THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

 

IV.

 

NEW MARKET CROSS ROADS.[1]

 

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General McClellan selected Harrison's Landing, some­times termed Turkey Point, on the James River, as his future base. His line of retreat was therefore nearly due south, vii Savage Station, to White Oak Swamp, and from thence to Harrison's Landing. The impedimenta of the army consisted of a train of five thousand wagons, with a herd of twenty-five hundred beef cattle. More important than anything else, how­ever, was a park of artillery commanded by General Hunt. This constituted the reserve, and including guns, caissons, bat­tery wagons and ammunition trains, must have totaled at least three hundred vehicles. If this artillery could be safely con­ducted to Malvern Hill and there placed in position, the safety of the army while retreating to its new base was assured. Its capture or destruction en route would entail results too unpleas­ant to be considered.

General McClellan, determined to preserve this artillery at all hazards, selected for its escort the division of Pennsylvania Reserves. Cognizant of the fact that they had, alone, fought the battle of Mechanicsville without losing one inch of ground; and that at Gaines' Mills they had extorted expressions of admiration from friend and foe alike by their daring and valor,

 

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he committed to their charge the vital part of the army. Though the Reserves were exhausted with their labors, terribly in want of sleep, and badly in need of rations, General McCall, at 9 o'clock on the evening of the 28th, put them into motion.

The artillery they were conducting, added to that attached to their own division, must have made a train of at least seven miles. The night was dark and rainy, thus adding to the unpleasantness of a duty that in no event could have been pleasurable. Pushing along, the column arrived safely at Savage Station, during the morning of the 29th.[2]

At this point disorder was rampant. Apart from the con­fusion attendant on the movement of the wagon trains, the numbers of wounded destroyed all semblance of orderly ar­rangements. In ambulances and on stretchers; in stores and on the ground; resting in barns or forced to seek shelter in

 

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outhouses, they dominated the scene. As troops came into the station, anxious to know if their comrades were amongst those borne from the field, they broke ranks, each man search­ing for what he almost feared to find. The Bucktails found but few faces that they knew, being compelled, in the majority of cases, to wait for the future to show them if the absent ones were dead or only captured.

Early in the afternoon the regiment, with the other rem­nants of the Reserves, moved forward, orders having been received to conduct the artillery through White Oak Swamp, and to see that it was parked on the first firm ground south of the swamp. Leaving at the time they did, they were spared witnessing the scenes of misery that followed the announcement that it was impossible to carry the wounded with the army, and that they would be left behind, to fall into the hands of, and to be tended by, the Confederates.

Relieved of the care of the artillery reserve at 5 o'clock, the march was resumed, along the New Market Road to a point near where the Quaker Road crosses it. Here a halt was made for the night. The known proximity of the enemy ren­dered the greatest precaution still necessary. Pickets were thrown out, and the entire regiment ordered to rest on their arms, but not to sleep. Each man was ordered to roll up his right sleeve, in order that he might in case of a night attack, know friend from foe. Though several alarms occurred no enemy appeared. At 7 A. M., on the morning of the 30th, orders were received to retire to near where the Turkey Bridge Road crosses the New Market Road, form line of battle, and hold the position till the whole of the immense army trains had passed on, in the rear, towards the James River.

The situation was this. Lee had not divined McClellan's intentions till the 29th; then he took steps to prevent the accom-

 

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plishment of his opponent's plans. Jackson fell upon the Fed­eral rear at Allen's Farm and at Savage Station, but was bravely repulsed. Lee then decided to attempt to break through on the right flank of the Federal line of retreat. The army trains and troops extended from the swamp on the north to the James River on the south, and Lee hoped by advancing down the New Market Road, which bisects this line of march, to cut his opponent's forces in two and defeat them in detail. Across this road, however, General McCall placed his terribly diminished division of Pennsylvania Reserves, numbering at this time not more than 6,ooo men.[3] His line of battle was therefore parallel to the roads pursued by the retreating Union trains in his rear. Kearney's division was on his right flank, Hooker's division and Summer's corps on his left. Yet while these divisions were many times larger than his, as his division straddled the road it was destined to be the target of the full force of the rebel attack. This attack was to be delivered by the troops under Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet, who must have had about 2o,ooo men.[4] General Lee was person­ally present to direct the movements, being accompanied by Jefferson Davis.

McCall formed his line with Meade's brigade on the right and Seymour's brigade on the left. The First brigade, now commanded by Colonel Simmons, was held in reserve. The batteries were placed in front of the infantry; Randall's on the right, Cooper's and Kern's in the center, and two German batteries, accidentally attached to the division, on the left.

In the front of the division the country was open, the

 

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New Market Road, along which ran a small strip of timber, being to the right of the clearing. On the left was a farm­house, known as Nelson's. The clearing was about Boo yards in width and 1,000 yards in length. In the rear of the Union position was a wooded slope. In the front, beyond the clear­ing, woods concealed further view. On the extreme left of the Union position was a small creek or swamp, running at right angles to the line of battle, heavily timbered and form­ing the left flank. Technically, the battle-field was almost ideal, but McCall lacked sufficient men to properly occupy it.

Shortly after 2 o'clock, the Confederates commenced to drive in the Union pickets. Then their artillery opened, and was replied to vigorously by the Union batteries.[5] An attempt was made to capture the Third regiment that had been ad­vanced, before it could fall back into position, but desperate fighting saved it. Then a regiment was launched at the right center, beneath the cover of heavy artillery fire. The Seventh regiment, and a portion of the Eleventh, springing to the front of the battery, by the use of the bayonet repulsed the assault.

Before the lines could be dressed General McCall became aware of a new movement. The enemy, taking advantage of the vigilance required by his opponent to hold the center, had massed a force to attack the left. Heavy columns were moving through the woods and preparing to assault, whereupon the "Dutch" battery promptly retired to the rear. General McCall ordered up the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth regiments, while at-the same time he persuaded the battery to resume its position.

 

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He then ordered a charge, Colonel Simmons of the Fifth leading it over a course that ran diagonally to the left. The charge was made with extreme gallantry, and with such impetuosity that the Confederates fell back. Colonel Simmons fell at the head of his column, but his men never stopped till they reached the woods, where they captured and sent back one or two hundred prisoners.[6]

General McCall had at the same time ridden up to Major Stone of the Bucktails, who had at that moment 5 officers and 150 men of his own regiment, and 5 officers and 84 men of the U. S. Sharpshooters, ordering him to the left [7]When the other regiments charged forward, Major Stone accordingly moved to the left of the battery, and then towards the rear of the Nelson Farm House.

The danger of a successful charge was never better illus­trated. The brigade was far in advance of the line, their leader, Colonel Simmons, was dead, more or less disorganization had necessarily been attendant upon their advance, and confusion was inevitable in sending back the prisoners. From the posi­tion which he then held, Major Stone watched the enemy suddenly hurl fresh masses of troops on the brigade in his front. The pressure was too great to be resisted and the column, a moment before victorious, came flying back. The "Dutch" battery, upon the approach of the rebels, again fled in disorder. Major Stone, anxious to stop the rout at any cost, ordered his men to fall upon their faces; and Colonel McCand­less, who with the Second regiment was in his rear, did like-

 

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wise. The retreating troops came tearing back. The efforts of Major Stone and the officers of the Second regiment to halt and rally them were in vain. They raced over the prostrate men towards safety and the rear. As soon as their front was unmasked, the Bucktails rose, and for some moments poured in a fire that held the enemy in check. Yet the men were dropping rapidly, Captain Philip Holland, of Company A, being shot dead while steadying his own men and attempting to rally others. Realizing that if he stayed much longer he would be completely surrounded, Major Stone ordered his men to fall back, which they did slowly and in good order.[8]

Four hundred yards was the extent of the rearward move­ment. There Major Stone made the Bucktails the nucleus for rallying the fragments of the regiments that came into his vicinity; nor was it long before he had the colors of six regi­ments about him, and a respectable brigade of troops properly officered and in fighting condition.[9]

On the center and right, the battle raged with equal fury. Realizing that if he could break through the line of the Reserves he would be able to cut McClellan's army in half, and that if he failed to do so McClellan would be able to concentrate the

 

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Federal troops at the point he had selected, Lee did not hesitate to hurl regiment after regiment at his opponent. Cooper's and Kern's batteries in the center, and Randall's on the left, became the points of attack. Cooper's battery was taken, retaken and then abandoned. Kern's battery, four guns under Amsden, hung on to its position desperately, till with ammunition com­pletely exhausted it was compelled to withdraw.[10] Randall, on the right, manfully maintained his position, though charged repeatedly by' single regiments.[11]

Then the Confederate commander ordered forward two regiments,[12] who with guns trailing advanced, without order, but in wedge shape. So confident was Captain Randall of his ability to repulse the assault, that he requested the Fourth regiment, in his rear, to withhold its fire. Though his guns tore great gaps in the advancing host, it moved with such momentum, that before it could be stopped it reached the battery. The guns were overturned, the horses killed and the defenders of the battery by sheer weight borne to the rear. Company B, of the Fourth, stood its ground, and with a num­ber of men from other commands fought desperately, both with the bayonet and with clubbed guns. General McCall, riding to the front, witnessed the fight and urged on the men to almost superhuman efforts. The weight of the Confeder­ate assault proved too great to be resisted by the light line of the Reserves, and it was forced backward.

 

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Here McCall called upon General Kearney for reinforce­ments, while Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, of the Reserves, who had collected some 500 men, moved forward to assist the shattered line. At the same time Meagher's "Irish" brigade, of Richardson's division of Summer's corps, moved forward to support the left of the Reserves.

Hearing the noise of battle on the right, Major Stone moved his battalion, consisting of the Bucktails and the frag­ments of the other regiments that had congregated near him, towards that wing.[13] It was rapidly growing dark, and General McCall was endeavoring to dress his line so as to hold the new position to which he had been driven. Out of his staff and his cavalry escort of a Captain and twenty men but two remained­Corporal King and a private. Of his brigade commanders, General Meade had been wounded and forced to retire, Colonel Simmons, who succeeded Reynolds in command of the First brigade, had been killed, and General Seymour had become separated from the division. Hence McCall was compelled to perform duties that should have been done by others. Riding forward accompanied by Corporal King, a private, and Major Stone, the darkness was so intense that the entire party rode into the pickets of the Forty-Seventh Virginia. All were cap­tured with the exception of Major Stone, who, wheeling his horse suddenly, escaped in the darkness. Two volleys were fired after him, but beyond a slight wound in the hand, the Major of the Bucktails regained the Union lines unhurt.[14]

The battalion had utilized the time by capturing a Colonel with a small party of men. Upon returning, Stone formed the men across the road, a position which they maintained for

 

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half an hour. The Confederates had some troops in position to advance down the road, and had they done so, would have struck the Federal line at its weakest point. Shortly after the battle ceased, and before the battalion was withdrawn, Major Stone, who had gone to the rear in search of a cannon to strengthen his position, became so faint and dizzy from his wound, that before he could accomplish his design he was taken to the hospital.[15]

Though the Reserves had been driven from their position, they had accomplished the duty laid upon them. "The Con­federates had not achieved the .main object of their com­mander: the Federal army was not cut in twain, the line of "retreat to the James was yet in its possession."[16]

They had extorted a tremendous price for the loss which they had suffered, and though they had been forced back the enemy dared to occupy but little of the position from which they had retired.[17] General McCall reported that he captured during the day two or three hundred prisoners and three stands

 

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of colors.[18] The Confederate reports all speak of victory, but there is little exultation. They recognize that, though the Union troops had been made to give ground, the line of defense was unbroken and the object of the attack unattained.[19]

General Seymour in his official report of the campaign says: "Captain L. Wister and Quartermaster H. W. Patton, of "the First Rifles (Bucktails), are highly praised for efficient "and gallant service. Maj. Roy Stone deserves the highest "praise on all occasions. He relates that John Doyle, a private "of Easton's battery, after the guns were lost, went to his "command and, among the foremost, performed manly duty."[20]

 

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Major Stone in his report of the campaign says: "Sergt. "Maj. Roger Sherman, who shared the greatest dangers with "the most remarkable self-possession, was lost on the last "evening, and is probably wounded and a prisoner. I beg "leave also to mention the earnest and untiring labors of Chap­lain the Rev. W. H. Hatton, in caring for the wounded, en­couraging the exhausted, both on the field and in the hospital."[21]

Speaking of the battle of New Market Cross Roads he says: "The loss of my command in this action was much "greater in proportion than in any of the preceding. I have "this morning but 3 officers and 6o men of my own regiment, "and 3 officers and 28 men of the U. S. Sharpshooters for "duty."[22]