BURNSIDE'S CAMPAIGN.
II.
FREDERICKSBURG.
227
Upon arriving at Brooke's Station,
Captain Taylor, who had been exchanged, and Captain Irvin, who had recovered from the
wound he had received at South Mountain, rejoined the regiment. Great was the rejoicing
throughout the ranks, not only because of the affection felt for these officers, but also
because, by directions received from Headquarters, Captain Taylor assumed command. Few
inspections were so enjoyed as the one held by the latter on the 23rd; nor did anything
relieve the monotony of camp life until December 4th, when orders were received directing
the regiment to hold itself in readiness to march at a moment's notice. The long expected
advance upon Fredericksburg loomed close upon the horizon, and everything betrayed the
interest felt. On the 7th, a march &as made of some three miles, and on the 8th the
regiment Lrrived at a place, then termed Mrs. Gray's Bottom. The weather became colder,
and over icy roads the Bucktails on the ith advanced to the immediate vicinity of
Fredericksburg, in full hearing of the bombardment then in progress.
Fredericksburg lies in a broken plain
on the southern bank >f the Rappahannock; the town being oblong in shape, with its
ength parallel to the river. The plain, in which it is situated, s formed by a bold ridge,
partly wooded, which touching the Rappahannock above Falmouth, pursues a course in the
rear
228
of the town generally parallel with the
river. Six miles below Falmouth the Massaponax Creek, flowing north, crosses the plain and
empties into the Rappahannock. Thus the plain is best described as lying between the
Rappahannock and the ridge; its upper end formed by the angle of the ridge and the
Rappahannock, and its lower end by the Massaponax. Midway between the upper end and the
Massaponax, is Deep Run, which crossing the plain divides it into two. In the upper half
is the town itself.
When Burnside commenced his movement
towards Fredericksburg, the advance was given to Sumner's Grand division. Sumner, who
arrived at Falmouth upon the 17th of November, believing that it would be comparatively
easy to occupy the town, it being then but lightly defended, requested permission to seize
it, but his request was denied by General Burnside,[1] who proceeded slowly to mass
his troops preparatory to taking the town by assault. His pontoons did not arrive until
later than he expected, and this delayed him still further. The Confederates, fully
aware of the designs of the Union commander, made their preparations accordingly. During
the weeks that Burnside permitted them, they concentrated their forces on the ridge back
of the town. Earthwork epaulements for the protection of artillery, rifle pits for
infantry, and every other form of defense that human ingenuity could devise, were
constructed. With the guns placed in position and riflemen in the trenches, the position
became one that might well be termed impregnable.
Burnside when he finally decided to
attack, seems to have had no definite plan in mind. His orders were so vague in
phraseology that his subordinates were at a loss to know what
229
to do. Still, at any rate, Burnside
decided to cross his army over the Rappahannock, at two places,[2]
and then make an attack. Sumner's Grand division was to be the Union right and Franklin's
Grand division the left, while the majority of Hooker's Grand division was to be held in
reserve upon the northern bank. On the 11th and 12th of December the troops crossed the
river.
It is probable that the Union forces
amounted to about 113,000, against the Confederates' 78,000, a disparity[3]
in numbers that by no means counter-balanced the unequalness of position; for the
Union troops were to move across an open plain, to attack a position naturally strong, and
upon the defences of which the Confederates had spent weeks of labor, Sumner's Grand
division, forming the Union right, occupied Fredericksburg and in fact the plain from
its upper end to Deep Rum. Franklin's Grand division,[4] forming the Union left,
extended from Deep Run two miles towards the Massaponax. The entire army was formed
parallel to the river, with the exception of Franklin's extreme left. This was held by the
Pennsylvania Reserves, the division being formed at practically a right angle to the
general line; its left touching the river at Smithfield[5] and its right almost
connecting with the left of Gibbon's division. The division had been ordered to assume
this position to guard
230
against possible attacks that might be
made from the direction of the Massaponax, a mile away.
At 5 o'clock, on the afternoon of the
12th, Burnside visited Franklin, who requested permission to make a strong attack the next
morning. At- 6 o'clock Burnside left "without consenting to make the attack or
without saying he would not "do it," but he did state that orders would be
received in the course of two or three hours. After midnight Franklin sent an Aide-de-Camp
to the telegraph office, only to learn that the orders were being prepared. About 7
o'clock on the morning of the 13th, General Franklin received a despatch from Burnside's
Chief of Staff, a portion of which was as follows
"General Hardie will carry this
despatch to you and remain "with you during the day. The general commanding directs
"that you keep your whole command in position for a. rapid "movement down the
Richmond road, and you will send out at "once a division, at least, to pass below
Smithfield, to seize, if "possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side
of "the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its "line of
retreat open." [6]
It would appear that Franklin was
justified in believing that his main duty was to be ready to move down the Richmond road;
though he was at the same time ordered to make an effort to capture the heights in front
of him. This effort was to be made by but one division, which, however, was to be well
supported and to have its line of retreat assured. General Sumner, on the Union right,
seems to have received orders which were
231
no more definite than those sent to
Franklin.[7]
However, as a division was to be sent to do the work of two average corps, Franklin
instructed Reynolds to order one forward, and the choice fell upon the Pennsylvania
Reserves.
The distance from the Rappahannock to
the ridge at this point is about a mile and a half. The old Richmond stage road[8]
runs down the middle of the plain, being slightly nearer to the river than to the ridge.
Between the road and the ridge, in a slight depression several hundred yards in width,
runs the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad. The slope to the railroad from the extreme
left for the space of 300 or 4oo yards was clear; beyond it was wooded, the woods
extending across the hollow and in front of the railroad.
A heavy fog in the early morning had
obstructed the view, but lifted gradually. General Meade, upon receiving his orders to
attack, put his division in motion, advancing down the river some seven or eight hundred
yards, before, turning sharply to the right, he moved towards the ridge. Crossing the
road, considerable time was lost owing to the necessity of removing fences and bridging
the side drains, so as to permit of the passage of the artillery.[9]
The First Army corps, commanded by General Reynolds, consisted of three divisions:
Doubleday's, Gibbon's and Meade's, and General Reynolds, when ordering Meade to advance,
notified him that he would be supported upon his right by Gibbon, and his left covered by
Doubleday[10]
232
Between 9 and 10 o'clock, Meade formed
his column of attack: the First brigade in line of battle on the crest of the hollow and
facing the railroad; the Second brigade 3oo yards in the rear of the First; and the Third
brigade by the flank. The Third brigade assumed this position to guard against an attack
on the division's left flank and rear being made from the old Richmond road near the
Massaponax. An attack made almost immediately both by the artillery and infantry[11]
from this direction confirmed the justness of the disposition. The brigade's batteries
were brought into play, and sharpshooters deployed, with such effect that the
demonstration soon ceased. It was then decided to resume the advance and make the attempt
to penetrate the Confederate line, at the point where the woods projected beyond the
railroad. Contrary to usual custom, the Sixth regiment had been deployed as skirmishers
for the First brigade, while the Bucktails, divided into squads, were ordered to support
the various batteries. Preparatory to the infantry advance the batteries were ordered to
shell the woods and heights, and the Third brigade to change front, forming line of battle
on the left of the First. This movement had hardly been executed when the enemy's battery,
from the heights on the extreme left, poured in a hail of shot. Three batteries of the
division replied, and after being in practice for half an hour silenced it by blowing up
its caissons.
he Confederate right was defended by
Jackson; and to A. P. Hill's division fell the task of resisting Meade's assault. Archer's
brigade of seven regiments was on the Confederate right of the woods, and Lane's brigade
on the left. There was a gap of several hundred yards between the left of Archer and the
right of Lane, but both brigades had strong skirmish lines
233
pushed forward beyond the railroad;
while Gregg's brigade, 500 yards in the rear, covered the space between Archer and Lane.
In addition a heavy force of artillery strengthened the position.[12]
Moreover, while the woods entirely concealed both the disposition and strength of the
Confederates from the Union troops, the latter, maneuvering upon an open plain, were in
full view of their opponents.
About 1 o'clock General Meade gave the
order to advance, and the columns immediately moved forward. By the time the line had
advanced two or three hundred yards, General Meade rode up to Captain Taylor, who, with
his men, was supporting the batteries, and asked him what he was doing there. Taylor
explained that he had been ordered by Colonel Sinclair to remain with the guns, whereupon
General Meade countermanded the order of the Brigade-Commander, and directed the Captain
to form his regiment and take his proper place in the line. Eager to perform their duty
the men were formed, and advanced at the double-quick towards the right of the brigade;
but the Confederates, who by that time had fully recognized the meaning of the various
movements, opened such a withering fire that a gap was opened in the left, and into the
gap, Captain Taylor diverted his command.[13] Penetrating the woods, and
234
driving the rebels before them, the
Bucktails reached the railroad. Captain Larrimer, of Company E, of the Fifth regiment,
was at this point calling upon his men for a charge. Co-operating with this force, the
Bucktails endeavored to force back their opponents, but without avail, though the attempt
cost many lives. Upon the right of the Bucktails, the One-Hundredand-Twenty-First was
driving back the enemy, and thus relieved from the pressure on their right flank, the
Bucktails were enabled to join in the advance. From ditches and rifle pits close to the
railroad the First brigade drove the Confederates; then they forced them back into the
woods till they came to the second parallel, capturing a large number of prisoners and
stacks of muskets.[14] till they advanced till they gained the farther
side of the wood. Here a road ran in front of them and beyond it was an open plateau in
turn dominated by another ridge. Captain Taylor, whose horse had been shot under him, had
encouraged his men on foot till he fell wounded. Up at the front
Corporal Looney, of Company G, bore aloft the silk flag of Company K, which since the
Peninsular campaign had done service as the colors of the regiment; and as he dropped with
his death wound, his blood spurted over the tattered flag.
Acting as a wedge of the army, the
brigade had penetrated the Confederate line, and having done so, received a terrific fire
from both infantry and artillery on both flanks, as well as
235
upon the front. With its ammunition
practically exhausted it fell back. As it did so, the Second brigade advanced, and reached
nearly the same point, only to fall back in like manner.[15] The Third brigade held its
position in the woods for over an hour, but a portion of it gained the summit, as had the
First and Second brigades.[16]
General Meade's division had done
everything that had been asked of it. It had driven the enemy from his rifle pits and
breastworks for over half a mile: had taken over 300 prisoners and several standards.
Attacked upon three sides by the enemy, who was being reinforced as fast as Jackson could
urge his troops to the front, the division being unsupported was compelled to fall back.
So sure were the officers of their ability to have held the ground they had won, had they
been supported, that two of the Brigade-Commanders considered it incumbent upon them to
incorporate such a statement in their reports.[17] Gibbon's division, which was
to have supported their right, had been retarded, and diverted, [18]
and Birney's division, which had occupied the place vacated by the Reserves when they
moved to the attack, remained too far to the rear. Compelled to relinquish what he had
won, General Meade determined to withdraw his men with as small a loss as the situation
would permit. Sending back he called for reinforcements, but none came. With every moment
the situation became more critical,
236
till remembering that though he was
fighting in the uniform of a Brigadier-General, he had in his pocket his commission as
Major-General, he rode back to General Birney, exclaiming "General, I assume the
authority of ordering you up to the "relief of my men."[19]
A portion of Birney's division was immediately detached and assisted in the withdrawal
operations. With empty cartridge boxes, the shattered division was again forced to cross
the open plain, which, through the enemy's fire, resembled a ploughed field. General
Reynolds and General Meade attempted to rally the men while under fire, but not succeeding
the line was reformed on the other side of the old Richmond road. It cannot be too
persistently borne in mind that the act of penetrating an enemy's line is a dangerous one
for the troops constituting the wedge. Necessarily subjected to a heavy fire, they are
certain to be more or less diverted from their course, by objects with which they may
meet, and to become separated, more or less, after breaking through. When woods are
encountered the disorganization increases. If support is immediately given, the captured
position may be retained; but should delay occur in giving succor, the successful charge
frequently ends in a disorganized rout. - The withdrawal of the Reserves unannihilated
constituted a remarkable military feat. General Meade stated that 4,500 men would be a
liberal estimate of the strength of the division as it went into action:[20]
the official casualty reports[21] show that the loss in
killed, wounded and missing was 1,853. Well might Meade exclaim, "My God,
"General Reynolds, did they think my division could whip "Lee's whole army.
There is all that is left of my Reserves."
The rest of the battle is soon told.
Meade's division retired
237
shortly after 2 o'clock. Sumner, on the
right, had been ordered to assault the ridge in his front and selected Couch's Second army
corps for the attack.[22]
The divisions of Hancock and French were ordered forward and at about 1 o'clock, being
thrown against an impregnable position,[23] were destroyed: Hancock
losing 2,032 and French 1,160 men. Howard's division, which moved to their support,
escaped with a loss of 914. Sturgis' division, of the Ninth corps, had been ordered
forward on the left and made several attacks in support of the Second corps, losing t,oo7
men. This whole attack costing over 5,000 men, had spent its force by half past two, and
should lave convinced even the most sceptical of the futility of frontal attacks. Yet
Burnside obstinately ordered the Fifth army corps, which had been held on the north bank
of the river, to cross and attack. So apparent was the madness of assaulting the defences
the Confederates had erected at this point that General Hooker personally begged Burnside
to desist, but without result.[24] Humphreys division was
selected, with Sykes' division in support. When Hooker considered that he had lost as
many men as his orders required him to lose,[25] he suspended the attack. In
fifteen minutes Humphreys lost t,o19 men and Sykes 228. Fortunately it was approaching
evening and the battle ceased.
238
The Union commander was confronted with
a total loss of 12,653 men;[26]
while the Confederates apparently lost only 5,309;[27] and it should be remembered
that of this number more than two-thirds, or 3,415, fell before Franklin's attack, led by
the Pennsylvania Reserves, leaving but 1,555 to offset the Union casualties on the right.
During the night General Burnside
actually proposed to resume the attack the next day, by forming the Ninth corps in a
column of attack by regiments, and leading it to assault in person: yet, urgently
entreated by General Sumner, he abandoned the idea.
Military historians have universally
condemned the attack made by the Union right. The attack made by the Union left, led by
the Reserves, is a different matter. Franklin believed that could he secure firm lodgment
on the ridge it would be desirable, and though others consider the importance of such
position exaggerated, it is hard to see how the Confederates could have avoided a retreat
had it been held.[28]
The remarkable valor of the troops, who for a short time did cling to the ridge is,
however, not a matter of dispute. General Jackson reports the attack as being made by the
"main body of Frank"lin's grand division, supported by a portion of
Hooker's" and describes how they advanced to "within point blank range of
"our infantry" and became "thus exposed to the murderous fire "of
musketry and artillery."[29] General Archer, commanding a
brigade in A. P. Hill's division, reported that the Nineteenth
239
Georgia
and Fourteenth Tennessee were compelled to retire, leaving about i6o prisoners. Also that
the greater part of the Seventeenth Tennessee "left the trenches in disorder."[30]
In fact so rapid was their advance
that General Gregg, who, in the rear, guarded the gap between Archer and Lane, did not
believe that they could be Union troops and ordered his men to hold their fire, paying for
his mistake with his life a moment later.[31]
Owing to their conflicting orders the
Bucktails are practically unmentioned in the official reports, though they stand out
prominently in the casualty report
|
Killed |
Wounded |
Missing |
Total |
| Officers |
1 |
4 |
1 |
6 |
| Men |
18 |
109 |
28 |
155 |
|
|
|
|
|
| Total |
19 |
113 |
29 |
161[32] |
