THE PENNSYLVANIA INVASION.

 

III.

 

 

CENTREVILLE AND THE MINE RUN CAMPAIGN.

 

 

When he possessed definite knowledge of the Confederates' retreat, Meade put his army in pursuit of Lee, who by the 7th had reached the Potomac, and who, had not the river been swollen by rain, would have crossed unmolested.[1] By the iath, however, Meade confronted Lee, who with his back to the river, designed to cross at Williamsport. Undecided what to do, Meade then called a council, the majority of whom voted against giving battle. General Meade, notwithstanding, ordered an attack for the morning of the 14th, but Lee, during the night put his army across the river and moved away.

The Bucktails on this march to the Potomac neared the. State line on the 6th, trudging along in mud knee deep. On the 7th they covered twenty-four miles, on the 8th fifteen miles, and on the 9th, crossing South Mountain in the rain, seven miles. Reaching the Antietam on the l0th, the regiment was on picket duty and had skirmishes with the enemy. Still on picket duty on the 11th, they moved forward about a mile, lay practically unmolested during the day, but at night, advancing two miles, participated in another skirmish, after which they were relieved, but only to lie in the battle line upon the 13th.

From this time on, until they went into winter quarters, the regiment did but little fighting, outside of skirmishing. Yet

 

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the hardships entailed by the long marches which culminated in the Mine Run fiasco, were such, that many of the men look back to this period as the most trying one in all their army expe­rience.

As Lee had withdrawn his army south of the Potomac, it was necessary that Meade should follow, and he decided to do so, keeping to the east of the mountains, while his opponent kept upon the other side. The two armies, therefore, moved south­ward, practically parallel to each. other. Emerging to the east of the mountains, by the early part of August, Lee with his army, rested at Culpepper, a few miles south of the Rappahan­nock river; while Meade went into camp on the north bank near Rappahannock Station.[2] During this march the men suffered for want of food. The regiment drew no rations on July 24th, 25th and 26th. On the 27th the commissariat being again in working order they had a "grand feast-hard tack and pork." A few days later twenty-five of the Bucktails were detailed as guard for one hundred wagons on a foraging trip, but as they were relieved before the wagons returned it is doubtful if the men personally profited much. Wild berries were plentiful and upon every opportunity they went out to gather them.[3]

With the establishment of the camp at Rappahannock came

 

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a cessation of marching orders. The forces of General Meade were being reduced, troops being taken from him to help Rose­crans in the west, and also to assist in enforcing the draft laws in New York. Hence until Lee, in the early part of September was similarly weakened, Meade was compelled to act strictly on the defensive.

If armies even approximated the ideal in constitution and administration, such a rest as ensued would have been an un­mitigated pleasure. But in addition to daily drills-division re­views, batallion drills, brigade drills, dress parades, general in­spections, regimental inspections, etc.-many troubles arose. Camp followers distributed cheap whiskey and court martiala and periods in the guard house followed. Deserters were rounded up and brigades ordered out to see them shot. Upon some, necessarily, fell the duty of being in the firing squad or of digging their graves.[4] Still many pleasant things occurred. Members of one regiment exchanged visits with those of an­other. The One-Hundred-and-Forty-Ninth was not far away and frequently the Bucktails would go over and see the "new "Bucktails ;" in some cases staying over the night.

After camp had been established, Major Hartshorne held inspection, but on September 3rd, Lieutenant-Colonel Niles, rejoined his regiment.

On August 28th, the men and officers of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, presented to General Meade, as a token of the esteem in which they held him, a sword, sash, belt and pair of golden spurs. Governor Curtin was present, but the actual presentation was made by General Crawford. In his speech of

 

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acceptance, General Meade, who can never be accused of hyper­bole, paid a glowing tribute to the valor of his old division; mentioning "Dranesville, where the first success that crowned "the arms of the Army of the Potomac was gained, unaided and "alone, by a single brigade." . . . "Mechanicsville, . .

"where the whole of Longstreet's corps was held in check and "victory really won, by only two brigades." Then he referred to New Market Cross Roads and South Mountain; to Antietam where the Reserves "boldly attacked that portion of the Confed­erate army in its front without knowing its strength, and con­tinued to drive it until dark, and then held the position it had "gained until morning when the battle was renewed;" to Fred­ericksburg, where the Reserves "crossed and led the advance, "unaided and alone, up the heights," and where "had they been "followed and supported by other troops, their courage that day "would have won a victory." He expressed his sense of loss through the death of General Reynolds, members of his staff, and regimental officers; of the three latter mentioned by name, two were Bucktails-McNeil and Taylor.[5]

When General Meade became aware that Longstreet's corps had been taken away from Lee for duty in the west, he crossed his army over the Rappahannock and drove the Confed­erates south of the Rapidan.[6] While lying in their new camp, the division was reviewed by General Meade, who had the Mex­ican General Cortez as his guest. At this time, too, the regi­ments were informed that members of the infantry could, should they so desire, be transferred to the artillery, a privi-

 

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lege that was to be restricted to regiments attached to the Army of the Potomac.

Strong efforts were also made to induce the men to re-enlist for three years more, unless previously discharged. The commanding officers appreciated the value of the training that the men had received, and the ability they had acquired through such training to fight effectively and campaign intelli­gently, nor did they desire to see their places filled by raw troops. Hence as an inducement, bounties were offered to those who would re-enlist, supplemented by a promise of thirty days' furlough. Not only did the officers expect that the privilege of spending thirty days at their homes would act as a strong in­ducement upon the men, but they calculated that the soldiers at home on furlough would act as recruiting agents.

The various companies and regiments were frequently formed in line to hear their officers read orders in regard to re-enlistment. Some promptly signed, but others demurred. Gradually the bounties increased, till, in the early part of the year, New Jersey paid $350.00 in greenbacks per man, with an added $2.00 per month during active service.[7]

At this camp, too, the medical staff was reinforced by the appointment of Dr. Lafayette Butler.

When General Meade received reinforcements, he decided to assume the offensive; but Lee, who had also been strength­ened, came to the same decision, at the same time. The Con­federate General intended to move his force, with extreme rapidity, northward around the right of the Union army, fall upon its rear and destroy its communications. Hence before

 

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Meade became aware of his adversary's intentions, he was actually moving south while Lee was marching north. When the plans of the opposing armies became clear, the campaign degenerated into a simple race for Centreville, a contest which the Union army, aided by having the interior route, won. Hav­ing been defeated in his main designs, Lee did not relish re­treating without accomplishing something, so he moved over to Bull Run and occupied himself with destroying the railroad before he commenced his retrograde movement on October 18th. Repairing the railroad as he advanced, Meade followed the Confederates, going into camp, once more, south of the Rappahannock. Thus by November 8th or 9th, the contesting armies had resumed their former positions.[8]

While in their new position the Bucktails moved into the old rebel camp, and joyfully availed themselves of its comforts. The season being far advanced, and the soil of Virginia ren­dering impossible active operations during winter time, the various troops looked forward to a period of rest, bending all their energies to making their quarters as comfortable as cir­cumstances would permit. Yet General Meade had no inten­tion of abandoning active operations for the winter without

 

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making another attempt to inflict damage on the Southern army. His victory at Gettysburg had resulted in the expulsion of an invading force; he now desired to inflict a blow that should cripple his antagonist.

Lee's army was south of the Rapidan, but scattered con­siderably. His right was at Mine Run, a small tributary of the Rapidan, which flowing north at right angles to that river, empties into it at Morton's Ford, and upon this stream Lee seems to have placed considerable reliance, as the fords across the Rapidan below the mouth of the Run were left unprotected. Meade with his army, north of the Rapidan, planned to cross by these unprotected fords, carrying ten days' rations with him, and by rapid movements turn the Mine Run defenses be­fore Lee could concentrate his forces to oppose him. The movement was to commence on the 26th of November,[9] and on that date the army crossed the Rapidan. The success of the movement was entirely dependent upon each corps moving in exact accordance with the schedule compiled. But the Third corps was three hours late in reaching the point assigned to it, and the engineers bungled-making the pontoon bridges too short to span the Rapidan-thus delaying the army still further while they concocted temporary extensions. Instead of being across early on the 26th ready to advance, the columns were hardly in position to advance till the morning of the 27th. By one o'clock, however, the Second corps reached the position to which it had been ordered and opened fire. Here it should have been joined by the Third corps, but that corps had moved by the wrong road, got into action, and by the time it had extri­cated itself and got into touch it was night.[10]

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Necessarily the Second corps could not advance till joined by the Third corps and hence remained near Robertson's Tavern. The Fifth corps, to which the Bucktails were attached;[11] commanded by General Sykes, moved down the Orange Plank Road. Near White Chapel the cavalry was attacked. The Sixth regiment of the Pennsylvania Reserves was ordered up, but failed to drive the enemy back. The Bucktails then moved to the right, and lay under a heavy artillery fire the entire afternoon, two men being wounded.

Lee, who now fully understood his opponent's intentions, had not been idle: he had moved his troops to the best possible positions and improved his defenses. Meade, though aware that his original plan of attack had been made impossible through the delay in the movement of his troops, was reluctant to abandon the attack, and spent the 28th in making an ex­amination of the position.[12] Ultimately it was decided that Warren's corps should attack the Confederate right, and Sedg­wick's corps, supported by Sykes' corps, the Confederate left.

On the 29th, the troops were placed in position, but the operation consumed so much time that it was too late to attack that day. The charge was then ordered for the next morning.[13]

When the morning came, General Warren perceived that the works he was intended to carry, had been greatly strength­ened in the night, and upon his own authority suspended the charge, till General Meade could make a personal observation. His judgment was confirmed by his Commanding General,

 

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who then realized that it had become necessary for him to forego all expectations of successful attack, and to prepare to withdraw his troops and permit them to go into winter quar­ters.

The operation of withdrawal was a delicate one. The weather was intensely cold, and the positions of the advanced troops precluded fires. Some of the men were frozen to death.[14]

On the 1st of December, everything was frozen solidly. The Bucktails were forced to remain in the rifle pits till 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when they were withdrawn, a com­pany at a time, rifles at the trail, eighty rods to the rear to relieve some troops belonging to the First corps. Here at least they were able to build a fire, but as it grew dark were ordered to fall back towards the Rapidan. Throughout the bitterly cold night the men were moving-about two rods at a time. Crossing the river at 4 n. ns. on the 2nd, they procured three hours' sleep one mile north of its bank. By 7 n. m. they were marching again, headed northeast.[15]

Going into camp near the old battle-field, the regiment was divided, the right wing being two or three miles farther up the railroad than the left. On December 5th General Meade re­ported its strength to be:

 

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Present. Absent. Total.

Officers                25           7        32

Men                     355         169    524

Total -                  380         176    556[16]

Lieutenant-Colonel Niles, although he returned to the regi­ment, continued to suffer from the wound he had received at Gettysburg to such an extent as to prevent his taking part in an active campaign. He was therefore compelled to resign,[17] when the command of the regiment fell upon Major Harts­horne. Second-Lieutenant William Taylor, of Company E, was on October l0th promoted to First-Lieutenant. The usual camp interests resumed sway. Some of the officers went to the capital, some received furloughs. Troubles having arisen, Major Hartshorne issued orders forbidding the men to visit the sutlers, and a few days later forbade citizens or pie-ped­dlers to enter the camp. Recruiting agents became extremely active, and scouting parties became necessary owing to the never ceasing activity of Mosby.[18]

On December 27th, the regiment moved down the rail­road, establishing its camp at Bristoe Station, where it re­mained till the spring, when the army under General Grant moved against Richmond.