POPE'S ARMY OF VIRGINIA.

 

II.

 

SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

 

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After snatching what rest was possible, the troops, early on the morning of the 30th, prepared to resume the contest The general alignment of the opposing forces.was not greatly altered, excepting that the lines of battle extended farther south of the Warrenton pike than on the previous day; the Union line having its center thrown forward. Jackson still formed the Confederate left, while Longstreet on the right had extended his troops southward till they touched the Manassas Gap Rail­road. General Pope seems to have designed to assault the Confederate left; while Lee, purposed to attack, and if,possible envelop, the Union left.

Reynolds' division formed the extreme Union left, and Meade's brigade was ordered to move forward and discover the position and force of the enemy. General Pope believed at that time that the Confederates were retreating down the pike.

Immediately the Bucktails advanced as skirmishers; Cooper's battery being placed in the center with the other regi­ments, on each side, in support. Advancing west, the brigade received a heavy fire from the rebel batteries posted on the ridge back of Groveton. The Bucktails engaged the Con-

 

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federate skirmishers on the near side of Groveton, but met with such resistance that they were compelled to give ground. Seeing this, General Meade brought Cooper's battery into play, and sent the Third regiment forward to assist the Bucktails. With this support the Bucktails were able to advance, while the brigade was established on the ridge immediately overlooking Groveton.[1]

While this action was going on, Porter had moved his troops between the opposing lines, formed in front of the Union center, and, in accordance with his orders, attacked furiously though unavailingly. General Reynolds, who had noticed how stubbornly the advance of his own skirmishers had been con­tested, had advanced with some of his staff through some, woods, and while under fire discovered that instead of the enemy being prepared to retreat, he was merely masked pre­paratory to making an assault in force on the Union left, after it should have been sufficiently advanced.[2]

Upon reporting the true condition of affairs to the Com­manding General, Reynolds received orders to dispose his division so as to resist the threatened attack. The resultant order to retreat came as a disappointment to the Bucktails, who, having passed through the town and across a small flat, had captured a piece of artillery. Their further advance had been checked; but by dint of steady work with their breech-loading rifles, they had mantained their position, many of the men being protected by the trees of a neighboring orchard. It being im­possible to drag the piece with them, the Bucktails spiked it as effectually as they could with an old bayonet.

Hardly had the various regiments regained their earlier position in accordance with orders delivered to them, than, on

 

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account of the repulse of Porter's attack, and his retreat in some disorder, the division was ordered to march across the field and form in a position that would permit the rallying of Porter's troops in its rear. As the regiments moved to the right, the attack by the Confederates on the Union left commenced. The Third brigade, before it could leave its place was assailed and forced to form into line of battle. The First and Second bri­gades moved on; their ranks raked by shot and shell, and their course diverted, both by the nature of the ground and by con­tact with retreating masses of troops. Failing to get into proper position, General Reynolds then ordered the two brigades to retrace their steps. The Third brigade had, in the meanwhile, fought gallantly to maintain its position, though it was ulti­mately forced back.[3]

To understand the service now rendered by the Reserves, it must be borne in mind, that the Union and Confederate forces faced each other, and that both were astride of the Warrenton pike. In the rear of the Union army, and running in a generally parallel direction with its front, was Bull Run, which crosses the Warrenton pike at right angles. A road runs from Sudley Springs, some two miles north of the Warren­ton pike, southward, in a direction generally parallel with Bull Run, crosses the Warrenton pike, a little over a mile west of Bull Run, and then, half a mile further on, runs over a hill known as the Henry House Hill. It was to the right of the house upon this hill that Reynolds now directed the First and Second brigades. He perceived that if the Confederates should take this hill, or so envelop it as to force its evacuation, they would then be in position to take possession of the Warrenton pike itself. Then, as the main bridge over Bull Run, generally called the Stone Bridge, was where the pike crossed the stream,

 

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they would hold the line of the Union retreat and be in position to destroy its lines of communication.

As the Confederates massed their forces to attack the hill, the regiments of the First and Second brigades fell into posi­tion. A little in front of the Henry House Hill was a rise known as Bald Hill, and already the Confederates possessed it. All over the field the Union forces were being driven back­ward. The Confederates, victorious in repulsing the attack made by the Union right, now sought to press home the thrust they themselves had delivered against the Union left. If suc­cessful and they gained the pike, what would be the fate of the troops now using that pike to gain the bridge that to them meant safety?

Gathering at the top of Bald Hill, the Confederates came charging down the declivity prepared to ascend to the summit of the hill that opposed them. Reynolds, ever alert, driving his spurs into his horse's side, shouted his order: "Forward, "Reserves 1" In a moment his troops, inoculated with his enthu­siasm, swept forward and downward. The two lines met. Outnumbered, the Reserves fought with bulldog tenacity, by good fortune partially protected by a road that was somewhat depressed. Still, the First and Second regiments seemed about to give way beneath the tremendous pressure, when General Reynolds, "observing that the flagstaff of the Second regiment "had been pierced by a bullet and broken, seized the flag from "the color-bearer, and dashing to the right rode twice up and "down his entire division line, waving the flag about his head "and cheering on his men."[4]

A mark for the rebel sharpshooters, he seemed to bear a charmed life. The men, roused by his heroism, redoubled their

 

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efforts, so that the rebel ranks gave way. With perpetual firing the barrels of their rifles became hot. Then, as the darkness fell, the contest ceased, and wearied out, the division was re­lieved by Buchanan's brigade of regulars. The division, fol­lowing Sykes' division, then marched towards Centreville, bivouacking for the night at Cub Run.[5]

On the 31st the brigade continued its march to Centreville, drew some rations and then returned to Cub Run. The enemy making dispositions with the apparent intention of forcing the stream, General Meade deployed his regiments on each side of the road, ordering Ransom's battery to open on the Con­federates.

The troops remained under arms throughout the night, but it becoming obvious the next morning, September 1st, that the b enemy had withdrawn, the command was marched to Centre­ville and from thence to Fairfax Court House, where it bivouacked for the night. On the and, it was marched to the woods adjoining Arlington House, where it went into camp,[6]  and where the companies in Kane's battalion joined them and were reunited.

 

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In reporting the actions of his division throughout the campaign, General Reynolds mentions the gallant conduct of the brigades upon the Henry House Hill.[7] General Meade in his report says: "It was the good fortune of the Reserves to "be brought into action at this moment, and by their gallant "bearing and firm advance to compel the enemy to retire to "the shelter of the woods." . . . "It is due to the Pennsylvania "Reserves to say that this charge and the maintenance of this "position were made at a most critical period of the day.," Praising universally the conduct of his command he continues: "At the same time, the nature of the service required of them, "viz, picket duty and skirmishing, have placed more promi­nently before me the First Rifles (Bucktails), whose coolness"and steadiness under fire, when led by their commander, Col "Hugh W. McNeil, attracted my attention, and deserve, in my "judgment, particular notice."[8]

The official casualty report, for the operations August 16-September 2, 1862, show the loss in the six companies of the Bucktail regiment to have been.---

Killed. Wounded. Missing.  Total.

    5           19         3              27.[9]

Though the repulse of the Confederates at Chantilly,[10] on the 1st, proved that the Union forces, although driven back-

 

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ward, were able to maintain their present position and thus insure the safety of Washington, they needed rest.

The men had marched and countermarched, fought and skirmished, unceasingly for ten days. Their rations had been insufficient; their sleep broken and scanty. The cavalrymen reported that the saddles had not been removed from the backs of their horses since the opening of the campaign, and the condition of the animals assigned to the artillery and wagons ryas no better. The army might justly be described as thor­oughly used up.

General Pope was relieved -from command of the troops about Washington and ordered to the command of the North­west. The Army of Virginia was united to the Army of the Potomac, and once more the Pennsylvania Reserves came under the command of General McClellan.


[1] Meade's report (O.R. I. XII.ii., p. 398

[2] 'Reynolds' report (O. R I. XII. ii., p. 394).

[3] 'Reynolds' report (O. R I. XII. ii., p. 395-396).

[4] 'History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps," by J. R. Sypher. p. 347.

[5] It is perhaps desirable, more especially because of the modest tone of the reports of both General Reynolds and General Meade, to quote the following from the report of General McDowell to General Pope

"It was a question with me whether we could hold the Henry House "Hill. . . It was a question of importance, on which I should have "liked to consult you . . . . But while General Milroy gave me nothing "whatever on which I could be justified in acting . . . I received a clear "message from that intelligent as well as gallant officer Brigadier-General Meade, through one of his aides-de-camp, to the effect that if he "could have some reinforcements sent to him in the woods on the "Henry House Hill he could not only hold them, but drive out the "enemy, who were not then there in great force. Relieved from all "doubt by this message, I exclaimed, ' Meade shall have re-enforce­ments,' and immediately gave General Porter orders to send them "forward." (O. R. I. XII. ii., p. 342-343.)

[6] Meade's report (O. R. I. XII. ii., p. 399).

[7] '0. R. I. XIl. ii., p. 395

[8] O. R. I. XII. ii., p. 396-399

[9] O. R. I. XII., ii., p. 256.

 

[10] 'The Bucktail regiment did not take active part in this action, though one of their men was wounded by being struck with the limber of a cannon. Lee with designs upon the Union lines of retreat, sent Jackson around Pope's right to strike the Little River turnpike. Only a portion of the armies became engaged and the losses were not large, though the death of General Kearney, will forever lend prominence to the battle. As previously stated, Kane's battalion was also under fire for a portion of the time that the action lasted.