Imhof, John D. "Two Roads to Gettysburg: Thomas Leiper Kane and the 13th Pennsylvania Reserves."  Gettysburg Magazine 9 (Jul 1993): pp.53-60

"Come forward Americans who are not degenerate from the spirit of '76."[1] These words, affixed to a handbill dated April 17, 1861 summoned to arms a band of warriors who would carve a lasting niche in the annals of the American Civil War: the 13th Pennsylvania Reserves. Although they were never an ostentatious unit, the 13th Pennsylvania served with distinction in virtually every major campaign in the Eastern theatre of war. Their tenacity and exceptional skills as marksmen would, after the war, qualify them as one of Col.William Fox's three hundred fighting regiments, and their exploits would consecrate them as heroes in their hometowns . [2]
    
The man who devoted his energies to the formation and training of this exceptional fighting unit seems to have been peculiarly suited to the task at hand. Thomas Leiper Kane was born in Philadelphia on January 27, 1822, to a family whose patriot ties ran deep. His paternal great grandfather was Gen. Robert VanRenssalaer and his maternal grandfather was Maj. Thomas Leiper, both early American patriots. John Kane, Thomas's father, was a man of varied interests and an unflinching belief in honorable public service. During his tenure as a District Court Judge, Mr. Kane introduced reforms which resulted in a loss of personal income amounting to $2,500 per year.[3] The Kanes seem to have been a family that believed in service to one's fellow man regardless of the personal cost.
     A highly developed sense of adventure also ran in Thomas Kane's immediate family, and in him person ally. His brother, Dr. Elisha Kent Kane, had, during the 1850s, been a famous arctic explorer and author. At one point he had spent nearly two years stranded in the arctic, his ship surrounded by ice. Thomas himself had spent the late 1840s and much of the 1850s in a continuing effort to assist the beleaguered Mormon sect. His efforts on their behalf had allowed them to avoid violent confrontation with the U.S. government, and had earned him the unending respect of members of the Mormon church. Today, though Kane never joined the Mormon church himself, a statue dedicated to him is one of only two to be found in the rotunda of the Utah State House in Salt Lake City. [4]
     The year 1861 found Kane in the wilds of northcentral Pennsylvania, managing his father's interests in that region, promoting railroad and mining interests for the McKean and Elk Land Improvement Company. However, on April 15, 1861, he was home in Philadelphia, taking a break from his duties.[5] On that day, President Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 three-month volunteers to combat a rising rebellion.[6] For a man of Kane's adventuresome spirit, such a call was totally irresistible.
     Kane immediately dispatched a telegram to Pennsylvania Governor Andrew G. Curtin, offering to raise a regiment in the mountainous regions of McKean and Elk counties. By April 17, Kane had arrived in Smethport, Pennsylvania, and had begun recruiting an effort which would meet with very good results, as the news of the April 12 attack on Fort Sumter was just then reaching the Smethport area.[7]
     Kane concentrated his recruiting efforts on the counties of McKean, Elk and Cameron, personally attending to much of the speech-making and organization. He wanted recruits who were "used to taking care of themselves, accustomed to handling guns, familiar with the atmosphere of the forests, dogged and determined in character and possessed of strong, rugged physiques through their outdoor existence.[8] The lumbermen of  this region answered Kane's call with enthusiasm. From first to last, at least 1,165 men entered the regiment.[9]
     The new recruits proved to be a colorful lot-one of their members had earned them their nickname before they had fully finished training. The McKean County company was assembling near the courthouse in Smethport when a new recruit named James Landregan noticed a deer hanging in a butcher shop across the street. Crossing the street, Landregan removed the deer's tail and attached it to his hat. When Kane noticed the man, he immediately decided that his new regiment would be called the "Bucktails." His men liked the idea, and from that point forward all members of the regiment would adorn the side of their hats with deer's tails or with strips of deer hide fashioned in an appropriate shape.[10] Before the war was over, the 13th Pennsylvania would be assigned many official and unofficial designations, but friend and foe alike would always know them as "The Bucktails.[11]
     On April 23, 1861, the McKean County troops departed Smethport and began their long road to Gettysburg, meeting their comrades from Cameron County and Elk County. Here they constructed four large rafts and on the morning of April 27,1861, set off down Sinnemuhonmy Creek and the Susquehanna River for the state capital of Harrisburg, intent on offering their services to Governor Curtin. Attached to the colors which waved on their rafts was the proud bucktail.[12]
     As the Bucktails headed for Harrisburg, state recruiting efforts were going very well-too well in fact. By April 30, the state had already exceeded its quota, and Governor Curtin was scrambling to find a way to use the extra troops, who were arriving day by day. Curtin was a capable man and a great patriot, but the situation in Harrisburg was becoming difficult to control.[13]
     By the time the Bucktails reached Harrisburg on May 4, they had already been informed that the state could accept only two companies of seventy-seven men each. Kane was determined not to send any of his men home, and resolved to stay until a settlement could be found. His men, already loyal to their new commander, vowed to remain in camp until they were accepted into the service of their state and nation.[14]
     Governor Curtin found the solution when he formed the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, a group of thirteen regiments, including one rifle company. Curtin assigned Brig. Gen. Archibald McCall to the task of organizing these commands and recommended that Kane and his three companies form the nucleus of the proposed rifle company. On June 12, after adding several companies from other mountainous areas of the state, the Bucktails had taken the form they would maintain throughout the war.[15]
     Governor Curtin's organization of the Reserve Corps showed incredible foresight. At a point when most people still believed that the war would be a ninety-day affair, Curtin seemed to realize that the national government would soon need many more able-bodied men. Kane and his men would soon embark on a road which would take them through some of the bloodiest days of the Civil War. At the June 6,1862, Battle of Harrisonburg, Virginia, the Bucktails would face down elements of Stonewall Jackson's Confederate army, led by one of his favorite lieutenants, Brig. Gen. Turner Ashby. Though outnumbered by nearly five to one, and eventually driven back, the Bucktails inflicted terrible casualties, including General Ashby. Kane heard Maj. Gen. Richard Ewell, the Confederate division commander, deride one of his commanders for claiming victory against such a small force. Ewell, impressed by the 13th Pennsylvania's stamina, even allowed the Confederate 1st Maryland to attach a captured bucktail to their regimental colors as an honor for distinguished service in battle.[16]
     Kane was himself wounded, captured, and subsequently imprisoned following the battle.[17] He refused parole until August 18, 1862, when the ill health of a companion forced him to agree to a parole. Kane returned to his regiment immediately.[18]
     Colonel Kane's remaining time with the Bucktails grew painfully short. His conspicuous bravery at the battles of Catlett's Station and Second Bull Run (Manassas) earned Kane a promotion to brigadier general on Sept. 7, 1862. The promotion was by all standards well deserved, but its acceptance meant that Kane would have to leave his beloved men and assume command of a brigade. With reluctance, Kane chose to move on. He assumed command of the Second Brigade, Second Division of the Twelfth Army Corps, and from that point on, he and his Bucktails would travel different roads to Gettysburg.[19]
     Although the Bucktails were without the only regimental leader they had ever known, they would not lack for effective leadership. Throughout the remainder of the 13th Pennsylvania's career, they would know such men on the regimental, brigade and division levels as Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, Maj. Gen. Samuel Crawford, Col. Hugh McNeil, Col. William McCandless, and Col. Charles Taylor. These men provided the inspiration and guidance which lead the Bucktails to their fine service record, but not all of them would live to enjoy the glory.
     Col. Hugh McNeil was destined to be one of the first men killed at the titanic Battle of Antietam. McNeil was leading the Bucktails, along with other units of the
Pennsylvania Reserves, through the East Woods on the eve of the battle when he was struck and killed by the bullet of an enemy sniper.[20]  His death marked a low point for the regiment. Many of the original members had been killed, wounded, or transferred, and were no longer with the Bucktails. The regiment could muster just over two hundred effectives.[21] Some of those who had been transferred had left to form the new Pennsylvania "Bucktail Brigade," the brain child of Maj. Roy Stone, an original member of the 13th Pennsylvania. Stone left in July of 1862 to begin his recruiting, and successfully raised two regiments, the 149th and 150th Pennsylvania. Although these regiments would eventually establish themselves as exceptional fighting units, their adoption of the bucktail caused great resentment among the men of the 13th Pennsylvania, who felt that these "New Bucktails" had not earned the right to the symbol the 13th had paid for in blood at Antietam .[22] While some men's opinions would change after the Battle of Gettysburg, there were many who would carry these ill-feelings to their graves.
     One of the high points of the Bucktails career would occur in the midst of a disastrous Union defeat. While the Union right at Fredericksburg was being slaughtered at Marye's and Willis's heights in front of the stone wall, the Union left, in particular General Meade's Pennsylvania Reserve Division, was driving Confederate forces under A. P. Hill from their breastworks. The reserves could not hold their gains because of a lack of reinforcements, but the mere fact that they had driven three brigades of Hill's division of Jackson's corps for a short time provided them a bright spot in an otherwise dismal campaign.[23]
     General Kane and his brigade were not engaged at Fredericksburg, but Kane was destined to witness what would become Gen. Robert E. Lee's most brilliant victory: the Battle of Chancellorsville. Kane did survive the struggle, but the effects of multiple wounds and the rigorous campaigning began to damage his health. Immediately after the battle, Kane was sent to Baltimore to recover from pneumonia, an affliction which would plague him often during the war.[24]
     The Bucktails, assigned to the defense of Washington during the Chancellorsville campaign, had missed the battle.[25] However, events were conspiring to ensure they would not be absent when the next great battle erupted. June of 1863 was full of change and confusion for the Army of the Potomac. While Union forces attempted to regroup after the debacle at Chancellorsville, it became apparent that Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia were on the move again, and seemed to be heading north. Meanwhile, the Union leadership was in disarray. Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac, wanted o cross the Rappahannock, seize the heights beyond, and advance on Richmond. The Lincoln administration, having lost confidence in Hooker, vetoed his bold proposal.[26]
Clearly, something had to give, but as the month drew to an end no one knew what that something might be.
     June 28, 1863, would bring the answer the Union troops had been awaiting. On that date, General Hooker was replaced as commander by Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, then the commander of the Union Fifth Corps, of which the Bucktails were a part. [27]
While the Bucktails must have been proud of their former chief, their overall reaction was not exactly enthusiastic. They considered Meade capable, but uninspiring, and many hoped that President Lincoln would reappoint Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan.[28] Another rumor circulated that Maj. Gen. John Reynolds had refused the promotion unless he was given a free hand to act.[29] To most of the Bucktails, it appeared Meade was stuck with the job, whether or not he or anyone else liked it.
     News of Meade's appointment reached the Bucktails while they were on their way to a rendezvous with the remainder of the Fifth Corps near Frederick, Maryland. Since Meade had been Fifth Corps commander, it was necessary to replace him immediately. The man chosen was Maj. Gen. George Sykes, another steady but unspectacular career man, who immediately set the Fifth Corps and the Bucktails on the road northward[30] June 30 found the Fifth Corps in the vicinity of Uniontown, Maryland. Muster rolls from that day show that the Bucktails could claim 349 effectives-a number that would be reduced to just 297 by the time the regiment entered battle on July 2.[31] The loss of numbers was not a result of combat, butrather of the summer heat and the brutally long marches. Diary entries from those days indicate that between June 26 and July 1 the regiment covered at least 98 miles in temperatures that often exceeded ninety degrees.[32] As the Bucktails reached the Pennsylvania-Maryland border on July 1, they were as yet unaware of the great battle that had commenced near the small farming community and county seat of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. But as they marched further, a great many rumors reached their anxious ears, rumors that ranged from wishful to fantastic to deeply troubling. One of the first rumors held that General McClellan had assumed command of the Army of the Potomac and would soon arrive with 60,000 reinforcements.[33] Later in the day, it was heard that the ghost of George Washington had been seen riding at the head of the column on a grand white charger. [34] But late in the day, the Bucktails heard the rumor that troubled them most; they heard the Union forces at Gettysburg had been routed with a horrible loss of life and that General Reynolds had been killed in the action. If this were true,
the Bucktails would have lost yet another friend to the cruel fortunes of war.
     General Reynolds was, on July 1, 1863, in command of the left wing of the Union forces and although the 13th Pennsylvania was no longer under his direct command, those upstarts the "New Bucktails" were. Not only were the men of Roy Stone's brigade with Reynolds, but they were heavily engaged near to the point where Reynolds had, in fact, been killed. As the “Old Bucktails” continued on the road to Gettysburg, the "New Bucktails" were fighting near the McPherson farm, paying with their blood for the grudging respect of their forefathers and the right to wear the bucktail.[35]
     Throughout most of this period, General Kane was still recovering from the effects of the pneumonia, which had troubled him since the Chancellorsville Campaign. He was not with his brigade when it began the northward movement, and as he was still too weak to ride a horse, he hired a native Kentuckian to drive him to Gettysburg. While on this journey, Kane and his companion were stopped by men of Maj. Gen. "JEB" Stuart's Confederate cavalry, but escaped, using very convincing Southern accents. Still extremely weak, Kane arrived in time to assume command of his 12th Corps brigade for action on July 2, and to deliver a note to General Meade from the war department.[36]
     The brigade Kane commanded at Gettysburg was composed of the 29th, 109th, and 111th Pennsylvania infantries and, as originally posted, in a reserve position near Powers Hill. Kane's number on hand was quite small, totaling approximately 700 effectives.[37] But they were in a strong defensive position, having been moved to the slopes of Culp's Hill. This natural fortress was further strengthened by the construction of formidable breastworks.[38] Unfortunately for Kane and his men, they would have little opportunity to enjoy this haven in the trees.
     As Kane and his men assumed their position on Culp's Hill, the first elements of the Fifth Corps were arriving via the Baltimore Pike. By the time the Bucktails arrived on the field, sometime around noon on July 2, the corps had been placed in reserve position near Power's Hill.[39] The regiment was part of Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserve Division and a member of William "Buck" McCandless' brigade. As they settled in for what they hoped would be an afternoon's rest, they heard the first confirmation that their old friend General Reynolds was indeed dead
.[40] it came to be that Kane and his old command the 13th Pennsylvania would each be involved in the bloodiest battle of the Civil War. They had been on separate roads since September 7, 1862,'and would fight this battle on opposite ends of the Union line but with similar goals and similar results. Both Kane and the Bucktails would struggle to maintain and secure a flank at Gettysburg; Kane was deployed on the right at Culp's Hill and the Bucktails would enter the action on the far left near Little Round Top and the Devil's Den.
     Action on July 2 commenced near 4 p.m. and proceeded at a frantic pace well into the evening. Union forces were arranged in the now famous fishhook shape, bending around Culp's and Cemetery Hills and then proceeding south along Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top; at least that is what General Meade had in mind. However, as the action opened, the Union left was in a very different form, due to the actions of one man.
     For reasons that have been debated almost non-stop since the battle, Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles, commanding the Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, moved his corps forward and took up a new, longer line along the Emmitsburg Road, in the Peach Orchard, and on Houck's Ridge overlooking Devil's Den. Sickles took this action without Meade's knowledge-by the time Meade learned of the new deployment, it was too late to take any corrective action; Lee's artillery had already engaged
the Third Corps, and the infantry would shortly follow. [41]
     Lee's forces were arrayed in staging positions along Seminary and Warfield ridges, with Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's First Corps occupying the Confederate right. When the order to attack was given, Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood's division swept into the area near Devil's Den and the Round Tops, to be followed shortly by Lafayette McLaws's division, which struck in the Wheatfield and Peach Orchard. Sickles's forward line was soon in a desperate condition and would require immediate reinforcements if there was to be any hope of maintaining their position.
     Portions of the line were temporarily bolstered by the arrival of Brig. Gen. James Barnes's and Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres's divisions of the Fifth Corps and Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell's division of the Second Corps. These forces were fed in wherever the action seemed the hottest, but only two brigades succeeded in holding their original positions: those of Col. Strong Vincent and Brig. Gen. Stephen Weed, who occupied and reinforced the slopes of Little Round Top. The remaining commands would be chopped to pieces while they strove in vain to maintain Sickles's advanced position. All would be forced to retire, and most had suffered terrible casualties.[42]
     The Bucktails spent an unsettled afternoon near Power's Hill with the other members of Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserve Division. They had already seen first Barnes's and then Ayres's divisions move to the west, and must have known that it would be their turn soon. When they did receive their marching orders, they took the Granite School House Lane to the Taneytown Road, where they turned south and entered a small farm lane leading westward over the northern slope of Little Round Top. As they moved to the field the evidence of what was happening just ahead became all too clear; the road was jammed with wounded and frightened men heading for the rear.[43]
     Based on the way they would later deploy, it seems likely the Bucktails were in the rear of the column. When the Reserve Division arrived in the area of Little Round Top, the men were initially placed to the right of Ayres's division, but would soon shift left to fill the gap left by the departure of Col. Sidney Burbank's and Col. Hannibal Day's brigades of U.S. Regulars to the Wheatfield.[44]
     Fisher's Reserve Brigade, composed of the 5th, 9th, 10th, 1 lth, and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, was first in line, but soon received orders to march south to the aid of Vincent's brigade, which was heavily engaged. McCandless then deployed his brigade, along with the 11th Reserves whom Fisher had been ordered to leave behind, in two lines centering on the 11th. The Bucktails deployed on the left of the second or support line and awaited the call to advance.[45] This call would come quickly, as the Confederate brigades of Joseph B. Kershaw, George T. Anderson, Paul J. Semmes and W. T. Wofford were making short work of the Union brigades of Burbank, Day, and Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer.
     Union forces retreating from the Wheatfield were soon rushing up the western slope of Little Round Top, pursued by a disorganized mass of Confederates. As the retreating men cleared the Reserve's front, General Crawford ordered the Reserves to fire. He then gave a brief rallying speech and ordered the Pennsylvania men to fix bayonets and charge. The Reserves rushed down the slope and into what is now called the "Valley of Death," meeting with only minor resistance from the exhausted Confederates.[46] A more intense and concentrated fire from the left near Devil's Den prompted Colonel McCandless to shift the Bucktails and the 2nd Reserves, leaving the Bucktails as the left flank of Crawford's division, moving them close to the Confederate troops, who had shortly before seized Devil's Den. When the Reserves came to a stone wall near the eastern edge of the Wheatfield, they engaged in a brief struggle but soon seized the position.[47]
     On the far left, the Bucktails encountered a force composed of the 1st Texas and 5th Georgia regiments, along with scattered elements of a variety of Confederate brigades.[48] While the Bucktails initially sought the safety of the stone wall, it soon became apparent that an effort would have to be made to clear the woods to their front. A small force was sent forward and was in the process of reconnoitering when the regimental commander, Col. Charles F. Taylor, approached at a brisk pace to inquire why the men were not firing. The men responded that the force was too large, and begged the popular colonel to take cover. At that very moment, a mini6 ball struck Colonel Taylor in the chest, killing him almost instantly.[49]

    
The overall importance of the charge of the Bucktails and the Pennsylvania Reserves has been debated by Gettysburg scholars since the battle ended. Most believe that the Confederate attack had run out of steam and was easily repulsed. Whatever the degree of importance, the action did put an end to any further advances by the Confederates in the Devil's Den-Little Round Top area. Troops from other areas of the field could not make the same claim, in particular those deployed on the slopes of Culp's Hill.
     Kane's brigade had remained in the trenches near the lesser summit of Culp's Hill until about 6 p.m., when orders reached division commander John W. Geary to move his forces to aid the Union left and center, which were threatened by the attacks of Longstreet's and Hill's Confederate corps. Geary proceeded to march Kane's and Col. Charles Candy's brigades toward the Baltimore Pike, leaving the brigade of Brig. Gen. George S. Greene to defend the line alone.[50] What would occur next and over the hours that followed has remained one of the enduring controversies of the battle.
     For reasons that have never been adequately explained, Geary marched his troops directly south on the Baltimore Pike rather than follow the First Division to the scene of the fighting.[51] It was near this point in time that Johnson's Confederate Division of General Ewell's Second Corps struck Culp's Hill and seized the trenches formerly held by Kane's brigade and Ruger's First Division. Greene's brigade, the only Union force in the immediate area, was sorely pressed, but managed to hang on, due in large part to the impressive breastworks and the timely arrival of reinforcements from the First and Eleventh Corps.[52] 
     Kane and his men were still marching southward on the pike when they heard this new fighting to their rear and close by their former position. Unable to determine where his brigade was being lead or the purpose of this movement, Kane ordered his troops to countermarch and return to Culp's Hill.[53] This order was given on his own responsibility and is reminiscent of the bold action taken by Strong Vincent earlier in the day, when he too had marched his brigade without orders from his division commander. 
     The route back to Kane's former position led through the area that is known today as Ario Pardee Field. As Kane's lead regiment, the 29th Pennsylvania, neared the breastworks there, they came under heavy fire from a group they believed to be their own troops. In complete darkness--it was nearly 10 p.m.-Kane could not determine who the forces were or how many he was facing. He ordered his men back and sent to General Greene for a guide to lead them into position via Greene's lines. They formed on Greene's right and settled in for what would prove to be a very short night's rest.[54]

     As a result of the fighting of July 2, 1863, Kane and his former command found themselves in strikingly similar situations. Both were crouched in a defensive position at or near one flank of their army's tenuous defensive line; both had suffered modest casualties and both would see action the next day.
     Action for the Bucktails would involve reclaiming the land lost by Sickles's Corps in the afternoon of July 2. This would occur after Pickett's Charge and following a day spent in brisk skirmishing with the Confederate forces who still held Devil's Den. When the Confederates retreated, late in the afternoon of July 3, the Bucktails moved forward with only modest resistance, advancing toward the Rose Farm along the Emmittsburg Road.[55]
     Kane's brigade would not be so fortunate; the men were destined to witness and participate in some of the most intense action anywhere seen in the battle, or in the war itself. Resumption of the battle for Culp's Hill took place before sunrise on July 3 and raged unabated for the next seven hours. Charge after charge by the Confederate forces resulted in no gain, only piles of dead and wounded along the wooded slopes. Finally, about 10 a.m., a desperate charge was made against the line of Kane's and Greene's brigades. The Confederate 1st Maryland Battalion was destined to come closest to the Union lines, striking directly into Kane's position, but was fated to reap only casualties and a place in Gettysburg folklore.[56]
     In a letter written after the war, General Kane stated that as the Maryland men advanced, their canine mascot was seen bounding among the men, coming at one point among the men of Kane's brigade. After a particularly vicious volley, Kane again saw the dog limping among the fallen on just three legs as if searching for his master. Having apparently found the right man, he licked the dead man's hand and died in a hail of lead. Having seen this touching display of devotion, Kane demanded that the animal be given a proper burial as he was the only "Christian-minded" individual on the field that day.[57]
     General Kane's military career did not extend far beyond Gettysburg. The rigors of warfare had taken a serious toll on his already frail health and he was forced by this health to resign on November 7, 1863. His courageous service was recognized at that point; he was breveted major general, and retired to private life in McKean County, Pennsylvania. He would remain active in the development of this area until his death from the effects of Lobar pneumonia in 1883. He was laid to rest between the stairs of what is now the Kane Memorial Chapel in Kane, Pennsylvania.[58]
     Anyone visiting Kane, Pennsylvania, can stop by the chapel to visit General Kane's grave and to examine the many artifacts which the chapel contains. The chapel is owned and managed by Kane's old friends in the Mormon Church as another tribute to perhaps their greatest non-Mormon friend.
     The Bucktails continued to serve as a distinct command until May 30, 1864, when the regiment was mustered out of federal service, along with most of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps. Those who chose to reenlist, or had unexpired terms, joined either the new 190th and 191st Pennsylvania regiments or their former adversaries in the "New Bucktails." Unfortunately, there remained pitifully few men with the option to go home or re-enlist. Of the original 1,165 enlistees in the 13th Pennsylvania, a total of a least 848 had been killed, wounded, captured, died from sickness, or discharged because of sickness, during a career that extended from Dranesville to North Anna, with a stop-over at Gettysburg.[59] The Bucktails are memorialized at Gettysburg with a modest but appropriate monument on Ayres Avenue in the Rose Woods. The monument depicts a bucktailed rifleman standing stoically with his face toward the enemy. In the woods nearby rests a smaller monument which marks the spot where Colonel Taylor fell on July 2, 1863.
     Other monuments to the Bucktails can be found on the courthouse lawn in Smethport, Pennsylvania, where the regiment originated and in Driftwood, Pennsylvania, from which the regiment rafted to Harrisburg. Route 120, which runs through the mountains of northcentral Pennsylvania, has been renamed the Bucktail Trail.
     Kane and his Bucktails shared a long and torturous road with many branches leading invariably to Gettysburg. Although they fought separately in that great battle and would never again see action together, they were irrevocably bound together by bonds of blood and common affection.


 




[1] Howard Thomson and William H. Rauch, History of the Bucktails, Kane Rifle Regiment of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (Dayton, Morningside Press, 1988), 8.

[2] Ibid., XV.

[4] Thomas L. Taber, Sawmills Among the Derricks (Thomas L. Taber, 1975), 701; The Gettysburg Papers, compiled by Ken Bandy and Florence freeland, Indexed by Margie Riddle Bearss from the collection of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States (Morningside Press, 1986), 827

[5] Taber, 80.

[10] Ibid., 11, 423, 452.  Landregan survived the war and was mustered out with the regiment on June 11, 1864.  He was still living in McKean County as of 1906.

[11] The Bucktails were also known as the

[12] Thomason and Rauch, 12-13

[13] Ibid.,14-15

[14] Ibid., 16-17

[15] Ibid., 17-31

[16] Ibid., 154-160

[17] Ibid., 156

[18] Ibid., 170

[19] Ibid., 210

[20] Ibid., 216

[21] Ibid.,139-140

[22] Ibid., 233-235

[23] Ibid., 33

[24] Ibid., 245

[25] Edward B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign, A Study in Command (Dayton, Morningside Press, revised and reprinted, 1979) 95-96

[26] Ibid.,181.

[27] Ibid., 210

[28] Ibid., 37.

[29] Ibid., 229.

[30] John W. Busey and David G. Martin, Regimental Strengths and Losses at Gettysburg (Highstown, Longstreet House, 1986), 65.

[31] Thomson and Rauch, 261.

[32] Harry W. Pfanz, Gettysburg, the Second Day (Chapel Hill, the Universoty of North Carolina Press, 1987), 52.

[33] Alice Rains Trulock, In the Hands of Providence (Chapel Hill, the University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 125-126

[34] Coddington, 287.

[35] Thomson and Rauch, 33.

[36] Busey and Martin, 95

[37] The Gettysburg Papers, 822.

[38] Coddington, 334.

[39] Ibid., 335

[40] Pfanz, Chapter 7, 124-128. Sickles’ controversial move is mentioned only because it was the primary reason for the subsequent movements of reinforcements, including the Bucktails.

[41] Pfanz, Chapters 8-13.  Coddington, Chapters 15-16. For a detailed description of troop deployments on the afternoon of July 2d, these two volumes are highly informative, although some differences will be noted.

[42] Pfanz, 392.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid., 393. Thomson and Rauch, p266.

[45] Pfanz, 398.  Thomson and Rauch, p.266-267.

[46] Thomson and Rauch, p. 269.

[47] Pfanz, p.400.

[48] Thomson and Rauch, pp.269-270

[49] Ibid., 271

[50] The Gettysburg Papers, 824

[51] Ibid.

[52] Thomas L. Elmore, “Courage Against the Trenches:The Attack and Repulse of Steurt’s Brigade on Culp’s Hill,” The Gettysburg Magazine, July 1992, 827-828.

[53] The Gettysburg Papers, 827-828

[54] Ibid., 826-829, Elmore, 88

[55] Thomson and Rauch, 271-274.

[56] The Gettysburg Papers, 830-832. Elmore, 94

[57] Gregary A. Coco, On the Bloodstained Field (Gettyburg:Thomas Publications, 1987), 28.

[58] Thomson and Rauch, 33

[59] Ibid., 323-324