KANE'S BATTALION.[1]

­

I.

 

THE VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

 

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In  the last book it was stated that prior to the departure of the regiment with McCall's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves to join McClellan on the Peninsula, Company C, Cap­tain Leander W. Gifford, Company G, Captain Hugh McDon­ald, Company H, Captain Charles F. Taylor, and Company I, Captain William F.  Blanchard, were separated from the re­mainder of the Bucktails ; and under command of Lieutenant-­Colonel Thomas L. Kane attached to Bayard's "Flying "Brigade."

Lieutenant-Colonel Kane after his return to the regiment, upon recovering from the wound he had received at Dranes­ville, had devoted himself to compiling his "Instructions for "Skirmishers," a protest against European tactics being en­forced upon American riflemen. This outline of what he believed to be the proper system of tactics for riflemen he submitted to General McClellan, who, being impressed with

 

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the value of the suggestions contained in the paper, returned it with the following endorsement

"March 7th, 1862.

"Respectfully referred to General M'Call, with instruc-

tions to detail four companies of the Kane Rifles to report to "Colonel Kane, and until further orders to be drilled by Colonel "Kane exclusively in the system of tactics devised by him, so "far as the same is not inconsistent with the official system."[2]

In accordance wih General McClellan's endorsement, Com­panies C, G, H and I were placed under the tuition of Lieutenant-Colonel Kane, but their separation, not othly from the balance of the regiment, but from the division of the Penn­sylvania Reserves itself, came as a great surprise to the men. While it is undeniable that the majority of the regiment at that time was divided into two camps, with strong opinions as to who should command them, yet on all other questions it could be depended upon to act as a unit. The most sincere friendliness existed from the start, and this friendliness had been accentuated through dangers mutually endured at New Creek and Dranesville and the winter passed in camp together.

The " Flying Brigade" to which the four companies were attached was composed of the First Pennsylvania cavalry[3] and the First New Jersey cavalry, and the men under Kane were soon to be given an opportunity to prove the contention of their commander, that picked riflemen, in speed, effectiveness and stamina, were equal to cavalry.

To understand the reasons for the formation of this "Fly-

 

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"ing Brigade" and the movements of the Bucktail battalion, both while with it and later with Pope, until it was reunited with the main body of the regiment after the Second Battle of Bull Run, it will be necessary to take a hasty survey of the events immediately preceding its creation.

It has been narrated that on March 8th the Confederates commenced their rearward movement from Manassas, while the first of the Union troops destined for the Peninsula em­barked on March 17th.

McClellan coveted and was promised McDowell's First corps, to which McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, including the Bucktails, was attached. The Government, ever fearful that the enemy, racing up the Shenandoah Valley, would sweep into Washington before he could be stopped, was ren­dered more nervous by Stonewall Jackson's brilliant perform­ance at Kernstown on March 23rd,[4] and McDowell was retained to cover Washington. On April 4th the Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, and the Department of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, were organized.

The Bucktails as part of McCall's division, now attached to the Department of the Rappahannock, had broken camp at Fairfax Seminary, near Alexandria, and had joined in the advance to Fredericksburg. The Government realized that

 

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McDowell's corps could cover Washington effectively by hold­ing that town, and acceded to the Commanding General's re­quest for permission to occupy it, though at the same time it cautioned him that his duties were purely defensive.

On May 17th General McDowell was informed that Gen­eral Shields' division of General Banks' corps had been ordered to Fredericksburg to relieve him; and he was instructed to advance with his whole force towards Richmond and form junction with the Army of the Potomac as soon as Banks arrived. As McClellan had worked up the Peninsula, and by May t6th, with his force only a few miles distant from Rich­mond, had established firmly his base at White House, McDow­ell's corps would come into contact with its right. McDowell reported he would be ready to move on Saturday afternoon, May 24th. President Lincoln was adverse to commencing the movement on a Sunday, and the 26th was decided upon as the date for advance. The President, the Secretary of War, some members of the Cabinet and other distinguished personages visited General McDowell at Fredericksburg on the 24th, leav­ing the same evening. Lieutenant-Colonel Kane had the Buck­tails on dress parade on the same evening that the President left. The four companies were then attached to the "Flying Brigade"

which  General McDowell ordered to advance towards Richmond,  to act as skirmishers for his main body.

The men, who had been chafing at their inactivity, received the order with delight. Leaving Falmouth on the 25th, they crossed the Rappahannock and advanced down the plank road towards Hanover Court House, bivouacking for the first night some twelve miles below Fredericksburg. A portion of the cav­alry advanced to within eight miles of Hanover Court House, and the troops were already mentally capturing Richmond

 

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itself. In the night they received orders to return, and obeyed dispiritedly.

The situation in the Shenandoah Valley, that bete noir of the Government, was the cause of the recall which was ordered by the President himself. About May 6th, Stonewall Jackson found himself in command of the largest force he had had to date, his own division joined with Ewell's amounting to about 17,000 men. Cognizant of the fact that Washington was in perpetual fear of the passes from the Shenandoah Valley, and learning that Banks' forces, which were posted at Strasburg and Front Royal, had been terribly reduced through the sending of Shields' division to take McDowell's place at Fredericksburg, who in turn was to move to reinforce McClellan, he urged his troops north. By the evening of the 22nd he was at Luray, although the Union commanders believed him to be below Har­risonburg. On the 23rd he overwhelmed a detachment of Banks' army at Front Royal, and on the 25th struck Banks at Winchester driving him north of the Potomac. Steps were immediately taken by the Government, not only to stop the advance of the bold Confederate, but to capture him with his entire force. McDowell was ordered to move into the Valley through Manassas Gap, Fremont was recalled from western Virginia and Sigel and Banks were ordered to move south. Celerity of movement was of primal importance and the "Fly­ing Brigade" was laid under contribution.

On May 27th McDowell's Chief of Staff issued the follow­ing order

"HEADQUARTERS, May 27, 1862.

 "General McCall,

"Falmouth.

"General McDowell wishes you to order to Catlett's, Bay­ard's Brigade as now constituted, viz, two regiments of cav-

 

 

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"alry, Kane's battalion of rifles, and the battery of mountain "howitzers….

"ED. SCHRIVER,

"Chief of Staff."[5]

 

The "Flying Brigade" reached Catlett's Station at I P. m., May 29th and General Bayard, in answer to inquiries, gave the strength of the Bucktail battalion with his brigade as two hun­dred and sixty-four. The immediate presence of the brigade at Front Royal being vitally required, Bayard was ordered to forward the Bucktail battalion by rail, moving his cavalry and artillery as promptly as possible.[6] Meanwhile Jackson, who had been as far north as Harper's Ferry, conscious of the trap that was being laid for him, retreated to Winchester, left that place on May 3lst, and arrived at Strasburg the same evening. His capture seemed impossible, and he boldly waited for Winder, who with his command was still north of Strasburg, to arrive before continuing his retreat. Bayard's brigade was ordered on June 1st by General McDowell to advance to Strasburg, with a view of attacking Jackson's train as it passed. Contrary to expectations, the brigade found the train heavily protected by artillery mounted on commanding positions about the town. To attack such formidable works with an inferior force was out of the question. The Confederate guns threw a few shells at their enemies and towards night Bayard withdrew his brigade from the Strasburg side of the Shenandoah and encamped. The Bucktail battalion was placed so as to command and protect the railroad bridge across the river.

Early the next morning Colonels Karge’ and Kane recon­noitered the town. Finding it abandoned, they then occupied it. General Bayard, who also entered Strasburg, reported to Gen-

 

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eral Fremont, who, with his troops constituting the Mountain Department, had reached Strasburg on the 1st, and by him was assigned the advance in the ensuing pursuit of the retreating Confederate forces.[7] On the previous evening, two miles south of Strasburg, the Sixteenth Ohio and Eighth Virginia of Col­onel Cluseret's brigade had had an engagement with the enemy, and General Fremont, in his general report, chronicles that upon his arrival he found that some ten of the wounded had already been cared for by Colonel Kane.[8]

With feverish energy the Union troops started in pursuit of Jackson's force which had so cleverly slipped away, just as the mouth of the net was being closed. Still it was neither a parade nor a race. The rear guard was resourceful and was perpetually obstructing the advancing Federals. Even as early as 10 A. M. on the 2nd, the Confederates made a stand which was only broken by the use of artillery. Eighteen miles were accomplished in five hours, and at 5 o'clock Stahel's brigade occupied Woodstock. In a despatch to General McDowell, dated Woodstock, June 2nd, General Fremont says

"Your cavalry brigade rendered good and essential service, "and if I could have succeeded in bringing up my infantry, "would have made the day disastrous to Jackson; but the ".rapidity of the march made this impossible, and Jackson es­caped dispersion."[9]

In transmitting this despatch to the Secretary of War General McDowell adds

"I understand, unofficially, that Ashby's cavalry made an "unsuccessful charge on the Bucktails and were themselves "charged by Bayard and many prisoners made."[10]

 

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The Bucktail battalion was being put to a severe test. Day by day it kept pace with the cavalry, "bivouacked with them "every night during that memorable Valley campaign, as well "as skirmished for them in every engagement they had in the "Valley, save the one in which Colonel Wyndham was surprised.[11]

The fatigue incident to the exertions made on the 2nd did not prevent the pursuit being resumed at 7 A. M. on the 3rd. The advance was contested by the Confederates, who at Eden burg, five miles below Strasburg, destroyed the bridge across Stony Creek. A difficult ford was found and used, and by noon the bulk of the Union troops were across. Moving down the Valley the advance was just in time to save the bridge over Cedar (Mill) Creek at Mount Jackson, but the bridge over the North Fork of the Shenandoah River was burned in its face. General Bayard got his cavalry into position on an elevation overlooking the bridge, but lack of artillery rendered it impos­sible to save the structure.

By 6 o'clock on the morning of the 4th a pontoon bridge had been constructed, when a sudden rise in the river made it necessary to cut the ropes and permit the pontoon to swing to the northern shore. The flood subsiding that evening, by 10 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, the bridge was replaced and the pursuit resumed.

Jackson, by the destruction of the Shenandoah bridge, hail gained eighteen hours on the army that was upon his. trail; nor was it possible for the forces under Fremont to come up to him on that day. Eighteen miles were covered before night, how-

ever, and an early march on the morning of the 6th enabled the Union commander to restore the lost contact. At 2 o'clock in

 

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the afternoon the advance swept into Harrisonburg, a small town, the name of which was destined to be forever after linked with that of the Bucktails. The enemy being driven out, and the line of his further retreat being uncertain, the Union forces were ordered into camp. About 3 o'clock in the after­noon the First New Jersey cavalry were ordered to proceed beyond the town by General Bayard.[12] After proceeding about three and a quarter miles they suddenly found themselves under a heavy fire on both flanks and their front. The rebel ambus­cade resulted in the loss by the First New Jersey cavalry of thirty-two men, killed, wounded and missing, among the killed being Captain Haines, and among the captured Colonel Percy Wyndham and Captains Shelmire and Clark. Colonel Wynd­ham, in addition to being captured, was also wounded.

General Fremont did not desire to precipitate a general engagement just at that time, but Kane, who seems to have believed that he could rescue the wounded, pleaded with such vehemence to be allowed to advance, that permission was granted. General Bayard, with the First Pennsylvania cavalry and the Bucktail battalion, immediately moved forward. Gen­eral Ashby who protected the Confederates' rear had, after the repulse of the Union cavalry under Wyndham, ordered up infan­try reinforcements. General Bayard from his position caught sight of these reinforcements moving up and despatched a mes­senger to recall the Bucktail battalion. Before the order could be carried out, however, Colonel Kane with his little battalion­at that moment, numbering only one hundred and four men[13]­---entered the woods. Coming into contact with the Fifty-Eighth

 

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Virginia; the Bucktails poured in such a murderous fire that a portion of the opposing line fell back. There was a,little clear­ing in the forest at this place, and the Confederate firing line was protected by the crest of the hill. Kane, cautioning his men to take cover, but to "give them hell," now found himself opposed by a considerable force, for though some of the enemy had been driven back, yet the opposing line had through their very retreat been consolidated and made firmer. The battalion's orders, it was understood, were, "If you engage the enemy hold "your position at all hazards, and reinforcements will reach "you ;" [14] and even in default of such instructions neither the men nor their gallant Colonel were accustomed to retreat in the face of the foe. Martin Kelly, a private of Company G, took in the situation at a glance. With quick intuition he realized that with the exact position and strength of their opponents unknown; the order to advance, then almost quivering on his Colonel's lips, could only be carried out at a dreadful cost. With heroic devotion he resolved at the price of his own life to reduce the toll to be taken from his companions. "Colonel," he said, "shall I draw their fire?" As he stepped swiftly from behind a tree, a long line of red flame showed over the crest of the hill, and without flinching, pierced by a volley of balls, Martin

 

 

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Kelly dropped dead. Colonel Kane, ever watchful and alert, perceived at once that the line in front of him not only greatly outnumbered his scanty command, but was stretching out to­wards the left, threatening to envelop its flank, and instantly he ordered a detachment of his small band to drive back the menacing force. Wounded in the leg early in the fight, leaning against a tree, he directed his rapidly falling men. The opposing lines drew closer together and as the Bucktails by a withering fire drove back the attack that swarmed towards their flank, the rebel line appeared to crumble, and for a moment it seemed as though success would attend the efforts of the devoted band. At this moment General Turner Ashby, on foot, appeared in front of the Confederate line, urging his Virginians forward. His horse had been shot under him,[15] but undaunted he sprang forward, ordering the men to cease firing and use the bayonet. "Charge men," he shouted, "for God's sake "charge!”[16] His regiment rallied for a moment. Then one of the Bucktails took deliberate aim and fired.[17] With the crack of the rifle, Ashby, the beloved General of the Confederacy, fell dead.[18] Colonel Kane was wounded again in the breast and

 

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Lieutenant Wolfe, approaching him said: "Colonel, shall I send "two men to carry you back, we can't stay here any longer, if "we don't get out right speedily, we will all be captured." With bull-dog courage the Colonel responded: "You are doing nobly "Lieutenant, give them hell." About the time that General Ashby fell, the First Maryland, under Colonel Bradley T. Johnson, came to the assistance of the Fifty-Eighth Virginia. Raging at the loss of their brigade commander and led by Johnson, the two regiments, charging forward till but a hun­dred and fifty feet separated the combatants, redoubled their attack on their foes, now reduced in number to between fifty and sixty. Convinced that the support he expected would not arrive, with his own force but half the size it had been an hour previously while the enemy had been strengthened by fresh troops, Colonel Kane reluctantly, as the darkness gathered, ordered his men to retreat. Captain Taylor, of Company H, succeeded in drawing off the survivors, numbering but fifty­two. Unwilling to leave his commander alone, wounded, he returned to the field, to recover the body if dead, or to assist

 

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him if still living. With Kane he was made a prisoner. Recog­nizing his chivalrous conduct the Confederates offered him his parole, but he refused, as did also Colonel Kane.

Many stories have been told about this battle. On the Union side the loss of the Bucktails was at first underestimated, though the bravery of the men was immediately recognized. General Bayard, in his report, dated Harrisonburg, June 7, 1862, to Assistant Adjutant-General Breck, says:

"Colonel Kane had a fight with a regiment of infantry. "He was wounded and taken prisoner; also Captains Taylor "and Blanchard and Lieutenant Swayne wounded. He lost 25 "men. The Bucktails fought splendidly."[19]

In General Fremont's general report of the Valley cam­paign, referring to this action, he says:

"Almost immediately after getting into the timber the "Rifles encountered a regiment of cavalry with artillery and a "regiment of infantry, from which they received a very dam­aging fire. A very severe engagement of half an hour fol­lowed, during which the Rifles lost upward of 40 in killed, "wounded and missing. Colonel Kane was wounded and taken "prisoner, Captain Taylor a prisoner, Captain Blanchard shot "through both legs, and Lieutenant Swayne wounded. This "noble body of Riflemen is entitled to the expression of my "warm admiration for excellent conduct and efficiency during "the march, and for distinguished bravery on this occasion."[20]

 

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The Philadelphia Inquirer of June 10, 1862, published a report of the skirmish and gave the loss as 3 killed, 37 wounded and 9 missing. This report has many obvious errors in the spelling of the names. The muster rolls of Sypher's "History "of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps" show the loss as 37 killed, wounded and captured. Not taking into account those missing, but not captured, the muster rolls at the end of the present vol­ume show: Killed 7, wounded 39, captured 5. No official report covering the loss entailed in this affair had been discovered, but the loss as given in the muster rolls is believed to be correct, with the exception of two names as yet unidentified.

The fact that the regiment was engaged against troops of Ashby's brigade led Bates in his "History of the Pennsylvania "Volunteers," to write, so as to give the impression that the entire Confederate brigade, infantry, cavalry and artillery were in actual contact with Kane's battalion; further he states that a published rebel statement gave the Confederate loss as five hun­dred and fifty-nine.[21] As a matter of fact the Confederate artil­lery was in action, for Colonel Munford, commanding General Ashby's brigade, in his report of this engagement dated Febru­ary 26, 1863, says

"As soon as our forces became engaged the Yankee cavalry advanced to the support of the Bucktails. I advanced "with my command to meet them, and getting within easy "range, I opened with two pieces of Chew's battery, which had "been masked in the rear of the cavalry and drove them from "their position."[22]

Whether General Bayard's orders to Colonel Kane were to hold his position should he strike the enemy, or to return in forty minutes, his desire and attempt to relieve the hard-

 

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pressed battalion are thus established beyond dispute. That he did not do so, was owing to his strict orders not to bring on a general engagement, which must have inevitably resulted had he either continued to advance or called for reinforcements. Hard as it must have been to the intrepid cavalry leader, he was compelled to remain inactive, and pray dumbly that his Bucktail battalion would return before it was annihilated.

General Ewell reporting the loss sustained by his regiments, gives it as follows

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

First Maryland                 6             11                           17

Fifty-Eighth Virginia     11               39              3           53

   17           50              3           70.[23]

 

So gallant was considered the conduct of the First Mary­land in this battle that the following order was issued

"General Orders                                                                                                                                               Headquarters Ewell's Division.

"No. 30.                                                                                                                                                           June 12, 1862.

"In commemoration of the gallant conduct of the First "Maryland Regiment on the 6th of June, instant, when led by "Col. Bradley T. Johnson, they drove back with loss the Penn­sylvania Bucktail Rifles in the engagement near Harrisonburg, "Rockingham County, Va., authority is given to have one of the "captured bucktails (the insignia of the Federal regiment) "appended to the color staff of the First Maryland Regiment.

"By order of Major-General Ewell.

"JAMES BARTON,

"Assistant-Adjutant-General."[24]

 

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Had the Confederates realized the smallness of the force with which they contended, surely this order would not have been promulgated. As to the actual strength of the Confederate regiments, probably no more trustworthy information can be obtained, than that contained in the following letter from Col­onel Johnson

"The Woodlands, Virginia,

"Amelia Court House,

"August 8, 1898.

"T. H. Ryan, Esq.

"My Dear Sir: Your correspondence with me is very "interesting. After 36 years I learn for the first time that you "had only part of four companies-104 men. I had 275 men "present in ranks in the First Maryland and the Fifty-Eighth "Virginia must have had 200 or more. So you fought five to "one. Our loss was 17 killed, 50 wounded, and 3 missing (7o) "in all. A game fight for you, and I heartily congratulate you "on it.

"This shows how little we old soldiers knew of what we "were doing. I have always thought that you were almost "exterminated, for I saw no one reach the other side of the field "after you broke that covering. Anyhow, it was a pretty hard "fight all around.

"You put three balls into my horse and would have killed "me, dead sure, if, when the second ball struck him he had not "thrown up his head and caught the bullet intended for me.

"Good luck to you and all the old Bucktails. "Yours,

"BRADLEY T. JOHNSON."[25]

 

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Thus at the lowest estimate the battalion bad engaged five times its number, and was conscious during the entire time it was under fire, that not only were other regiments within call of their opponents, but that at any moment the enemy could obtain support from artillery and cavalry. The desperateness of the combat and the accuracy of the battalion's fire are attested by the fact that General Ashby's horse was shot a moment before he himself fell a victim to the Bucktail marksman; Gen­eral Johnson's horse received three bullets; and two successive color bearers of the First Maryland dropped badly wounded. Nor did the Bucktails suffer less. A newspaper correspondent reports[26] that he saw at the hospital one man who though wounded in three places had been brought back. A wounded officer, in reply to an inquiry told him, "Why you see I was told "to deploy some men as skirmishers and before we had moved "thirty yards we were breast to breast with a whole regiment of "Rebels. It was no use, of course, to fight, but as for retreat, "I knew the Colonel would not hear of it, so we went in."

The Shenandoah Valley may be roughly described as being formed by the Shenandoah mountains on the west and the Blue Ridge on the east, but divided longitudinally for some fifty miles by the Massanutten mountains, the northern extremity of which is level with a line drawn between Front Royal and Strasburg. The range runs southward, following the direction of the mountains that enclose the valley, and ends slightly below Harrisonburg. The north fork of the Shenandoah River runs north on the west side of the range, though it is not of any size below Mt. Jackson or New Market. The south fork, however,

 

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is a considerable stream for many miles, before on its northward journey it reaches the southern extremity of the range, and when it does, it flows northward on its eastern side.

While the force under General Fremont had been driving Jackson down the western side of the Massanutten, a force under General Shields had been traveling down the eastern side; and it was intended that the two forces should converge at the southern end of the range, and together crush the wily Confederate. Fremont had reached Harrisonburg on the 6th, and Jackson, to escape, was compelled to turn at bay. Jackson's desire was to hold the force under Fremont back, till he himself had crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah at Port Repub­lic, twelve miles away. If he could do this, and burn the bridge behind him, he felt confident that he could stave off any attack Shields might make. Hence while his main force moved down to Port Republic to cross the river, three brigades, Elzy's, Trimble's and Ewell's, were ordered to contest Fremont's ad­vance at Cross Keys, a small settlement seven miles below Har­risonburg, which owed its name to a small tavern that at one time stood a quarter of a mile from the Union church, and had for a sign a device with two keys crossed.

As has been seen, Fremont's desire to prevent a general engagement had deterred Bayard from succoring the Bucktails at Harrisonburg on the 6th. This desire seems to have been due to his ignorance of the exact location of Shields. On the morning of the 7th, still without definite information as to Shields' whereabouts, Fremont sent forward a reconnaissance in force, and learned that Jackson was preparing to resist a fur­ther advance by him. Accordingly on the morning of the 8th, Fremont moved forward in battle array. Bayard's cavalry, owing to its arduous service and lack of horseshoes, being unfitted for further movement, was temporarily left behind at

 

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Harrisonburg; but the remnant of the Bucktail battalion, which since the beginning of the campaign had marched, skirmished and fought foot to foot with this mounted force, was still reported to be in condition 1 It was therefore attached to Stahel's brigade. As the Union force advanced, Stahel's bri­gade formed the left and Milroy's brigade the right, with Schenck's brigade in support. The advance opened fire by haJf­past eight; by eleven o'clock heavy firing commenced, which lasted with great obstinacy and vehemence till four in the after­noon.[27] The Confederate line extended along one of the ridges, with which the country abounds, while the Union forces occu­pied a parallel lower ridge. As the battle progressed the Union formation became Stahel on the left, Milroy in the centre and Schenck on the right. Both flanks were heavily wooded. The Bucktails, who, since Colonel Kane and Captain Taylor had been captured at Harrisonburg, were commanded by Captain Hugh McDonald, of Company G, were ordered by General Stahel to support Buell's battery of Pierrepont guns, and with this battery, came into contact with Trimble's division, which formed the Confederate right. As the battery, with the Buck­ta.ils, emerged from the woods and went into action, the enemy dropped a few shells amongst them; John McElhaney of Com­pany C, being severely wounded in the leg. A member of the Twenty-Seventh Pennsylvania, deployed in advance of the Bucktails, was also hit. As the line of advance led down into the hollow and along a ravine at right angles, the desired posi­tion was attained without further damage being suffered. Cap­tain McDonald soon found, however, that his position was too far to the right and too directly in the range of the Union guns. Ordering his men to move towards the left, he made them lie down in the hollow. Though most of the shells passed safely

 

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over them, George C. DeBeck of Company G, was wounded by one that dropped into their midst. Lieutenant Winslow, who was also struck, escaped with an injury to his trousers. As the afternoon progressed a portion of Stahel's line was driven back, leaving Buell's battery, with its supports, exposed. The Confederate brigade, under Trimble, moving forward as the Union troops retreated, had worked around, till the latter was able in his report to say, that he observed "from its fire a "battery on the enemy's left, half a mile in front of us," and he "promptly decided to make a move from our right flank and "try to capture the battery."[28] The position was exceedingly complicated. General Trimble confident of success ordered por­tions of the Thirteenth and Twenty-Fifth Virginia regiments "to advance on the enemy in line of battle perpendicularly to "his line and in rear of the battery."[29] To assist in the move­ment he had near him the Twenty-First Georgia, the Sixteenth Mississippi and Fifteenth Alabama. As the menacing force advanced Captain Buell changed position and loaded his guns, remarking: "Boys, they've got us, but we will hurt some of "them badly before they take my guns." Fresh from the death trap of Harrisonburg the Bucktails muttered that they had been in worse places before. Captain McDonald ordered them to lie down and await the coming of the enemy, the Twenty-Seventh Pennsylvania waiting grimly with them. Two or three minutes later, the enemy came charging up the slope, and with a cheer the almost surrounded troops rose and rushed forward to meet them. Using the bayonet with deadly effect they repulsed the attack. So carried away by their impetuosity were they that for a time Captain Buell vainly begged them to return, so that he might bring his guns into play. When they did return, hardly

 

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had they taken cover before a new line of attack was formed by the Confederates, and to the terribly placed Captain of Artillery the case appeared hopeless. Again the intrepid Bucktails vowed that there would be much fun before the guns were lost.

An opportunity seemed to present itself. The artillery belched forth a murderous flood of grape-shot and .rapidly limbering up, a dash was made by the imperiled battery and its escort, towards the Union lines. So precarious had been its position, that General Fremont, who was watching the action, had given it up for lost, and when it emerged from the woods flying towards safety, some Union batteries, believing that it must be part of the Confederate artillery, opened fire upon it.[30]

The display of the flag of the Twenty-Seventh Pennsyl­vania caused these batteries to cease firing, and with the loss of one or two horses, Buell, the Bucktails, and the Twenty-Seventh drew up within the lines.[31] ft has been frequently claimed that

 

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had General Fremont not recalled Milroy, who was penetrating the Confederate center, at the time Stahel was driven back, a decided victory would have been recorded upon the Union side, if indeed Jackson had escaped being entirely crushed. Be that as it may, Milroy was recalled and the battle ceased.

The Bucktails had gone into the fight without a mouthful of food in their haversacks, in fact they had had been on half rations for several days; doubly acceptable, therefore, was the action of General Fremont in seeing that they were supplied with food from his own Headquarters. Colonel Pilsen, Fre­mont's Chief of Artillery, the next morning, sought out the bat­talion, to thank the men in person for what they had done. As he shook each of them by the hand tears rolled down the deeply bronzed cheeks of Captain Buell.

The official loss of the battalion was given as follows:

 

Killed. Wounded. Missing. Total.

    1            7                            8[32]

 

On the morning of the 9th, General Fremont moved for­ward to Port Republic, only to find that Jackson had crossed the Shenandoah, leaving the bridge in flames. Shields' ad­vance guard had been driven back; and on the same morning that General received orders to get his force together to move to Fredericksburg, while Fremont, through a telegram from the President, was ordered to pursue no farther. This ended the Valley campaign, during which Bates estimated that Kane's battalion, moving with Bayard's cavalry, had aver­aged twenty miles a day, exclusive of the extra ground covered in skirmishing. On June 7th, in a communication to Assistant Adjutant-General Breck, General Bayard says:

 

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"We have had the advance ever since we have been here, "and have taken about 300 prisoners and released about ,¢o of "Banks' men. We are utterly used up, except Lieutenant Hall's "Griffin guns, and the Bucktails."[33]

A greater tribute could not have been paid. The battalion, with a force of two hundred and sixty-four[34] on May 29th, was only able on June 6th, at Harrisonburg, to put into the field one hundred and five men. As the cavalry, utterly worn out, was left behind at Harrisonburg, while the Bucktails moved for­ward and took a brilliant part in the action at Cross Keys, Col­onel Kane's contention that they could wear down mounted forces was substantiated. Still, for the sake of the men, it was fortunate that the experiment was not repeated. Human endur­ance has limitations which may not with impunity be violated.

On June 10th Fremont was directed to send Bayard's cav­alry, with the Bucktail battalion, to join Shields' force.[35] He himself retired to Mt. Jackson, while Shields moved up the Luray Valley. Jackson encamped at Weyler's Cave, a few miles below Port Republic, on the 12th, and shortly after, moving through the passes, advanced by rapid marches to aid in the defense of Richmond, arriving in time to take active part in the battle of Gaines' Mill on June 27th. His campaign must be considered a brilliant strategetical victory. By skillful ma­neuvering, with about 17,000 men, he had neutralized the effectiveness of 6o,ooo or 7o,ooo Union troops, and prevented reinforcements being sent to McClellan on the Peninsula.

 

' '. '



[1] It is a matter of regret that more information in regard to the remarkable campaigns of these four companies is not obtainable. Taking part, as they did, in the whirlwind campaign against Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and the complicated maneuvers of General Pope ending in the Second Bull Run, the scarcity of data is the more lament­able, and renders the task of their historians more difficult. Moreover, around their achievements has grown up a mass of apochryphal litera­ture, the existence of which has necessitated the rejection of any but exceptionally well substantiated contributions to the scanty records.

 

[2] 'The manuscript is now in possession of Mrs. Kane, the widow of the late General

[3] 'Originally intended to serve with the other regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserves as the 15th of that corps. The difficulties encountered in recruiting and organizing this force have already been mentioned in a previous chapter.

 

[4] 'While the Union troops were victorious, Jackson was able to report "though the field is in possession of the enemy, yet the most "essential fruits of the battle are ours." (O. R. I. XII. ii., p. 383-384.) The Confederate aim was, by making their opponents believe a large force was prepared at any moment to debouch from the Valley on Wash­ington, to prevent their strengthening McClellan, on the Peninsula. Whether Jackson was corrcct in his report may be judged from the fact that Shields reported "The enemy's strength was about 15,000; the "strength of our division not over 8,ooo" (O. R. I. XII. ii., p. 335) ; and Jackson reported that in the battle he had only 2,742 infantry, 18 pieces of artillery and ego cavalry engaged, while he estimated the Federal in­fantry engaged as "probably over 8,ooo." (O. R. I. XII. ii., p. 383.)

[5] O. R. I. LL i., p. 639.

[6] 'See telegrams from Breck and Bayard, O. R. I. XII. 111., p. 283.

 

[7] Bayard's report. O. R. I. XIL i., p. 677

[8] O. R. I. XIL i., p. 14-16

[9] O. R. I. XIL, iii., p. 324.

[10] O. R. I. XIL, iii., p. 324.

[11] 'From letter of Major John A. Wolfe to Captain John P. Bard, October 22, 1885.

[12] 'Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Karge. O. R. I. XII. i., p. 679.

 

[13] Major Wolfe, who was Lieutenant in Company G, and a partici­pant in the battle, stated positively that only one hundred and five men (evidently including Kane himself) were in the battle.

 

[14] 'Letter from Captain L. W. Gifford, Company C. On the other hand, a correspondent of the Philadelphia Inquirer who was present during Kane's conversation with General Bayard says: "'But not to "'leave poor Wyndham on the field and all our wounded' remonstrated "my brave Colonel Kane of the Bucktails, 'and besides, General, think "'how such a stampede as this will dishearten and demoralize the "'Army; let me at 'em General, with my Bucktails! ' Just forty min­"'utes I'll give you Colonel; says General Bayard, pulling out his watch; "'peep through the woods on our left, see what is in there, and out "'again when the time's up.' It was my first introduction to Colonel "Kane. 'Good bye,' he said pressing the hand of each of our group; ' I "'hope to see you again; but if I don't, take it for granted that I and "'my Bucktails have given a good account of ourselves."'

 

[15] "'Ashby was riding a horse belonging to Lieutenant Willis . . . "he was now killed and Ashby was on foot" Lossing's "Civil War in "America," Vol. IL, p. 395.

 

[16] "'Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War," by Lieutenant­Colonel C. F. R. Henderson, Vol. I., p. 445. Also John 1~sten Cooke's "Military History of Stonewall Jackson."

 

[17] 'Bates states that the shot was fired by Corporal Holmes who was lying mortally wounded on the ground. In this he is almost beyond the slightest doubt in error. The man believed to be the real marksman is still living, but though proud of his membership in the regiment pre­fers to remain unnamed in this case.

 

[18] The stern Jackson valued General Ashby so highly that in his official report he said: " as a partisan officer I never knew his superior; "his daring was proverbial; his powers of endurance almost incredible; "his tone of character heroic, and his sagacity almost intuitive in di­vining the purposes and movements of the enemy." (O. R. I. XII. i., p. 712.) Colonel Kane, who a prisoner, was taken to General Ewell's headquarters, is reported as saying that upon an officer reporting to that General that the Confederate forces had gained a glorious victory driving the enemy from the field, General Ewell exclaimed "General, I am aston-

ished that you should have the face to come into my presence and claim "a victory; such victories would drive us to hell before we are ready to "go. Shame! shame! that not over one hundred men should so nearly "destroy one of my best brigades, and worse that I must lose the brave "General Ashby who had to take command of your brigade in person in "order to prevent defeat. I would not have lost him for a regiment such "as you." Captain John P. Bard stated that this conversation was re­ported to him by an officer to whom Colonel Kane had repeated it. Though plainly somewhat exaggerated and distorted, it is doubtless nearly correct, and the fact that Colonel Kane had been a classmate of General Ewell's, and was therefore more likely to speak frankly to him, may explain how the latter, alone amongst the Confederates seems to have had an accurate knowledge of the strength of the Bucktail battalion.

 

 

[19] O. R. I. XII. i., p. 676.

 

[20] O. R. I. XII. i., p. 18. Lieutenant Swayne died in the hospital at Harrisburg, and Captain Blaachard, although he succeeded in rejoining the regiment near Sharpsburg, in October, was so crippled that he was compelled to resign in December. Suffering constantly, his wounds the

seat of erysipelas, his subsequent life has been little better than daily torture. Although not mentioned in this despatch, Captain Gifford, of Company C, was also severely wounded, and weakened both in this way and by exposure was compelled to resign November 17, 1862.

[21] Vol. L, p. 9II-913.

 

[22] O. R. L XIL i., p. 732.

 

[23] O. R. I. XII. i., p. 783.

 

[24] O. R. I. LL ii., p. 570. General Bradley T. Johnson in a letter dated July 9, 1898 to 1st-Sergt. William H. Rauch, stated that the regi­mental flag to which the trophy was attached was carried at the battle of Cross Keys; during the rest of the Valley Campaign; the Seven Days' battles; and till the regiment was mustered out on August 12, 1862. The flag and the trophy were then presented by the regiment to Mrs. Johnson.

 

[25] 'Thomas H. Ryan was a Corporal in Company G. General Johnson always exhibited keen interest in the doings of his sometime opponents, until his death, October 5th, 1903, and only unavoidable cir­cumstances prevented his attending some of the Bucktail reunions. He had the engraving of the battle made, which is reproduced in this volume, designing that the money obtained from the sale of copies, should be devoted to the erection of a monument to commemorate the Maryland line. The receipts proving very slight this plan was aban­doned.

 

[26] Philadelphia Inquirer, June 16, 1862.

[27] Fremont's report. O. R. I. XII. i., p. 654.

[28] O. R. I. XII. i., p. ,'96.

[29] O. R. I. XII. i., p. 796.

 

[30] McDonald's report, O. R. I. XII. i., p. 676.

[31] As with the fight at Harrisonburg, considerable vagueness has characterized the reports not only in regard to the battle in general, but also as to the endangered batteries of General Stahel. General Trimble who reports the attempted capture (O. R. I. XII. i., p. 796)

does not seem to have known what battery he was attacking, nor by what regiments it was saved. He places the responsibility for the failure on the Sixteenth Mississippi. General Fremont in his general report (O. R. I. XII. i., p. zI) states that the regiment that was repulsed by the use of the bayonet was a Mississippi regiment; but though General Trimble's report is slightly difficult of understanding without further knowledge of the local topography, it is probable that the Sixteenth Mississippi was the one driven back. Captain McDonald in his official report (O. R. I. XII. i., p. 675), in accordance with his character, gives a short terse account, carefully avoiding anything like the glorification of his command. In another short report (O. R. I. XII. i., p. 658) General Fremont merely records the fact that " the bayonet was used to "extricate one of our batteries from more than three regiments of the "enemy." The account here given is in strict accord with the various

official records, pieced together, the obscure places having been made plainer by the account written by the late Captain John P. Bard, and Submitted by him to Major Wolfe, who was lieutenant of Company G.

[32] O. R. I. X11. i., p. 665. But the muster rolls show at least one man missing. The loss, killed, wounded and missing, of the 27th Pennsyl­vania was 92.

 

[33] O. R I. XII. i., p. 676.

[34] O. R I. XII. iii., p. 284

[35] O. R I. XII. i., p. 655.