THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

 

II.

 

 

MECHANICSVILLE.

 

96

 

 

It was the lot of the Bucktails and the other regiments of Pennsylvania Reserve Corps to take such an important part in the Seven Days' battles on the Peninsula, that it is necessary to explain briefly the condition of affairs existing at the time of their arrival.

The Peninsula is formed by the York River on the north and the James River on the south; the general direction of both being from the northwest to the southeast. The Penin­sula itself is from seven to fifteen miles wide, the country being low, flat, wooded, and in some places marshy. It loses its character as a peninsula fifty miles from its lower end, the York River, its northern boundary, dividing at that point into two very much smaller rivers; the northern branch being called the Mattapony and the lower branch the Pamunkey. The James River is much longer than the York, and upon its northern bank, seventy-five miles from its mouth, is situated the Confederate capital, Richmond, the objective of McClellan's campaign.

McClellan's forces landed on the lower end of the Penin­sula, and by the 2nd of April were moving towards Yorktown. To take this town, McClellan made full and correct siege prep­arations; but as soon as they were completed, the Confed­erates, on May 4th, evacuated it. The opposing forces next

 

97

 

came into real contact, at Williamsburg, on the 4th and 5th, the Confederates evacuating that place on the morning of the 6th. The Union army pushed forward, retarded considerably how­ever by the poor condition of the roads. Still on the t6th of May the advance reached White House on the Pamunkey River. It will be remembered, that the Pamunkey is the more southern of the two rivers which uniting at West Point form the York River. McClellan was supplying his army via the York River, and its continuation, the Pamunkey; and his base of supplies was established from this time at White House on the Pamunkey, from which place, the Richmond and York River Railroad runs to Richmond, a distance of about eighteen miles.

When it is recalled that Richmond is on the north bank of the James, while White House is on the south bank of the Pamunkey, and that between the two flows the Chickahominy, at this point parallel to both, it will be apparent that to attack Richmond, McClellan was compelled to straddle the latter, in order to retain communications with his base.[1] The Chicka­hominy itself is inconsiderable, but flows through a belt of heavily timbered swamp. The tops of the trees in the swamp reach to about the level of the highlands on each side; and while at parts the stream follows a single channel, more fre­quently it flows in several. When the stream rises, even but a little, above its summer level, it overflows the entire swamp, three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a quarter in width. The formidableness of such an obstacle to military operations is

 

98

 

apparent. McClellan immediately commenced the construction of bridges and on May 31st, a battle was fought at Fair Oaks, south of the Chickahominy and only a few miles east of Rich­mond.

With this battle, the end of which saw the Union troops in possession of the ground for which they contended, may be said to end the aggressive movement of McClellan. He over­estimated the strength of his opponents; was uncertain where Jackson was; and declined to move without reinforcements. By the time that active operations were again resumed, Lee had been, or was being, reinforced, while it would seem doubt­ful if McClellan's reinforcements more than equalized his losses at Fair Oaks.[2]

Upon leaving the "South America" at White House, the Bucktails went into camp. So fine was the appearance of the division, that a contemporary commented upon their apparent efficiency,[3] and two officers of the Peruvian army, who were present, expressed astonishment at their military bearing.

On the 12th the division moved down the Richmond and York River Railroad, past Dispatch Station, to within thirteen miles of Richmond. Shortly after the regiments had gone into camp the next day, a report reached General McCall that the enemy was raiding the railroad in his rear. He immediately or­dered General Reynolds to move with the First brigade to the relief of the guard. Though night, there was a bright moon

 

99

 

shining, and the First brigade with the six companies of the Bucktails, commanded by Major Stone, thrown forward as skirmishers, marched rapidly back up the railroad. Eight miles were covered, and then at Tunstall's Station the troops came upon a train of cars which had been set on fire. The enemy had also torn up a portion of the track; but had themselves effec­tually disappeared.[4] The next day, the Bucktails were engaged scouting but without result. On the 15th they were ordered forward to Dispatch Station, where upon the 16th they were paraded for General McClellan. Much disappointment was felt when the Commanding General failed to appear; and still more when the experience was repeated on the 17th.

On the 18th the regiment marched to within three miles of Mechanicsville, moving up to that place on the 19th. In this position they formed the extreme right advance of the army.

McClellan apparently planned to attack Richmond by throwing forward his left; but his base of supplies being at White House, on the north side of the Chickahominy, while the attack was to be made on the south, a sufficient force would have. to be left on the north side to insure the safety of his communications. This force was under General Porter and consisted of the Fifth corps, to which McCall's division, as­signed the position of honor, was temporarily attached.

An army astride of a river is always in a dangerous posi­tion, and McClellan seems early to have realized, that should he fail to take Richmond promptly, it might be advisable to

 

100

 

change his base from White House on the Pamunkey, to a point near Richmond on the James; withdrawing at the same time his entire army to the south side of the Chickahominy.

Mechanicsville on the north side of the Chickahominy is nearly due north of Richmond and the front of the Union army extended in a quarter circle to a point on the south side of the Chickahominy nearly due east of Richmond. The Confeder­ates held the south bank of the Chickahominy north of Rich­mond, within the arc of the Union front; and McCall's divi­sion, constituting as it did the extreme right of the army, faced them from the north bank. A mile or so east of Mechanicsville, Beaver Dam Creek, flowing south, at right angles with the Chickahominy, empties into that river. If Lee should attempt to cut the Union communications by falling on its right flank, he would cross the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville or above, and then move down parallel with the north bank of the river. Hence, to prevent this, while watching the Chickahominy, McCall at the same time constructed his main line of defense along the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek, at right angles to the Chickahominy, throwing out skirmishers towards Mechan­icsville and beyond.

It being important to prevent any information reaching the enemy as to the Federal strength or position, orders were issued forbidding the men to fire guns. Drumming also came under ban. By the 22nd the regiments were busily engaged in digging rifle pits; but with the exception of some shelling indulged in by the batteries, nothing of moment occurred till the 26th.

Before McClellan delivered his attack, Lee, on the 25th, knowing that Jackson was close at hand, decided to assume the offensive. Selecting the Union right flank as the point of his assault, General Hill was ordered to cross to the north bank of

 

101

 

the Chickahominy, unite with Jackson, and push the Union forces backward.

Early on the morning of the 26th, Jackson, who was at Ashland, commenced his march towards the scene of action. Near Atley's Station, Branch's division of Hill's corps, which had crossed higher up the Chickahominy,[5] and was moving so as to unite with Jackson, came into contact with the Eighth Illinois cavalry, driving it back in the direction of the Meadow Bridge, which spans the Chickahominy a mile or so west of Mechanicsville.

General McCall, in anticipation of such an attack, had in the morning ordered the six companies of the Bucktails and the Fifth regiment to the latter point, and at i o'clock, upon hearing that the Union cavalry were being forced back, he ordered Major Stone to advance with three companies to its support. Moving forward rapidly to a point where three roads meet, Major Stone placed Captain Wister, with Company B, at the junction, throwing forward Captain Jewett, with Com­pany D, on the road leading towards Atley's Station, and Captain Irvin, with Company K, on the road leading to Cren­shaw's Bridge. The third road was in the rear and led towards Meadow Bridge. Near this bridge were the remaining three companies of the Bucktails and the Fifth regiment.

Hardly had Captain Jewett succeeded in deploying Com­pany D, when the enemy's infantry appeared in his front in force. He opened fire on them at short range, with such effect that they halted in confusion. As they re-formed he poured in a second volley.[6]

While Company D was thus engaging the enemy in their front, the Confederate General, A. P. Hill, had crossed Field's

 

102

 

 

division over the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, meeting with no opposition,[7] as orders had been given to the Union troops to fall back to the defensive position prepared on the east bank of Beaver Dam Creek. With the withdrawal of the Fifth regiment and three companies of Bucktails from the vicinity of the Meadow Bridge,[8] and the crossing of it by the Confed­erates, Companies B, D and K were cut off from the other troops.

Captain Wister, at the junction of the roads, found him­self suddenly hotly engaged by the enemy approaching from Meadow Bridge; but remembering that Companies D and K were in front of him, he determined to hang on to his position as long as possible in order to give them an opportunity of withdrawing. Lieutenant Patton, the Quartermaster of the regiment, at this moment notified him that the enemy had crossed in force, and though the steady fire of Company B temporarily checked the rebel advance, owing to the strength­ening of the attack, it was soon compelled to retreat. Unable to do so by way of Mechanicsville, Captain Wister moved northward, contesting every inch of ground as he went, till he gained the line at Beaver Dam Creek.[9]

Major Stone, who upon hearing that the guard at Meadow Bridge had been withdrawn, had ridden -forward to the junc­tion of the roads and assisted personally in the withdrawal of Company B, now turned back to see if he could not save Com­pany D, under Captain Jewett. Meeting the column, he diverted its course to the north, and assisted by a small rear

 

103

 

guard of cavalry managed by making a long detour to bring it also safely to its position.[10]

Captain Irvin, with Company K, who had advanced along the road towards Crenshaw's Bridge, had also been notified by Lieutenant Patton of the crossing of the Meadow Bridge by the Confederates and advised to retire. Captain Irvin, how­ever, finding that the Lieutenant frankly admitted that he was the bearer of no official orders, but was acting on his own initiative, decided that he could not retreat without official in­structions. Major Stone hearing that Captain Irvin refused to move without orders,[11] made an attempt to send such orders to him, but it was too late.[12] The opportunity to withdraw had ceased to exist and the company was surrounded.

When Lieutenant Patton left, Captain Irvin sent a man back to investigate. Hardly had he gotten out of sight before the balls commenced to fly thick. Driven back, the messenger reported that Lieutenant Patton had reported only too truly. Captain Irvin immediately formed his men and moved towards the rear. Here he struck a road running to the Meadow Bridge, upon which the Confederates were drawn up in force, and some of the company heard the officers instructing their men to be careful upon whom they fired, as' their own troops were approaching down the river. Captain Irvin then made an attempt to break through at the junction of the three roads; but by.this time, that position also was strongly held, and the company retreated to the cover of the swamps. The sound of firing continued; but as it became constantly more distant, it indicated only too plainly that the Union troops were being

 

104

 

withdrawn towards Mechanicsville, and Beaver Dam Creek beyond.

Lying in the swamps the men saw the Confederate troops pass by. At times Captain Irvin or some of the officers would reconnoiter, only to return impressed with the impossibility of getting out of the trap at that time. Shortly after the battle of Mechanicsville commenced[13] and the company lay hiding, listening to the cannonading and infantry fire. The idea that the Union troops would either be beaten or would retreat, did not occur to any of the men. When it became dark scouts were sent out in every direction, in the hope that some place might be discovered through which the men could slip. But the roads and country beyond the swamp were everywhere lit up by camp-fires. As the men had left camp in the morning with no rations, by the next morning they were pretty hungry and great was their disappointment to find by the sound of firing that the battle was still further away. The conclusion that the army was either retreating defeated, or was engaged in the hazardous operation of making a change of base, was irresistible. Stubborn in their determination not to surrender, spending the days hiding like foxes, and the nights in attempt­ing to find a place of egress, the men became unkempt and haggard. Their nerves protested against the strain under which they were kept, and their bodies cried for nourishment. On the 28th, a rebel straggler, John Robb, was captured. Anx­ious himself to get home, he offered to do what he could to guide them to Fredericksburg. To rejoin the army, not to escape northward, was the desire of the company, hence the Confederate was retained as a prisoner, and starved with them.

The human physique has its limits of endurance. On the evening of the 3oth, Captain Irvin and Lieutenants Welch and

 

105

 

Dale, with two or three men, went out scouting. During their absence, the others resolved to surrender. They had eaten nothing for five whole days. Before the plan could be put into operation, the officers returned and Captain Irvin sternly refused to give his assent. A council was immediately held at which it was decided to make another attempt to escape. Keep­ing well within the swamp on the north side of the Chickaho­miny, the company had gradually worked down the stream, till they were but a short distance from the bridge over which the Virginia Central Railroad crosses to reach Richmond. The rail­road was guarded by sentinels and trains ran across it con­stantly. It was raised eight or ten feet above the swamp, and rushes and briars grew close up to the embankment. Before attempting to cross it, it was considered best to wait until it was completely dark. During a terrific storm, Captain Irvin advanced, climbed the embankment, crept across the tracks between two sentinels making a vain effort to protect them­selves from the weather, and beckoned to his men to follow. One by one they did so, dropping down the farther side of the embankment till all were across. The lightning ceased, but the rain came down in torrents, and twice the way was missed. As the light came with the morning, it was found that they were then level with Mechanicsville but between that settle­ment and the river. To advance, and to advance was their only chance, it soon became necessary to cross a cleared patch of ground, two or three hundred feet in width. One by one the men were to endeavor to steal across. Though on a hill above a camp of rebels was plainly visible, it was already the first day of July, and the men who had had nothing to eat since the 26th of June were in no mood to delay on account of danger. Nearly the entire party succeeded in crossing before two stragglers noticing them gave warning to the rebel camp.

 

106

 

Five miles from Richmond, surrounded by forces a dozen times their own strength, exhausted from exposure and weak from lack of food nothing was left but surrender. As one of the party went forward, waving a handkerchief for a flag of truce, some of the men broke down and cried like children. An officer who met the envoy assembled a detachment of cav­alry and infantry, and then the worn-out company marched out and stacked arms. They were then marched to Mechan­icsville, where they notified their captors that they had had nothing to cat for six days. Some effort was made to relieve their condition, but before food could be procured the com­pany was ordered to fall in, and was marched to Richmond. At that place, after it became dark, the men received and divided amongst themselves, about a half a bushel of soda crackers.

For the sake of continuity it has been necessary to follow the fortunes of one company throughout a week, during each day of which the fate of the main army hung in the balance. It is therefore necessary to return to the afternoon of the 26th.

It has been stated that three companies left at Meadow Bridge had been ordered back, and that Major Stone had suc­ceeded in extricating Companies B and D. Hence Companies A, B, D, E and F fell into the positions assigned to them to resist the main attack of the enemy at Beaver Dam Creek. General McCall had formed his line with First brigade on the right and the Third brigade on the left; the Second brigade being held in reserve.[14]

 

107

 

General Reynolds, commanding the First brigade, formed his line so as to take advantage of the formation of the ground; the Second regiment being on the extreme right, with the Bucktails on their left. Two companies of U. S. Berdan sharp­shooters were with the five companies of Bucktails ; the entire seven companies being placed in rifle pits in front of Cooper's battery.

McCall's force consisted of but about 9,500 men, while to attack this small body, Lee had two-thirds of his army on the north side of the Chickahominy-A. P. Hill, D. P. Hill and Longstreet being close up; while Jackson was rapidly getting within touch.[15]

As the skirmishers were driven backward some modifica­tions were made in the disposal of the troops, the First regi­ment moving to the extreme right. General Lee, who had arrived on the field, had ordered General A. P. Hill to attack the Union right. Hill to do this had three brigades, Ander­son's, Archer's and Field's; and he hurled these forces against the brigade commanded by General Reynolds. As the Con­federates came into view the Union batteries poured in a de­structive storm of lead. Still the enemy pushed on till within a hundred yards of the rifle pits. Then, following their orders; the infantry regiments commenced their,fire. So rapidly and so accurately did they ply their guns that the charging column halted, reeled back and sought shelter in the swamp. Gen­eral McCall, recognizing that the enemy was concentrating to crush Reynolds' brigade, advanced Kern's battery and the Third

 

108

 

regiment to its support. The Confederates rallied, massed fresh troops, and once again charged forward. A Georgia and a Louisiana regiment, wading breast high through the creek, obtained footing on the bank held by the Reserves, till gal­lantly charged and driven back by the Second regiment. At the same time immense pressure was thrown on the Bucktails and the Fifth, the two regiments holding the immediate left of the Second. With their ammunition rapidly running out the men stuck to their task. The contest became desperate, but the stamina and ability of the Union troops finally gave to them the victory and enabled them to drive the Confederates back.[16]

Having failed to carry the Union right, Lee decided to assault the Union left, held by Seymour's brigade, which was astride of the Ellerson's Mill Road. General D. P. Hill's divi­sion attacked savagely only to be repulsed; and his defeat was followed by an attempt by General Longstreet which was equally futile.

With darkness at 9 o'clock the battle ceased. McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, with probably but slightly over 7,000 men, had repulsed the attack of three strong divi­sions, one division of which, Hill's, alone was estimated to contain 14,000 men.[17] The total Confederate loss was reported in the Richmond papers as not short of 2,000.[18] The total Union loss was 361 killed, wounded and missing[19] and the loss in the Bucktail regiment was

 

109

 

Killed.                                     Wounded.                                     Missing.                         Total.

Officers  .. ………………                                                            2                                  3                                  5

Men  ……………………            2                                              16                                72                                90

Total…………………….        2                                              18                                75                                95[20]

 

Adjutant Hartshorne was severely wounded in the head, while the officers captured were Captain Irvin and Lieutenants Bard and Dale of Company K.[21]

With the cessation of the battle, the various regiments of the Reserves busied themselves with preparations to resume the contest upon the following morning. Towards the close of the action the Fourteenth New York had been ordered forward to relieve and support the Bucktails,[22] but Major Stone declined to be relieved except as to picket duty, so the Bucktails slept in the rifle pits without cover.[23] The surgeons, and the various squads appointed to assist them, worked so industriously that by 7 A. m. the next day all the wounded had been cared for,

and the killed buried.

In his official report, General McCall says

"Where all so gallantly supported the honor of the flag it "would seem almost invidious to particularize, but my thanks "are particularly due to Generals Reynolds and Seymour, and "to Colonels Simmons, of the Fifth, and Taggart, of the

 

110

 

"Twelfth, and Lieutenant-Colonel McCandless, of the Second, "Major Stone, of the Rifles, who were all closely engaged.[24]

Major Stone in his report of the campaign says

"My adjutant, Lieut. W. R. Hartshorne, one of the best "officers in the service, was severely wounded in the head "on the evening of the 26th, and is doubtless taken prisoner in "the hospital at Savage Station. Quartermaster Lieut. H. D. "Patton, an officer of great energy and activity, was of the "highest service to me on the 26th."[25]

Though the Confederate General Jackson had only suc­ceeded in getting a part of his artillery into play during the battle, during the night he pushed his force forward between the right flank of McCall's division and the south bank of the Pamunkey River, thus threatening McClellan's communications with White House. To defend his communications against the bulk of the Confederate army, McClellan would have been com­pelled to bring the bulk of his army back to the north side of the Chickahominy and offer general battle; but this was almost impossible, as the enemy was already upon his communica­tions, and if he had offered battle he would have done so with­out an assured retreat. To concentrate his forces south of the Chickahominy, and make a sudden dash at Richmond was a plan he did not consider sound; hence he chose the only other line of action, short of a retreat by the way he had come, a change of base to the James River.

This involved the abandonment of White House, the burn­ing of such stores as could not be moved, the movement of slow and heavy wagon trains for a period of several days, and at the end the establishment of a strong position, preparatory to commencing new operations. Two things pre-eminently

 

111

 

were necessary: a strong rear guard on the north bank of the Chickahominy to hold the river till the trains could be put in motion; and strong guards later on, to prevent flank attacks while the trains moved towards the base selected upon the James River.

To General Porter's Fifth corps, with McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, was the duty of holding, during the next day, the north bank of the Chickahominy assigned.