THE WINTER OF 1861.
II.
DRANESVILLE.
72
General McClellan had risen at one
leap to the command of the army, after its defeat at Bull Run, through the prestige of his
successful campaign in western Virginia. This rapidity of his rise deprived him of the
opportunity of more active service in minor commands. Yet he was without doubt
absolutely unequalled as an organizer. His ability in this respect was phenomenal; his
results were produced with remarkable rapidity.
He knew that only well organized and
drilled troops could hope to succeed against those of the South, officered as they were
for the most part, by graduates of the United States Military Academy. As the troops
from the Northern States poured into Washington they were, through his efforts,
transformed from recruits into soldiers. While a delay in resuming active operations
against the South, was not only desirable, but necessary, an extended period of
inactivity was little relished by the North. The Confederate army not only remained in
possession of the Bull Run battle-field, in sight of Washington; but controlled the
Potomac below the capital, thus crippling her commerce. McClellan, from his knowledge of
the necessities of an army, was desirous of obtaining an ideal equipment of men and
supplies before undertaking offensive movements. Hence no operations were undertaken from
July to December,
73
with the
exception of that resulting in the disaster of Ball's Bluff, which only served to fan the
flame of desire, on the part of the Government authorities, for action that would result
in effective retaliation. As winter came on the difficulties of such operations increased.
The soil and climate of Virginia are most unfavorable to military movements. Without
warning, storms cause the rivers that flow across the State to rise with such speed as to
preclude their being crossed by armies, and at the same time turn the roads into
quagmires.
Notwithstanding this period of
preparation, however, a battle was fought before the year closed. On December 19th,
General McCall received reports, indicating that the enemy had pushed a strong foraging
party towards Dranesville. He immediately ordered General Ord to move his brigade the
next morning in that direction, with the two-fold object of driving away the enemy's
pickets and of obtaining forage himself. To strengthen Ord's brigade, the Bucktails, a
force of cavalry, and Captain Faston's Battery A, were ordered to accompany it.[1]
The
Confederate foraging party, in search of hay, was stronger than suspected. It was
protected by four regiments of infantry, aggregating 1,6oo men, 150 cavalry, and a battery
of four pieces, all under the command of General J. E. B. Stuart.[2]
No election having been held to fill
the vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Colonel Biddle, the command of the Bucktails
naturally devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Kane. At this time he was lying ill in
Washington. Fearful that some active operation or forward movement would be made, while he
was absent, he had extorted promises from a friend and his surgeon to advise him should
marching orders be received.
74
Upon
receiving notice of the projected reconnaissance through these sources, he insisted on
being moved. Wrapped in blankets, he was carried to an ambulance and thus taken to his
tent. The next morning, to the surprise of his regiment, he took his place on horse-back
at its head.
Starting at 5 A. M. General Ord moved
his column along the road towards Dranesville. Reports had led him to believe that the
force he was likely to meet was not very strong and was destitute of artillery. Some
confusion in the movements of his own troops caused him to enter Dranesville, 12 miles
from his starting place, with only his cavalry and artillery, supplemented by the Bucktail
and Ninth regiments which were thrown out as flankers.
Dranesville is situated on the
Leesburg pike, which runs southeast from Leesburg to Alexandria. The road from Camp
Pierpont, over which the regiments had moved, runs into the Leesburg pike at a sharp
angle, a short distance east of Dranesville, and at a still shorter distance east of
this junction a road runs, at right angles from the pike, southwest to Centreville. South
of the Leesburg pike, on both sides of the Centreville road, there is open ground; the
clearing being double the width on the eastern side of the road than it is on the western
side. In this wide clearing there is a brick house. Beyond the clearing and fields, on
each side, are heavy woods.
As General
Ord was in Dranesville, he was therefore in a position where the Centreville road entered
the pike in his rear. While waiting for the other regiments to arrive he placed the
artillery, cavalry, Ninth regiment and two companies of Bucktails in positions to defend
the approaches of the town. The remaining ten companies of Bucktails, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Kane were ordered to occupy the pike.[3]
75
Kane, who during the advance to
Dranesville, had been scouting, had already noticed the brick house,[4]
before mentioned, and realized that it would prove of great value, should the enemy,
advancing up the Centreville road, attack on both sides of that road. His present duty,
however, was to investigate the woods, between the Leesburg pike and the Potomac river.
After some distance had been covered, the regiment arrived at a farm-house, and here the
Lieutenant-Colonel captured a man accused of shooting pickets. Forwarding the captive to
the proper authorities, the regiment commenced to retrace their steps; but hardly had they
done so, when an orderly from General Ord, delivered a message to the Lieutenant-Colonel.
The latter raised himself in his stirrups and gave the command
"Forward,
Bucktails, there's fun ahead." The men broke into a run, came down the road to within
a hundred yards of the enemy, filed right, and, came into line. The line covered the brick
house, and Lieutenant Rice, with Company I, was ordered to take possession of the building
itself.
By this time the Confederates were
moving to the attack. Captain Niles, with Company 1~, of the Bucktails, and Captain Smith,
with Company A, of the Ninth regiment, having been detached and thrown forward as
skirmishers, first felt the assault. They now, falling back slowly before the enemy,
regained touch with their respective regiments.[5] General Ord
76
ordered his
artillery into position, but in its endeavor to act promptly, the battery ran past its
station and upset one of its guns. Thus the Confederate artillery opened fire about
fifteen minutes before Captain Easton could get his guns working.[6]
When the battery did open, it did so with magnificent effect; its third shot hitting the
opposing battery and compelling its withdrawal.[7]
When the battle assumed form the
Union line was formed by the Bucktails on the left (east of the Centreville road), a
portion of the Sixth regiment in the center and the Ninth regiment on the right (both
the latter west of the Centreville road), The battery was in the rear, fronting down the
Centreville road, but on the north side of the Leesburg pike which runs at right angles to
the Centreville road. The other regiments and the cavalry were in reserve. The
Confederates had made an attempt to turn the Union left flank, leaving the cover of the
woods and charging forward in good form. But the Bucktails had met the attack with such a
vigorous and well directed fire that the Confederates had retreated to the woods.[8]
On the right Colonel Jackson's Ninth regiment had maintained its position bravely.[9]
General Ord having placed his cavalry
safely on the left flank; and ordered Captain Easton to right the overturned gun and place
it with two others in an advantageous position, found
77
that his
artillery had practically silenced the enemy's, and showed no signs of being discomposed
by the fire directed at it.
The other regiments assigned to
positions in reserve, were sheltering themselves in ditches and under fences, as best they
could. None of the brigade, with the exception of the Bucktails had previously been
under fire; hence General Ord's decision, which he now made, to push forward his
infantry, involved a test of their mettle. Their task, made easier by the wonderful
practice of Captain Easton's battery, was to cross the fields, enter the woods and drive
back the enemy.
General Ord personally superintended
the charge, at the head of which Kane placed himself with his Bucktails.[10]
The Ninth regiment, led by the intrepid Jackson, was no less eager to prove its valor. The
column swept forward, General Ord doing his utmost to urge on the rear regiments. In the
front, Captain Niles of the Bucktails, his tall figure rendering him dangerously
conspicuous, charged forward, till a bullet, piercing his lung, made him drop to the
ground.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kane was struck in
the face by a ball that pierced his upper jaw. A moment's halt, just sufficient to tie a
bandage of some sort, and he again, despite the pain and loss of blood, resumed his
position at the lead of his men. In the face of such determination, resistance was
useless. Breaking in disorder the Confederates fled.
General Ord, having heard that
General McCall had arrived on the ground, had, after he saw that the brigade had gained
the woods, formerly occupied by the Confederates, gone to the rear to report. General
McCall had ordered up the brigade of General Reynolds to support Ord's; but before
78
it arrived
the battle had been won. A pursuit of half a mile was all that was permitted, after which
General McCall ordered General Ord to withdraw his brigade. The Bucktails, who requested a
few minutes' grace, were thus deprived of the capture of a gun abandoned by their
opponents.
The moral effect of the victory, thus
achieved by one brigade of the division of Pennsylvania Reserves, cannot be overestimated.
It was the first victory gained by troops in the Army of the Potomac, and coming after the
disaster of Bull Run and the massacre of Ball's Bluff, had an added significance. Though
the number of men engaged was not large, the battle afforded proof, both of the ability of
Northern officers, and the valor of Northern troops. General Ord's force was little, if
any, superior in numbers to that of General Stuart's; yet he inflicted more than three
times the punishment he received, his loss being 68, to Stuart's 194.[11]
In a dispatch to General McClellan,
General McCall said
"Ord's brigade, with the First
Rifles, and Easton's battery, "had a brisk affair with four regiments and a battery
of the "rebels at 12 M. to-day. . . . The Rifles behaved finely.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Kane very slightly wounded, but still in the "field."[12]
In his official report, General Ord
says
"The wounded officers,
Lieutenant-Colonel Kane and Captain Niles, of the Kane Rifles . . . were conspicuous,
"leading their men when wounded."[13]
Lieutenant-Colonel Kane in his
official report, says:
"Of my own officers and the men
I love I am too proud "to say more than that they all, without an exception, did
their
79
"duty;
but it is my place to mention the courage of Captain "Ent during the brief period
when you were good enough to "place the Sixth under my command. I cannot consider it
out of "place, either, for me to bear my own testimony to the admirable conduct of
Captain Easton and the brave artillerists with "him, who served the guns of Battery
A, from the regiment of "the gallant Charles T. Campbell.
"I enclose a copy of the report
of Dr. S. D. Freeman, regimental surgeon, showing a list of 3 killed and 27 wounded.
"I trust the life of Captain Niles will be spared to his friends "and his
country. He led the flankers on the left yesterday, "and though his tall figure made
him a conspicuous mark for "the enemy's rifles, he did not cease exposing himself to
cheer "on his men until he fell. This was but little before the enemy
"retired."[14]
The official casualty report shows
the total loss of the brigade in killed, wounded and missing to have been 68. The Bucktail
loss was
Killed.
Wounded. Missing.
Total.
Officers
..
2
2
Men
3
24
27
Total
3
26
29[15]
80
the largest
sustained by any regiment in the brigade. The Sixth regiment lost 15, and the Ninth 22 ;
thus the three regiments that did the fighting before the charge lost 66 men. The Tenth
and Twelfth lost 1 between them, the battery escaped miraculously with a loss of i, and
the cavalry was unengaged.
When the enemy fled he did so in
disorder. "The "road was strewed with men and horses; two caissons, one of
"them blown up; a limber; a gun-carriage wheel; a quantity "of artillery
ammunition, small-arms, and an immense quantity "of heavy clothing, blankets,
etc."[16]
General McCall, in ordering the
division to return to Camp Pierpont, was hampered by the want of ambulances; being
compelled to leave many of his wounded prisoners in Dranesville, where they could
receive proper attention. With him he took his forage-sixteen wagon loads of excellent hay
and twenty-two of corn.[17]
The troops arrived at their camp the
same evening, thoroughly exhausted. In addition to doing battle they had marched
twenty-five miles, hence they hastened to turn in as rapidly as possible.
So rejoiced were the Nation and the Government at the victory, that on December 28th, Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, addressed a congratulatory letter to General McCall, in which, after expressing his delight that it had been given to Pennsylvania troops to inspire confidence in the ulti-
81
mate triumph
of the cause, he added: "Other portions of the "Army will be stimulated by their
brave deeds, and men will be "proud to say that at Dranesville they served under
McCall "and Ord."[18]
Governor Curtin, through General
Russell, Aide-de-Camp, also issued a congratulatory order, commencing "The
gallantry of our troops at Dranesville demands a public acknowl"edgment."
The Governor, in addition, personally visited the camp, to insure everything being done,
that was possible, to help and relieve the wounded.
General McCall issued another
congratulatory order, and caused both the letters from Secretary Cameron and Governor
Curtin to be read to the different regiments. The colors of the regiments engaged in the
battle were taken to Washington and on each flag, "Dranesville, December 20,
1861," was painted in golden letters.[19]
[1]
O. R 1. V., p. 480-481.
[2]
Stuart's report, O. R I. V., p.
490.
[3] Ord's report, O. R I. V., p. 478.
[4]
'The house had been occupied by
General McCall in October. (Kane's report, O. R. I. V., p. 481.)
[5] 'See map drawn by H. H. Strickler, of Company A, Ninth Regiment, O. R Atlas, Vol. I, Plate XLI. The sketch accompanying report of General Ord., O. R. Atlas, Vol. I, plate XIII., is inferior. The official reports of the battle, printed in O. R. I. V., are not as clear as might be desired; but an excellent account by Colonel A. P. Sharpe, who was on General Ord's staff, was printed some time since in the Philadelphia Weekly "Times," and reprinted in the "Carlisle Herald." Numerous other reports are, of course, current.
[6] Stuart's report, O. R. I. V., p. 491.
[7]
Easton s report, O. R. I. V., p.
489.
[8]
'According to General Stuart's
report (O. R. I. V. p. 491), this attack was made principally by the Loth Alabama and 6th
Carolina, both regiments losing heavily.
[9]
It suffered more than necessary,
through the enemy gaining the first fire. Understanding the Bucktails were close to them,
and fearful of firing on members of their own brigade, one of the men had challenged
the Confederate troops with, "Are you the Bucktails?" The answer,
"Yes;" was but the prelude to a murderous volley.
[10]
Kane, at the head of his regiment
leading. His and Jackson's "regiments required no urging." (Ord's report, O. R
I. V., p. 479.)
[11] Ord"s report, O. R. I. V., p. 489. Stuart's report, O. R. I. V., p. 494.
[12]
O. R. I. V., p. 473-474.
[13] O. R. I. V., p. 480.
[14]
O. R. I. V., p. 481-482.
Unfortunately, the reDo: L of the strvice performed is not as full as might be desired,
Kane's modesty causing
him to say,
"You saw the rest." The commendatory portion has been quoted in full as an
example of Kane's generous recognition of brav
ery, whether
in his own regiment or another's. His own wound remains unmentioned. For the short time
that Kane had virtual charge of the
brigade, Captain McNeil led the regiment.
[15]
O. R. I. V., p. 489. Kane's
report, 3 killed and 27 wounded, was therefore incorrect by one. The mention by name,
excepting in the muster rolls, of men killed or wounded in battle, does not come within
the scope of this "History," unless some particularly conspicuous act of
bravery was the cause of such death or wound being received. A list of all the men killed
or wounded in any one battle would be meaningless, both because of its size and because it
is embodied in the muster rolls. A partial list would be obviously unfair to those
Omitted. Yet it is probably not out of place to mention here the death of George Cook,
of Company F., after whom the G. A. R., Post 315, of Wellsboro, is named, he being the
first man from Wellsboro County td die in battle.
[16] McCall's report, O. R. 1. V., p. 475.
[17] McCall's report, O. R. I. V., p. 476.
[18] O. R. I. V., p. 477.
[19] 'See "History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps," by Justin R. Sypher, p. 140-141.