CHAPTER IX.
POPE’S CAMPAIGN--BULL
RUN--MARYLAND CAMPAIGN--SOUTH MOUNTAIN--ANTIETAM.
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Position of
Pope's army--Abandons the line of the Rapidan—Position on the Rappahannock--Movements
of the enemy--Attempts to cross the river--Pope's army outflanked--Promised reinforcements
do not arrive--Rain storm--Movement to Warrentoz--March to Manassas--Battle
AFTER the battle of Cedar Mountain,
General Pope moved forward his whole command, and took a position on the north hank of
tile Rapidan. The right, commanded by General Sigel, who had relieved General Fremont of
leis command, rested on the Robertson river; the centre,
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under
General McDowell, occupied both flanks of Cedar Mountain, and the left, commanded by
General Reno, of Burnside's command, held a position near Raccoon ford. The enemy rapidly
collected in great force on the south hank of the Rapidan, and it was manifestly his
intention to overwhelm the Army of Virginia, before it could be reinforced by the troops
from the Peninsula. General Pope held on to his advanced position with great tenacity, in
order to afford as much time as possible for the transfer of the Army of the Potomac. But
on the 18th of August, it became evident to the commanding general, that the line. of the
Rapidan was no longer tenable with the small force under his command, against the
overwhelming force of the enemy, which by reason of its great numbers, could engage his
front, and at the same time turn either flank. General Pope, therefore, determined to fall
back to the line of the Rappahannock, and in compliance with instructions received from
the department at Washington, to maintain, if possible, his communications with
Fredericksburg, as it was upon that line reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac were
expected to reach him. All the trains were sent beyond the Rappahannock during the 18th,
and before the sun went down on the 19th, the whole army with its transportation and
baggage, was securely posted on the north bank of the Rappahannock; its left resting at
Kelly's ford, and its right extending three miles above Rappahannock station.
Early on the morning of the 20th, the
enemy drove in the pickets of General. Reno's command in front of Kelly's ford, and at
about the same time, made an attack opposite Rappahannock station; but, finding the
crossings strongly guarded, and that it would be impossible to force the passage of the
river, without heavy loss, the enemy halted his advance and brought up the main force from
beyond the Rapidan. During the night of the 20th, the whole force of General Lee's
command was brought forward, and on the morning of the 21st, again confronted General
Pope's army, at Kelly's ford
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and at
Rappahannock station, and extended for several miles beyond the right of General Sigel's
corps, which formed the extreme right of General Pope's army. On this day, and also on the
22d, the enemy attempted at various points to cross the river, but was invariably
repulsed. The artillery fire was rapid and continuous during the whole of those days, and
at times, extended along the line of the river for a distance of eight miles. Unable to
force a crossing, the enemy began to move in heavy columns up the river, for the purpose
of turning the right flank. General Pope's orders required him to keep open his
communications with Fredericksburg; he could not therefore abandon his position at
Kelly's ford; his army was too small to enable him to extend his line further to the
right, without. so weakening the centre, as to endanger his whole army, vet the movement
of the enemy to the right must be met, or Lee would interpose his army between the Army of
Virginia and Washington. Day after day, General Pope telegraphed to Washington, fully
explained the situation on the Rappahannock, and informed the Commander-in-Chief, that
it would be impossible for him to maintain hip connection with Fredericksburg, and at the
same time prevent the enemy from crossing the river at the upper fords, and gaining the
rear of his position on the line of the Rappahannock. General Halleck assured General
Pope, on the 21st of August, that if he would hold the line of the river two days longer,
he should be so strongly reinforced, as not only to be secure, but to be able to resume
offensive operations against Lee's whole army. The soldiers of the Army of Virginia,
weary, sworn, and broken by incessant duty, marching, guarding, and fighting since the Ist
of August, looked anxiously towards Fredericksburg, toward Alexandria, and towards
Washington for the promised relief. Though the body was exhausted, the spirit was still
strong, and the noble men who stood on the banks of the Rappahannock, felt that Nation's
honor and the: Capital must, for two days more, be defended by their
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arms or be
lost by their defeat. The 21st and the 22d passed in anxious waiting and continued
fighting ; the 23d came, but still no tidings of coming reinforcements cheered the hearts
of the patriot band on the line of the Rappahannock. The enemy had already crossed at
Sulphur Springs and at Waterloo bridge, and General Pope's position was no longer tenable.
Though General McClellan had abandoned General Pope, to the power of the enemy, the God
of Nations did not forsake the patriot army; standing guard in front of the Nation's
Capital. On the night of the 22d, a heavy rain set in, and before daylight on the
following morning, the water in the Rappahannock had risen full seven feet, and swept in
furious torrents in front of the rebel army,
interposing an impassable barrier to its advance.
Early on the morning of
the 23d, therefore, there being no longer any danger of the enemy's interposing a force
between him and Fredericksburg, General Pope massed his whole force at Rappahannock
station, with the determination of falling upon that portion of Lee’s army that had crossed the river, and crushing it before it could
be succored by the troops on the south bank. The army moved up to Warrenton, Sulphur
Springs, and Waterloo, on the 24th, but the enemy had already escaped by a rapid march
northward towards Rectortown, and with a force of twenty thousand men, threatened General
Pope's communications with Washington. General Halleck reassured General
Pope that
reinforcements would reach him on the 24th, at Warrenton Junction. It was during this
movement to the right, that General Reynolds arrived on the upper Rappahannock and
reported to General Pope.
The Reserve corps had embarked on
transports at Harrison's landing on the 11th of August, and set sail for Aquia creek
landing on the Potomac, where the greater part of the fleet arrived on the morning of the
13th. The regiments were immediately
disembarked, and sent forward by railroad to Falmouth. On the 21st, the whole division,
with the except-
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tion of the
Second reginment, marched for Kelly's ford, on tile Rappahannock, where it arrived on the
22d; on the following day it moved forward to Rappahannock station, and thence, with the
Army of Virginia, to Warrenton, where it was attached to the First army corps, commanded
by General McDowell. On the 24th the division encamped on the Sulphur Springs road, one
mile from Warrenton, with General Meade's brigade advanced two miles towards the river.
This most faithful division, and General Kearney's division, four thousand strong, which
reported Warrenton Junction on the following day, were the only troops from the Army of
the Potomac that joined General Pope, until the 26th, when he had fallen back to Warrenton
Junction, and was retiring towards Manassas, to resist the enemy under General Jackson,
who was advancing through Thoroughfare gap, towards Centreville.
The Second
regiment had been detached to guard the transportation. On arriving at Falmouth on the
22d, Colonel McCandless determined to march his regiment through the enemy's country, in
search of the division. After a hard and tedious march, he rejoined the Reserves at
Warrenton.
General Pope ordered his whole army
to withdraw on the Warrenton pike and roads parallel to it, towards Centrceville, and to
concentrate on the evening of the 2 7th, with the; centre at Gainesville. In the
afternoon, General Hooker encountered Ewell's division of Jackson's forces four miles west
of Bristoe station, and a severe engagement took place, in which the enemy was driven from
the field and across Broad run, with the loss of about three hundred in killed and
wounded, and much of his baggage train. The enemy had torn up the railroad track, and
destroyed several bridges between Bristoe station and Warrenton Junction.
General Banks was ordered to guard
the trains and locomotives at the Junction, until General Porter's corps had passed, and
then to move forward as rapidly as the railroad could be repaired. All the troops reached
the several
336
positions to
which they had been ordered, and it was evident to General Pope, that he had
successfully interposed his forces between Jackson, who was at Manassas Junction, and Long
street, with the other wing of the rebel army at White Plains. Accordingly, General Pope
ordered his whole army to move at daylight on the 28th, against Jackson's troops.
McDowell, to whose corps the Reserves
were attached, formed the left, and was ordered to move forward on the Warrenton pike;
Sigce in the centre, moved on the line of the Manassas railroad, and Heintzelman on the
right, moved up from Bristoe station. General Fitz John Porter was ordered to march with
his corps from Warrenton Junction, at two o'clock in the morning of the 28th, and to
report at Bristoe station at daylight.
General Reynolds, commanding the
Reserve corps, was directed to follow General Sigel's corps on the Warrenton and
Alexandria turnpike towards Centreville, until they arrived at Gainesville, where the
Manassas gap railroad crosses the turnpike; Sigel would then move to the right along the
railroad, and General Reynolds was directed to form in columns of echelons on Sigel's
left; King's division formed in like manner on the left of the Reserves. On arriving at
Gainsville, the head of Reynolds' column was fired upon by the enemy with two pieces of
artillery, in position on the heights above Groveton, and to the left of the turnpike.
Three men were killed, and five more -wounded, in the Eighth regiment, by the enemy's
shell. Ransom's battery of the Reserve corps was brought into position and opened on the
enemy, and General Meade, who was in the advance, immediately formed his brigade into line
of battle. The Fourth regiment was formed on the right of the turnpike; the Third and
Seventh, on the left, ;and the Eighth was held in reserve. The range being too great for
Ransom's guns, Captain Cooper's battery of new rifled guns, was ordered up, and opened
with such good effect, that the enemy was forced to withdraw, and soon dis-
337
appeared
from the hill. General Reynolds then resumed the march towards Manassas.
General Jackson finding himself cut
off from the other portions of Lee's army, evacuated Manassas Junction at three o'clock on
the morning of the 28th, and rapidly retreated towards Centreville. General Pope reached
the Junction with Kearney's and Reno's troops, at twelve o'clock mid-day, just about an
hour after Jackson bad removed his head-quarters from that place. Hooker, Kearney, and
Reno were pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy ; McDowell was ordered to change his line
of march from the direction of Manassas, and to move direct upon Centreville, and General
Porter was ordered to march to Manassas Junction. Late in the afternoon, General Kearney
came up with the enemy's rear guard, and drove it through Centreville, and occupied the
town. The enemy rapidly retreated in two columns ; one on the Warrenton pike towards
Gainesville, and the other taking the Sudley Springs road. McDowell, with his own corps,
and the troops under Sigel and Reynolds, bad promptly changed the direction of his march,
and succeeded in interposing himself between Jackson's retreating column, and Thorough
fare gap, which was the great object General Pope bad been striving to compass. At six
o'clock on the evening of the 28th, Jackson found himself confronted by a large force, and
at the same time the troops of Heintzelman's corps were pressing on the rear of his column
for Centreville. A severe engagement was fought by King's division of McDowell corps,
with the advance of Jackson's troops, which was terminated by darkness; each party
maintaining its ground. General Pope, now felt sure that there was no escape for Jackson's
command. McDowell was in his front, able to resist his advance; Heintzelman was pressing
his rear with a heavy force, and Porter was ordered to move from Manassas, and to fall on
his left flank. General Pope had ordered McDowell to maintain his position in the front;
he directed Kearney, the advance of Heintzelman's corps,
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to press the
enemy from the direction of Centreville, at one o'clock on the morning of the 29th, and
instructed Porter to be on the field at daylight with his command. By these dispositions
it was expected to crush Jackson's force.
By some fatality of circumstances,
the order directing him to hold his position, did not reach McDowell. And therefore,
during the night King's division withdrew from the Warrenton pike, in the front, and
retired towards Manassas; thus leaving open the road between Jackson and Longstreet
through Thoroughfare gap. General Pope did not learn of the withdrawal of King's division
until near daylight, on the morning of the 29th. An immediate change in the disposition,
and proposed movement of troops became necessary. An order was at once sent to General
Sigel, who was in the neighborhood of Groveton, supported by the Pennsylvania Reserves,
to attack the enemy vigorously as soon as it was light enough to distinguish foe from
friend, and if possible to bring him to a stand. General Heintzelman, at Centreville, was
ordered to move forward with Hooker's and Kearney’s divisions towards Gainesville;
General Reno was directed to follow Heintzelman's troops closely as possible. General
Heintzelman's instructions were, to move at early dawn, to use all speed, and as soon as
he came up with the enemy, to establish communication with Sigel, and .attack with the
utmost promptness and vigor. General Porter, at Manassas Junction, was ordered to march
forward with the utmost rapidity, upon Gainesville, by the direct road from the Junction
to that place. He was urged by General Pope to make all possible speed, that he might come
up with the enemy, and be able to turn his flank, near where the Warrenton road is
intersected by the road leading from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. General
McDowell, who had, during the night retired to Manassas Junction, was directed to follow
Porter's corps towards Gainesville, and to form on his left and attack the enemy on the
right flank and rear.
General Sigel constructed his line of battle before
day-
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light, by
placing General Schurz's division north of the Warrenton pike, parallel to the Sudley
Springs road; General Milroy in the centre on the turnpike, and General Schenck on an
adjoining range of hills on the left, and south of the pile. In this order, promptly, at
the dawn of day, General Sigel's troops moved forward and vigorously assaulted the enemy,
and in a vehement artillery and infantry contest of four hours duration, drove him back
from point to point, until Generals Schurz and Milroy had advanced their lines more than
a mile over the enemy’s ground, and General Schenck had gained two miles against the
enemy's right. General Reynolds with the Reserve corps. had, during the evening of the
28th, marched by the left flank from the road leading from Gainesville to Manassas, and
moving in the direction of Centreville, had closed up with Sigel's corps; at daylight, on
the morning of the 29th, he was, therefore, on the field in front of the enemy. With the
spirit of a true patriot, and a generous soldier he did not delay action from doubt of
authority to move. General Reynolds was subject to McDowell’s orders and might have declined to bring his troops into
action without orders from that officer; but, fortunately, neither the officers nor the
privates of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, were governed by any other than patriotic
motives. It was enough for them to know that the enemy was in their front, and that
Slgel's corps was about to engage him. Reynolds formed his division on the left of
Schenk's division of Ohio troops, and from daylight till dark, with no higher orders than
the consciousness of a worthy deed nobly done, the General and his troops, marching and
countermarching, moving against the flank, or straight to the front, fought the enemy,
driving his right wing from hill top to hill top until darkness put an end to the contest.
Early in the day General Meade was
directed to form his brigade on the right of the division, and to move forward in support
of Cooper's battery. The Bucktail regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil was thrown forward
as
340
skirmishers,
and the brigade continued to advance, keeping in line with Schenck's division, until it
crossed the Warrenton pike within half a mile of Groveton ; General Meade then discovered,
that Schenck's division had been withdrawn, and that the enemy was deploying his
infantry in his front in such force. that it became necessary to withdraw the brigade to
a plateau south of the pike, where it took a strong position and held it until dark ;
King's division, which had attacked the enemy on the pike, was then repulsed, and the
.rebel troops were advancing between General Meade's position and the troops on his right,
he Therefore withdrew his batteries, and rejoined the division on the hill near the Henry
house.
Meanwhile, at about ten o'clock in
the forenoon, General Heintzelman arrived on the field, and before twelve o'clock, all the
troops in his corps were in line of battle, and Hooker's division had already become
engaged in the centre of the line, where General Sigel, who superintended the battle, had
sent him to reinforce General Milroy's division, which was hard pressed by the enemy.
General Kearney had, in obedience to orders, formed his division on the extreme right, in
front of the enemy's left, and Reno's division, as soon as it arrived on the field, was
sent to the relief of General Schurz's division, which had maintained a terrific
conflict against vastly disproportionate numbers, from five o'clock in the morning until
two in the afternoon. The enemy's left had been protected by an abandoned railroad cut,
which afforded it excellent shelter; General Schurz was ordered to drive the rebels from
this strong position ; it was a desperate undertaking, but with the co-operation of
Kearney on his right, it was considered possible; but for' some unexplained reason,
Kearney's troops did not advance, and the whole force of the enemy fell upon Schurz's
division; his troops swayed backward and forward with alternate success, until finally
Colonel Schimmelfennig's brigade, on the right, gained the embankment and dislodged the
enemy from his cover.
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Heintzelman's
troops then coming up, relieved the exhausted regiments of Schurz's brigade, which
retired to replenish their ammunition.
General Pope arrived at the front, at
one o'clock, and found the line formed, with Heintzelman's corps on the right, Sigel and
Reno in the centre, and Reynolds' division on. the left. There was a lull in the battle,
and little more than desultory skirmish firing was heard along the line. It was the
general impression that Porter and McDowell had advanced far enough on the road towards
Gainesville to threaten the rear of the enemy's position, and that Jackson was, therefore,
withdrawing his troops. At two o'clock ill the afternoon, artillery firing was heard on
the extreme left, and General Pope believed that Porter and McDowell were engaging the
enemy on his right flank; the firing however
At the same time General Reynolds, by
direction of
342
General
Pope, threatened the enemy's right flank and rear, General Seymour's, and General
.Jackson's brigades were moved forward along a strip of woodland, under a heavy fire from
the enemy's batteries, and soon became engaged with his infantry; Colonel Roberts and
Colonel McCandless, with. the First and Second regiments, moved on the right through a
woods, and became sharply engaged with the enemy's infantry, and were also exposed to a
terrific shower of shot and shell. The troops advanced promptly, but soon they were
confronted by overwhelrning numbers, and at the same time were attached by a large force
in the left flank, and hence, notwithstanding all their steadiness and courage, they were
forced to retie o, which they did in good order, and resumed their former position on the
hill.
At about this time the troops of
McDowell's corps began to arrive on the field, and were ordered by General Pope to move
forward on the Warrenton pike, and to attack the enemy. King's division got into position
at about sunset, and opened the attack with an impetuosity that amounted to rashness, but
by this time the advance of Longstreet's rebel corps, had arrived and confronted King's
division, at a point on the pike about three-quarters of a mile in front of the line of
battle, where a severe encounter took place in which King was severely repulsed.
Whilst these movements were
transpiring on the left, Heintzelinan and Reno on the right continued to push back the
enemy's left in the direction of the Warrenton turnpike, so that at eight o'clock in the
evening, when the battle ceased, the greater portion of the field was occupied by the
National army. Still, nothing, had been heard from General Porter, and his troops took no
part whatever in the engagement, but were suffered, by him, to lie on their arms within
sight and sound of the battle, during the whole of the day. If General Porter had obeyed
the orders sent to him by General Pope, and made a vigorous attack on the enemy's right
flank or rear, as he had been directed to do, at any time up to eight o'clock in the
night, Jackson's forces would
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have been
crushed, and the larger portion of his men captured, before they could, by any
possibility, have been reinforced by General Longstreet's command. The destruction of
Jackson's command would have crippled Lee's army to an extent that would have compelled
him to retreat in great haste towards Richmond, to escape with any portion of his army
intact. A decisive victory at Bu11 Run, on the 29th of August, would have spared the North
the disgrace of the Maryland and Pennsylvania invasion, and the people, the loss of the
blood and treasure poured out on the fields of South Mountain and Antietam. The full
measure of that day's disaster cannot be estimated, and will never be known to the
American people. General Porter was tried by a court-martial composed of the ablest
officers in the National army, and was defended by the most learned lawyers in the United
States; he was found guilty of the most flagrant disobedience of orders, and was
disgracefully dismissed from the army of the United States.
The loss in General Pope's army in
the battle of the 29th was about seven thousand killed and wounded.
General Pope says, in his report:
Every indication during the night of
the 29th, and up to ten o'clock on the morning of the 30th, pointed to the retreat of the
enemy from our front. Paroled prisoners of our own, taken on the evening of the 20th, and
who came into our lines on the morning of the 30th, reported the enemy retreating during
the whole night in the direction of and along the Warrenton turnpike. Generals McDowell
and Heiutzelman, who reconnoitred the positions held by the enemy's left on the evening of
the 29th, confirmed this statement. They reported to me that the positions occupied by the
enemy's, left had been evacuated, and that there was every indication that lie was
retreating in the direction of Gainesville.
On the
morning of the 30th, as may be supposed, our troops, who had been so continually marching
amid fighting for so many days, were in a state of great exhaustion. They had had little
to eat for two days previous, and the artillery and cavalry horses had been in harness
and saddled continually for ten days, and had had no forage for two days previous. It may
easily be imagined how little these troops, after such severe labor, and after undergoing
such hardship and privation, were in condition for active and efficient service. I had
telegraphed to the
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general-in-chief
on the 28th our condition, and had begged of him to have rations and forage sent forward
to us front Alexandria with all despatch. I also called his attention to the imminent need
of cavalry horses to enable the cavalry belonging to the army to perform any service
whatever.
About daylight of the 30th, I
received a note from General Franklin, herewith appended, written by direction of General
McClellan, and dated at eight o'clock the evening before, informing me that rations and
forage would be loaded into the available wagons and cars at Alexandria as soon as I
would send back a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. Such a letter, when we were
fighting the enemy, and Alexan-. dria, was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as
was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front,
nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have
hall provisions or have fallen back in the direction of Washington; nor do I yet see what
service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains.
It was not until I received this
letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the
operations with which I was charged; but I felt it to be my duty, notwithstanding the
desperate condition of my command, from great fatigue, from want of provisions and
forage, and from the small hope that I had of any effective assistance from Alexandria, to
hold my position at all hazards and under all privations, unless overwhelmed by the
superior forces of the enemy. I had received no sort of information of any troops coming
forward to my assistance since the 24th, and did not expect on the morning of the 130th,
that any assistance would reach me from the direction of Washington ; but I determined
again to give battle to the enemy on the 30th, and at least to lay on such blows as would
cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance
towards the capital. I accordingly prepared to renew the engagement. At that time my
effective forces-greatly reduced by losses in killed, wounded, missing and broken-down men
during the severe operations of two or three days and nights previous ; the sharp actions
of Hooker, King, and Ricketts on the 27th and 28th, and the furious battle on the 29th
were estimated by me and others, as follows:
McDowell's corps, including
Reynolds's division, twelve thousand men; Sigel's corps, seven thousand men; Reno's corps,
seven thousand men ; Heintzelman's,corps, seven thousand men; Porter's corps, which had
been in no engagement, and was, or ought to have been, perfectly fresh, I estimated at
about twelve thousand men, including the brigade of Platt, which formed a. part of
Sturgis's division, and the only portion that ever joined me. But of this force the
brigades of Piatt and Griffin, numbering, as I understood, about five thousand men, had
been suffered to march off at daylight on the 30th to Centreville, and were not
available for operations on that clay. This reduced Porter's effective force
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on the field
to about seven thousand men, which gave me a total force of forty thousand men. Banks's
corps, about five thousand strong, was at Bristoe station, in charge of the railroad
trains and of a portion of the wagon trains of the army still at that place.
Soon after the Reserve regiments had
collected themselves together on the night of the 29th, Seymour's brigade, containing
the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth regiments, was ordered out on picket duty, which, on a
battle-field, means to stand guard in front of the foe, ready at any moment to resist his
attach. The men rested on their arms during the night, so near to the enemy, that they
could hear the conversation of the rebel guard, but a few yards in front of their line. At
daylight the brigade was relieved, and returned to the division.
Early in the morning. the Reserves
were in position on the left of the Warrenton pike, facing to the west. Meade's brigade
was ordered to move forward and discover the position, and force of the enemy. The "
Bucktail " regiment was deployed as skirmishers, and pushed forward to the top of the
hill at Groveton, where it encountered a stubborn resistance, and was reinforced by the
Third regiment. By, this force the enemy's skirmish line was swept from the field, and the
brigade coming up, maintained its position at Groveton until it was ordered, by General
Reynolds, to retire.
During the forenoon a line of battle
was formed in the vicinity of Groveton. General Heintzelmen's corps was on the right,
Reno's and McDowell's corps in the centre, resting on the Warrenton pike cast of
Groveton, and Sigel's corps and Reynolds' division were on the left. Shortly after this
disposition hart been made, General Porter's corps marched between the line of battle and
the enemy, and formed in front of 1\fcDowell's and Reno's troops, masking the entire
front. It was the intention of General Pope to break the enemy's left, and for that
purpose reinforcements were sent to the right, to aid Heintzelman and Reno.
Before two o'clock, Porter had
advanced into the woods
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in his front
and was engaging the enemy, who, being strongly posted behind a railroad embankment,
easily re. pulsed Porter's troops, and drove them from the woods in considerable disorder.
The enemy followed the retiring troops, and at the same time, commenced a furious assault
on the left flank, thus developing his real design of attempting to turn the left of
Pope's position, and interpose between General Banks at Bristoe, and the main army, and
thus capture or destroy the supply trains in charge of Banks' corps. Heintzelman and Reno
moved forward on the right without meeting with much resistance; the mass of the rebel
army was opposite the left. When Porter's troops emerged from the woods in front, and a
large mass of the enemy appeared on the left flank, Sigel was ordered to face to the left;
Rickett's division was hurried across the field from the right, and Reynolds, who bad
moved forward on Sigel's left before the battle opened, was now ordered to form the
Reserves on the extreme left, behind which Porter's corps might be rallied. The battle
immediately burst in a furious assault along the entire line; in addition to being able to
engage all the troops in the front, the enemy had an excess of force sufficient to detach
a heavy column to envelop the left wing of Pope's army, and force its flank. General
Reynolds, with the instinct of a thorough soldier, discovered that the enemy was aiming to
seize the Warrenton pike in the rear of the broken masses of troops, that were now flowing
back from the front; he at once determined to throw his division in the breach, and save
the army, or perish in the attempt.
The plan of the enemy was, to break
the centre and seize the roads between the two wings of the army, and thus ensure its
destruction. The heroic general, fully conscious of the desperate situation of the army,
galloped along his line and called upon his men to charge upon and hurl back the advancing
foe. The Reserves saw by the ardor of their general that the whole army was in imminent
danger; in a moment they were up and charging, with a cheer and yell,
347
across an
open field; they encountered the enemy at the brow of a declivity, up which the rebels
struggled in vast numbers, and with unwearying pertinacity. Fortunately, the Reserves were
aligned upon a country road, which, having been somewhat worn by use, aflorded partial
protection, and also depressed their fire. The contest became hot and desperate. Greatly
outnumbered by the rebels, they were only enabled to hold them in check by rapid and
unceasing firing.
The field
officers who rode upon the ground above tire road, were much exposed and suffered
severely. At one moment all seemed to be lost. The First and Second regiments were
engaged in an almost hand to hand encounter; the left was pressed back, and to the
consternation of the mounted officers, who from their positions had a view of the field,
the troops on tile right of the Reserves gave way in utter confusion. At this critical
moment, tile gallant Reynolds, observing that the flag-staff' of the Second regirnent
had been pierced by a bullet and broken, seized the flag from the color-bearer, and
dashing to the right, rode twice up and down his entire division line, waving the flag
about his head and cheering on his men.
The rebel sharp-shooters rained
fierce showers of bullets around the ensign thus borne aloft. but in vain did tire
missiles of death fill the atmosphere in which it moved. The effect upon the division was
electrical; the men, inspired by the intrepidity of their leader, rent the air with
cheers, plied their tremendous musket fire with renewed energy and vigor, and in a few
moments, the thinned ranks of the rebel regiments gave way before the steady and
unrelenting volleys poured upon them. Night came on and put an end to the contest; but
the famous Stone bridge over Bull Run -was, by the genius and heroic daring of General
Reynolds, and the valor of tile brave men he commanded, preserved for the use of the
National army. The enemy, thus beaten back, retired beyond tile range of the loyal guns,
appalled at the havoc they witnessed in their ranks,
348
and
confounded by their failure to reach the turnpike. The sun was now setting, and the battle
had ended.
General Reynolds says, in his report
of the operations of his division in Pope's campaign:
On the morning of the 30th I was
directed to take post with my division on the left of the pike near the Henry house, and
ordered by Major-General Pope to form my division in column by company at full
distance, with the whole of my artillery on the left; that I would be the pivot in the
attack which Porter's corps was to make on the enemy's right, then supposed to be on the
pike and in retreat. Having formed my division in the position indicated, and opened with
my rifled batteries to drive the enemy from the first ridge, the skirmishers advanced and
the attack by Porter's corps commenced. When the skirmishers arrived in the thick woods
opposite Groveton, I found the resistance so great that another regiment was deployed to
support them, and finally a second ; in all, three regiments.
The advanced skirmishers were the
First rifles, Colonel McNeil, and the First, infantry, Colonel Roberts, supported by the
Seventh infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson. The Sixth regiment, Colonel Sinclair, was
thrown through the woods on our left flank. Becoming convinced that the enemy were not in
retreat, but were posted in force on our left flank, I pushed through the skirmishers to
the edge of the woods on the left, gaining sight of the open ground beyond ; and advancing
myself into the open ground, I found a line of skirmishers of the enemy nearly parallel to
the line of skirmishers covering my left flank, with cavalry formed behind them, perfectly
stationary, evidently masking a column of the enemy, formed for attack on my left flank
when our line should be sufficiently advanced. The skirmishers opened fire upon me, and I
was obliged to run the gauntlet of a heavy fire to gain the rear of my division, losing
one of my orderlies who had followed me through the woods. I immediately communicated this
to the commanding general of the corps, who came upon the ground, and directed me to form
my division to resist this attack, the dispositions for which were rapidly completed.
Other troops were to be sent to my support, when the commanding general, observing the
attack of Porter to have been repulsed, ordered me with my division across the field to
the rear of Porter, to form a line behind which the troops might be rallied. I immediately
started my division in the direction indicated; but before the rear of my column had left
the position the threatened attack by the enemy's right began to be felt, and the rear
brigade, under Colonel Anderson, with three batteries of artillery, were obliged to form
on the ground on which they found themselves to oppose it. Passing across the field to the
right, with Meade's and Seymour's brigades and Ransom's battery, my course was diverted by
the difficult nature of the ground, and the
349
retreating
masses of the broken columns, among troops of Heintzelman's corps, already formed, by
which much tune was lost and confusion created, which allowed the enemy to sweep up with
his right, so far as almost to cut us off from the pike, leaving nothing but the rear
brigade and the three batteries of artillery of my division and scattered troops of other
commands to resist the advance of the enemy upon our left. , It was here that the most
severe loss of the division was sustained, both in men and material, Kern losing, his four
guns, but not until wounded and left on the field; Cooper, his caisson.
Colonel Hardin, commanding the
Twelfth regiment, was here severely wounded. The brigade under command of Colonel Anderson
sustained itself most gallantly, and though severely pushed on both front and flank
maintained its position until overwhelmed by numbers, when it fell back, taking up new
positions wherever the advantages of ground permitted. The two brigades and battery of
artillery under my immediate command, finding ourselves perfectly out of place, moved, by
the direction of an officer of General Pope's staff, to a position to the right of the
Henry house, which position was most gallantly maintained by the commands of Meade and
Seymour and Ransom's battery fur nearly two hours, when. they were relieved by the
division of regular troops under Colonel Buchanan.
In reference to the battle of
Saturday, August 30, General Pope says:
Between twelve and two o'clock in the
day I advanced the corps of Porter, supported by King's division of McDowell's corps, to
attack the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike. At the same time I directed Heintzelman and
Reno, on our right, to push forward to the left and front towards Warrenton turnpike, and
attack the enemy's left in flank, if possible. For a short time Rickett's division of
McDowell's corps was placed in support of this movement on our right.
It was necessary for me to act thus
promptly and make an attack, as I had not the time, for want of provisions and forage, to
await an attack from the enemy; nor did I think it good policy to do so under the
circumstances. During the whole night of the 29th and the morning of the 30th, the
advance of the main body under Lee was arriving on the field to reinforce Jackson, so that
by twelve or one o'clock in the day we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our
own, and these forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals of the
enemy from the direction of Thoroughfare gap. Every moment of delay increased the odds
against us, and I therefore advanced to the attack as rapidly as I was able to bring my
forces into action. Shortly after General Porter moved forward to the attack along the
Warrenton turnpike, and the assault on the enemy was made by Heintzelman and Reno on the
right, it became apparent that the enemy was massing his
350
troops, as
fast as they arrived on the field, on his right, and was moving forward from that
direction to turn our left, at which point it was plain lie intended to make his main
attack. I accordingly directed General McDowell to recall Rickett's division iniinediat6y
from our right, and post it on the left of our line; with its left refused. The attack of
Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable
confusion. As soon as they commenced to fall brick, the enemy advanced to the assault, and
our whole line, from right to left, was soon furiously engaged. The main attack of the
enemy was made upon our left, but was met with stubborn resistance by the divisions of
General Schenck, General Milroy, and General Reynolds, who, shortly after the action
began, were reinforced on their left and rear by the division of Ricketts. The action
raged furiously for several hours, the enemy bringing up his heavy reserves, and pouring
mass after mass of his troops upon our left. So greatly superior in number were his forces
that, whilst overpowering us on our left, he was able to assault us also with very
superior forces on our right. Porter's forces were rallied and brought to a halt as they
were retiring to the rear. As soon as they could be used, I pushed them forward to support
our left, and they there rendered most distguished service, especially the brigade of
regulars under Colonel Buchanan.
Tower's brigade of Rickett's division
was rushed forward into action in support of Reynold's division, and was led forward in
person by General Tower with conspicuous skill and gallantry. The conduct of that brigade,
in plain view of all the forces on our left, was especially distinguished, and drew forth
hearty and enthusiastic cheers.
The example of this brigade was of
great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed their intrepid
conduct. Reno's corps was also withdrawn from its position oil our right centre late in
the afternoon, and thrown into the action on our left, where it behaved with conspicuous
gallantry. Notwithstanding these great disadvantages, our troops held their ground with
the utmost firmness and obstinacy, and the losses on both sides here very heavy. By dark
our left had been forced back about a half or three=quarters of a mile; but still remained
firm and unbroken, and still covered the turnpike in our rear.
About six o'clock in the afternoon i
heard, accidentally, that Franklin's corps had arrived at a point about four miles east
of Centreville,
351
bout eight
o'clock at night, therefore, I sent written instructions to the commanders of corps to
withdraw leisurely towards Centreville, and suited to them what route each should pursue,
and where they should take post. General Reno was instructed with his whole corps to cover
the movements of the army towards Centreville. The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly,
and in good order, no pursuit whatever having been attempted by the enemy. A division of
infantry with its batteries was posted to cover the crossing of Cub run.
The exact losses in this battle I am
unable to give, as the reports received from tile corps commanders only exhibit the
aggregate losses during the whole of the operations from the 22d of August to the 2d of
September. Before leaving the field that night, I sent orders to General Banks, at Bristoe
station, to destroy the railroad trains and such of the stores in theirs as he was unable
to carry off, and rejoin me at Centreville. I had previously sent him orders to throw
into each wagon of the army trains as much as possible of the stores from the railroad
cars, and to be sure and bring off with him
from Warrenton Junction, and Bristoe, all the ammunition and the sick and wounded that could be transported, and
for this purpose, if it were necessary, to throw out the personal baggage, tents,
&,c., from the regimental trains. These several orders are appended. At no time during
the 28th, 29th, 30th, and 31st of August, was the road between Bristoe station and
Centreville interrupted by the enemy. The whole of the trains of the army were on that
road in charge of General Banks, and covered and protected by his whole corps. If any of
these wagons were lost, as I believe none were, it was wholly without necessity. I enter
thus specifically into this matter, and submit the orders sent to General Banks and his
subsequent report to me because no part of the misrepresentation of this campaign has been
grosser than the statement of our heavy loss of wagons and supplies. The orders submitted
will show conclusively that every arrangement was made, in the utmost detail, for the security of our trains and
supplies, and I am quite convinced that General Banks
is not the
man to neglect the duty with which he was charged.
I arrived at Centreville between nine
and ten o'clock on the night of the 30th. The same night I sent orders to the corps
commanders to report to me in person as early after daylight as possible on the morning
of the 31st, and on that morning the troops were directed to be posted as follows: Porter
to occupy the intrenchments on the north or right of Centreville ; Franklin on his left,
in the intrenchments. In
352
in force.
McDowell was posted about two miles in the rear of Centreville on the road to Fairfax
court-house. Ammunition trains and some provisions were gotten up on the 31st, and all
corps commanders were notified, by special order to each, that the ammunition trains were
parked immediately in rear of Centreville, and were directed to send officers to procure
such ammunition as was needed in their respective, corps. I directed the whole of the
trains of the army to be unloaded at Centreville and sent to Fairfax station to bring up
forage and rations.
We remained during the whole day of
the 31st, resting the men, getting up supplies of provisions, and re-supplying the
command with ammunition.
Early in the night after the battle,
the Reserve corps marched towards Centreville and bivouacked on the east bank of Cub run,
and on the following morning it proceeded to Centreville. Never were the men of this
division in more straitened circumstances; there had been no
proper and
full ration issued since the 24th day of the month; the severity of the marches, the
frequent night guards, and the days of battle that intervened, required men possessing
great power of' physical endurance, as well as the spirit of patriot soldiers; for two
days the men had
subsisted on
green fruit and herbs snatched by the wayside, and had been sustained more by the fierce
excitement of battle, than by physical strength. At ten o'clock in the morning, the
division was led down the turnpike two miles from Centreville, where the regiments were
halted, and a small quantity of coffee and some hard bread were distributed among the
men. An officer in one of the regiments wrote home : " It did not take us long to
get our fires burning. These rations were a perfect god-send to us. Every mouthful of
coffee we drank, seemed like so much life flowing into the; body." In the afternoon
the division marched back. to Centreville and there received rations of salt beef. It then
marched back to Cub run to relieve Reno's troops, who were guarding the crossings of that
stream. The men, now, hard their haversacks filled with rations of coffee, bread and meat,
and their cartridge boxes replenished with ammunition; so that, refreshed in body
353
and spirit, they marched to duty forgetful of the
hardships of the terrible week that had passed. A heavy rain set in and the night was dark
and dreary. The enemy had been too severely handled to attempt any serious work, and the
troops were allowed to rest.
On the morning of the 1st of
September, the whole army was withdrawn from Centreville towards Fairfax Court House.
General Pope discovered that the enemy was moving northward with the intention of turning
his right flank. He therefore determined to give him battle in front of Chantilly, early
on Tuesday morning, the 2d of September. On Monday afternoon he sent General Hooker to
Fairfax C. H., and instructed him to move forward with all the troops at that place to
Germantown; McDowell took up a position on Difficult creek, connecting with Hooker's left;
Reno was pushed forward on the direct road to Chantilly; Heintzelman formed in rear of
Reno's troops within supporting distance; Franklin's corps, which had arrived from
Alexandria on the 1st, was posted on the left and rear of McDowell's troops; Sumner's
corps, which hack also come up, was formed on the left of Heintzelman, and the corps of
Sigel and Porter were directed to unite with the right of Sumner. General Banks, still
guarding the immense supply trains, moved on the old Braddock road and came on the
Alexandria pike in the scar of the army, and conducted his entire train in safety to the
Potomac. The rebel general saw that General Pope had discovered his plans, and had placed
his army in a position to resist his advance. General Lee, therefore, determined not to
await the attack, but fell upon the right wing of Pope's army with great fury, late in the
afternoon of the 1st. The assault was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearney, and
though the attack was sudden and the action severe, the enemy was repulsed and driven back
with great loss. The battle terminated at dark; but not before two of the most
distinguished and promising officers in the United States had fallen. Major-general
Philip Kearney and Major-general
354
Isaac
Ingalls Stevens were both killed while leading their commands to victory.
General Pope, says further
The main body of our forces was so
much broken down and so completely exhausted that they were in no condition, even on the
lst of September, for any active operations against the enemy, but I determined to
attack at daylight on the 2d of September, in front of Chantilly. The movement of the
enemy had become so developed by the afternoon of the 1st., and was so evidently directed
to Fairfax Court House, with a view of turning my right, that I made the necessary
disposition of my troops to fight a battle, between the Little river pike and the road
from Centreville to Fairfax Court-House.
Just before sunset on the 1st, the
enemy attacked us on our right, but was met by Hooker, McDowell, Reno, and Kearney's
division of Heintzelman's corps. A very severe action occurred in the midst of a terrific
thunder-storm, and was terminated shortly after dark. The enemy was driven back entirely
from our front, but during that engagement we lost two of the best and one of the most
distinguished of our general officers—Major-General Kearney and Major-general
Stevens--who were both killed while gallantly leading their commands and in front of their
line of battle. It is unnecessary for me to say one word of commendation of two officers
who were so well and widely known to the country. Words cannot express my sense of the
zeal, the gallantry, and the sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier,
Major-General Kearney. In him the country has suffered a loss which it will be difficult,
if not impossible, to repair. He died as he would wish to die, and as became his heroic
character.
On the morning of the 2d of
September, the enemy still continuing his movement towards our right, my whole force was
posted behind Difficult creek, from Flint hill to the Alexandria turnpike. Although we
were quite able to maintain our position at that place until the stragglers could be
collected and the army, after its labors and perils, put into condition for effective
service, I considered it advisable, for reasons which developed themselves at Centreville,
and which I explained to the general-in-chief and set forth herewith in the appendix, that
the troops should be drawn back to the intrenchmcnts in front of Washington, and that
some reorganization should be made of them, in order that earlier effective service should
be secured than was possible in their condition at that time. I received orders about
twelve o'clock on the 2d of September, to draw back the forces within the intrenchments,
which was clone in good order and without any interruption by the enemy. The reasons which
induced me, before I took the field in Virginia, to express to the Government my desire to
be relieved from the command of the army of Virginia and return to the West, existed in
equal, if not greater, force at this time than when I first stated them. I accordingly
355
renewed,
urgently, my application to be relieved. The Government assented to it with some
reluctance, and I was transferred to the command of the Department of the Northwest, for
which department I left Washington on the 7th of September.
It seems proper for me, since so much
misrepresentation has been put into circulation as to the support I received from the Army
of the Potomac, to state here precisely what forces of that army came under my command
and were at any time engaged in the active operations of the campaign. Reynolds's division
of Pennsylvania Reserves, about two thousand five hundred strong, joined me on the 23d of
August, at Rappahannock station. The corps of Heintzelman and Porter, about eighteen
thousand strong, joined me on the 20th and 27th of August at Warrenton junction.
The Pennsylvania Reserves, under
Reynolds, and Heintzelman's corps, consisting of the divisions of Hooker and Kearney,
rendered most gallant and efficient service in all the operations which occurred after
they had reported to me. Porter's corps, from unnecessary and unusual delays and frequent
and flagrant disregard of my orders, took no part whatever except in the action of the
30th of August. This small fraction of twenty thousand five hundred men was all of the
ninety-one thousand veteran troops from Harrison's landing which ever drew trigger under
my command, or in any way took part in that campaign. By the time that the corps of
Franklin and Sumner, nineteen thousand strong, joined me at Centreville, the original army
of Virginia, as well as the corps of Heintzelman and the division of Reynolds, had been so
much cut up in the severe actions in which they had keen engaged, and were so much broken
down and diminished in numbers by the constant and excessive duties they had performed,
that they were in little condition for any
effective service whatever, and required and should have had some days of rest to put them
in anything like condition to perform their duties in the field.
The enemy did not again come within
striking distance of General Pope's army, which was now fully able to maintain its
position. Put, to secure the proper union and perfect harmony of the Army of Virginia, the
Army of the Potomac, and Burnside's array from North Carolina, required a more thorough
re-organization than could be effected in the field in the face of the enemy; at the
suggestion of General Pope, the forces were, therefore, withdrawn within the
fortifications around Washington. The retirement of the troops was commenced on the
afternoon of the 2d, and before sundown on the 4th, the combined
356
forces of
the three armies were posted behind the defenses around the Capitol. Retiring with
McDowell's corps, General Reynolds marched his division, on the evening of the 2d, on
the Alexandria and Columbia pike, to the vicinity of Hunter's Chapel and Arlington, and on
the afternoon of the 4th encamped in position north of Munson's hill.
The Reserve corps went into
"Pope's Campaign" -with about six thousand men, of which number, four officers
and sixty-four privates were killed; thirty-one officers and three hundred and sixty-four
privates were wounded, and four officers and one hundred and eighty-five privates were
missing, making an aggregate loss of six hundred and fifty-two men.
In the First regiment Captain Mott
Hooton was wounded, six men were killed, and twenty-two wounded; in the Second, Colonel
McCandless, Lieutenants John H. Jack, Daniel L. Conner and J. B. Robinson were wounded,
one man was killed and eleven wounded; in the Third Captain H. Clay Beatty, a young
officer of. great promise, known and beloved throughout the command, was killed on the
30th, while gallantly leading his company; two privates were killed and twenty wounded; in
the Fourth, one man was killed and eleven wounded; in the Fifth, commanded in this
campaign by Lieutenant-colonel George Dare, Lieutenant Robert W. Smith, acting as
adjutant of the regiment, was severely wounded in the gallant charge made at the close
of the battle on the 30th, h was left on the field, and fell into the hands of the enemy,
was paroled on the 4th of September, with other wounded prisoners, and was taken to
Washington, where he died, bleeding to death under the hands of the surgeon, on Sunday the
7th, and when his father and brother were knocking at the door of the apartment of the
hospital to be admitted to his aid, or to comfort him in the hour of death. This young
officer had risen from a private by his meritorious conduct on the field of battle, and
his loss was deeply felt by his comrades in arms. In the same regiment, Lieu-
357
tenant David
McGaughy was wounded, one private was killed. and seven wounded; in the Sixth, Colonel
Sinclair, Lieutenants Wm. Goodman and R. M. Pratt were wounded, five men were killed and
thirty-three were wounded; in. the Seventh, one man was killed and twenty-two wounded; in
the Eighth, Adjutant Henry Wetten, Captain J. G. Henry, and Lieutenant A. H. Sellers were
wounded, five men were killed, and eighteen were wounded ; in the Ninth, Lieutenants
Alexander McCord and G. A. Wenks, and twelve men were killed, Captains Charles Barnes and
J. W. Ballentine, and fifty-one privates were wounded, Captain J. T. Shannon and
Lieutenant J. M. Sowers, and twenty-three; men were reported missing at the close of the
action; in the Tenth, Captain James S. Hindman, Lieutenant Henry B. Fox, and ten privates
were killed; Colonel James B. Kirk, Captain Ira Ayer, Adjutant M. M. Phelps and Lieutenant
W. B. M. Williams, and thirty men were wounded, and nineteen were reported missing; in the
Eleventh, Lieutenant John C. Kuhn, and four men were killed, Adjutant Robert A. McCoy,
Captain William Stewart, and Lieutenants R. M. Jones, James Kennedy, D. R. Coder, and L.
A. Johnson, and forty-one enlisted men were wounded, and five were missing ; in the
Twelfth, Colonel Martin D. Hardin, commanding the Third brigade, Captain Francis
Schilling, and Lieutenants W. H. Weaver were wounded, five privates were killed, and
thirty-five were -wounded; Lieutenant Samuel Cloyd and twenty-two enlisted men were
missing ; the Bucktail regiment lost five men killed, nineteen wounded and three missing.
Battery A lost one man killed, five. wounded and one missing; in battery B, four men were
killed, Lieutenaut William C. Miller and seventeen privates were wounded; in battery G,
three men were killed, Captain Kern, a most gallant officer who had rendered valuable
service in the Peninsula, was wounded and taken prisoner, and subsequently died; also
Lieutenant George Buffum and twenty-one men were wounded and seven men were missing. This
battery also lost its guns on the 30th, after the most
358
desperate
resistance and fierce destruction of the enemy. Captain Cooper, in the same struggle, lost
his caissons.
General Jackson commanding the Third
brigade ruptured a blood vessel and became severely ill in the battle of the 29th, and
the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Hardin, who being severely wounded on the
30th, turned over the command to Colonel Anderson of the Ninth regiment. Colonel Fisher of
the Fifth regiment having received a serious injury by the fall of his horse, during a
night march from Falmouth on the 21st of August, was not able to continue with his
command, but had been sent home on furlough. Lieutenant-colonel Dare commanded the Fifth
regiment, Major Snodgrass the Ninth, and Major Peter Baldy the Twelfth, at the close of
the engagement on Saturday night.
The four companies of Bucktails, that
had been detached from the regiment at Fredericksburg, in May, to accompany General Bayard
to the Shenandoah valley, became attached to the Army of Virginia, and retired with
General McDowell's corps from the line of the Rapidan towards Washington.
Lieutenant-Colonel Kane, who had been exchanged in the early part of August, hastened to
the front, and took command of the battalion at Catlett's station. The detachment remained
under his command until the army arrived in the fortifications at Washington, when it
rejoined the regiment.
On the 7th of September, Kane was
promoted to a brigadier-generalship, and was assigned to the command of a brigade in the
Twelfth corps.
Thomas L. Kane was the second son of
Judge Kane of Philadelphia; he received a liberal education in the schools of that city,
and was then sent to France to pursue a higher course. Whilst in Paris, he espoused the
cause of Red republicanism, and took his first military lesson behind the Trench
barricades. After his return to Pennsylvania, he read law in his father's office, and was
admitted to practice. President Polk, during his administration, sent him to Mis-
359
souri to
settle the Indian difficulties in that territory, and to superintend the exodus of the
Mormons from Nauvoo. In the Utah war of 1851, Mr. Kane was again sent on a mission to the
Mormons, and by the most untiring efforts reached their capital, and succeeded in
negotiating a truce; and subsequently, procured an amnesty from President Buchanan, for
the offending Mormons, which finally led to a peaceful settlement of the Utah
difficulties.
The exposure in the mountains, to
which Mr. Kane had been subjected during his journeys to Salt Lake City, had seriously
impaired his health; he therefore removed from Philadelphia to the forests of McKean
county. When the rebels fired on Fort Sumter, Mr. Kane.offered his services to Governor
Curtin, and immediately recruited four companies, which afterwards became part of the
Bucktail regiment. The men were collected on the headwaters of the Susquehannah, where
they embarked on rafts, and floated down to the capital of the State, and entered Camp
Curtin. Kane was in command of these men until the time of the organization of the
regiment. His services with the Bucktails have been recorded in the accounts of their
campaigns.
General Kane commanded his brigade in
the battles and campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, until November, 1863, when he
resigned and retired from the service, completely broken down in health. General Pope
was, at his own request, relieved from the command of the troops about Washington, and
proceeded immediately to the North-west to take command of that department. His great
campaign has been the subject of the most unparalleled misrepresentation, and has been
more widely misunderstood than any other in the history of the war.
The object of this campaign into
Virginia was to relieve tile Army on the James river, and to ensure its withdrawal to the
Potomac. To accomplish this, it became necessary for General Pope to confront, with a
small army, vastly superior forces, to fight battles without hope of victory, but only
360
to gain time
and embarrass and delay the forward movements of the enemy; in short, to make every
sacrifice necessary to keep the enemy from the fortifications around the National Capital,
until the army from the Peninsula could be transferred, and placed in position to aid in
its defence. In this the commanding general succeeded, and if the whole Army of the
Potomac had moved with reasonable promptness to his relief, he would not only have ended
his campaign triumphantly, but would have sealed it with a complete victory, that would
have overwhelmed the rebel army in Virginia and broken the power of the rebellion in the
east.
The main body of the Army of the
Potomac lead evacuated the camp at Harrison's landing, and crossed the Chickahominy,
near its mouth, on a pontoon bridge, on the 17th of August; marching thence, down the
Peninsula through Williamsburg, the several corps reached Yorktown, Newport News, and
Fort Monroe on the 20th. At these points they were embarked on transports and carried to
Alexandria, whence they marched to Centreville and joined the Army of Virginia. General
McClellan arrived at Alexandria on the night of the 26th of August, and on the lst of
September, he was ordered to Washington to confer with General Halleck on the situation in
front. On the 2d, General McClellan was assigned to the command of all the forces about
the defences of the Capital.
As soon as the National forces had
reached the fortifications in front of Washington, the enemy began to withdraw towards
Leesburg, and on the 4th of September, commenced to cross the Potomac river in force, near
Poolesville in Maryland. It was now evident to the authorities at Washington that the
Confederate general contemplated the invasion of 1-Laryland, and an attack on the
Capital from the north side of the Potomac. On the day previous to the crossing at
Poolesville by the enemy, General McClellan had ordered the Second, and the Twelfth corps,
to cross the Potomac on the Chain bridge, and to occupy Tenallytown.
361
On the 4th,
the whole army was put in motion, moving up both banks of the river for the purpose of
discovering the position and intentions of the enemy. The defences of the Capital were
intrusted to General Banks, and all the available troops were hurried away, under the
command of General McClellan, in pursuit of the enemy. The army which but three days
before had been on the defensive, falling back from position to position, until it retired
within the line of fortifications on the Potomac, now reorganized, harmonized, united, and
reinforced, marched out boldly and defiantly to give battle to the enemy whenever and
wherever he could be found.
On the 7th of September the Reserve
corps, as a division of the First army corps, commanded by General Hooker, marched from
its camp near Munson's hill, crossed the Potomac on Long bridge, and thence, marching
through the streets of Washington, encamped on Meridian hill. On the following clay, new
clothes and a fresh supply of rations were issued to the men, and the division moved
forward to a point near Brookville in Maryland, where it encamped two days. From
Broolr_ville it marched on the road towards Frederick, and on the night of the 12th,
encamped beyond New Market, near the Monocacy creek.
Governor Curtin, believing the enemy
would invade the State of Pennsylvania, issued a proclamation on the 4th of September,
calling out seventy-five thousand troops from the militia force of the State; and on the
12th, General Reynolds was relieved from the command of the Reserve Corps, and was ordered
to procede to Harrisburg, at the request of the Governor, to organize and command these
forces. The command of, the division then devolved on General Meade; On the 13th, the
troops crossed the Monocacy, and during the afternoon, pitched camp on the western bank of
the creek.
During this time the whole army of
the Potomac had moved forward, from Washington towards Frederick ; its left resting all
the while on the north bank of the Potomac,
362
and its
right wing marching on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. On the 13th, the main
bodies of the right wing and centre passed through the city of Frederick, and it was soon
discovered that the entire force of the enemy was in Maryland, and had fallen back to a
strong position on South Mountain.
Colonel D. S. Miles with a force of
about twelve thousand men, collected from.the military posts in the Shenandoah valley, was
garrisoning Harper's Ferry. On the 12th, General Jackson with a strong rebel force
recrossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and marched against that post which was foolishly
surrendered with its garrison and stores, after a weak defence, at eight o'clock in the
morning of the 15th of September. Before the capitulation of the garrison, Colonel
Davis, of Illinois, commanding the cavalry at Harper's Ferry determined to cut his way out
through the enemy's lines; accordingly on the night of the 13th, he crossed the pontoon
bridge, and pursuing the road up the river to Sharpsburg, and thence to Williamsport and
Hagerstown, arrived safely in Pennsylvania with his whole troop of gallant young men, who
not only successfully extricated themselves from a most embarrassing situation, but on
their way northward, captured General Longstreet's supply train, and brought it within the
National lines.
As soon as General McClellan had
fully ascertained the position of the enemy, he made the necessary dispositions to
dislodge hirn from the mountain passes, and if possible to interpose Franklin's command,
including the Sixth corps and Couch's division of the Second, between the enemy's forces
on the mountains and Jackson's troops operating against Harper's Ferry. General Franklin
pushed his command rapidly forward towards Crampton's pass, and at about twelve o'clock on
the 14th, arrived at Burkettsville; immediately in rear of which he found the enemy's
infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, with artillery in strong positions to
defend the approaches to the pass. Slocum's division was formed upon the right of the
road lead-
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ina through
the gap, and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbett's brigades,
supported by Newton, advanced steadily upon the enemy, at a charge, on the right. The
rebels were driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where they were
protected by a stone wall, steadily forced back up the slope until they reached the
position of their battery on the road, well up the mountain. There they made a stand. They
were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in echelon until, after an action of
three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the
other side.
On the left of the road, Brooks' and
Irvin's brigades, of Smith's division, formed for the protection of Slocum’s flank,
charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the
crest was carried Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, seven
hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery and three colors, were captured by
Franklin's troops in this brilliant action.
The loss in General Franklin's corps
was one hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two missing. The
enemy's position was such that artillery could not be used against him with any effect.
The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in Pleasant valley on the night
of the 14th, within three and a half miles of the point on Maryland heights where he
might, on the same night or on, the morning of the 15th, have formed a junction with the
garrison at Harper's Ferry had it not been previously withdrawn from Maryland heights.
Whilst these movements were
transpiring on the left, the troops of the right wing and centre, which had been
concentrated at Frederick, were pushed forward in pursuit of the enemy on the Hagerstown
pike. General Pleasonton was sent forward with his corps of cavalry, and soon came up with
the enemy; after skirmishing with him during the whole of the forenoon, driving his rear
guard from several
364
strong
positions, he finally discovered his main force strongly posted at Turner's gap in South
Mountain. General Pleasonton sent back to General Burnside, who had been ordered to
support him, for an infantry force, and upon its arrival, lie proceeded to make a forced
reconnoissance of the enemy's position.
The South mountain is at this point
about one thousand feet in height, and its general direction is from northeast to
southwest. The national road from Frederick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at right
angles through Turner's gap, a depression which is some four hundred feet in depth.
The mountain on the north side of
the. turnpike is divided into two crests, or rides, by a narrow valley, which, though deep
at the pass, becomes a slight depression at about a mile to the north. There are two
country roads, one to the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give
access to the crests overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called the "Old
Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the
turnpike, until. it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The
other road, called the "Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the
mountains about a mile from the turnpike, and bending to the left over and along the first
crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass.
On the morning of the 14th, the First
corps, commanded by General Hooker, was encamped on the Monocacy two miles from Frederick
; the Second, General Sumner's, was near Frederick; the Sixth, General Franklin's, was at
Buckeyetown; the Ninth, General Reno's, was at Middletown; the Twelfth, General
Williams', was near Frederick; Couch's division was at Licksville, near Franklin's corps,
and Sykes' division of regulars, from the Fifth corps, was at Frederick. General Burnside
commanded the right wing, including the First and Ninth corps; General Sumner the centre,
composed of the Second and Twelfth corps, and General Franklin the left, including the
Sixth corps and Couch's
365
division. As
soon as General Burnside reported to General McClellan that the enemy was found in force
at Turner's gap, the whole force of the right wing and centre was ordered forward to
dislodge him.
General Cox's division, which had
been ordered up to support General Pleasonton, left its bivouac, near Middletown early
in the morning. The First brigade reached the scene of action about nine o'clock, and was
sent up the old Sharpsburg road to feel the enemy, and ascertain if he held the crest on
that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the case; and General Cox having
arrived with the other brigade, and bringing information from General Keno, that the
column would be supported by the whole corps, the division was ordered to assault the
position. Colonel Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, well covered by skirmishers, moved
up the slope on the left of the road with the object of turning the enemy's right, if
possible. It succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of
the vigorous efforts of the enemy, who was posted behind stone walls and the edges of
timber. Colonel Crooke's brigade marched in columns at supporting distance. A section of
McMullan's battery, under Lieutenant Croome, who was killed while serving one of his guns,
was moved up with great difficulty, and opened with canister at very short range on the
enemy's infantry, but it was soon silenced and forced to withdraw.
The enemy several times attempted to
retake the crest, advancing with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then withdrew
their battery to a point more to the right, and formed columns on both flanks. It was now
about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which
the other divisions of Reno's corps were coming tip. General Wilcox's division was the
first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain, General Reno ordered him to
move up the old Sharpsburg road and take a position to its right, overlooking the
turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support General Cox, at his
366
request. One
section of Cooke's battery was placed in position near the turn of the road, on the crest,
and opened fire on the enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to
deploy to the right of the road, when the; enemy suddenly opened, at one hundred and fifty
yards, with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cooke's cannoneers
with their limbers, and caused a temporary panic. But the Seventy-ninth New York and
Seventeenth Michigan promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out
to protect the guns. Order was soon restored, and the division formed in line on the right
of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as possible under the hillside until the whole line
advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery in front, but also to that of the batteries on the otherside of the
turnpike, and lost heavily.
Shortly before this time General
Burnside arrived at the base of the mountain, and directed General Reno to move up the
divisions of Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move
upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he was informed that General
Hooker, who had just been directed to attack on the right, was well advanced up the
mountain.
General Reno then went to the front
and assumed the direction of affairs. General Sturgis had left his camp at one o'clock,
and reached the scene of action about half past three. Clark's battery, of his division,
was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and the Second Maryland and
Sixth New Hampshire regiments were detached by General Reno, and sent forward a short
distance on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and
Rodman's division was divided; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being placed on the extreme
left, and Colonel Harland's, under General Rodman's personal super. vision, on the right.
The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of the infantry;
but
367
its position
was made untenable, and it was hastily remove and not again put in position in that part
of the. field.
In reporting the dislodgement of the
enemy on the left General Wilcox refers, in the most complimentary language, to the
gallant conduct of the Forty-fifth regiment of Pennsylvania volunteers, which charged the
enemy in the front, and forced him, at the point of the bayonet, from one of his strongest
positions.
While Reno was operating against the
enemy's right Hooker was vigorously engaging his left. As early as one o'clock in the
afternoon, General Meade, commanding the Pennsylvania Reserves, was ordered to make a
diversion on the right in favor of General Reno's troops, who were being hard pressed on
the left.
On Sunday morning, September 14, the
regiments broke camp on the bank of the Monocacy, marched forward through the city of
Frederick, and out on the turnpike through Middletown, and a short distance beyond, where
they were halted at one o'clock. An hour later, the
division
moved forward and turned off to the right front the main road, on the old Hagerstown road
to Mount Tabor church, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting about
one and a half mile from the; turnpike. The enemy fired a few shots from a battery on the
mountain side, but did no considerable damage. Cooper's battery was placed in position on
high ground at about three and a half o'clock, and opened on the enemy on the slope, but
was soon ordered, by General Hooker, to cease firing, and the position of the troops going
up the mountain prevented any further use of artillery by the Reserves on that part of the
field. The First Massachusetts cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the
movements, if any, of the enemy in that direction, and General Meade directed Captain John
Clark, commanding the Third regiment, to post his companies to guard a road coming in from
that direction. The other divisions of Hooker's corps were deployed as they came up,
General Hatch's on the left, and General
368
Ricketts' in
the. rear. General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General
Burnside, for the purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's centre, up the main
road, as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed.
The country in front of General Meade
consisted of a succession of parallel ridges, alternated with deep irregular valleys and
broken ravines. The hills increased in height, and their eastern slopes became more abrupt
and rugged, as they neared the mountain crest. The enemy occupied all these ridges as
out-post defences, protecting the stronger and principal position on the top of the
mountain. The line of these hills presented an irregular crescent front, in many places
jutting out in rugged prominences, and everywhere rough, rocky, and difficult to ascend;
the valleys and slopes farthest from the mountain were cultivated, and were traversed by
stone fences, which separated the fields from the forest, and afforded additional shelter
to the enemy.
General Meade was ordered to move his
division so as, if possible, to outflank the enemy, and then move forward and attack hire
on the mountain. To accomplish this, it was necessary to move over the broken country in
his front. The general thoroughly understood the difficulties the troops must encounter;
he also knew the quality of the soldiers he was about to order to storm tile mountain, nor
were the men less informed as to the ability of their commanding officers; there was
mutual confidence in the corps, and the veteran heroes of many battles were fully aroused
to the magnitude of the work before them. The First brigade, commanded by General Seymour,
was formed on the right; the Second brigade, commanded by Colonel Magilton, was posted on
the left, and the Third, commanded by Colonel Gallagher, held the centre. Thus formed, the
division began to advance towards the mountain; the nature of the ground was such, that
the troops of each brigade could not see the movements of those in either of the other
two, but could judge of their success,
369
only by the
progressive roar of battle. The Bucktail regiment, commanded by Colonel McNeil, was
deployed as skirmishers in front of the division, and was closely followed by the whole
line of battle; the enemy's out-posts were rapidly driven in, forced from the hills, and
routed
from the
ravines, until suddenly, the regiments of the First brigade arrived at a corn-field
"full of rebels," protected by a stone wall at the foot of the abrupt mountain
side; the Bucktails received a terrific volley of musketry, which brought them to a halt.;
General Seymour, who was on the ground with his men, seeing that then was the critical
moment, called out to Colonel Roberts, commanding the First regiment, to charge up the
mountain, and at the same instant, turning to Colonel Fisher of the Fifth regiment,
whose men were coming up in well dressed lines, he exclaimed: " Colonel, put your
regiment into that corn-field and hurt somebody!" " I will, general, and I'll
catch one alive for you," was the cool reply of Colonel Fisher. The Second regiment,
commanded by Captain Byrnes, and the Sixth, Colonel Sinclair, were ordered forward at the
same time. The men of the Fifth leaped the stone wall, immediately, captured eleven
prisoners and sent them back to the general. A patriot cheer rose from the entire line,
and the regiments darted forward through the field, over the wall, and up the rugged steep
beyond, over rocks, stones, logs, and through underbrush, pulling themselves up with one
hand and fighting the rebels with the other. From behind
every rock,
tree, and log, they forced the enemy with ball and bayonet; the color bearers struggled up
the mountain side, and the men rallied round the flag, cheer after cheer responded to the
rebel volleys from the summit; onward and upward the fiery line rolled and surged; the
bewildered rebels saw in astonishment the smoke and flame rising from rock to rock.
"What troops are those?" anxiously inquired a rebel officer. "I don't
know, sir, I'll see," said the colonel of an Alabama regiment. Peering over the rocky
barrier that had protected him, he exclaimed: “My
370
God, its the
Pennsylvania Reserves I" and instantly he fell pierced by a dozen bullets. A moment
more, and the gallant brigade rose to the crest, and delivered a murderous volley into the
ranks of the panic-stricken enemy, who retreated in hot haste down the western slope of
the mountain. The starry banner which had risen above the shadows of the mountain side,
reflected the lingering rays of the setting sun; a triumphant cheer ran- out over the
mountain tops, that was heard along the entire line, and was taken up by brigade after
brigade, until the voices of a hundred thousand men rose in the tremendous shout of
victory.
The Second and Third brigades, like
the First, had successfully dislodged the enemy from their front, and amid the roar of
the closing battle, and the shout of victory, gained the summit of the mountain on the
left. Colonel Gallagher fell severely wounded while gallantly leading his brigade in a
charge against the enemy strongly posted in a deep ravine; Colonel Anderson of the Ninth
regiment, being the ranking officer, assumed command, and led it up the mountain, the men
rushing upon the enemy behind ledges of rocks, timber, and intrenchments, until they had
cleared the slope and gained possession of the crest. At one point the Eleventh regiment,
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel S. DL Jackson, was ordered to drive the enemy from a
deep ravine; the regiment charged upon the concealed rebels, and at a single volley from
the hidden foe, more than half the commissioned officers fell to the ground, but the men,
as if maddened by the loss of their officers, rushed upon the energy, forced him from his
shelter, and never ceased cheering, charging, climbing, and firing, until they ended with
the triumphant shout of victory.
The Second brigade, on the extreme
left, moved up the mountain on the slope, facing towards the turnpike, and encountered a
stronger force of the enemy, and a more stubborn resistance, the Eighth regiment, forming
the extreme left of the division, fought its way at every step, and sustained a heavier
loss than all the other regiments of the
brigade
combined. The Second did not gain the crest, therefore, quite as promptly as the brigades
on the. right, but as soon as the rebels discovered, that their position was outflanked,
they fled in dismay, and the National army held the passes. It was already dark, and
pursuit over the rough grounds in front being impracticable, the troops bivouacked for the
night, replenished their ammunition, collected their wounded, buried their dead, and
made preparations for an early and vigorous pursuit at daylight on Monday morning.
General Meade reported this battle as
follows
MAJOR .T.
DICKINSON,
Assistant
Adjutant General.
MAJOR :--I have the honor to submit
the following report of the operations of the division of the Pennsylvania Reserves
under my command, during the action at South Mountain gap on the 14th inst.
The division left its camp on the
Monocacy early on the morning of the 14th inst., and marched to Middletown and beyond,
where it was halted about one P. M. of that day. General Reno's corps being in front and
engaged with the enemy. About two P. M., this division was ordered to the front to his
support. The enemy was disputing our passage over the turnpike through the South Mountain,
and had been attacked on the left by General Reno. After some consultation with the
general commanding the right wing and the corps, I was directed to move the division on a
road leading off to the right of the turnpike and towards the enemy's left. After
advancing for over a mile on this road,
the division
which was the advance of the corps, was turned across the fields to the left and moved in
an advantageous position to support Cooper's battery, which it was proposed to establish
on an adjoining eminence. The enemy perceiving these dispositions opened on the column
from a battery on the mountain side, but without inflicting any injury. Captain Cooper's
battery of three-inch ordnance guns, was immediately put into position on the ridge above
referred to, and at the salve time by direction of the general commanding the corps, the
regiment of First Rifles of the division was sent forward as skirmishers to feel for the
enemy.
Being well satisfied from various
indications that the enemy occupied the mountain in force with his infantry, the general
commanding the corps directed me to advance my division to the right, so as if possible to
out-flank him, and then to move forward to the attack; a slight description of the
features of the ground is necessary to properly describe the movements of the division.
The turnpike from Frederick to
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Hagerstown, in crossing the mountains, takes a general direction of northwest and southeast. The mountain ridge occupied by the enemy was perpendicular in its general direction to the road, parallel to the mountain was another ridge separa