CHAPTER IX.

 

POPE’S CAMPAIGN--BULL RUN--MARYLAND CAMPAIGN--­SOUTH MOUNTAIN--ANTIETAM.

 

 

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Position of Pope's army--Abandons the line of the Rapidan—Position on the Rappahannock--Movements of the enemy--Attempts to cross the river--Pope's army outflanked--Promised reinforcements do not arrive--Rain storm--Movement to Warrentoz--March to Manassas--Battleat Bristoe station-- Skirmish at Gainesville--Jackson's retreat from Manassas--Pursuit--Jackson surrounded--Withdrawal of McDowell’s forces--Change of plan--Porter's disobedience of orders—General Sigel's attack on Jackson on the 29th of August--Noble conduct of General Reynolds--Desperate fighting--Heintzelman and Reno on the field--General Pope orders a charge along the front--The enemy driven from the field--Inexplicable conduct of General Porter--Situation at nightfall--Position on Saturday morning--Porter's repulse, desperate fighting along the whole line--The enemy in overwhelming numbers­--Turning of Pope's left--Attempt to seize the Stone bridge—Daring valor of General Reynolds and the Reserves--Official reports--Loss in Reserve regiments--March to Centreville--Condition of the troops­--Rations issued--Battle of Chantilly--Retirement of the army within the fortifications--Object of Pope's campaign--Transfer of the Army of the Potomac--Movements of McClellan--The rebels cross the Poto­mac--Pursuit by General MeClcllan--March of the Reserves--Meade in command--Battle of South Mountain--Spirited charge up the mountain slope--The shout of victory--The casualties--The bivouac--Pur­suit of the enemy--Position on the Antietam--Hooker ordered to turn the enemy's left--The Reserves in the advance--The fight on Tuesday night--The picket line on the field--Battle of Antietam--Desperate fighting--Field won, lost and won again--Fighting on the right­--Fighting on the left--The field--The casualties--Official reports. 

 

AFTER the battle of Cedar Mountain, General Pope moved forward his whole command, and took a position on the north hank of tile Rapidan. The right, commanded by General Sigel, who had relieved General Fremont of leis command, rested on the Robertson river; the centre,

 

 

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under General McDowell, occupied both flanks of Cedar Mountain, and the left, commanded by General Reno, of Burnside's command, held a position near Raccoon ford. The enemy rapidly collected in great force on the south hank of the Rapidan, and it was manifestly his intention to overwhelm the Army of Virginia, before it could be rein­forced by the troops from the Peninsula. General Pope held on to his advanced position with great tenacity, in order to afford as much time as possible for the transfer of the Army of the Potomac. But on the 18th of August, it became evident to the commanding general, that the line. of the Rapidan was no longer tenable with the small force under his command, against the overwhelming force of the enemy, which by reason of its great numbers, could engage his front, and at the same time turn either flank. General Pope, therefore, determined to fall back to the line of the Rappahannock, and in compliance with instructions received from the department at Washington, to maintain, if possible, his communications with Fredericksburg, as it was upon that line reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac were expected to reach him. All the trains were sent beyond the Rappahannock during the 18th, and before the sun went down on the 19th, the whole army with its trans­portation and baggage, was securely posted on the north bank of the Rappahannock; its left resting at Kelly's ford, and its right extending three miles above Rappahannock station.

Early on the morning of the 20th, the enemy drove in the pickets of General. Reno's command in front of Kelly's ford, and at about the same time, made an attack opposite Rappa­hannock station; but, finding the crossings strongly guarded, and that it would be impossible to force the passage of the river, without heavy loss, the enemy halted his advance and brought up the main force from beyond the Rapidan. Dur­ing the night of the 20th, the whole force of General Lee's command was brought forward, and on the morning of the 21st, again confronted General Pope's army, at Kelly's ford

 

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and at Rappahannock station, and extended for several miles beyond the right of General Sigel's corps, which formed the extreme right of General Pope's army. On this day, and also on the 22d, the enemy attempted at various points to cross the river, but was invariably repulsed. The artillery fire was rapid and continuous during the whole of those days, and at times, extended along the line of the river for a distance of eight miles. Unable to force a cross­ing, the enemy began to move in heavy columns up the river, for the purpose of turning the right flank. General Pope's orders required him to keep open his communica­tions with Fredericksburg; he could not therefore abandon his position at Kelly's ford; his army was too small to enable him to extend his line further to the right, without. so weakening the centre, as to endanger his whole army, vet the movement of the enemy to the right must be met, or Lee would interpose his army between the Army of Virginia and Washington. Day after day, General Pope telegraphed to Washington, fully explained the situation on the Rappahannock, and informed the Commander-in­-Chief, that it would be impossible for him to maintain hip connection with Fredericksburg, and at the same time pre­vent the enemy from crossing the river at the upper fords, and gaining the rear of his position on the line of the Rap­pahannock. General Halleck assured General Pope, on the 21st of August, that if he would hold the line of the river two days longer, he should be so strongly reinforced, as not only to be secure, but to be able to resume offensive operations against Lee's whole army. The soldiers of the Army of Virginia, weary, sworn, and broken by incessant duty, marching, guarding, and fighting since the Ist of August, looked anxiously towards Fredericksburg, toward Alexandria, and towards Washington for the promised relief. Though the body was exhausted, the spirit was still strong, and the noble men who stood on the banks of the Rappahannock, felt that Nation's honor and the: Capital must, for two days more, be defended by their

 

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arms or be lost by their defeat. The 21st and the 22d passed in anxious waiting and continued fighting ; the 23d came, but still no tidings of coming reinforcements cheered the hearts of the patriot band on the line of the Rappahan­nock. The enemy had already crossed at Sulphur Springs and at Waterloo bridge, and General Pope's position was no longer tenable. Though General McClellan had aban­doned General Pope, to the power of the enemy, the God of Nations did not forsake the patriot army; standing guard in front of the Nation's Capital. On the night of the 22d, a heavy rain set in, and before daylight on the following morning, the water in the Rappahannock had risen full seven feet, and swept in furious torrents in front of the  rebel army, interposing an impassable barrier to its ad­vance.
     Early on the morning of the 23d, therefore, there being no longer any danger of the enemy's interposing a force between him and Fredericksburg, General Pope massed his whole force at Rappahannock station, with the determina­tion of falling upon that portion of Lee’s army that had  crossed the river, and crushing it before it could be succored by the troops on the south bank. The army moved up to Warrenton, Sulphur Springs, and Waterloo, on the 24th, but the enemy had already escaped by a rapid march northward towards Rectortown, and with a force of twenty thousand men, threatened General Pope's communications with Washington. General Halleck reassured General

Pope that reinforcements would reach him on the 24th, at Warrenton Junction. It was during this movement to the right, that General Reynolds arrived on the upper Rappahannock and reported to General Pope.

The Reserve corps had embarked on transports at Harri­son's landing on the 11th of August, and set sail for Aquia creek landing on the Potomac, where the greater part of the fleet arrived on the morning of the 13th. The regiments were  immediately disembarked, and sent forward by railroad to Falmouth. On the 21st, the whole division, with the except-

 

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tion of the Second reginment, marched for Kelly's ford, on tile Rappahannock, where it arrived on the 22d; on the following day it moved forward to Rappahannock station, and thence, with the Army of Virginia, to Warrenton, where it was attached to the First army corps, commanded by General McDowell. On the 24th the division encamped on the Sulphur Springs road, one mile from Warrenton, with General Meade's brigade advanced two miles towards the river. This most faithful division, and General Kear­ney's division, four thousand strong, which reported Warrenton Junction on the following day, were the only troops from the Army of the Potomac that joined General Pope, until the 26th, when he had fallen back to Warrenton Junction, and was retiring towards Manassas, to resist the enemy under General Jackson, who was advancing through Thoroughfare gap, towards Centreville.

The Second regiment had been detached to guard the transportation. On arriving at Falmouth on the 22d, Colonel McCandless determined to march his regiment through the enemy's country, in search of the division. After a hard and tedious march, he rejoined the Reserves at Warrenton.

General Pope ordered his whole army to withdraw on the Warrenton pike and roads parallel to it, towards Centrceville, and to concentrate on the evening of the 2 7th, with the; centre at Gainesville. In the afternoon, General Hooker encountered Ewell's division of Jackson's forces four miles west of Bristoe station, and a severe engagement took place, in which the enemy was driven from the field and across Broad run, with the loss of about three hundred in killed and wounded, and much of his baggage train. The enemy had torn up the railroad track, and destroyed several bridges between Bristoe station and Warrenton Junction.

General Banks was ordered to guard the trains and loco­motives at the Junction, until General Porter's corps had passed, and then to move forward as rapidly as the railroad could be repaired. All the troops reached the several

 

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positions to which they had been ordered, and it was evi­dent to General Pope, that he had successfully interposed his forces between Jackson, who was at Manassas Junction, and Long street, with the other wing of the rebel army at White Plains. Accordingly, General Pope ordered his whole army to move at daylight on the 28th, against Jack­son's troops.

McDowell, to whose corps the Reserves were attached, formed the left, and was ordered to move forward on the Warrenton pike; Sigce in the centre, moved on the line of the Manassas railroad, and Heintzelman on the right, moved up from Bristoe station. General Fitz John Porter was ordered to march with his corps from Warrenton Junction, at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, and to report at Bristoe station at daylight.

General Reynolds, commanding the Reserve corps, was directed to follow General Sigel's corps on the Warrenton and Alexandria turnpike towards Centreville, until they arrived at Gainesville, where the Manassas gap railroad crosses the turnpike; Sigel would then move to the right along the railroad, and General Reynolds was directed to form in columns of echelons on Sigel's left; King's division formed in like manner on the left of the Reserves. On arriving at Gainsville, the head of Reynolds' column was fired upon by the enemy with two pieces of artillery, in position on the heights above Groveton, and to the left of the turnpike. Three men were killed, and five more -wounded, in the Eighth regiment, by the enemy's shell. Ransom's battery of the Reserve corps was brought into position and opened on the enemy, and General Meade, who was in the advance, immediately formed his brigade into line of battle. The Fourth regiment was formed on the right of the turnpike; the Third and Seventh, on the left, ;and the Eighth was held in reserve. The range being too great for Ransom's guns, Captain Cooper's battery of new rifled guns, was ordered up, and opened with such good effect, that the enemy was forced to withdraw, and soon dis-

 

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appeared from the hill. General Reynolds then resumed the march towards Manassas.

General Jackson finding himself cut off from the other portions of Lee's army, evacuated Manassas Junction at three o'clock on the morning of the 28th, and rapidly retreated towards Centreville. General Pope reached the Junction with Kearney's and Reno's troops, at twelve o'clock mid-day, just about an hour after Jackson bad removed his head-quarters from that place. Hooker, Kear­ney, and Reno were pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy ; McDowell was ordered to change his line of march from the direction of Manassas, and to move direct upon Centreville, and General Porter was ordered to march to Manassas Junction. Late in the afternoon, General Kearney came up with the enemy's rear guard, and drove it through Centreville, and occupied the town. The enemy rapidly retreated in two columns ; one on the Warrenton pike towards Gainesville, and the other taking the Sudley­ Springs road. McDowell, with his own corps, and the troops under Sigel and Reynolds, bad promptly changed the direction of his march, and succeeded in interposing himself between Jackson's retreating column, and Thorough fare gap, which was the great object General Pope bad been striving to compass. At six o'clock on the evening of the 28th, Jackson found himself confronted by a large force, and at the same time the troops of Heintzelman's corps were pressing on the rear of his column for Centreville. A severe engagement was fought by King's division of Mc­Dowell corps, with the advance of Jackson's troops, which was terminated by darkness; each party maintaining its ground. General Pope, now felt sure that there was no escape for Jackson's command. McDowell was in his front, able to resist his advance; Heintzelman was pressing his rear with a heavy force, and Porter was ordered to move from Manassas, and to fall on his left flank. General Pope had ordered McDowell to maintain his position in the front; he directed Kearney, the advance of Heintzelman's corps,

 

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to press the enemy from the direction of Centreville, at one o'clock on the morning of the 29th, and instructed Porter to be on the field at daylight with his command. By these dispositions it was expected to crush Jackson's force.

By some fatality of circumstances, the order directing him to hold his position, did not reach McDowell. And there­fore, during the night King's division withdrew from the Warrenton pike, in the front, and retired towards Manassas; thus leaving open the road between Jackson and Longstreet through Thoroughfare gap. General Pope did not learn of the withdrawal of King's division until near daylight, on the morning of the 29th. An immediate change in the dis­position, and proposed movement of troops became neces­sary. An order was at once sent to General Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton, supported by the Penn­sylvania Reserves, to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough to distinguish foe from friend, and if possible to bring him to a stand. General Heintzelman, at Centreville, was ordered to move forward with Hooker's and Kearney’s divisions towards Gainesville; General Reno was directed to follow Heintzelman's troops closely as pos­sible. General Heintzelman's instructions were, to move at early dawn, to use all speed, and as soon as he came up with the enemy, to establish communication with Sigel, and .attack with the utmost promptness and vigor. General Porter, at Manassas Junction, was ordered to march for­ward with the utmost rapidity, upon Gainesville, by the direct road from the Junction to that place. He was urged by General Pope to make all possible speed, that he might come up with the enemy, and be able to turn his flank, near where the Warrenton road is intersected by the road lead­ing from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. General Mc­Dowell, who had, during the night retired to Manassas Junction, was directed to follow Porter's corps towards Gainesville, and to form on his left and attack the enemy on the right flank and rear. 

       General Sigel constructed his line of battle before day-

 

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light, by placing General Schurz's division north of the Warrenton pike, parallel to the Sudley Springs road; General Milroy in the centre on the turnpike, and General Schenck on an adjoining range of hills on the left, and south of the pile. In this order, promptly, at the dawn of day, General Sigel's troops moved forward and vigorously assaulted the enemy, and in a vehement artillery and in­fantry contest of four hours duration, drove him back from point to point, until Generals Schurz and Milroy had ad­vanced their lines more than a mile over the enemy’s ground, and General Schenck had gained two miles against the enemy's right. General Reynolds with the Reserve corps. had, during the evening of the 28th, marched by the left flank from the road leading from Gainesville to Manas­sas, and moving in the direction of Centreville, had closed up with Sigel's corps; at daylight, on the morning of the 29th, he was, therefore, on the field in front of the enemy. With the spirit of a true patriot, and a generous soldier he did not delay action from doubt of authority to move. General Reynolds was subject to McDowell’s orders  and might have declined to bring his troops into action without orders from that officer; but, fortunately, neither the officers nor the privates of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, were governed by any other than patriotic motives. It was enough for them to know that the enemy was in their front, and that Slgel's corps was about to engage him. Reynolds formed his division on the left of Schenk's division of Ohio troops, and from daylight till dark, with no higher orders than the consciousness of a worthy deed nobly done, the General and his troops, marching and countermarching, moving against the flank, or straight to the front, fought the enemy, driving his right wing from hill top to hill top until darkness put an end to the contest.

Early in the day General Meade was directed to form his brigade on the right of the division, and to move forward in support of Cooper's battery. The Bucktail regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil was thrown forward as

 

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skirmishers, and the brigade continued to advance, keeping in line with Schenck's division, until it crossed the Warrenton pike within half a mile of Groveton ; General Meade then discovered, that Schenck's division had been with­drawn, and that the enemy was deploying his infantry in his front in such force. that it became necessary to with­draw the brigade to a plateau south of the pike, where it took a strong position and held it until dark ; King's divi­sion, which had attacked the enemy on the pike, was then repulsed, and the .rebel troops were advancing between General Meade's position and the troops on his right, he Therefore withdrew his batteries, and rejoined the division on the hill near the Henry house.

Meanwhile, at about ten o'clock in the forenoon, General Heintzelman arrived on the field, and before twelve o'clock, all the troops in his corps were in line of battle, and Hooker's division had already become engaged in the centre of the line, where General Sigel, who superintended the battle, had sent him to reinforce General Milroy's divi­sion, which was hard pressed by the enemy. General Kearney had, in obedience to orders, formed his division on the extreme right, in front of the enemy's left, and Reno's division, as soon as it arrived on the field, was sent to the relief of General Schurz's division, which had main­tained a terrific conflict against vastly disproportionate numbers, from five o'clock in the morning until two in the afternoon. The enemy's left had been protected by an abandoned railroad cut, which afforded it excellent shel­ter; General Schurz was ordered to drive the rebels from this strong position ; it was a desperate undertaking, but with the co-operation of Kearney on his right, it was considered possible; but for' some unexplained reason, Kearney's troops did not advance, and the whole force of the enemy fell upon Schurz's division; his troops swayed backward and forward with alternate success, until finally Colonel Schimmelfennig's brigade, on the right, gained the embankment and dislodged the enemy from his cover.

 

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Heintzelman's troops then coming up, relieved the ex­hausted regiments of Schurz's brigade, which retired to replenish their ammunition.

General Pope arrived at the front, at one o'clock, and found the line formed, with Heintzelman's corps on the right, Sigel and Reno in the centre, and Reynolds' division on. the left. There was a lull in the battle, and little more than desultory skirmish firing was heard along the line. It was the general impression that Porter and McDowell had advanced far enough on the road towards Gainesville to threaten the rear of the enemy's position, and that Jackson was, therefore, withdrawing his troops. At two o'clock ill the afternoon, artillery firing was heard on the extreme left, and General Pope believed that Porter and McDowell were engaging the enemy on his right flank; the firing however soon ceased, and the whole army, knowing that these two corps had marched against the enemy's flank and rear, waited in dread suspense to hear the roar of battle in that direction; for the troops in front also knew that Long street was marching to jeinforce Jackson, and that soon the whop; rebel army would confront them. Three o'clock had passed; four o'clock, and still no tidings from, Porter and McDowell. Finally, McDowell reported that he was march­ing towards the field of battle, on the Sudley Springs road, and would reach the front at half-past five o'clock. At half-past four, General Pope sent a peremptory order to General Porter to push forward at once into action on the enemy's right, and, if posible, to turn his flank. At half-past five o'clock, when General Porter should have been going into action in compliance with this order, General Pope directed Heintzelman and Reno to assault the enemy’s left. The attack was made with great gallantry, and the whole of the left of the enemy's line was doubled back towards his centre, and the National troops, after a fierce conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle with the dead and wounded of the enemy in their hands.

At the same time General Reynolds, by direction of

 

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General Pope, threatened the enemy's right flank and rear, General Seymour's, and General .Jackson's brigades were moved forward along a strip of woodland, under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries, and soon became engaged with his infantry; Colonel Roberts and Colonel McCandless, with. the First and Second regiments, moved on the right through a woods, and became sharply engaged with the enemy's infantry, and were also exposed to a terrific shower of shot and shell. The troops advanced promptly, but soon they were confronted by overwhelrning numbers, and at the same time were attached by a large force in the left flank, and hence, notwithstanding all their steadiness and courage, they were forced to retie o, which they did in good order, and resumed their former position on the hill.

At about this time the troops of McDowell's corps began to arrive on the field, and were ordered by General Pope to move forward on the Warrenton pike, and to attack the enemy. King's division got into position at about sunset, and opened the attack with an impetuosity that amounted to rashness, but by this time the advance of Longstreet's rebel corps, had arrived and confronted King's division, at a point on the pike about three-quarters of a mile in front of the line of battle, where a severe encounter took place in which King was severely repulsed.

Whilst these movements were transpiring on the left, Heintzelinan and Reno on the right continued to push back the enemy's left in the direction of the Warrenton turnpike, so that at eight o'clock in the evening, when the battle ceased, the greater portion of the field was occupied by the National army. Still, nothing, had been heard from General Porter, and his troops took no part whatever in the engage­ment, but were suffered, by him, to lie on their arms within sight and sound of the battle, during the whole of the day. If General Porter had obeyed the orders sent to him by General Pope, and made a vigorous attack on the enemy's right flank or rear, as he had been directed to do, at any time up to eight o'clock in the night, Jackson's forces would

 

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have been crushed, and the larger portion of his men cap­tured, before they could, by any possibility, have been rein­forced by General Longstreet's command. The destruction of Jackson's command would have crippled Lee's army to an extent that would have compelled him to retreat in great haste towards Richmond, to escape with any portion of his army intact. A decisive victory at Bu11 Run, on the 29th of August, would have spared the North the disgrace of the Maryland and Pennsylvania invasion, and the people, the loss of the blood and treasure poured out on the fields of South Mountain and Antietam. The full measure of that day's disaster cannot be estimated, and will never be known to the American people. General Porter was tried by a court-martial composed of the ablest officers in the National army, and was defended by the most learned lawyers in the United States; he was found guilty of the most flagrant disobedience of orders, and was disgracefully dismissed from the army of the United States.

The loss in General Pope's army in the battle of the 29th was about seven thousand killed and wounded.

General Pope says, in his report:

 

Every indication during the night of the 29th, and up to ten o'clock on the morning of the 30th, pointed to the retreat of the enemy from our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of the 20th, and who came into our lines on the morning of the 30th, reported the enemy retreating during the whole night in the direction of and along the Warrenton turnpike. Generals McDowell and Heiutzelman, who reconnoitred the positions held by the enemy's left on the evening of the 29th, confirmed this statement. They reported to me that the positions occupied by the enemy's, left had been evacuated, and that there was every indication that lie was retreating in the direction of Gainesville.

On the morning of the 30th, as may be supposed, our troops, who had been so continually marching amid fighting for so many days, were in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little to eat for two days pre­vious, and the artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness and saddled continually for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous. It may easily be imagined how little these troops, after such severe labor, and after undergoing such hardship and privation, were in condition for active and efficient service. I had telegraphed to the

 

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general-in-chief on the 28th our condition, and had begged of him to have rations and forage sent forward to us front Alexandria with all despatch. I also called his attention to the imminent need of cavalry horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any service whatever.

About daylight of the 30th, I received a note from General Franklin, herewith appended, written by direction of General McClellan, and dated at eight o'clock the evening before, informing me that rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars at Alex­andria as soon as I would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. Such a letter, when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexan-. dria, was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have hall provisions or have fallen back in the direction of Washington; nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains.

It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged; but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the despe­rate condition of my command, from great fatigue, from want of pro­visions and forage, and from the small hope that I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless overwhelmed by the superior forces of the enemy. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming forward to my assistance since the 24th, and did not expect on the morning of the 130th, that any assistance would reach me from the direction of Wash­ington ; but I determined again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance towards the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement. At that time my effective forces-greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing and broken-down men during the severe operations of two or three days and nights previous ; the sharp actions of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th­ were estimated by me and others, as follows:

McDowell's corps, including Reynolds's division, twelve thousand men; Sigel's corps, seven thousand men; Reno's corps, seven thousand men ; Heintzelman's,corps, seven thousand men; Porter's corps, which had been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at about twelve thousand men, including the brigade of Platt, which formed a. part of Sturgis's division, and the only portion that ever joined me. But of this force the brigades of Piatt and Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about five thousand men, had been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th to Centreville, and were not avail­able for operations on that clay. This reduced Porter's effective force

 

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on the field to about seven thousand men, which gave me a total force of forty thousand men. Banks's corps, about five thousand strong, was at Bristoe station, in charge of the railroad trains and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army still at that place. 

Soon after the Reserve regiments had collected them­selves together on the night of the 29th, Seymour's brigade, containing the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth regiments, was ordered out on picket duty, which, on a battle-field, means to stand guard in front of the foe, ready at any moment to resist his attach. The men rested on their arms during the night, so near to the enemy, that they could hear the conversation of the rebel guard, but a few yards in front of their line. At daylight the brigade was relieved, and returned to the division.

Early in the morning. the Reserves were in position on the left of the Warrenton pike, facing to the west. Meade's brigade was ordered to move forward and discover the position, and force of the enemy. The " Bucktail " regiment was deployed as skirmishers, and pushed forward to the top of the hill at Groveton, where it encountered a stubborn resistance, and was reinforced by the Third regiment. By, this force the enemy's skirmish line was swept from the field, and the brigade coming up, maintained its position at Groveton until it was ordered, by General Reynolds, to retire.

During the forenoon a line of battle was formed in the vicinity of Groveton. General Heintzelmen's corps was on the right, Reno's and McDowell's corps in the centre, rest­ing on the Warrenton pike cast of Groveton, and Sigel's corps and Reynolds' division were on the left. Shortly after this disposition hart been made, General Porter's corps marched between the line of battle and the enemy, and formed in front of 1\fcDowell's and Reno's troops, masking the entire front. It was the intention of General Pope to break the enemy's left, and for that purpose reinforcements were sent to the right, to aid Heintzelman and Reno.

Before two o'clock, Porter had advanced into the woods

 

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in his front and was engaging the enemy, who, being strongly posted behind a railroad embankment, easily re. pulsed Porter's troops, and drove them from the woods in considerable disorder. The enemy followed the retiring troops, and at the same time, commenced a furious assault on the left flank, thus developing his real design of attempting to turn the left of Pope's position, and interpose between General Banks at Bristoe, and the main army, and thus capture or destroy the supply trains in charge of Banks' corps. Heintzelman and Reno moved forward on the right without meeting with much resistance; the mass of the rebel army was opposite the left. When Porter's troops emerged from the woods in front, and a large mass of the enemy appeared on the left flank, Sigel was ordered to face to the left; Rickett's division was hurried across the field from the right, and Reynolds, who bad moved forward on Sigel's left before the battle opened, was now ordered to form the Reserves on the extreme left, behind which Porter's corps might be rallied. The battle immediately burst in a furious assault along the entire line; in addition to being able to engage all the troops in the front, the enemy had an excess of force sufficient to detach a heavy column to envelop the left wing of Pope's army, and force its flank. General Reynolds, with the instinct of a thorough soldier, discovered that the enemy was aiming to seize the Warrenton pike in the rear of the broken masses of troops, that were now flowing back from the front; he at once determined to throw his division in the breach, and save the army, or perish in the attempt.

The plan of the enemy was, to break the centre and seize the roads between the two wings of the army, and thus ensure its destruction. The heroic general, fully conscious of the desperate situation of the army, galloped along his line and called upon his men to charge upon and hurl back the advancing foe. The Reserves saw by the ardor of their general that the whole army was in imminent danger; in a moment they were up and charging, with a cheer and yell,

 

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across an open field; they encountered the enemy at the brow of a declivity, up which the rebels struggled in vast numbers, and with unwearying pertinacity. Fortunately, the Reserves were aligned upon a country road, which, having been somewhat worn by use, aflorded partial protec­tion, and also depressed their fire. The contest became hot and desperate. Greatly outnumbered by the rebels, they were only enabled to hold them in check by rapid and unceasing firing.

The field officers who rode upon the ground above tire road, were much exposed and suffered severely. At one moment all seemed to be lost. The First and Second regi­ments were engaged in an almost hand to hand encounter; the left was pressed back, and to the consternation of the mounted officers, who from their positions had a view of the field, the troops on tile right of the Reserves gave way in utter confusion. At this critical moment, tile gallant Rey­nolds, observing that the flag-staff' of the Second regirnent had been pierced by a bullet and broken, seized the flag from the color-bearer, and dashing to the right, rode twice up and down his entire division line, waving the flag about his head and cheering on his men.

The rebel sharp-shooters rained fierce showers of bullets around the ensign thus borne aloft. but in vain did tire missiles of death fill the atmosphere in which it moved. The effect upon the division was electrical; the men, in­spired by the intrepidity of their leader, rent the air with cheers, plied their tremendous musket fire with renewed energy and vigor, and in a few moments, the thinned ranks of the rebel regiments gave way before the steady and un­relenting volleys poured upon them. Night came on and put an end to the contest; but the famous Stone bridge over Bull Run -was, by the genius and heroic daring of General Reynolds, and the valor of tile brave men he commanded, preserved for the use of the National army. The enemy, thus beaten back, retired beyond tile range of the loyal guns, appalled at the havoc they witnessed in their ranks,

 

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and confounded by their failure to reach the turnpike. The sun was now setting, and the battle had ended.

General Reynolds says, in his report of the operations of his division in Pope's campaign: 

On the morning of the 30th I was directed to take post with my division on the left of the pike near the Henry house, and ordered by Major­-General Pope to form my division in column by company at full dis­tance, with the whole of my artillery on the left; that I would be the pivot in the attack which Porter's corps was to make on the enemy's right, then supposed to be on the pike and in retreat. Having formed my division in the position indicated, and opened with my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first ridge, the skirmishers advanced and the attack by Porter's corps commenced. When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods opposite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regiment was deployed to support them, and finally a second ; in all, three regiments.

The advanced skirmishers were the First rifles, Colonel McNeil, and the First, infantry, Colonel Roberts, supported by the Seventh infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson. The Sixth regiment, Colonel Sinclair, was thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becoming convinced that the enemy were not in retreat, but were posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond ; and advancing myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly stationary, evidently masking a column of the enemy, formed for attack on my left flank when our line should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing one of my orderlies who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground, and directed me to form my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed. Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the com­manding general, observing the attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately started my division in the direction indicated; but before the rear of my column had left the position the threatened attack by the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, were obliged to form on the ground on which they found themselves to oppose it. Passing across the field to the right, with Meade's and Seymour's brigades and Ransom's battery, my course was diverted by the difficult nature of the ground, and the

 

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retreating masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzel­man's corps, already formed, by which much tune was lost and con­fusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with his right, so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division and scattered troops of other commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. , It was here that the most severe loss of the division was sustained, both in men and material, Kern losing, his four guns, but not until wounded and left on the field; Cooper, his caisson.

Colonel Hardin, commanding the Twelfth regiment, was here severely wounded. The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on both front and flank maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new positions wherever the advantages of ground permitted. The two brigades and battery of artillery under my immediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved, by the direction of an officer of General Pope's staff, to a position to the right of the Henry house, which position was most gallantly maintained by the commands of Meade and Seymour and Ransom's battery fur nearly two hours, when. they were relieved by the division of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan.

In reference to the battle of Saturday, August 30, General Pope says:  

Between twelve and two o'clock in the day I advanced the corps of Porter, supported by King's division of McDowell's corps, to attack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike. At the same time I directed Heintzelman and Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and front towards Warrenton turnpike, and attack the enemy's left in flank, if possible. For a short time Rickett's division of McDowell's corps was placed in support of this movement on our right.

It was necessary for me to act thus promptly and make an attack, as I had not the time, for want of provisions and forage, to await an attack from the enemy; nor did I think it good policy to do so under the cir­cumstances. During the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th, the advance of the main body under Lee was arriving on the field to reinforce Jackson, so that by twelve or one o'clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own, and these forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare gap. Every moment of delay increased the odds against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my forces into action. Shortly after General Porter moved forward to the attack along the Warrenton turnpike, and the assault on the enemy was made by Heintzelman and Reno on the right, it became apparent that the enemy was massing his

 

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troops, as fast as they arrived on the field, on his right, and was moving forward from that direction to turn our left, at which point it was plain lie intended to make his main attack. I accordingly directed General McDowell to recall Rickett's division iniinediat6y from our right, and post it on the left of our line; with its left refused. The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon re­tired in considerable confusion. As soon as they commenced to fall brick, the enemy advanced to the assault, and our whole line, from right to left, was soon furiously engaged. The main attack of the enemy was made upon our left, but was met with stubborn resistance by the divisions of General Schenck, General Milroy, and General Reynolds, who, shortly after the action began, were reinforced on their left and rear by the division of Ricketts. The action raged furiously for several hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy reserves, and pouring mass after mass of his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in number were his forces that, whilst overpowering us on our left, he was able to assault us also with very superior forces on our right. Porter's forces were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the rear. As soon as they could be used, I pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered most distguished service, especially the brig­ade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan.

Tower's brigade of Rickett's division was rushed forward into action in support of Reynold's division, and was led forward in person by General Tower with conspicuous skill and gallantry. The conduct of that brigade, in plain view of all the forces on our left, was especially distinguished, and drew forth hearty and enthusiastic cheers.

The example of this brigade was of great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed their intrepid conduct. Reno's corps was also withdrawn from its position oil our right centre late in the afternoon, and thrown into the action on our left, where it behaved with conspicuous gallantry. Notwithstanding these great disadvan­tages, our troops held their ground with the utmost firmness and obsti­nacy, and the losses on both sides here very heavy. By dark our left had been forced back about a half or three=quarters of a mile; but still remained firm and unbroken, and still covered the turnpike in our rear.

About six o'clock in the afternoon i heard, accidentally, that Frank­lin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east of Centreville, and twelve miles in our rear, and that it was only about eight thousand strong. The result of the battle of the 30th, the very heavy losses we had suffered, and the complete prostration of our troops from hunger and fatigue, made it plain to me that we were no longer able, in the face of such overwhelming odds, to maintain our position so far to the front, nor would we have been able to do so under any circumstances, suffer-ing as were the men and horses from fatigue and hunger, and weakened by the heavy losses incident to the uncommon hardships which they had suffered.

 

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bout eight o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions to the commanders of corps to withdraw leisurely towards Centreville, and suited to them what route each should pursue, and where they should take post. General Reno was instructed with his whole corps to cover the movements of the army towards Centreville. The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in good order, no pursuit whatever having been attempted by the enemy. A division of infantry with its batteries was posted to cover the crossing of Cub run.

The exact losses in this battle I am unable to give, as the reports received from tile corps commanders only exhibit the aggregate losses during the whole of the operations from the 22d of August to the 2d of September. Before leaving the field that night, I sent orders to General Banks, at Bristoe station, to destroy the railroad trains and such of the stores in theirs as he was unable to carry off, and rejoin me at Cen­treville. I had previously sent him orders to throw into each wagon of the army trains as much as possible of the stores from the railroad cars, and to be sure and bring off  with him from Warrenton Junction, and Bristoe, all the ammunition and the  sick and wounded that could be transported, and for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents, &,c., from the regimental trains. These several orders are appended. At no time during the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st of August, was the road between Bristoe station and Centre­ville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains of the army were on that road in charge of General Banks, and covered and protected by his whole corps. If any of these wagons were lost, as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter thus specifi­cally into this matter, and submit the orders sent to General Banks and his subsequent report to me because no part of the misrepresentation of this campaign has been grosser than the statement of our heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted will show conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the  utmost detail, for the security of our trains and supplies, and I am quite convinced that General Banks

is not the man to neglect the duty with which he was charged.

I arrived at Centreville between nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 30th. The same night I sent orders to the corps commanders to report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morn­ing of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be posted as follows: Porter to occupy the intrenchments on the north or right of Centreville ; Franklin on his left, in the intrenchments. In rear of Centreville, between Franklin and Porter as a support, was hosted the corps of Heintzelman. Sigel occupied the intrenchments on the left and south side of the town, with Reno on his left and rear. Banks was ordered to take post, as soon as he arrived, on the north side of Bull run, and to cover the bridge on the road from Centreville to Manassas Junction. Sumner, as soon as he arrived, was ordered to take post between Centreville and Chantilly, and to occupy Chantilly

 

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in force. McDowell was posted about two miles in the rear of Centre­ville on the road to Fairfax court-house. Ammunition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all corps commanders were notified, by special order to each, that the ammunition trains were parked immediately in rear of Centreville, and were directed to send officers to procure such ammunition as was needed in their respective, corps. I directed the whole of the trains of the army to be unloaded at Centre­ville and sent to Fairfax station to bring up forage and rations.

We remained during the whole day of the 31st, resting the men, get­ting up supplies of provisions, and re-supplying the command with ammunition. 

Early in the night after the battle, the Reserve corps marched towards Centreville and bivouacked on the east bank of Cub run, and on the following morning it proceeded to Centreville. Never were the men of this division in more straitened circumstances; there had been no

proper and full ration issued since the 24th day of the month; the severity of the marches, the frequent night guards, and the days of battle that intervened, required men possessing great power of' physical endurance, as well as the spirit of patriot soldiers; for two days the men had

subsisted on green fruit and herbs snatched by the wayside, and had been sustained more by the fierce excitement of battle, than by physical strength. At ten o'clock in the morning, the division was led down the turnpike two miles from Centreville, where the regiments were halted, and a small quantity of coffee and some hard bread were dis­tributed among the men. An officer in one of the regi­ments wrote home : " It did not take us long to get our fires burning. These rations were a perfect god-send to us. Every mouthful of coffee we drank, seemed like so much life flowing into the; body." In the afternoon the division marched back. to Centreville and there received rations of salt beef. It then marched back to Cub run to relieve Reno's troops, who were guarding the crossings of that stream. The men, now, hard their haversacks filled with rations of coffee, bread and meat, and their cartridge boxes replenished with ammunition; so that, refreshed in body

 

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 and spirit, they marched to duty forgetful of the hardships of the terrible week that had passed. A heavy rain set in and the night was dark and dreary. The enemy had been too severely handled to attempt any serious work, and the troops were allowed to rest.

On the morning of the 1st of September, the whole army was withdrawn from Centreville towards Fairfax Court House. General Pope discovered that the enemy was moving northward with the intention of turning his right flank. He therefore determined to give him battle in front of Chantilly, early on Tuesday morning, the 2d of Septem­ber. On Monday afternoon he sent General Hooker to Fairfax C. H., and instructed him to move forward with all the troops at that place to Germantown; McDowell took up a position on Difficult creek, connecting with Hooker's left; Reno was pushed forward on the direct road to Chantilly; Heintzelman formed in rear of Reno's troops within sup­porting distance; Franklin's corps, which had arrived from Alexandria on the 1st, was posted on the left and rear of McDowell's troops; Sumner's corps, which hack also come up, was formed on the left of Heintzelman, and the corps of Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with the right of Sumner. General Banks, still guarding the immense sup­ply trains, moved on the old Braddock road and came on the Alexandria pike in the scar of the army, and conducted his entire train in safety to the Potomac. The rebel general saw that General Pope had discovered his plans, and had placed his army in a position to resist his advance. Gene­ral Lee, therefore, determined not to await the attack, but fell upon the right wing of Pope's army with great fury, late in the afternoon of the 1st. The assault was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearney, and though the attack was sudden and the action severe, the enemy was repulsed and driven back with great loss. The battle ter­minated at dark; but not before two of the most distin­guished and promising officers in the United States had fallen. Major-general Philip Kearney and Major-general

 

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Isaac Ingalls Stevens were both killed while leading their commands to victory.

General Pope, says further 

The main body of our forces was so much broken down and so com­pletely exhausted that they were in no condition, even on the lst of September, for any active operations against the enemy, but I deter­mined to attack at daylight on the 2d of September, in front of Chan­tilly. The movement of the enemy had become so developed by the afternoon of the 1st., and was so evidently directed to Fairfax Court ­House, with a view of turning my right, that I made the necessary dis­position of my troops to fight a battle, between the Little river pike and the road from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House.

Just before sunset on the 1st, the enemy attacked us on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearney's division of Heintzelman's corps. A very severe action occurred in the midst of a terrific thunder-storm, and was terminated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven back entirely from our front, but during that engage­ment we lost two of the best and one of the most distinguished of our general officers—Major-General Kearney and Major-general Stevens--who were both killed while gallantly leading their commands and in front of their line of battle. It is unnecessary for me to say one word of commendation of two officers who were so well and widely known to the country. Words cannot express my sense of the zeal, the gal­lantry, and the sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier, Major-General Kearney. In him the country has suffered a loss which it will be difficult, if not impossible, to repair. He died as he would wish to die, and as became his heroic character.

On the morning of the 2d of September, the enemy still continuing his movement towards our right, my whole force was posted behind Difficult creek, from Flint hill to the Alexandria turnpike. Although we were quite able to maintain our position at that place until the stragglers could be collected and the army, after its labors and perils, put into condition for effective service, I considered it advisable, for reasons which developed themselves at Centreville, and which I explained to the general-in-chief and set forth herewith in the appendix, that the troops should be drawn back to the intrenchmcnts in front of Washing­ton, and that some reorganization should be made of them, in order that earlier effective service should be secured than was possible in their con­dition at that time. I received orders about twelve o'clock on the 2d of September, to draw back the forces within the intrenchments, which was clone in good order and without any interruption by the enemy. The reasons which induced me, before I took the field in Virginia, to express to the Government my desire to be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia and return to the West, existed in equal, if not greater, force at this time than when I first stated them. I accordingly

 

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renewed, urgently, my application to be relieved. The Government assented to it with some reluctance, and I was transferred to the com­mand of the Department of the Northwest, for which department I left Washington on the 7th of September.

It seems proper for me, since so much misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the Army of the Poto­mac, to state here precisely what forces of that army came under my command and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, about two thousand five hundred strong, joined me on the 23d of August, at Rap­pahannock station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about eighteen thousand strong, joined me on the 20th and 27th of August at Warren­ton junction.

The Pennsylvania Reserves, under Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after they had reported to me. Porter's corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays and frequent and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever except in the action of the 30th of August. This small fraction of twenty thousand five hundred men was all of the ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Harrison's landing which ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in that cam­paign. By the time that the corps of Franklin and Sumner, nineteen thousand strong, joined me at Centreville, the original army of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman and the division of Reynolds, had been so much cut up in the severe actions in which they had keen engaged, and were so much broken down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed, that they  were in little condition for any effective service whatever, and required and should have had some days of rest to put them in anything like condition to perform their duties in the field. 

The enemy did not again come within striking distance of General Pope's army, which was now fully able to main­tain its position. Put, to secure the proper union and perfect harmony of the Army of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac, and Burnside's array from North Carolina, required a more thorough re-organization than could be effected in the field in the face of the enemy; at the suggestion of General Pope, the forces were, therefore, with­drawn within the fortifications around Washington. The retirement of the troops was commenced on the afternoon of the 2d, and before sundown on the 4th, the combined

 

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forces of the three armies were posted behind the defenses around the Capitol. Retiring with McDowell's corps, Gene­ral Reynolds marched his division, on the evening of the 2d, on the Alexandria and Columbia pike, to the vicinity of Hunter's Chapel and Arlington, and on the afternoon of the 4th encamped in position north of Munson's hill.

The Reserve corps went into "Pope's Campaign" -with about six thousand men, of which number, four officers and sixty-four privates were killed; thirty-one officers and three hundred and sixty-four privates were wounded, and four officers and one hundred and eighty-five privates were missing, making an aggregate loss of six hundred and fifty­-two men.

In the First regiment Captain Mott Hooton was wounded, six men were killed, and twenty-two wounded; in the Second, Colonel McCandless, Lieutenants John H. Jack, Daniel L. Conner and J. B. Robinson were wounded, one man was killed and eleven wounded; in the Third Captain H. Clay Beatty, a young officer of. great pro­mise, known and beloved throughout the command, was killed on the 30th, while gallantly leading his company; two privates were killed and twenty wounded; in the Fourth, one man was killed and eleven wounded; in the Fifth, commanded in this campaign by Lieutenant-colonel George Dare, Lieutenant Robert W. Smith, acting as adju­tant of the regiment, was severely wounded in the gallant charge made at the close of the battle on the 30th, h was left on the field, and fell into the hands of the enemy, was paroled on the 4th of September, with other wounded prisoners, and was taken to Washington, where he died, bleeding to death under the hands of the surgeon, on Sunday the 7th, and when his father and brother were knocking at the door of the apartment of the hospital to be admitted to his aid, or to comfort him in the hour of death. This young officer had risen from a private by his merito­rious conduct on the field of battle, and his loss was deeply felt by his comrades in arms. In the same regiment, Lieu-

 

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tenant David McGaughy was wounded, one private was killed. and seven wounded; in the Sixth, Colonel Sinclair, Lieutenants Wm. Goodman and R. M. Pratt were wounded, five men were killed and thirty-three were wounded; in. the Seventh, one man was killed and twenty-two wounded; in the Eighth, Adjutant Henry Wetten, Captain J. G. Henry, and Lieutenant A. H. Sellers were wounded, five men were killed, and eighteen were wounded ; in the Ninth, Lieuten­ants Alexander McCord and G. A. Wenks, and twelve men were killed, Captains Charles Barnes and J. W. Ballentine, and fifty-one privates were wounded, Captain J. T. Shannon and Lieutenant J. M. Sowers, and twenty-three; men were reported missing at the close of the action; in the Tenth, Captain James S. Hindman, Lieutenant Henry B. Fox, and ten privates were killed; Colonel James B. Kirk, Captain Ira Ayer, Adjutant M. M. Phelps and Lieutenant W. B. M. Williams, and thirty men were wounded, and nineteen were reported missing; in the Eleventh, Lieutenant John C. Kuhn, and four men were killed, Adjutant Robert A. McCoy, Captain William Stewart, and Lieutenants R. M. Jones, James Kennedy, D. R. Coder, and L. A. Johnson, and forty-one enlisted men were wounded, and five were missing ; in the Twelfth, Colonel Martin D. Hardin, com­manding the Third brigade, Captain Francis Schilling, and Lieutenants W. H. Weaver were wounded, five privates were killed, and thirty-five were -wounded; Lieutenant Samuel Cloyd and twenty-two enlisted men were missing ; the Bucktail regiment lost five men killed, nineteen wounded and three missing. Battery A lost one man killed, five. wounded and one missing; in battery B, four men were killed, Lieutenaut William C. Miller and seventeen privates were wounded; in battery G, three men were killed, Captain Kern, a most gallant officer who had rendered valuable ser­vice in the Peninsula, was wounded and taken prisoner, and subsequently died; also Lieutenant George Buffum and twenty-one men were wounded and seven men were missing. This battery also lost its guns on the 30th, after the most

 

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desperate resistance and fierce destruction of the enemy. Captain Cooper, in the same struggle, lost his caissons.

General Jackson commanding the Third brigade rup­tured a blood vessel and became severely ill in the battle of the 29th, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Hardin, who being severely wounded on the 30th, turned over the command to Colonel Anderson of the Ninth regiment. Colonel Fisher of the Fifth regiment having received a serious injury by the fall of his horse, during a night march from Falmouth on the 21st of August, was not able to continue with his command, but had been sent home on furlough. Lieutenant-colonel Dare commanded the Fifth regiment, Major Snodgrass the Ninth, and Major Peter Baldy the Twelfth, at the close of the engagement on Saturday night.

The four companies of Bucktails, that had been detached from the regiment at Fredericksburg, in May, to accompany General Bayard to the Shenandoah valley, became attached to the Army of Virginia, and retired with General McDowell's corps from the line of the Rapidan towards Washington. Lieutenant-Colonel Kane, who had been ex­changed in the early part of August, hastened to the front, and took command of the battalion at Catlett's station. The detachment remained under his command until the army arrived in the fortifications at Washington, when it rejoined the regiment.

On the 7th of September, Kane was promoted to a briga­dier-generalship, and was assigned to the command of a brigade in the Twelfth corps.

Thomas L. Kane was the second son of Judge Kane of Philadelphia; he received a liberal education in the schools of that city, and was then sent to France to pursue a higher course. Whilst in Paris, he espoused the cause of Red republicanism, and took his first military lesson behind the Trench barricades. After his return to Pennsylvania, he read law in his father's office, and was admitted to practice. President Polk, during his administration, sent him to Mis-

 

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souri to settle the Indian difficulties in that territory, and to superintend the exodus of the Mormons from Nauvoo. In the Utah war of 1851, Mr. Kane was again sent on a mission to the Mormons, and by the most untiring efforts reached their capital, and succeeded in negotiating a truce; and sub­sequently, procured an amnesty from President Buchanan, for the offending Mormons, which finally led to a peaceful settlement of the Utah difficulties.

The exposure in the mountains, to which Mr. Kane had been subjected during his journeys to Salt Lake City, had seriously impaired his health; he therefore removed from Philadelphia to the forests of McKean county. When the rebels fired on Fort Sumter, Mr. Kane.offered his services to Governor Curtin, and immediately recruited four companies, which afterwards became part of the Bucktail regiment. The men were collected on the headwaters of the Susque­hannah, where they embarked on rafts, and floated down to the capital of the State, and entered Camp Curtin. Kane was in command of these men until the time of the organi­zation of the regiment. His services with the Bucktails have been recorded in the accounts of their campaigns.

General Kane commanded his brigade in the battles and campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, until November, 1863, when he resigned and retired from the service, com­pletely broken down in health. General Pope was, at his own request, relieved from the command of the troops about Washington, and proceeded immediately to the North-west to take command of that department. His great campaign has been the subject of the most unparalleled misrepresentation, and has been more widely misunderstood than any other in the history of the war.

The object of this campaign into Virginia was to relieve tile Army on the James river, and to ensure its withdrawal to the Potomac. To accomplish this, it became necessary for General Pope to confront, with a small army, vastly supe­rior forces, to fight battles without hope of victory, but only

 

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to gain time and embarrass and delay the forward move­ments of the enemy; in short, to make every sacrifice necessary to keep the enemy from the fortifications around the National Capital, until the army from the Peninsula could be transferred, and placed in position to aid in its defence. In this the commanding general succeeded, and if the whole Army of the Potomac had moved with reasonable promptness to his relief, he would not only have ended his campaign triumphantly, but would have sealed it with a complete victory, that would have overwhelmed the rebel army in Virginia and broken the power of the rebellion in the east.

The main body of the Army of the Potomac lead evacu­ated the camp at Harrison's landing, and crossed the Chick­ahominy, near its mouth, on a pontoon bridge, on the 17th of August; marching thence, down the Peninsula through Williamsburg, the several corps reached Yorktown, New­port News, and Fort Monroe on the 20th. At these points they were embarked on transports and carried to Alexan­dria, whence they marched to Centreville and joined the Army of Virginia. General McClellan arrived at Alexan­dria on the night of the 26th of August, and on the lst of September, he was ordered to Washington to confer with General Halleck on the situation in front. On the 2d, General McClellan was assigned to the command of all the forces about the defences of the Capital.

As soon as the National forces had reached the fortifica­tions in front of Washington, the enemy began to withdraw towards Leesburg, and on the 4th of September, commenced to cross the Potomac river in force, near Poolesville in Maryland. It was now evident to the authorities at Wash­ington that the Confederate general contemplated the inva­sion of 1-Laryland, and an attack on the Capital from the north side of the Potomac. On the day previous to the crossing at Poolesville by the enemy, General McClellan had ordered the Second, and the Twelfth corps, to cross the Potomac on the Chain bridge, and to occupy Tenallytown.

 

 

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On the 4th, the whole army was put in motion, moving up both banks of the river for the purpose of discovering the position and intentions of the enemy. The defences of the Capital were intrusted to General Banks, and all the available troops were hurried away, under the command of General McClellan, in pursuit of the enemy. The army which but three days before had been on the defensive, falling back from position to position, until it retired within the line of fortifications on the Potomac, now reorganized, harmonized, united, and reinforced, marched out boldly and defiantly to give battle to the enemy whenever and wherever he could be found.

On the 7th of September the Reserve corps, as a division of the First army corps, commanded by General Hooker, marched from its camp near Munson's hill, crossed the Potomac on Long bridge, and thence, marching through the streets of Washington, encamped on Meridian hill. On the following clay, new clothes and a fresh supply of rations were issued to the men, and the division moved forward to a point near Brookville in Maryland, where it encamped two days. From Broolr_ville it marched on the road towards Frederick, and on the night of the 12th, encamped beyond New Market, near the Monocacy creek.

Governor Curtin, believing the enemy would invade the State of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation on the 4th of September, calling out seventy-five thousand troops from the militia force of the State; and on the 12th, General Reynolds was relieved from the command of the Reserve Corps, and was ordered to procede to Harrisburg, at the request of the Governor, to organize and command these forces. The command of, the division then devolved on General Meade; On the 13th, the troops crossed the Monocacy, and during the afternoon, pitched camp on the western bank of the creek.

During this time the whole army of the Potomac had moved forward, from Washington towards Frederick ; its left resting all the while on the north bank of the Potomac,

 

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and its right wing marching on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. On the 13th, the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through the city of Frederick, and it was soon discovered that the entire force of the enemy was in Maryland, and had fallen back to a strong position on South Mountain.

Colonel D. S. Miles with a force of about twelve thousand men, collected from.the military posts in the Shenandoah valley, was garrisoning Harper's Ferry. On the 12th, General Jackson with a strong rebel force recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and marched against that post which was foolishly surrendered with its garrison and stores, after a weak defence, at eight o'clock in the morning of the 15th of September. Before the capitulation of the garri­son, Colonel Davis, of Illinois, commanding the cavalry at Harper's Ferry determined to cut his way out through the enemy's lines; accordingly on the night of the 13th, he crossed the pontoon bridge, and pursuing the road up the river to Sharpsburg, and thence to Williamsport and Hagerstown, arrived safely in Pennsylvania with his whole troop of gallant young men, who not only successfully extricated themselves from a most embarrassing situation, but on their way northward, captured General Longstreet's supply train, and brought it within the National lines.

As soon as General McClellan had fully ascertained the position of the enemy, he made the necessary dispositions to dislodge hirn from the mountain passes, and if possible to interpose Franklin's command, including the Sixth corps and Couch's division of the Second, between the enemy's forces on the mountains and Jackson's troops operating against Harper's Ferry. General Franklin pushed his command rapidly forward towards Crampton's pass, and at about twelve o'clock on the 14th, arrived at Burkettsville; immediately in rear of which he found the enemy's infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, with artillery in strong positions to defend the approaches to the pass. Slo­cum's division was formed upon the right of the road lead-

 

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ina through the gap, and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbett's brigades, supported by Newton, advanced steadily upon the enemy, at a charge, on the right. The rebels were driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope until they reached the position of their battery on the road, well up the mountain. There they made a stand. They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in echelon until, after an action of three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the other side.

On the left of the road, Brooks' and Irvin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Slocum’s flank, charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the crest was carried Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, seven hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery and three colors, were captured by Franklin's troops in this brilliant action.

The loss in General Franklin's corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's position was such that artillery could not be used against him with any effect. The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in Pleasant valley on the night of the 14th, within three and a half miles of the point on Maryland heights where he might, on the same night or on, the morning of the 15th, have formed a junction with the garrison at Harper's Ferry had it not been previously withdrawn from Maryland heights.

Whilst these movements were transpiring on the left, the troops of the right wing and centre, which had been con­centrated at Frederick, were pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy on the Hagerstown pike. General Pleasonton was sent forward with his corps of cavalry, and soon came up with the enemy; after skirmishing with him during the whole of the forenoon, driving his rear guard from several

 

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strong positions, he finally discovered his main force strongly posted at Turner's gap in South Mountain. Gen­eral Pleasonton sent back to General Burnside, who had been ordered to support him, for an infantry force, and upon its arrival, lie proceeded to make a forced reconnois­sance of the enemy's position.

The South mountain is at this point about one thousand feet in height, and its general direction is from northeast to southwest. The national road from Frederick to Hagers­town crosses it nearly at right angles through Turner's gap, a depression which is some four hundred feet in depth.

The mountain on the north side of the. turnpike is divided into two crests, or rides, by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two country roads, one to the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called the "Old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until. it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The other road, called the "Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mountains about a mile from the turnpike, and bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass.

On the morning of the 14th, the First corps, commanded by General Hooker, was encamped on the Monocacy two miles from Frederick ; the Second, General Sumner's, was near Frederick; the Sixth, General Franklin's, was at Buck­eyetown; the Ninth, General Reno's, was at Middletown; the Twelfth, General Williams', was near Frederick; Couch's division was at Licksville, near Franklin's corps, and Sykes' division of regulars, from the Fifth corps, was at Frederick. General Burnside commanded the right wing, including the First and Ninth corps; General Sumner the centre, composed of the Second and Twelfth corps, and General Franklin the left, including the Sixth corps and Couch's

 

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division. As soon as General Burnside reported to General McClellan that the enemy was found in force at Turner's gap, the whole force of the right wing and centre was ordered forward to dislodge him.

General Cox's division, which had been ordered up to support General Pleasonton, left its bivouac, near Middle­town early in the morning. The First brigade reached the scene of action about nine o'clock, and was sent up the old Sharpsburg road to feel the enemy, and ascertain if he held the crest on that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the case; and General Cox having arrived with the other brigade, and bringing information from General Keno, that the column would be supported by the whole corps, the division was ordered to assault the position. Colonel Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope on the left of the road with the object of turning the enemy's right, if possible. It suc­ceeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the enemy, who was posted behind stone walls and the edges of timber. Colonel Crooke's brigade marched in columns at supporting dis­tance. A section of McMullan's battery, under Lieutenant Croome, who was killed while serving one of his guns, was moved up with great difficulty, and opened with canister at very short range on the enemy's infantry, but it was soon silenced and forced to withdraw.

The enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a point more to the right, and formed columns on both flanks. It was now about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which the other divisions of Reno's corps were coming tip. General Wilcox's division was the first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain, General Reno ordered him to move up the old Sharpsburg road and take a position to its right, overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support General Cox, at his

 

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request. One section of Cooke's battery was placed in position near the turn of the road, on the crest, and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right of the road, when the; enemy suddenly opened, at one hundred and fifty yards, with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cooke's cannoneers with their limbers, and caused a tem­porary panic. But the Seventy-ninth New York and Sev­enteenth Michigan promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out to protect the guns. Order was soon restored, and the division formed in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as possible under the hillside until the whole line advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery in front, but also  to that of the batteries on the otherside of the turnpike, and lost heavily.

Shortly before this time General Burnside arrived at the base of the mountain, and directed General Reno to move up the divisions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was in­formed that General Hooker, who had just been directed to attack on the right, was well advanced up the mountain.

General Reno then went to the front and assumed the direction of affairs. General Sturgis had left his camp at one o'clock, and reached the scene of action about half past three. Clark's battery, of his division, was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and the Second Mary­land and Sixth New Hampshire regiments were detached by General Reno, and sent forward a short distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rodman's division was divided; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and Colonel Harland's, under General Rodman's personal super. vision, on the right. The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of the infantry; but

 

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its position was made untenable, and it was hastily remove and not again put in position in that part of the. field.

In reporting the dislodgement of the enemy on the left General Wilcox refers, in the most complimentary language, to the gallant conduct of the Forty-fifth regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers, which charged the enemy in the front, and forced him, at the point of the bayonet, from one of his strongest positions.

While Reno was operating against the enemy's right Hooker was vigorously engaging his left. As early as one o'clock in the afternoon, General Meade, commanding the Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered to make a diversion on the right in favor of General Reno's troops, who were being hard pressed on the left.

On Sunday morning, September 14, the regiments broke camp on the bank of the Monocacy, marched forward through the city of Frederick, and out on the turnpike through Middletown, and a short distance beyond, where they were halted at one o'clock. An hour later, the

division moved forward and turned off to the right front the main road, on the old Hagerstown road to Mount Tabor church, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting about one and a half mile from the; turnpike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's battery was placed in position on high ground at about three and a half o'clock, and opened on the enemy on the slope, but was soon ordered, by General Hooker, to cease firing, and the position of the troops going up the mountain prevented any further use of artillery by the Reserves on that part of the field. The First Massachusetts cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the movements, if any, of the enemy in that direction, and General Meade directed Captain John Clark, commanding the Third regiment, to post his companies to guard a road coming in from that direction. The other divisions of Hooker's corps were deployed as they came up, General Hatch's on the left, and General

 

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Ricketts' in the. rear. General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General Burnside, for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's centre, up the main road, as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed.

The country in front of General Meade consisted of a succession of parallel ridges, alternated with deep irregular valleys and broken ravines. The hills increased in height, and their eastern slopes became more abrupt and rugged, as they neared the mountain crest. The enemy occupied all these ridges as out-post defences, protecting the stronger and principal position on the top of the mountain. The line of these hills presented an irregular crescent front, in many places jutting out in rugged prominences, and everywhere rough, rocky, and difficult to ascend; the valleys and slopes farthest from the mountain were cultivated, and were traversed by stone fences, which separated the fields from the forest, and afforded additional shelter to the enemy.

General Meade was ordered to move his division so as, if possible, to outflank the enemy, and then move forward and attack hire on the mountain. To accomplish this, it was necessary to move over the broken country in his front. The general thoroughly understood the difficulties the troops must encounter; he also knew the quality of the soldiers he was about to order to storm tile mountain, nor were the men less informed as to the ability of their commanding officers; there was mutual confidence in the corps, and the veteran heroes of many battles were fully aroused to the magnitude of the work before them. The First brigade, commanded by General Seymour, was formed on the right; the Second brigade, commanded by Colonel Magilton, was posted on the left, and the Third, commanded by Colonel Gallagher, held the centre. Thus formed, the division began to advance towards the moun­tain; the nature of the ground was such, that the troops of each brigade could not see the movements of those in either of the other two, but could judge of their success,

 

 

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only by the progressive roar of battle. The Bucktail regi­ment, commanded by Colonel McNeil, was deployed as skirmishers in front of the division, and was closely fol­lowed by the whole line of battle; the enemy's out-posts were rapidly driven in, forced from the hills, and routed

from the ravines, until suddenly, the regiments of the First brigade arrived at a corn-field "full of rebels," protected by a stone wall at the foot of the abrupt mountain side; the Bucktails received a terrific volley of musketry, which brought them to a halt.; General Seymour, who was on the ground with his men, seeing that then was the critical mo­ment, called out to Colonel Roberts, commanding the First regiment, to charge up the mountain, and at the same in­stant, turning to Colonel Fisher of the Fifth regiment, whose men were coming up in well dressed lines, he exclaimed: " Colonel, put your regiment into that corn-field and hurt somebody!" " I will, general, and I'll catch one alive for you," was the cool reply of Colonel Fisher. The Second regiment, commanded by Captain Byrnes, and the Sixth, Colonel Sinclair, were ordered forward at the same time. The men of the Fifth leaped the stone wall, immediately, captured eleven prisoners and sent them back to the general. A patriot cheer rose from the entire line, and the regiments darted forward through the field, over the wall, and up the rugged steep beyond, over rocks, stones, logs, and through underbrush, pulling themselves up with one hand and fighting the rebels with the other. From behind

every rock, tree, and log, they forced the enemy with ball and bayonet; the color bearers struggled up the mountain side, and the men rallied round the flag, cheer after cheer responded to the rebel volleys from the summit; onward and upward the fiery line rolled and surged; the bewildered rebels saw in astonishment the smoke and flame rising from rock to rock. "What troops are those?" anxiously in­quired a rebel officer. "I don't know, sir, I'll see," said the colonel of an Alabama regiment. Peering over the rocky barrier that had protected him, he exclaimed: “My

 

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God, its the Pennsylvania Reserves I" and instantly he fell pierced by a dozen bullets. A moment more, and the gallant brigade rose to the crest, and delivered a murderous volley into the ranks of the panic-stricken enemy, who retreated in hot haste down the western slope of the mountain. The starry banner which had risen above the shadows of the mountain side, reflected the lingering rays of the setting sun; a triumphant cheer ran- out over the mountain tops, that was heard along the entire line, and was taken up by brigade after brigade, until the voices of a hundred thousand men rose in the tremendous shout of victory.

The Second and Third brigades, like the First, had suc­cessfully dislodged the enemy from their front, and amid the roar of the closing battle, and the shout of victory, gained the summit of the mountain on the left. Colonel Gallagher fell severely wounded while gallantly leading his brigade in a charge against the enemy strongly posted in a deep ravine; Colonel Anderson of the Ninth regiment, being the ranking officer, assumed command, and led it up the mountain, the men rushing upon the enemy behind ledges of rocks, timber, and intrenchments, until they had cleared the slope and gained possession of the crest. At one point the Eleventh regiment, commanded by Lieu­tenant-Colonel S. DL Jackson, was ordered to drive the enemy from a deep ravine; the regiment charged upon the concealed rebels, and at a single volley from the hidden foe, more than half the commissioned officers fell to the ground, but the men, as if maddened by the loss of their officers, rushed upon the energy, forced him from his shelter, and never ceased cheering, charging, climbing, and firing, until they ended with the triumphant shout of victory.

The Second brigade, on the extreme left, moved up the mountain on the slope, facing towards the turnpike, and encountered a stronger force of the enemy, and a more stubborn resistance, the Eighth regiment, forming the ex­treme left of the division, fought its way at every step, and sustained a heavier loss than all the other regiments of the

brigade combined. The Second did not gain the crest, therefore, quite as promptly as the brigades on the. right, but as soon as the rebels discovered, that their position was outflanked, they fled in dismay, and the National army held the passes. It was already dark, and pursuit over the rough grounds in front being impracticable, the troops bivouacked for the night, replenished their ammuni­tion, collected their wounded, buried their dead, and made preparations for an early and vigorous pursuit at daylight on Monday morning.

General Meade reported this battle as follows

 

MAJOR .T. DICKINSON,

Assistant Adjutant General.

MAJOR :--I have the honor to submit the following report of the ope­rations of the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves under my command, during the action at South Mountain gap on the 14th inst.

The division left its camp on the Monocacy early on the morning of the 14th inst., and marched to Middletown and beyond, where it was halted about one P. M. of that day. General Reno's corps being in front and engaged with the enemy. About two P. M., this division was ordered to the front to his support. The enemy was disputing our passage over the turnpike through the South Mountain, and had been attacked on the left by General Reno. After some consultation with the general commanding the right wing and the corps, I was directed to move the division on a road leading off to the right of the turnpike and towards the enemy's left. After advancing for over a mile on this road,

the division which was the advance of the corps, was turned across the fields to the left and moved in an advantageous position to support Cooper's battery, which it was proposed to establish on an adjoining eminence. The enemy perceiving these dispositions opened on the column from a battery on the mountain side, but without inflicting any injury. Captain Cooper's battery of three-inch ordnance guns, was immediately put into position on the ridge above referred to, and at the salve time by direction of the general commanding the corps, the regiment of First Rifles of the division was sent forward as skirmishers to feel for the enemy.

Being well satisfied from various indications that the enemy occupied the mountain in force with his infantry, the general commanding the corps directed me to advance my division to the right, so as if possible to out-flank him, and then to move forward to the attack; a slight description of the features of the ground is necessary to properly de­scribe the movements of the division. The turnpike from Frederick to

 

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Hagerstown, in crossing the mountains, takes a general direction of northwest and southeast. The mountain ridge occupied by the enemy was perpendicular in its general direction to the road, parallel to the mountain was another ridge separated from it at the turnpike, by a deep valley, but connected at the upper end by a very small depression, over this second ridge there was a road, along which I advanced Seymour's brigade of the division, directing him to push forward and feel for the enemy. Soon after advancing, General Seymour reported that he could take the crest of the first ridge along which ran the road, and could then advance across the ravine to the second ridge, which I immediately directed him to do, at the same time I deployed Gallagher's Third brigade and also Magilton's Second brigade on the same line, but down in the valley, and when the line of battle was completely formed, di­rected a general advance of the whole. Seymour soon gained the crest of the first ridge, and then moved in the same direction as the other two brigades. Anderson and 3lagilton advanced steadily to the foot of the mountain, where they found the enemy's infantry.; in a short tipne the action became general throughout the whole line. Steadily the line advanced up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and rocks, from whence he was slowly but gradually dislodged. Seymour first gaining the crest and driving the enemy to our left along the ridge, where he was met by the fire of the other two brigades. Soon after the action commenced, having reason to believe the enemy was extending his left flank, to outflank us, I sent to the general com­manding the corps for reinforcements, which were promptly furnished by sending General Duryea's brigade, of Ricketts' division. Owing however to the distance to be travelled to reach the scene of action, Duryea did not arrive. on the ground till just at the close of the engage­ment. His men were promptly formed in line of battle, and advanced on the left of Seymour, but only one regiment had an opportunity to open fire before the enemy retired and darkness intervened.

The conduct of the division on this occasion was such as to uphold its well earned reputation for steadiness and gallantry, and fortunately was witnessed by the general commanding the corps, as well as by others. I am greatly indebted to Brigadier-general Seymour for the skill with which he handled his brigade on the extreme right flank, securing by his manoeuvre the great object of our movement, viz : the outflanking the enemy. To Colonel McNeil of the First rifles, who with his regiment, has always been in the advance, I was indebted for ascertaining the exact position of the enemy. Colonels Magilton and Gallagher in command of the Second and Third brigades, formed their men and carried them to the summit of the mountain in the most credit­able manner. I regret to report that Colonel Gallagher, while gallantly leading his brigade, received a severe wound, and was compelled to leave the field. To my personal staff consisting of Captain E. C. Baird, assistant adjutant-general. Captain J. Adair, commissary of subsistence,

 

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and Lieutenants William Riddle, and A. G. Mason, Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve, acting aid-de-camp, I am indebted for the prompt execution of all my orders, carried under a severe fire across rocks, stone walls, and the most rugged country I almost ever saw. The command rested on their arms during the night. The ammunition train was brought up, and the men's cartridge boxes filled, and every preparation made to renew the contest at daylight the next morning, should the enemy be in force; unfortunately the morning opened with a heavy mist, which prevented any view of the country being obtained. So that it wag not till seven A. M., that it was ascertained the enemy had retired entirely from the mountain.

GEO. G. MEADE.

 

While Meade was thus gallantly driving the enemy on the right, Hatch and Ricketts moved forward against the enemy's centre, and before nine o'clock at night, had entirely cleared their front; General Reno fell mortally wounded in the moment of victoriously establishing his troops on the left; the mountain passes were gained, and the battle of South Mountain ended in victory to the National army.

The forces brought into action by General McClellan, numbered about thirty thousand. The aggregate loss amounted to one thousand five hundred and sixty-eight; of this number, three hundred and twelve were killed, one thousand two hundred and thirty-four were wounded, and twenty-two missing.

The Reserve Corps went into the battle of South Moun­tain with less than five thousand effective men. The loss of the division was three hundred and ninety-nine.

The regimental losses were, in the First, commanded by Colonel Roberts, three officers and seven enlisted men killed, three officers and twenty-seven men wounded; in the Second, commanded by Captain Byrnes, seven men killed, one officer and nine men wounded; the Third regi­ment was not engaged; in the Fourth, commanded by Captain Thomas F. B. Tapper, five men were killed, and twenty-two wounded; in the Fifth, commanded by Colonel Fisher, one man was killed and twelve wounded; in the Sixth, commanded by Colonel Sinclair, twelve men were killed, one officer and thirty-nine men were wounded; in

 

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the Seventh, commanded by Colonel Bolinger, five men were killed, and Colonel Bolinger and eleven men were wounded; when the colonel fell, the command of the regiment was assumed by Major C. A. Lyman; in the Eighth, commanded by Major S. M. Baily, one officer and thirteen men were killed, and one officer and thirty-six men were wounded; in the Ninth, commanded by Colonel Anderson, ten  men were killed, and one officer and thirty-six risen were wounded; early in the engagement, when Colonel Anderson was called to the command of the brigade, Cap­tain Samuel B. Dick assumed command of the regiment ; in the Tenth, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, four men were killed, one officer and eighteen men were wounded;. in the Eleventh, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel S. M. Jackson, two officers and ten men were killed, and five officers and twenty-four men were wounded; and in the Twelfth, commanded by Captain A. J. Bolar, six men were killed, and one officer and nineteen men were wounded; in the Bucktail regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil, one officer and fifteen men were killed, and two officers and thirty-two men were wounded. The artillery was so slightly engaged that it suffered no loss.

The casualties among the officers were the following: In the First regiment, Captain Thomas P. Diven, and Lieute­nants John H. Taylor and John D. Sadler, were killed; and Lieutenants Joseph Taggart, F. McManus, and H. N. Min­nigh were wounded; in the Second, Lieutenant Richard Clendenning was wounded; in the Sixth, Captain C. D. Roush was wounded; in the Seventh, Colonel Bolinger was severely wounded ; in the Eighth, Lieutenant William M. Carter was killed, and Lieutenant Samuel McCandless was wounded ; in the Ninth, Lieutenant William H. Hope was wounded; in the Tenth, Lieutenant H. I. Howe was wounded; in the Eleventh, Captain E. R. Brady, and Lieu­tenant W. F. Jackson were killed; Colonel Thomas F. Gallagher, Quartermaster H. A. Torrence, Captain Evard Bierer, Captain Nathaniel Nesbits, and Lieutenant James S.

 

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Kennedy were wounded; in the Twelfth, Lieutenant E. Kelly was wounded; and in the Bucktail Regiment, Lieu­tenant Charles Bitterling was killed, and Captain E. A. Irvin, and Lieutenant Samuel A. Mack were wounded.

General McClellan expected to renew the battle in the morning, and hence, during the night moved up all his forces within easy supporting distance. The enemy, however, rapidly and quietly withdrew under cover of the night, and retreated across the Antietam creek, in the direction of Sharpsburg.

When the skirmishers advanced, cautiously through the mist and grey dawn of the morning, they discovered that, the enemy had fled. The heavy fog, which enveloped the mountain, and lay in impenetrable clouds upon the valley, screened the movements of the enemy and delayed a vigor­ous pursuit, until after the middle of the forenoon. The cavalry under General Pleasonton, and three corps of in­fantry, commanded by Generals Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield, the latter having relieved General Williams in the command of the Twelfth corps, moved forward on the national turnpike towards Boonsboro'; Burnside and Porter marched on the old Sharpsburg road, and Franklin was ordered to move into Pleasant valley.

Pleasonton overtook the enemy's cavalry in Boonsboro', and, in a daring charge, killed and wounded a number, and captured two hundred and fifty prisoners and two guns.

General Richardson's division of Sumner's corps pressing the rear guard of the enemy with vigor, passed Boonsboro' and Keedysville, and came upon the main body of tie enemy, a few miles beyond the latter place. The enemy occupied a strong position on the heights, on the west side of Antietam creek, displaying a large force of infantry and cavalry, with numerous batteries of artillery, which opened on the troops as they appeared in sight on the Keedysville road and Sharpsburg turnpike.

Antietam creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by four stone bridges; the upper one on the Keedysville and Williams-

 

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