THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

 

III.

 

 

GAINES' MILL.[1]

 

 

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About daylight on the morning of the 27th, the orders to fall back to the position selected by General Porter to dispute the passage of the Chickahominy were received.

The operation of withdrawing troops from a position, such as that occupied by the Reserves, is at any time a delicate one; and General McCall felt much apprehension at undertaking it during daylight. Under his orders Meade's brigade left first, then Reynolds' brigade and lastly Seymour's. To partially veil his rearward movement from the enemy, General McCall or­dered active demonstrations, and General Reynolds instructed Major Stone to hold, with his regiment and the battery, the position he then occupied [2] Major Stone deployed his men to the right and left in an attempt to deceive the enemy and make him believe that the entire line was still occupied. Upon open­ing fire he received a heavy reply from the Confederates, who, during the night, had advanced their guns to within grape-

 

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shot range. Their infantry, too, came forward with undimin­ished force, filling the road towards the ford with a solid column.

The artillery opposing the Bucktails and the battery was more powerful than that of the previous evening. So hot did its fire become, that the Union gunners found it impossible to stand up to load their pieces; still, as long as their ammunition lasted, they, with the aid of the Bucktails, succeeded in holding the enemy in check. About 6 A. m., Major Stone was ordered to fall back and rejoin the main column of the army, then moving to take position at Gaines' Mill. His course, for a half mile after leaving the intrenchments, was one that was within range of the rebel batteries. The movement was neces­sarily hurried; as in addition to the force in their front as they fell back, the Bucktails had been flanked. Major Stone ordered Captain Holland, with Company A, to take position 300 yards from the ford and obstruct the hostile advance. Captain Wister, with Company B, was to destroy the bridge at the Mill Hospital.[3]

Captain Niles, of Company E, was holding a detached position with portions of Companies E and D. In some way he did not receive the order to fall back until after the bridge had been destroyed and the other companies had retired. He therefore found himself left in the swamp at the border of the creek Both Captain Holland and Captain Wister, the latter sustaining a wound in the ankle, performed the duties assigned to them in a manner worthy of the greatest praise and enabled Major Stone to bring his force within the lines. Yet the action had cost dear. It was necessary to abandon the dead and wounded; the heat was so intense that men fainted; and the

 

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movements were executed with such rapidity that many dropped from exhaustion and were captured.

Not half of the Bucktails in line on the morning reached the position at Gaines' Mill, Major Stone reporting at 12 o'clock that he had but 6 officers and 125 men.[4]

Captain Niles, hopelessly cut off, as Captain Irvin had been the previous day, resolved to do what he could. Falling back in the swamps and woods he engaged the Confederates with such vigor as to mislead them; nor did they succeed in effecting the capture of his little party till several hours had elapsed, and an entire division had been employed to surround them.

Bates in his "History of Pennsylvania Volunteers,"[5] points out the immense service rendered by Captain Niles and his men in thus detaining the Confederates, and affording General Porter time to establish his troops in position.

Before surrendering, the men who had with them the regimental flag buried or concealed it in the swamp, and thus saved the regiment the humiliation of having their flag become a rebel trophy.[6]

Major Stone, in reporting the action, commented on the duties assigned to Captains Holland and Wister, adding: "These were difficult and hazardous duties, and were performed "with the coolness of veterans, and probably saved us from "entire destruction."[7]

 

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General Reynolds complimented the command warmly, and said "I take great pleasure in bearing testimony to the gallantry "and good conduct displayed by him (Major Roy Stone) while "in command of the First Pennsylvania Rifles, at Mechanics­"ville and Gaines' Mill, and particularly in covering the with­drawal of our troops from the former to the latter position on "the morning of the 27th of June, which took place under my "personal supervision. I know of no officer more worthy to "be placed at the head of a brigade of light troops."[8]

General Reynolds testified later that the rear guard during the withdrawal was "a couple of pieces on the right and left, "and one regiment supporting them; those were finally with­drawn simultaneously by General Seymour and myself."[9] General Seymour had selected the Ninth regiment for rear guard duty, at his end of the line; but it does not seem to have had a difficult task, the brunt falling on the small body of Bucktails. In fact General Seymour, in his official report says"In the absence of General Reynolds, I may say that much of "the credit of this day belongs to him .  his conduct of the "right wing is worthy of all praise  Major Stone, with "rare intelligence, prepared his position and fought it like a "true soldier to the end."[10].

 General Porter had elected to place his troops on the Cur­tis' and Gaines' farms in the arc of a circle. The two flanks were to rest on the Chickahominy, or to be sufficiently near to the river to obtain the advantage of such a position. In the rear would be the bridges connecting the corps with the main army now retreating towards the James River. To withstand

 

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the Confederate assault, General Porter had but Morrell's di­vision of three brigades; Sykes' division of three brigades; and McCall's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, three bri­gades; in all 17,330 infantry. A small detachment of cavalry and some artillery completed his resources.[11] To Morrell's divi­sion was assigned the left of the line, and to Sykes' division the right. McCall's division having been through hard fighting was held in reserve. The cavalry was posted on the extreme left in the hollow approaching the river; the artillery at various advantageous points. The position was a strong one, but Por­ter's forces were not sufficiently large to properly occupy it. Had axes that he sent for been supplied, artificial works could have been made to counteract this weakness, but through a series of mischances he failed to obtain them.

By :2 p. m., Lee was ready to attack. Not that he had as yet fathomed McClellan's plans. On the contrary, he still be­lieved the Union army was endeavoring to retreat down the Peninsula, but he was desirous of cutting its communications. He had the forces of Generals A. P. Hill, D. P. Hill, Long­street and Jackson available-not less than 65,ooo to 70,000 men--and ordered A. P. Hill to assault the Union left. This was done with tremendous spirit, a portion of the column actu­ally piercing the Union line. Hastily the various regiments of the Second and Third brigades of the Reserve Corps were thrown in, regiment by regiment, at the points most in danger. The First brigade had been posted on the extreme right to cover the approaches from Cold Harbor and Dispatch Station to Summer's bridge,[12] but General Reynolds hearing the tre­mendous firing on the left, and having previously repulsed the

 

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enemy on his front, led his men, regiment by regiment, to the assistance of the hardly pressed troops.[13]

The Bucktails, on the right of the Fifth regiment, went in on the left of Sykes' division and the right of Morrell's! In their front the enemy was concealed in some woods, a battery being visible 500 yards away.

The attack of A. P. Hill being repulsed, Lee prepared for a general assault in force, and Porter called urgently upon McClellan for reinforcements from the south side of the Chick­ahominy. Ultimately he received Slocum's division, which arrived about 4. o'clock,[14] and increased his force to about 30,000 men.

From the opening of the battle till about 6 P. m., regi­ment after regiment, and brigade after brigade, charged for­ward against the Federal line, only to be driven back. The attack on the left and right being equal in power, troops could not be withdrawn from one place to strengthen another. Only reserves could be ordered up, as regiments having spent their ammunition, fell back to replenish it.

As the Bucktails moved into line, they had 15o men and 6 officers.[15] Devoting their attention to the battery in their front, such was the accuracy of their fire that they compelled it to frequently change its position, finally silencing it entirely. A little before sunset, their ammunition began to run low. Taking advantage of the consequent slackening in their fire, the enemy emerged from the woods and formed for a charge. The Buck­tails delivered a well-directed volley which staggered them, while the Fifth regiment rushed forward to within 15o yards

 

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of the enemy's lines before pouring in a volley that drove him back.

At 6.30 P. m. the Confederates made another powerful attack, along the entire front, pushing forward fresh troops to oppose the greatly wearied Federals. Still the latter's line held bravely and firmly against the outnumbering enemy, excepting at one place near the center of Morrell's line. Here Hood's Texans broke through, and before they could either be ex­pelled, or the line altered, the Union artillery on the left was thrown into disorder by a mass of their own cavalry rushing amongst them.[16] Believing that the Confederates were upon them, the artillery retreated precipitately, striking the infantry and demoralizing it. Fortunately, at this moment, the men under Generals French and Meagher advanced to the support of the shattered line.

The position held by the Bucktails and the Fifth had become untenable. The troops on the left were retreating, and already, to prevent disaster, the entire right of the army was falling back, preparatory to establishing a more concentrated line, the movement resulting in the exposure of the right of the Bucktails to an enfilading fire. Major Stone changed front and fired his last volley. He then attempted to take cover behind a ridge on the right; but, as the position was in the range of the Union batteries, it was impossible to do so. Falling back with the other troops, the Bucktails were .then-formed in the rear of the hospital.[17]

With the shortening of his entire line, a shortening that was accomplished partly deliberately, partly in haste but with-

 

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out confusion,[18] General Porter decided to transfer his corps to the southern bank of the river. Wagon trains, ammunition trains, detached masses from brigades, stragglers from a hun­dred regiments, wounded men, some on improvised stretchers, some supported by comrades, blocked the ground about the approaches to the bridges. The curses of the mule drivers mingled with the short, sharp orders of the officers, and the pleadings and expostulations of the wounded. Ultimately an opening was made in the tangled mass and the wagons passed over. With each vehicle or man that crossed, order developed,[19] till at the last the troops filed past and fell into positions as­signed to them on the southern bank. At the meadow edge of the bridge, under instructions of an officer of General Mc­Clellan's staff, Major Stone and Captain Wister halted the stragglers and re-formed nearly 2,000 men of the Pennsylvania Reserves.[20]

Here the Reserves stayed till two o'clock in the morning, when they crossed over the new bridge from the battle-field to the southern bank of the Chickahominy.

Towards the close of the battle the Eleventh regiment of the Reserves, and the Fourth New Jersey, were surrounded, through the other regiments in their vicinity falling back, and compelled to surrender. General Reynolds, while laboring at the task of leading troops to reinforce others, also became cut off, and was compelled, after spending the night in the woods, to yield himself a prisoner.

Major Stone, in his official report, gave his casualties as

 

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1 officer and 25 men[21] and the official casualty reports give the loss as follows:

                                          Killed.                         Wounded.                         Missing.                         Total.

Officers  .. ....                                                                                        6                                     6           Men..............               1                                  14                                   90                                 105
Total ............               1                                  14                                    96                               111[22]

  

Thus the battle of Gaines' Mill passed into history. One corps of the Union army had borne the brunt of the attack of two-thirds of the Confederate forces. The Union loss was reported as 6,837 men;[23] the Confederate loss cannot have been much less; and if only the killed and wounded are counted, must have been considerably more.[24]

During the battle, McClellan had had on the south bank the bulk of his army-probably nearer 70,000 than 50,000 men. To oppose this force, had McClellan ordered it to fall upon Richmond, the Confederates had left but 25,000 men under General Magruder. Yet such a "noise and clatter" did Magru­der make, that McClellan not only did not walk into Richmond, but considered it inadvisable to send desperately required reinforcements to General Porter's corps.

 

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With the withdrawal of the entire army to the south bank, involving as it did the last act of severance from the base at White House, the thing to be achieved was the establishment of a base from which to supply the army. In other words, the campaign to capture Richmond was temporarily suspended while the efforts of the General were directed to securing a new base of supplies, from which he could later on resume his offensive campaign.