THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

 

II.

 

 

ANTIETAM.

 

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A dense fog obstructed the view on the morning of the 15th,[1] and Lee, who, during the night had recognized the futil­ity of contesting further the passage of the Gap, took advan­tage of it to slip away unmolested.

Already he was establishing his army at Sharpsburg, seven miles northwest from the summit of the Gap, and making preparations to consolidate his forces at that place.

Harper's Ferry,[2] as has been seen, is on the south bank of the Potomac. Some ten miles above it on the north side, though advanced eastward a mile and a half, is the small town of Sharpsburg. The Potomac, at this point, winds so in its course that a straight line five miles in length drawn through the western end of the town would touch the river with both its ends. In front of Sharpsburg flows the Antietam, which enters the Potomac at the southern end of our imaginary line. Not running quite parallel with the general direction of the Potomac, the Antietam at the northern end of our imaginary line is about two and a half miles east of the river. Running northward from Sharpsburg, almost midway between the Poto­mac and the Antietam, is the Hagerstown road.

 

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The broad outlines of the situation can be easily stated. Lee, stretching his line in a segment of a circle, could rest both his flanks on the Potomac, a slight forward curvature being sufficient to inclose Sharpsburg. In his rear he would have the Potomac, easily fordable at that place, and in his front the Antietam, over which there were but four bridges. Moreover, the troops that were still in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry could join him easily, by simply proceeding up the south bank of the Potomac and fording the river in his rear.

Moving down the mountain side, on the morning of the t 5th, the Bucktails marched to beyond Boonsboro, a few miles northeast of Sharpsburg. McClellan spent the day and the morning following reconnoitering the position and placing his troops. By the afternoon of the i6th he had completed his arrangements. The three lower bridges being covered by the enemy, he decided to throw his right across the Antietam, bye a higher unguarded bridge, and thus envelop the Confederate left flank and drive it in upon the center. During the con­fusion incidental to this movement, if successful, the Union left and center were to carry the bridges in their front.

The turning movement was intrusted to Hooker's corps. By a p. M. the column was in motion and crossing the stream, some two and a half miles north of Sharpsburg. Confident in the fighting ability of the Pennsylvania Reserves, General Hooker placed them in the advance and General Meade gave to Seymour's brigade the post of honor. As the troops moved towards the northwest their left flank skirted some woods. Reaching the end of these woods, the column swung round and faced southward towards Sharpsburg. Four companies of the Bucktails, fulfilling their duty as skirmishers for the brigade, were deployed; the remaining six being held in reserve under Lieutenant Welch. The advance was made cau­-

 

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tiously for about three-quarters of a mile, when the enemy's pickets were discovered, extending in a line across a ploughed field. At the far side of the field were some heavy woods in which the enemy was concealed in force.[3] As the Confederate infantry opened fire, the six companies held in reserve moved up, while the, brigade prepared to give active support. Some Confederate artillery, although engaged by Cooper's battery, succeeded in getting into play. Colonel McNeil, after about fifteen minutes, ordered his men to charge and clear the enemy out of the woods. With no cover to protect them, in full view of both forces, across a field raked by artillery and covered by a heavy force of infantry, the men were ordered to dash. Fearless as ever, McNeil led his men in person into the open. Seventy-five yards from their goal, the fire became so murder­ous that the men dropped to the ground, lying flat on their faces but pouring in shot after shot from their breech-loaders. From time to time they would rise and run forward a few feet, only to drop again as they caught the first flash of a volley of mus­ketry. Though the advance amidst the increasing hail of shot and shell was slow, yet it was steady. When but a few paces from the fence that marked the edge of the woods, Colonel McNeil sprang forward crying, "Forward, Bucktails, forward." Even as he spoke, he pitched lifeless to the ground.[4] A mad fury seized his men. Raging to revenge the death of the man to whom they were devoted, they cleared the fence in an in­stant. Outnumbered, they cared nothing. With their breech­loading rifles and ample cover they were prepared to make the enemy pay dearly. General Seymour, seeing that his skirmish­ers had gained the edge of the woods, was ordering forward

 

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the brigade. The enemy, though fighting desperately, was slowly being driven backward out of the woods, but darkness compelled the men, however reluctantly, to cease the action. The pickets of the combatants were so close together, that Gen­eral Seymour reported that they slept foot to foot. The men who had had nothing to eat since noon realized that with the coming of daylight the combat would be resumed. The prox­imity of the foe rendered it impossible that they should receive food, and a few hours' rest was the sum of all for which they could hope. Yet even such rest as they could snatch was not to be undisturbed. Twice during the night the enemy attacked their pickets only to be repulsed with heavy loss.[5] After the fall of Colonel McNeil, the command fell upon Captain McGee, of Company F. Unsuited to the work of leading the regiment, he permitted Adjutant Hartshorne to direct the men.

During the night the commanders of both armies made hasty preparation; Lee to protect his threatened flank,[6] McClel­lan to concentrate his attack. Hooker's corps had been formed with Meade's division in the center, Doubleday's division being on the right, and Rickett's on the left; and McClellan ordered Mansfield's corps to cross the Antietam and move up in the rear of Hooker. Jackson opposed Hooker with two divisions, Ewell's division being advanced to cover the open ground.

Seymour's brigade of Meade's division had pushed for­ward to the farther edge of the woods, which run nearly par­allel with the Hagerstown road half a mile away. East of the road, and even with Hooker's left, was the now famous Dunker church. There were woods west of the Hagerstown road and

 

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 a fringe of forest on its eastern side. Between this fringe and the woods occupied by Seymour, was the cornfield in which the bloodiest actions of the battle were to take place.[7] At five o'clock in the morning[8] fighting was recommenced. As far as can be ascertained it started without orders. A gun being dis­charged, accidentally or on purpose, the close proximity of the men and the lifting darkness made it inevitable. The Buck­tails, skirmishers for Seymour's brigade, became immediately engaged with Trimble's brigade of Ewell's division.[9] Slowly the Confederates were driven back towards the Hagerstown road. In the middle of the cornfield was a ridge, behind which a considerable force of the enemy was sheltered. As the Union forces approached they were met with a furious fire and forced to give ground. Thinned in numbers, having fasted since noon of the previous day, almost exhausted by their efforts, the position of the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves had been further weakened by the withdrawal of Magilton's brigade to the left. General Meade, seeing the threatening columns of the Confederates advancing, ordered Ransom's battery to open

 

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on them. Magilton's brigade then fell into line, and in con­junction with Seymour's and Rickett's drove the enemy back, Anderson's brigade being eventually established upon the ridge.[10]

As the morning advanced, the ammunition of the Bucktails became nearly exhausted, and details were sent to the rear to replenish it. But at io o'clock the division was relieved, Mans­field's and Sumner's corps moving up to continue the attack. In the afternoon, at 2 o'clock, the division of Pennsylvania Re­serves, having obtained food and been resupplied with ammuni­tion, was formed on the right flank, in reserve, but was not again actively engaged.[11]

Mansfield's corps, which relieved Hooker's, fought val­iantly, but was beaten back by Hood.[12] Then Summer's corps was thrown in and suffered terribly.[13] Thus three corps in suc­cession had been hurled against the Confederate left without accomplishing its destruction. Though each extracted a heavy return, their losses had been sufficient to destroy their own offensive effectiveness. Franklin's corps was then crossed and advanced against the enemy that had so stubbornly resisted three previous attacks.

On the Union left the attack had also been unsuccessful. McClellan had ordered Burnside to carry the bridge in front

 

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of him at 8 A. m., but the bridge was not carried until 1 P. M., after which Burnside's troops halted till 3 P.M.. At that time, McClellan sending imperative orders to continue the advance, Burnside's force moved.[14] With a lodgment effected on the west side of the Antietam, facing the Confederate right, they pushed forward, some of the troops reaching the outskirts of Sharpsburg by night.[15]

With darkness the battle ended. Burnside's troops on the Union left were at the town; and Franklin's forces, on the Union right, though stationary, were holding firm. Hence through the advance by both the Union right and left, the Con­federate line, though not disrupted, had been driven back and made shorter. Lee, however, in the rear of Sharpsburg was receiving reinforcements in the shape of troops, who had marched up the south bank of the Potomac and crossed, in his rear, to his assistance. The total loss by the Union side was 12,410 killed, wounded and missing;[16] the Confederate loss has never been accurately ascertained. Though not less than 8,000, it was probably considerably greater.[17] McClellan undoubtedly had

 

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a larger number of men in his army than Lee had, probably nearly two to one. But every man in the Confederate army took active part, while two out of McClellan's six corps were hardly engaged. Moreover, the Union troops were attacking a strong defensive position; and it is doubtful, when remembering that instead of a concerted attack being made the various commands were launched against the enemy one after the other, if at any time during any attack the Union forces outnumbered those resisting them.[18] This must be the criticism, if any criticism be made, upon the battle. On the other hand, Lee's army, terribly shattered, was compelled to abjectly abandon its proposed northern raid; the safety of Baltimore and Washington was assured, and for a time the fears of the people were allayed. In addition, Lee, who by his invasion had hoped to largely recruit his forces, was forced to contemplate his army, reduced by battle and straggling to half its former strength; and to realize that the people of Maryland, far from rushing to the banners of the Confederacy, believed in the righteousness of the Union, and prayed for the success of its armies.

In his official report of the battle, General Meade says: "I "feel it also due to the memory of a gallant soldier and accom­plished gentleman to express here my sense of the loss to the "public service in the fall of Col. Hugh McNeil, of the First "Pennsylvania Rifles, who fell mortally wounded, while in the "front rank, bravely leading on and encouraging his men, on "the afternoon of the 16th."[19]

Captain McGee in his official report, referring to Colonel McNeil's death, mentions his gallant advance at the head of his men till pierced to the heart by a rifle ball. He also reports

 

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the loss of the regiment as follows: "6 killed, among whom was "Colonel McNeil and Lieut. William Allison; 23 wounded, "including 2 officers, Lieutenants Welch and Bell. We also lost "in missing 10 men."[20]

The official casualty report[21] shows the loss as 5 killed, 20 wounded, none missing; but is plainly in error, as Captain McGee's report was not made out until September 22nd, up to which date he positively states that nothing had been heard of those reported missing.

The condition of the regiment was most deplorable. Re­duced in numbers to a scant two hundred, the officers in whom they trusted were absent, wounded, or had been killed or as­signed to other commands.

Their Colonel had just been killed, and though Captain Irvin had been commissioned Lieutenant-Colonel on Septem­ber roth, he had not been mustered; moreover, he was absent on account of the wound received at South Mountain. Of the Captains of companies, Captain Holland, of Company A, had been killed on the Peninsula; Captain Wister, of Company B, had resigned to become Colonel of the One-Hundred-and­Fiftieth; Captain Gifford, of Company C, had been wounded; Captain Jewett, of Company D, was still in the General Hos­pital recovering from the Peninsular campaign; Captain Niles, of Company E, captured on the Peninsula, had not yet returned; Captain Taylor, of Company H, captured at Harrisonburg, had not yet been exchanged; and Captain Blanchard, of Com­pany I, had been wounded at Harrisonburg. This left but Captain McDonald, of Company G, and Captain McGee, of Company F, the latter being the ranking officer, though Adju­tant Hartshorne led the men.

 

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The body of Colonel McNeil, under the care of Lieutenant McNaughton, was taken to Auburn, N. Y., and interred with military ceremonies.

Speaking of Colonel McNeil, Justin R. Sypher, in his "History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,"[22] says: "Colonel "McNeil was not only an accomplished scholar and a gallant "soldier, but he was what is more and greater, a devout Chris­tian. The precepts of the Bible taught him by his father, he "made the rule of his life. He entered the service of his coun­try from a sense of duty; devoted to the cause of the consti­tution, he laid down his life a willing sacrifice on the altar of "universal liberty, and died in the defense of republican gov­ernment."

Lieutenant Allison had also been much beloved, and his name is perpetuated in the G. A. R. Post 196.[23]

When morning came on the 18th, McClellan did not resume the attack, preferring to wait for reinforcements then rapidly approaching.[24] He had captured 13 guns, 39 colors, some 15,000 stand of small-arms, and over 6,ooo prisoners during the cam­paign, and was able to state, "Not a single gun or color was lost "by our army during these battles."[25] The battle-field, small in extent, resembled a shambles, and the victor was content to spend the day burying his dead and giving his forces a chance to recuperate, at the same time issuing orders to renew the conflict on the morning of the 19th.

During the night of the 18th, however, Lee with his shat­tered army slipped across the Potomac; and with this crossing ended the Maryland invasion.

 

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