THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

 

I.

 

SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

 

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Lying in camp near Arlington, the Bucktails, with the other regiments constituting the Pennsylvania Reserves, appre­ciated deeply the rest vouchsafed to them. The men who had taken part in the Shenandoah Valley campaign exchanged ex­periences with those who had lived through the terrible expe­riences of the Seven Days' Retreat, and this relation of occur­rences, combined with the execution of camp duties, completely filled the all too short September days.

In the meantime, General McClellan labored to restore order and effectiveness to the troops under his command.[1] The army was reorganized, corps reconstituted, and discipline more firmly established. Though much of this work was done while marching to meet the enemy, between. the 7th and 13th, much was accomplished while still in the vicinity of Washington. The camp was but a short distance from the capital, yet per­missions to visit the city were almost without exception refused.

 

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The elite of Washington, in handsome equipages, carne driving about the camps in the cool afternoons, returning to spend their evenings amidst various divertisements ; but the soldiers, only partially recovered from their arduous services, remained in camp, being whipped into shape for another campaign by their officers, who were glad to be again under the orders of "Little Mac."[2]

As by the 3rd or 4th it was apparent that Lee had with­drawn his forces from the immediate vicinity of Washington, it became of vital importance to ascertain his future intentions. Gradually his plans became plain. He intended to invade Maryland and' perhaps Pennsylvania. His object was two­fold. First, by crossing the Potomac into Maryland and ad­vancing along its northern side, he would be threatening both Washington and Baltimore in his rear; he would be approach­ing the Cumberland Valley, which gives access to Pennsyl­vania; and he would also be able to re-establish communica­tions with Richmond via the Shenandoah Valley. Second, the Southerners believed that Maryland was, so to speak, groaning under the Northern yoke; and that nothing but lack of oppor­tunity prevented thousands of the inhabitants of that State from enlisting under the banners of the Confederacy. This opportunity the invasion would afford.

Lee moved his troops on the Virginia side of the river towards Leesburg, some thirty miles northwest from Washing­ton. Arriving at this place, he then crossed his army over the Potomac and advanced on Frederick City almost due north. The passage of the river was made between the 4th and 7th, and on the 8th the Confederate General issued a proclamation "To the People of Maryland" inviting them to assist his army

 

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in regaining for them the rights of which they had been despoiled.[3]

With Lee's invasion of soil regarded as Northern, his de­signs had become obvious to McClellan, who put his army in motion. The Union forces advanced, leisurely, towards Fred­erick by five parallel roads; the columns being so disposed as to cover both Washington and Baltimore.[4] The general direc­tion of the Potomac River from about two miles south of the southern boundary of Pennsylvania (some twenty-five miles west of Chambersburg) to Washington is from the northwest to the southeast. Fifty miles northwest of Washington the Potomac is increased by the waters of the Shenandoah River, which, flowing north, empty into it at a place called Harpe0s Ferry. Harper's Ferry itself is situated in the crotch of the two rivers, being west of the Shenandoah and south of the Potomac. The Blue Ridge, which forms the eastern boun­dary of the Shenandoah Valley, running north close to the eastern bank of the Shenandoah, continues to the southern bank of the Potomac, where it is known as Loudon Heights. A continuation of the ridge, commencing at the north side of the river, is known as the South Mountain. A short distance to the west of the South Mountain, commencing at the north bank of the Potomac, is a ridge named Maryland Heights.

Harper's Ferry was held by a small Union force[5] under General Miles, and Lee expected that upon his arrival at Fred­erick it would be evacuated. In fact, to insure the safety of the Confederate army, if it was not evacuated it would have to be reduced. This necessity becomes apparent should we,

 

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ignoring minor facts, consider the Cumberland Valley merely as a natural continuation of the Shenandoah Valley, the line of division being the Potomac River. For, if Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah Valley was held by the Union troops, while Lee proceeded north into the Cumberland Valley, they would be in his rear, able both to cut his communications and also to assume the offensive when strengthened. Lee, finding by the 9th that the Union troops did not intend to abandon their position,[6] issued an order on that date[7] separating his command in order to compass its fall. Jackson was to march to Martins­burg to capture the small Union force stationed at that point, or to drive it south to the Ferry; McLaws was to take posses­sion of the Maryland Heights; and Walker was to seize the Loudon Heights. The various movements were to be executed by the 12th, then the reduction of the garrison was to follow, after which the commands were to rejoin the main body. Hill was to remain at the western side of South Mountain, and a cavalry force under Stuart at the eastern side, to observe and retard the Union advance.

The rate of advance of the Union army in the meantime had been noted, and Lee was confident that his army would have ample time to execute his orders before McClellan would be in a position to succor the endangered garrison.

McClellan, on his part, was unwilling to advance rapidly until he received more definite information as to his opponent's designs. The Bucktails, late on the 6th, had marched into Washington over the Long Bridge, some of the men there

 

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receiving much needed clothing.[8] On the 7th they arrived at Leesboro; on the 9th they moved forward to Brookville; on the loth they advanced four miles further; and on the iith they reached Lisbon on the Frederick pike. While at this place General Reynolds left the division. Governor Curtin, alive to the peril of the impending invasion of his State, issued a proclamation by authority of the President, calling into imme­diate service 50,000 of the militia of the State, and General Reynolds on the 12th, by order of the Secretary of War, pro­ceeded to Harrisburg to organize and command these forces.

A reorganization of the division of Pennsylvania Reserves became necessary, and was accomplished as follows

Third Division, First Army Corps.

Brig.-Gen. George G. Meade.

Brig.-Gen. Truman Seymour.

First Brigade                      Second Brigade

Bri.-Gen. Truman Seymour        Col. Albert L. Magilton

                                                                          Col. R. Biddle Roberts

1st Penna. Reserves           3rd Penna. Reserves

2nd Penna. Reserves          4th Penna Reserves

5th Penna. Reserves           7th Penna. Reserves

6th Penna. Reserves           8th Penna. Reserves

                                                                            13th Penna. Reserves

(Bucktails)

Third Brigade

Col. Thomas F. Gallagher

Lieut.-Col. Robert Anderson

9th Penna. Reserves

l0th Penna. Reserves

11th Penna. Reserves

12th Penna. Reserves

 

 

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Artillery

1st Penna. Light Battery A.

1st Penna. Light Battery B.

1st Penna. Light Battery G.

5th United States Battery C.[9]

 

The First army corps was commanded by General Hooker and with the Ninth army corps, commanded by General Reno, formed the right wing of the Army of the Potomac, General Burnside having command of the two corps.

On the 13th the Bucktails were again in motion. They crossed the Monocacy, three miles below Frederick, bivouack­ing for the night near that stream. On the same evening,[10] General McClellan was favored by fortune. A copy of Gen­eral Lee's order of the 9th, making the dispositions above summarized for the reduction of Harper's Ferry, fell into his hands. The Union army was not more than twenty miles[11] from the passes of the South Mountain, beyond which the enemy was separated, while Franklin's corps was not more than twelve miles from Crampton's Gap. McClellan, in an order dated 6.20 P. m, ordered Franklin to move next morning.[12] Burnside's command was to move "this evening and early "to-morrow morning." Warned, however, by Stuart of McClel­lan's approach, Lee commenced early on the t4th to strengthen

 

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the defences of the mountain passes through which the Fed­erals must force their way, their right headed for Crampton's Gap, and their left for Turner's Gap.

The Bucktails left camp on the morning of the 14th. Seven miles from Frederick the regiment passed Middletown, and in a nearby field made coffee and ate dinner. The South Mountain is plainly visible from this point, rising some one thousand feet in the air, its base protected by a series of ridges. Six miles north of Crampton's Gap, which Franklin carried in the afternoon after a rather small though spirited action, is Turner's Gap, the pass through which Burnside was to drive his force. The pike from Middletown to Hagerstown runs through the Gap, which is formed by a depression of about four hundred feet. The mountain on the north side of the pike is divided into two crests by a narrow valley, which runs at right angles to the road, the crest of the mountain thus being formed of two ridges. The Gap itself is unassailable; but by roads running parallel to and into the main road its evacuation ,can be forced.

General Burnside had under his command the Ninth corps under General Reno, and the First corps under General Hooker. At 6 A. m., the advance of the Ninth corps moved to assault the left, or south side, of the pass. By brisk fighting they reached the crest at 9 A. M., and succeeded in establish­ing their position despite the efforts of the Confederates. To open the Gap, it now became necessary to take the right, or north side, of the turnpike. Reno's men were to move north from the ground they had won in the morning, and Hooker's corps were to advance in a sort of semi-circular movement and close in on the pike at the summit. To do this the Pennsyl­vania Reserves, forming the extreme right of Hooker's corps, would have to be thrown forward till Seymour's brigade

 

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reached the second ridge. Then while Seymour swept down the second ridge, Magilton's and Gallagher's brigades would advance down the ravine.

The Bucktails in accordance with their usual practice moved forward, with about 275 men and 13 officers in line,[13] acting as skirmishers for the entire division. Between 3 and q. o'clock in the afternoon the columns were well under way, and the Bucktails sighted by the Confederate batteries, placed high up on the mountain, received a storm of shell. Sharp­shooters, protected by rocks and trees, also opened upon them and drove them to cover. All up the mountain side rocks and boulders abound, and here and there, stone walls. When to these features are added heavily wooded portions and frequent depressions in the ground itself, some idea may be gathered of the difficulty of the task laid upon the division. By both armies guns were planted wherever it was possible to bring them into play.

Quickly taking shelter behind trees and rocks, the Buck­tails brought into play their accuracy of marksmanship. Having in their hands Sharps rifles, they were enabled to pick off many a Confederate, who, attempting to reload his inferior weapon, was compelled to partially expose his person. Then with a cheer, leaving cover for a moment, the regiment rushed forward, and charging drove the enemy from his first line of defense back to his second and stronger position, the rest of the division moving up at the same time. General Seymour, confident that his men could take the first crest, and then by advancing through the valley seize the second, gave the order to advance. Moving to the place where the fire was hottest he found Colonel McNeil, and together the two officers encouraged the men. The task was enough to cause the boldest

 

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to hesitate. The troops were expected to charge uphill, and drive from an eminently strong defensive position an equal number of opponents[14] With the Bucktails deployed in single line at intervals of from two to twenty feet the ascent was commenced. At the rear of Company K, the Eleventh regi­ment fell into position. Not more than a hundred and fifty yards separated the combatants. A well-aimed bullet struck the color bearer of the Eleventh, and immediately a Color-Cor­poral dashed forward to raise it aloft. Realizing the peculiar conditions of the battle, and unwilling to see lives uselessly sacrificed, Lieutenant Welch, of Company K, of the Bucktails, ordered him to desist.

At this time, the condition of the men was perilous. The Confederates were sheltered more adequately than the Buck­tails, and were doing terrible execution. Captain Irvin sprang to the front, crying, "Forward Bucktails, drive them from their "position." With a cheer the men rushed forward, closely followed by the Eleventh, but before he could turn Irvin fell, wounded in the head. Infuriated by his loss the men charged boldly. The first ridge was gained and forcing the enemy back, step by step, before dark Seymour's brigade rested in

 

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possession of the second. Magilton's and Gallagher's[15] brigades had performed the work assigned to them, Reno[16] had moved north as ordered, while Gibbon had pushed his demonstration up the main road well towards the summit.

If the contest was resumed in the morning it could have but one result. The way for the army to interpose between the fragments of the Confederate forces was open, nor as yet had Harper's Ferry been surrendered. The price paid by the Union General for Turner's Gap was 1,813 men, of which the Pennsylvania Reserves lost 392. The Bucktail loss was as fol­lows

Killed.             Wounded.             Missing.           Total.

Officers  .......…. 1                              2                   3

 Men ………… 10                            37                 47

 

                                                                           11                           39                 50[17]

Lieutenant Bitterling, Company F, was killed and Cap­tain Irvin, Company K, and Lieutenant Mack, Company E, were wounded.

General Meade in his official report, after extending praise to General Seymour and his brigade for the successful accom­plishment of the great object of the movement, viz.: the out­flanking of the enemy, says: "To Colonel McNeil, of the First "Pennsylvania Rifles, who with his regiment has always been "in the advance, I am indebted for ascertaining the exact posi­tion of the enemy."[18]

 

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Captain McGee, who, owing to Colonel McNeil's death at Antietam, made the official report of this battle, says: "Among "those who particularly distinguished themselves for gallantry

"on this occasion I have to mention the following: Captain "Edward A. Irvin (severely wounded), Captain A. E. Niles,

"Adjt. William R. Hartshorne, Lieuts. James M. Welch, Lucius "Truman, S. A. Mack, Jr. (wounded), N. B. Kinsey, David "G. McNaughton, and Sergt.-Maj. Roger Sherman."[19]

No attempt was made during the evening to descend the mountain on its western side, and the battle of South Mountain

closed[20] with the oncoming of night. The day's heavy fighting, made still more hard by the difficult climb, had rendered the

men thoroughly exhausted. The Bucktails, now reduced to but slightly over two hundred men, with the adaptability of

seasoned campaigners, turned in promptly. If the pass was in their possession, the objective of the campaign was still to be secured, for Lee with his troops, scattered though they were,

lay in the plains below them. McClellan was certain to order an advance by the next morning at the latest.