made under cover of a terrific artillery fire, and was gallantly met and driven back with great slaughter, and over two hundred prisoners taken. The "Bucktails," Major Stone, at this time were sent to the left and posted in the marsh woods, the First, Colonel Roberts, was sent to support Kern's battery, the Fifth, Lieutenant-Colonel Fisher, and the Eighth, Colonel Hays, were ordered forward to the support of the left centre, and the last regiment of the reserve, the Second, Lieutenant-Colo­nel McCandless, was ordered to the left front.

In anticipation of this order we had been advanced down the hill to near the edge of the woods, where the cannoneers of a section of a Dutch battery belonging to Porter's corps and assigned that day to the Reserves, having cut their traces, came dashing through our regiment, trampling several men to the ground and breaking the line. Their guns were abandoned in the plain before us, but the regiment advanced with loud cheers and swept across the field under a

 

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murderous fire of round shot and shell, and reaching a point near Nelson's house, and immediately on the right of the marsh woods, were laid down under a slight elevation of the ground. Here we were joined by a detachment of the Twelfth, under Adjutant McMurtrie, who were placed on our left.

The battle was now raging with terrific fury, a perfect storm of shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads. As the gallant Seymour sat unmoved upon his horse in our rear, and saw the restiveness of the boys to advance, he said to them, "Lay down Second, lay down and go to sleep, I will wake you up when I want you." "Come and take a nap with us, General," replied the boys. The foe being heavily reinforced, were steadily advancing, and the regiments that had driven them back with such gallantry had become somewhat disordered by the very impetuosity of the charge, and had not time fully to reform, and they in their turn were forced back, passing to our right. The Fifth and Eighth in the mean time had joined us on the right, and when the foe had arrived within fifty yards of us, Seymour cried out, "Up and at them," and rising we poured in a murderous fire that caused them to stagger and reel. With loud cheers we rushed upon them with the bayonet, and one of those desperate hand-to-hand struggles ensued that are seldom witnessed in war. The two hostile flags were surging over the struggling mass a few feet from each other, and around them was poured out the best blood of Pennsylvania and Virginia. The struggle was a short but desperate one. Already had Major Woodward, Captains Smith and Neide, and Lieutenants Fletcher and Nightingale, and many other gallant spirits fallen, and the ground was crimsoned with their blood. In vain the wounded boys, who lay thick and near, urged on their com­rades, but the enemy in crushing masses poured in around us, and with impetuous fury charged, to wrench from our hands the glorious banner that flaunted over our heads.

Overpowered, but with our banner and our honor unsullied, we were swept from the field. General Meade was borne off wounded, the heroic Simmons who commanded our brigade, and Biddle, the Adjutant-General of the division, were mortally wounded, and a host of brave officers and men of the brigade lay around them. As we retreated across the plain before us and up through the woods, the fire of hell was let loose upon us, the shells and canister tearing up the ground in deep furrows, or rushing, shrieking and hissing through the air, rending the very vault of heaven.

On the plateau in the rear of the woods, the "Bucktails," Sec­ond, Fifth and Tenth Regiments were rallied by their respective com­manders, and formed in line to the right of Sumner, and with the

 

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artillery that was playing over their heads succeeded in checking the further progress of the foe, and advancing, drove them back and recovered the ground lost. Meanwhile a portion of the Twelfth Regi­ment, with detachments of the Fifth, Eighth and Tenth, who were carrying prisoners to the rear, retreated to the left on a byroad be­tween Sumner and Hooker, followed closely by the enemy, who suddenly and unexpectedly coming upon these fresh troops, for neither had hitherto been engaged, soon recoiled, and were driven over upon our centre.

While this was going on the left, the centre and right of the Reserve were also hotly engaged, and so graphically is the opera­tions of these portions of the line described by General McCall, in his official report of the battle, that we copy it verbatim.

        "It must not be imagined that the enemy was inactive along the centre and right of my line during all this time. Cooper's and Kern's batteries, in front of the centre, were boldly charged upon, each time a regiment dashing up to within forty or fifty yards. They were then hurled back by a storm of canister and the deliberate fire of the First Regiment, Colonel Roberts, whom I had placed immediately in the rear of Kern's, and the Ninth Regiment, Colonel Jackson, in the rear of Cooper's. The contest was severe, and put the steadiness of these regiments to the test; both suffered heavy loss, but particularly the First Regiment, whose gallant Lieutenant-Colonel (McIntire) was severely wounded.

"Some time after this, the most determined charge of the day was made upon Randall's battery, by a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, without order, but with a wild recklessness that I never saw equalled. Somewhat similar charges had, as I have stated, been previously made on Cooper's and on Kern's batteries by single regiments without success, the Confederates having been driven back with heavy loss. A like result appears to have been anticipated by Randall's company; and the Fourth Regiment (as was subsequently reported to me) was requested not to advance between the guns as I had ordered, as it interfered with the cannoneers, but to let the battery deal with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt, I am sat­isfied, his ability to repel the attack, and his guns fairly opened lanes in the advancing host. These gaps were, however, immediately closed, and the enemy came on, with arms trailed, at a run, to the very muzzles of his guns, where they pistoled or bayoneted the cannoneers. Two guns were limbered, and were in the act of wheeling to the rear when the horses were shot, the guns were both overturned, and presented one confused heap of men, horse and carriages. Over all these the men of the Eleventh Alabama Regiment dashed in, a per-

 

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fect torrent of men, and I am sorry to say, the greater part of the Fourth Regiment gave way. The left company (Captain Conrad) of that regiment, however, stood its ground, and with some fifty or eighty men of other companies met the Alabamians.

"I had ridden into the regiment and endeavored to check them; but, as is seen, with only partial success. It was here, however, my fortune to witness between those of my men who stood their ground and the Rebels who advanced, one of the fiercest bayonet fights that perhaps ever occurred on this continent. Bayonets were crossed and locked in the struggle; bayonet wounds were freely given and re­ceived. I saw skulls crushed by the heavy blow of the butt of the musket, and, in short, the desperate thrusts and parries of a life and death encounter, proving indeed that Greek had met Greek when the Alabama boys fell upon the sons of Pennsylvania.

"My last reserve regiment I had previously sent to support Coo­per, and I had not now a man to bring forward. My men were bodily borne off the ground by superior numbers. A thick wood was immediately in the rear, and the Confederates did not follow my men into the thicket. It was at this moment, on witnessing the scene I have described that I bitterly felt that my division ought to have been reinforced.

"My force had been reduced, by the battles of the 26th and 27th, to less than six thousand, and on this occasion I had to contend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, estimated among the strongest and best of the Confederate army, and numbering that day from eighteen to twenty thousand.

"The centre was at this time still engaged and I could not withdraw any troops from it.

"The Alabama troops did not attempt to enfilade my line, and leaving the guns on the ground, (the horses having, during the fight, been either killed or dispersed,) they retired to the woods on my right.

"It was now near sunset and the heat of battle had greatly subsided. I now rode to the rear to rally and collect the stragglers. At a short distance I came upon two regiments of Kearney's division. I requested them to move forward, but was informed their orders were to await the arrival of General Kearney. I moved on and set some officers at work to form the stragglers of my own regiments into line. On my return I found General Kearney. He put his regiments in motion and moved to the front and on the right of my line.

"As he rode away he said to me, `If you can bring forward an­other line in a few minutes we can stop them.' By this time the sun had set, and the desultory firing was confined to the extreme right.

 

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"In a short time Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, Third Regiment, came up and reported to me that he had collected about five hundred men, with whom he was then advancing. I rode on with him at the head of the column in a direction to bring this force up on Kearney's left.

"On arriving near the ground where Randall's battery stood, I halted Thompson's command, wishing to ascertain whether any of my men were still in front of me. I had left Captain Conrad's com­pany about one hundred yards in advance, but it was now so dark I could scarcely distinguish a man at ten paces. The battle, in fact, was now over; the firing on the left and centre had ceased, and there was only a desultory firing between Kearney's men and the enemy, some distance to the right. I rode forward to look for Conrad, and on the ground where I left him I rode into the enemy's picket, the Forty­Seventh Virginia, Colonel Mayo, resting under some trees, and before I knew in whose presence I was, I was taken prisoner. Unfor­tunately for myself I had no staff officer with me, or I should have sent him forward to examine the ground, instead of going myself; but my Adjutant General, the valiant Captain Henry J. Biddle, had been mortally wounded; Lieutenant Scheetz had his horse killed, and was injured by the fall; my Chief of Ordnance, the gallant Beatty, had been severely wounded at my side, and only left me when I had insisted on his doing so; my excellent Orderly, Sergeant Simeon Dunn, Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry, was also fatally wounded at my side, and out of my escort of a captain and twenty men of the Fourth Cavalry, but one corporal (the brave King) and one private remained with me; these two men were made prisoners with myself. About the time I was taken prisoner the desultory firing on my right died away."

The Reserves remained on the field during the night, and the rear guard withdrew from it about three o'clock the next morning, rejoining McClellan at Malvern Hill, after every gun and wagon of the Army of the Potomac had passed safely to the river.*

The loss of the division in killed, wounded and prisoners, in the three battles of the 26th, 27th and 30th of June, was three thousand one hundred and eighty, out of about seven thousand who went into the battle of Mechanicsville. The trophies of the day were three stands of colors captured and nearly three hundred prisoners.

The command of the division now devolved upon General Seymour, and of our brigade upon Colonel Hays, of the Eighth Reserve.

___________________________________________________________________________

* See Appendix A.

 

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In regard to this battle, justice and truth requires that notice be taken of the report of General Hooker, of the part taken by his division in it, as published in 'Wilkes' Spirit of the Times," of No­vember 1st, 1862. In this report that officer states, "the whole of McCall's division was completely routed," &c. This sweeping asser­tion has always been regarded by every officer and man of the divi­sion as exhibiting a misapprehension of facts that was perfectly incomprehensible, and evidence has since been produced to show that it was not in accordance with facts.

Besides the official report of General McCall, which is a suffi­cient refutation of the charge, we have his testimony before "the Joint Committee of the Conduct on the War," in which he states:

"I have no desire to treat lightly the reverses on both flanks on my division in this hard-fought field; they were the almost inevi­table results of greatly superior numbers, impelled on those points with great impetuosity; but the Pennsylvania Reserves as a divi­sion, although terribly shattered, were never `routed'; they main­tained their ground with these exceptions, for three hours against thrice their numbers, in, I believe, the hardest fought and bloodiest battle in which they ever have been engaged, and in this opinion I am sustained by most of those officers, if not all, with whom I have conversed on the subject.

Had my division been routed, the march of the Federal army would certainly have been seriously interrupted by Lee forcing his masses into the interval. (See General Porter's statement herewith.) When I was surrounded and taken prisoner, I was conducted at once to Lee's headquarters. Here Longstreet told me they had seventy thousand men bearing on that point, all of whom would arrive be­fore midnight; and had he succeeded in forcing McClellan's column of march, they would have been thrust in between the right and left wings of the Federal army. Now, under this very probable contin­gency had I not held my position (see General Porter's report here­with) the state of affairs in the left wing of McClellan's army would have been critical indeed; but Lee was checked (as Longstreet ad­mitted) by my division (see Surgeon Marsh's report herewith), and the divisions in the rear, together with the Pennsylvania Reserves and others, moved on during the night, and joined McClellan at Malvern Hill before daylight. What share my division had in effect­ing this happy result let the country judge."

General Porter writing to General McCall from Washington, October 20th, 1862, says: "Had not McCall held his place on New Market Road, June 20th, that line of march of the (Federal) army would have been cut by the enemy."

 

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General Meade, to the same, from camp, near Warrenton, Vir­ginia, under date of November 7th, 1862, writes: *** "It was only the stubborn resistance offered by our division (the Pennsylvania Reserves), prolonging the contest till after dark, and checking till that time the advance of the enemy, that enabled the concentration, during the night, of the whole army on James River, which saved it."

Colonel Roy Stone, One Hundred and Forty-Ninth Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, who commanded the "Bucktails," at New Market Crossroads, writes:

"Meantime the enemy (recoiling from Sumner and Hooker) turned to the left and was repulsed by your centre. About sunset I was ordered to the right, and went directly to the ground occupied by me when the action commenced, and I can bear witness that the ground held by the centre of your division when the battle opened, was held by your troops in the face of a large force of the enemy long after dark; and so far as my observation extended, the only regi­ments that broke in the early part of the fight were those that had become disordered by their own charge into the enemy's line."

Colonel Hays, Eighth Reserves, writes: *** "I ordered the line to advance and take a position in a field immediately in front of where General Seymour had been in the commencement of the ac­tion. We lay till four o'clock, the next morning, and so near the en­emy that we could hear the voices of officers giving orders."

Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, commanding Tenth Reserves, writes: *** "The enemy being checked in these woods, the regiment again formed in line, with others of the Reserves who were rallied at this point, and moved forward to within a hundred yards of the ground it held at the beginning of the battle. Here it remained in line of battle, till 11 o'clock at night, when it was ordered to move to Malvern Hill."

Surgeon N. F. Marsh, Fourth Pennsylvania cavalry, writes:

 

"WASHINGTON, November 25th, 1862 - General: -After the battle of the 30th of June, I remained at `Willis' Church, with a large number of our wounded. The next morning I was directed by Gen­eral Jackson (Stonewall) to report to General Lee. I found General Lee in company with General Longstreet, Magruder and Hill, on the New Market Road. I addressed General Lee and informed him that I was a Federal surgeon, and had remained to care for our wounded, and wished protection and supplies for our men. He prom­ised supplies, and directed General Longstreet to write the neces­sary permit. At the time I approached they were discussing the battle of the previous day, being then on the ground. General Longstreet

 

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asked me if I was present. I replied I was. He asked what troops were engaged. I replied I only knew the division I was connected with - McCall's - which fought just where we then were. General Longstreet said, `Well, McCall is safe in Richmond; but if his divi­sion had not offered the stubborn resistance it did on this road, we would have captured your whole army. Never mind, we'll do it yet.'

"On Thursday, 3d July, General Roger A. Pryor came into the Church (hospital), and we had a long conversation. He repeated in substance what General Longstreet said, and spoke in the highest terms of the `pluck displayed by McCall's Pennsylvania troops.'

"The interest I felt in the Reserve Corps made me careful to remember these acknowledgments of the rebel generals." Surgeon James R. Riley, of the One Hundred and Twenty-Sev­enth Pennsylvania Volunteers writes:

"Washington, January 16, 1864 - GENERAL: - On the 18th of December, 1862, I was engaged dressing the stump, having previ­ously amputated the leg of Captain_________(name not recollected), of the Twelfth Mississippi Regiment, who had been wounded at the battle of Fredericksburg, when he asked me what corps I belonged to, I replied the Pennsylvania Reserves. He said he had been in sev­enteen battles, and in all those on the Peninsula; that if the Penn­sylvania Reserves had not fought so well at Mechanicsville, where they had their best troops, and again at New Market Crossroads, the Confederates would have captured McClellan's army."

It is not necessary to dwell longer upon this subject, as the above adduced testimony sets at rest the matter beyond all controversy.

While the battle of Charles City Crossroads was progressing, the enemy were attempting to force a passage of White Oak Swamp which was held by General Franklin. Between twelve and one o'clock they opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson, and Naglee's brigades at this bridge. This artillery fire was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suffered severely. Captain Ayres directed the artillery with great effect. Hazzard's bat­tery, after losing many cannoneers, and the Captain being mortally wounded, was compelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's bat­tery, which partially silenced the enemy's guns.

General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak Swamp.

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached Malvern Hill about four o'clock that afternoon. About this time the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, which

 

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was posted on the left, holding the river road to Richmond, and at five o'clock advanced in large force against his left flank, posting

artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought to bear on the enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren. The gunboats rendered most efficient aid during the attack.

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