WITH GRANT TOWARDS RICHMOND.

 

I.

 

 

THE WILDERNESS.[1]

 

 

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The spring of 1864 was to inaugurate another campaign against the armies of the South, but a campaign different from those that had preceded it.

When on July 3rd, 1863, at Gettysburg, the Army of the Potomac under General Meade had defeated the invading force, great thankfulness had been felt throughout the loyal States. When, in addition, on July 4th, General Grant had received the surrender of Vicksburg, thus giving back to the nation the Mississippi, from its source to its mouth, the jubila­tion had become tumultuous. Yet General Meade had obtained no decided advantage over his opponent since Gettysburg, and the two propositions in the east that had confronted the Gov­ernment at the beginning of the war, confronted it when nearly three years had elapsed: the reduction of the Confederate capital, and the protection of Washington from an active, present and dangerous foe.

 

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In the west, General Grant had followed up the early successes of Forts Donelson and Henry with Vicksburg; a little later winning another brilliant victory through the opera­tions in the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possessor of a rec­ord of great personal bravery during the Mexican War; known to be desirous of securing the best material, but willing to work with what he could obtain; firm and inflexible in dis­position; calm in battle; resourceful and undefeated; the eyes of the country at large turned towards him. On Feb­ruary 29th, 1864, Congress revived the grade of Lieutenant­General, and on March 9th General Grant received his new commission and assumed command of all the armies of the United States.

Possessed of an extraordinary ability to select his sub­ordinates, General Grant decided to make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, leaving to General Sherman. aided by General Thomas, the projected movement to Atlanta. No longer were the various armies to operate disconnectedly. The movements projected were to enclose the Confederates in an ever-closing net. On the north the Cumberland and Ten­nessee had already been regained, on the west the Mississippi; now, Sherman, sweeping southeastwardly to Atlanta and from thence to the sea, was to decrease the area in rebellion; while at the same time the Army of the Potomac, moving overland, would push back Lee's forces, till they reached Richmond, and turned at bay to make a last stand.[2]

When General Grant assumed command of the Army of the Potomac he realized the desire of the nation that the war should be brought to a conclusion. Personally he did not care for taking Richmond, excepting insofar as the operation in­volved fighting Lee's army. To fight to-day, to-morrow, the next day, and so on, indefinitely, till his antagonist was entirely

 

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destroyed was his wish. He was no longer in the position he had been in when, with an inferior force, he placed himself be­tween Johnston at Jackson and Pemberton at Vicksburg, taking both towns and over 30,000 prisoners; nor when with i5,ooo men he had taken Fort Donelson defended by 20,000 men. He knew that he had more men than Lee; that he could fill any depletion in his ranks that might occur, while Lee could not; and above all he knew that more men in an army are killed through disease and hardships than fall in battle. Humanity demanded that the war be conducted with the mini­mum of death and illness. Better a short hard struggle than one protracted through years. The heavier "killed in battle" roll would be more than offset by the diminution in the number of those who succumbed to disease, or returned to their homes disabled for life.

By the end of April, General Grant had decided upon his plan of campaign. At General Meade's request, the Army of the Potomac had been reorganized from five into three corps

the Second under General Hancock, the Fifth under General Warren, and the Sixth under General Sedgwick. The division of Pennsylvania Reserves, reduced to ten regiments, remained in the Fifth corps, the brigade organization being:

Third Division.

Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford.

First Brigade                 Col. Joseph W. Fisher

Col. William McCandless          Third Brigade

1st Penna. Reserves           5th Penna. Reserves

2nd Penna. Reserves          8th Penna. Reserves

6th Penna. Reserves         l0th Penna. Reserves

7th Penna. Reserves           12th Penna. Reserves[3]

    11th Penna. Reserves

    13th Penna. Reserves

     (Bucktails )

 

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The reduction in the number of regiments was occasioned by the Third and Fourth having been ordered to western Virginia. Attached to General Crook's forces they maintained the reputation of the division in skirmishes and battles, in­cluding Cloyd's Mountain. The Ninth regiment's term expired upon May 4th, and they were ordered home.

In planning his campaign, General Grant had two options. The Confederates, under General Lee, lay some distance below the Rapidan, behind the defenses at Mine Run which had stopped Meade when he had attempted to turn them. If the Union army, crossing the river, turned the Confederate left flank, Lee must retreat directly upon Richmond. But such an advance would render difficult, if not doubtful, the Union sup­plies.[4] By attacking the Confederate right flank supplies could be forwarded partially by water.[5] Therefore the advance by 'v the latter way was decided upon.

On April 3oth, under command of Major Hartshorne, the Bucktails, with their division, marched to Culpeper.

Before leaving Washington they had turned in the Sharps breech-loading rifles and received Spencer repeaters. These latter were magnificent weapons for skirmish work, the maga­zine having a capacity of seven cartridges. After firing, a single

 

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movement of a lever both ejected the used shell and brought the next one into position.

On May 4th, the regiment crossed the Rapidan at Germanna Ford. Below, lay the Wilderness.  -

To understand what took place, it is necessary to obtain some idea of the ground designated as the Wilderness. In extent it covers several miles, and in every place is thickly wooded, the thicket being broken occasionally by narrow roads. Mineral mining having been carried on there, in the times of Governor Spottswood, the timber had been cut down to make fuel for the furnaces. Thus a dense undergrowth arose, min­gled with scraggy pines, scrub oaks and hazels. Cavalry in such territory was useless, artillery excepting at occasional roads futile, the maneuvering of infantry forces impossible. There are three principal roads in the Wilderness: the Ste­vensburg plank road running southerly from the Germanna Ford, which connects with the Brock road which in turn emerges or. the southern side of the Wilderness; and two roads that cross the Stevensburg plank road at right angles, the more northern of the two being the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike, and the more southern the Orange and Fredericks­burg plank road. The distance between these two roads where they cross the Stevensburg plank road is about two miles.

The line of march decided upon by General Grant in­volved the traversing of the Wilderness by his army. He apparently did not wish to give battle there, but such an event was not entirely unexpected: at the same time he must have recognized that such a jungle would prevent the bringing into play of his preponderance of force. Almost certainly he hoped to pass the Wilderness before Lee attacked. But Lee, recog­nizing the immense importance of stopping the campaign in its incipiency, also saw that the nature of the Wilderness would

 

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render the numerical inferiority of his forces of less moment; instead of waiting, he moved forward to meet his antagonist. Before the real battle of the 6th, Grant was strengthened by Burnside's Ninth corps, and Lee by Longstreet, with 14,000 men.[6] Warren's corps moved south from the Germanna Ford in the direction of Parker's Store, which is on the Orange plank road between two and three miles west of the point where that road meets the Stevensburg plank road. As the Union line of march may be described as through the Wilderness from north to south, Lee decided to attack the flank, by advancing troops over both the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike and the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, both of which, as previously stated, bisect the line formed by the Stevensburg plank road and its continuation, the Brock road.

The Reserves, early on the 5th, had moved forward till they struck the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, a little west of the Stevensburg plank road. Now ordered to advance towards Parker's Store, the command was formed with the Bucktails on the left of the line, holding the road, and the First regiment, at their left, at right angles to their line and facing the road. Some time in the afternoon the enemy was encountered. A regiment of dismounted cavalry, engaged in the woods in the front, were being by sheer weight driven back. Major Hartshorne ordered his regiment forward and gave instructions to the men to conceal themselves, as far as possible, behind the trees and logs. Then notice was sent to the cavalry of the position assumed, and a suggestion made that it fall back slowly behind the line formed, so as to draw the enemy forward and into position to receive the fire of the Bucktails. The cavalrymen, who seem to have been fighting

 

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since morning, were nothing loath, and the ground itself was extremely favorable to the execution of the plan. In the front of the Bucktails the woods were clear of underbrush for a hundred and fifty yards, sloping down to a small stream, and beyond the stream the corresponding rise was also clear. While waiting their chance, the words of the Confederate officers, encouraging their troops, were plainly audible to the Bucktails. The opposing infantry was urged to charge and capture the Yankees, who "were only a handful of dismounted cavalry "anyhow." Both the Bucktails and cavalrymen smiled.

When the cavalrymen falling back reached the farther side of the clearing, the paucity of their number became apparent to the Confederates, who charged boldly. The object being achieved, the cavalrymen then quickly retreated behind the line of the Bucktails, who immediately poured in volley after volley from their new Spencer repeaters. The severity and unexpect­edness of the attack demoralized the charging party and, com­pletely routed, it retreated precipitately; though not till one man, whom an officer was trying to persuade to make a stand by assuring him that there was nothing in front but some dis­mounted cavalry, was heard to exclaim: "Cavalry h-1: cav­alry don't carry knapsacks and wear bucktails."

Major Hartshorne had reported to General Crawford, that the enemy appeared to be in force upon his front, and that his (the enemy's) line extended beyond his own right flank. Gen­eral Crawford ordered the brigade forward, and directed Major Hartshorne to hold his position.

Wadsworth's division of the Fifth corps, to the right of the Pennsylvania Reserves, was strengthened by the Second, Seventh and Eleventh Reserves, and as Wadsworth then suc­ceeded in driving back the enemy in his front, he opened a gap between his division and the Reserves, so that the latter

 

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became isolated. A signal officer was despatched to General Crawford, notifying him that if he did not withdraw his men promptly, they would be surrounded and cut off. Great efforts were made to save the imperilled regiments, and ultimately all but the Seventh, which was captured, with the exception of a few men, were extricated.[7]

When Major Hartshorne had found that the enemy was massing upon his left, he had ordered Companies E and K, under command of Lieutenant Bard, to move deployed as skir­mishers in that direction, the right of the two companies to rest on the regiment. The right flank also being threatened, he had then formed two other companies at right angles on the right, so as to complete the formation of three sides of a square.

The regiment was in a dangerous position. Though the enemy in front withheld his fire, he did so evidently only while waiting for his flanking parties to reach the positions assigned to them. Fortunately an Aide rode up to Major Hartshorne at this moment with orders to withdraw. A few minutes sufficed to rally the six companies in the center and the two upon the right, but the message failed to reach the two companies on the left and it soon became apparent that they had been left behind. Major Hartshorne sent a special messenger after them, though apparently they had but a slim chance of escaping. Lieutenant Bard, when he did receive the message, had the order passed along for the rear to close up double-quick. Then when the companies had closed up the order to run was given. The men started like a flash across a field, which the Con­federates entered at the same moment from the opposite side,

 

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then down into a small ravine, exposed on both sides to a flank­ing fire, and then up again to join the rest of the regiment, which gave three cheers in their honor as they appeared.

Rifle pits were thrown up in the new position, and shortly after the battle ceased.

The Confederates had also attacked north of Warren's corps on the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike, and though it must be admitted Warren's corps had been driven, yet the net result of the day's operations was the formation of the lines upon which the battle would be fought the next day. The lines thus drawn were practically parallel, the Union army facing west, having its right flank near the northern boundary of the Wilderness and its left flank near the southern boun­dary. Moreover, Lee by moving to attack had abandoned the entrenchments he had constructed during the winter at Mine Run.

During the night both commanders decided to assume the P offensive as soon as it became light. Grant's corps were placed from north to south as follows: Sedgwick, Warren, Burnside and Hancock, but as two divisions were detached from War­ren's to strengthen Hancock's corps, the two divisions left, Griffin's and the Reserves, were reduced to the defensive. The battle defies description. Both armies had thrown up intrench­ments and the day was spent in charges and counter-charges. So dense was the wood and underbrush that the officers were compelled to judge of the progress of the battle by the sound of the musketry. In the midst of gloom and darkness the two armies grappled, each endeavoring to inflict a mortal wound on the other. No regiment knew what its neighbor did, nor one brigade what its companion achieved.

During the greater part of the day the Bucktails were actively engaged; at one time, with the division, being ordered

 

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to the support of General Hancock. Their support not being required, they were ordered back to their former position. With darkness the battle died down, but late in the evening a night attack on Sedgwick's corps caused the Reserves to be ordered to its support. Again their assistance was not re­quired and again they marched back.

With this action ended the battle of the Wilderness. The mortality was tremendous on both sides, and the horror that attends all battles had been increased, during the afternoon of the 6th, by a portion of the woods catching fire and burning some hundreds of the wounded to death. The official casualty reports for the period of May 5-7, 1864, for the Army of the Potomac and Burnside's corps, show a total of 17,666 killed, wounded and missing:[8] the Confederate loss is unknown, yet when it is remembered that they assumed the offensive as fre­quently as their opponents, it cannot have been much less.

The loss in the Bucktail regiment was

              

	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Total
Officers
Men	3	31	3	37
Total	3	31	3	37[9]

Reconnaissances, made on the morning of the 7th, showed General Grant that Lee was deserting his position. Neither army was anxious to resume battle under such fearful condi­tions and already Lee was moving southward.

One of these reconnaissances was made about noon on the

 

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7th, when the Bucktails were ordered to advance along a country road, deployed as skirmishers. Major Hartshorne de­ployed Companies G and D on the right side of the road, two other companies on the left, and held the remaining six in reserve. Companies G and D soon met the enemy in force when Major Hartshorne ordered up Companies F and K to their support. These two latter companies were to deploy in the intervals of the other two companies then engaged, making a double line of skirmishers. Attaining the ordered formation, a charge was made, the Confederates retreating to the protec­tion of some rocks. It was then decided that the line in front of the rocks should hold its position, and that the other por­tions of the regiment should outflank the foe. Before this could be done, an order from General Crawford was received ordering the regiment to withdraw. Great was the chagrin felt. Twenty minutes would have sufficed to effect the capture of the Confederates, who numbered two or three hundred. Though the skirmish did not last many minutes it was very severe, the loss entailed by the Bucktails constituting the greater part of that included in the casualty report for the three days. Carrying its dead and wounded with it, the regiment returned to its place in the division.[10]

General Grant in moving through the Wilderness had designed to turn Lee's flank; this he had done. With the heavy loss he had suffered, a retreat for a time while he re­habilitated his army, or a period of rest for the same purpose, would have been justified by precedent. The men in the regi­ment expected it. The aftermaths of the Peninsular, Antietam and Gettysburg campaigns were fresh in their memories. But

 

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they did not at that time know their commander. Grant never gave ground, never went back. The Army of the Potomac had been fashioned in the first place by General McClellan and tempered by General Meade; now the weapon was in the hands of one who, recognizing its workmanship and its temper, would drive it home.

On the afternoon of the 7th, the army received orders to move-not rearward but forward-towards Spottsylvania Court House, on parallel roads to that pursued by its antag­onist.