THE ANTIETAM

AND

FREDERICKSBURG

 

BY

FRANCIS WINTHROP PALFREY

 

 

Tuesday the sixteenth was a terribly hot day in its early hours, with a burning sun and no breeze, but at about eleven the sun became overcast, and a little air stirred from time to time. It was a day of mere idleness throughout, for a large part of the army[1]; and no one but the gunners had anything

 

THE ANTIETAM.            57

to do in the afternoon.  We lay about on the eastern slope of the ridge which interposed between us and the valley of the Antietam, and occasionally we would go to the crest of the ridge to see what we could see.   There was plenty to see, but unfortunately that was not all of it.  The Confederate batteries were wide awake, and their practice was extremely good, and projectiles flew over the crest so thickly that mere curiosity was not sufficient to keep any one there long.
    On the morning of this day Jackson arrived at Sharpsburg with his own division under Lawton.  His troops were allowed some rest, and then his own division was placed on the left of Hood, who, himself being on the left of D.H. Hill, prolonged the Confederate line northward and westward to the Hagerstown pike. Jackson's right rested on the pike. Winder's and Jones brigades formed his front line and Taliaferro's and Starke's brigades his second.  Early's brigade Ewell's division was formed on his left, to guard his flank, and Hays's brigade rest near the Dunker Church. Walker, also, early this day, crossed the Potomac on his return from Harper's Ferry, but he also seems to have rested till daylight the next morning, when he placed his two brigades on the extreme right of the Con­federate position, about a mile and a half south of Sharpsburg, and in support to General Toombs, whose brigade was guarding the approach by the "Burnside Bridge."  These were all the troops which Lee had with him all day on the 16th, for McLaws did not come on the ground till sunrise the next morning, Anderson's division followed him, and A. P. Hill did not arrive till half-past two P.M.. Artillery seems to have been singularly plenty among the Confederates, for

 

58  ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

D. H. Hill, after stating that on the morning of the 17th he had but 3,000 infantry, proceeds as follows: "I had, however, twenty-six pieces of artillery of my own, and near sixty pieces of Cutts's battalion temporarily under my command."[2] As twenty-six pieces is a liberal allowance for 9,000 infantry, this statement excites some surprise. The ground occupied by the Confederates near the " Burn­side Bridge " was favorable for their defence. It consisted of undulating hills, their crests commanded in turn by others in their rear. The bridge itself is a stone structure of three arches, with a stone parapet above.  This parapet to some extent flanks the approach to the bridge at each end. The stream runs through a narrow valley. On the right bank (held by the Confederates), a steep slope comes very near the edge. In this slope the roadway is scarped, running both ways from the bridge, and passing to the higher land above by ascending through ravines. On the hill-side immediately above the bridge was a strong stone fence, running nearly parallel to the stream. The turns of the roadway were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks made of rails and stone. The slope was wooded to a considerable extent.
    For some reason which has never been made public, the right division of the army, Burnside's command, was divided  at Sharpsburg. Hooker's corps was made the extreme right of the army, and the other corps, the Ninth, now under Cox, with whom Burnside went, was made the extreme left. It was the understanding of the time at Burnside's headquar­ters that Hooker had in some way procured this separate duty, with a view to giving himself more importance. Burnside declined to assume personal command of the Ninth

 

THE  ANTIETAM.            59

 

Corps when this separation took place, intimating that if he should so assume command, it would look like acquiescence on his part with the arrangement, and might tend to make it permanent.Thus Burnside's position became somewhat anomalous. It is possible that this division of his command may have been the commencement of the estrangement be­tween him and McClellan, of the existence of which at a later date there is strong evidence.

General McClellan went to the left of his line himself, to see that the Ninth Corps was properly posted, his idea being that that force must be prepared both to resist an attack by the left bank of the stream, and to carry the bridge at the proper time. It is believed in some quarters[3] that Burnside was very slow in moving to the position assigned him, but McClellan simply says that he found it necessary to make considerable changes in his position, and that he directed him to advance to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of the bridge, and to carefully reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge.

By this time McClellan's plan for the battle seems to have taken definite shape in his mind. It was extremely simple, and ought to have been successful. It was in brief to attack the Confederate left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and if necessary by Frank­lin's, and, as soon as matters looked favorably there, to move the Ninth Corps against their extreme right, and whenever either of these movements should be successful, to advance

 

60            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

his centre with all the force disposable. With what McClellan knew then, with all we know now, nearly twenty years after the battle, the plan seems to have been well suited to the position of affairs. There is no censure too strong for his delay, but, having determined or permitted himself to delay, he shaped his programme well enough.

But for the success of this as well as every other military enterprise, two things were important, if not indispensable---first, that he should not tell his opponent what he was going to do; and second, that he should do well the thing he pro­posed to do. Able commanders seek to delude their oppo­nents. They use all the craft which they possess to induce the enemy to believe that the blow is to fall at some place other than the place which they have chosen. If possible, they lead the enemy to strengthen the point where the feigned attack is to be made, and to weaken the point where the real attack is to be made. Thus Marlborough carried the line of the Mehaigne at Ramillies. Thus Thomas deluded Hood at Nashville. Military history is full of such examples. But McClellan resorted to no such artifices; on the contrary, he informed Lee that he proposed to make his main attack with his right, and not only that, but almost certainly told him that he had greatly strengthened it for the purpose. With Maryland so full of Confederate sympathizers as it was, we cannot doubt that Lee knew by this time the general divi­sion of McClellan's army, and we can hardly doubt that he knew that he had departed from it to fight this battle. How­ever this may have been, it seems undeniable that McClellan's dispositions on the 16th were exactly appropriate to a plan of battle which contemplated a main attack to be made by his left, strengthened by troops to be moved there under cover of the night, and that they were extremely inappropriate to the plan which he had formed and to which he adhered.

 

THE ANTIETAM.            61

 

On the high ground in the centre of his position, between the Keedysville road on the left and Fry's house on the right, McClellan placed several batteries of long range guns. Standing among those guns, one could look down upon nearly the whole field of the coming battle, while the view was per­haps more complete from the high ground on the left of the road, where some of the Fifth Corps batteries were placed. From this point one could look to the right through the open space between the "East and West Woods." From the further bank of the stream in front, the land rose gently toward the ridge occupied by the Confederates, checkered with cleared fields and corn-fields, and traversed by many fences. The famous "sunken road " was almost in front of the spectator looking west. It branched off from the northern side of the Keedysville pike, about half way from the river to Sharpsburg, and ran in broken lines to the Hagerstown pike, which it entered about half-way between Sharpsburg and the Dunker Church, but nearer the latter.

The conformation of the ground was such that these cen­tral Federal batteries could sweep almost the whole extent of the hostile front. Some of them had a direct fire through the space between the East and West Woods, and others of them could enfilade the refused left wing of the Confeder­ate army.

About 2 P.m. McClellan ordered Hooker to cross the An­tietam at the upper bridge and a ford near by, to attack and, if possible, turn the enemy's left. He also ordered Sumner to cross Mansfield's Twelfth Corps during the night, and to hold the Second in readiness to cross early the next morn­ing. He seems to have devoted the rest of the day to ex­aminations of the ground, finding fords, clearing ap­proaches, and hastening the arrival of the ammunition and supply trains.

 

62            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

It is an ungrateful task to be always finding fault, but an important battle is to be described, and the reasons why its results were what they were, and only what they were, must be fully given. The perniciousness of the mistake which McClellan made in delaying his attack cannot be too strongly insisted upon. The reasons which he gives for his delay, are entirely inadequate, and part of the use which he made of the time thus placed at his command was positively damaging.  But having delayed his attack till the enemy was largely or completely concentrated, and having informed him, by the language of acts which it was difficult to misinterpret, where he meant to strike, it yet remained possible to strike with vigor and with concert. Instead of doing so, he issued such orders to his corps commanders on the right as made it impossible that they should act with concert early on the 17th, and improbable that they would act with concert at all. Under such orders, the attacks were far more likely to be successive than to be simultaneous.

On Tuesday the 16th, at 4 P.M., Hooker moved. He crossed the Antietam without opposition, at the points in­dicated.  Circling around until he faced southward, he pre­sently came upon the Confederate pickets.  His troops were deployed at once, with Meade in the centre, Doubleday on his right, and Ricketts on the left. The attack, such as it was, fell upon Hood's two brigades, Meade's division of Federals being principally engaged. The advantage seems to have been slightly upon the side of the Federals, though each side claims to have forced back the other.  Longstreet says "Hood drove him back, but not without severe loss," and Hood admits that be was relieved by Lawton, with two brigades, at the close of the fighting, though he claims that this was to enable his half-starved men to cook.  The relieving brigades were those of Trimble, which formed up

 

THE ANTIETAM.            63

 

next to the division of D. H. Hill, and Lawton's, which took position on its left.

During the night Mansfield crossed the Twelfth Corps, following in the track of Hooker, and passed what was left of the night about a mile in rear of Hooker. The Federal and Confederate pickets on Hooker's front were exceedingly close together. Sumner's Second Corps, Burnside's Ninth Corps, and all of Porter's Fifth Corps that had arrived, remained in bivouac.Morell's division of the Fifth Corps arrived in the evening of the 16^th.[4]  Franklin's Sixth Corps and Couch's division of the Fourth Corps were still at a distance, in the neighborhood of Crampton's Gap. Of the Confederate army, all the divisions were now in position excepting those of McLaws and Anderson, which, as has been said, arrived very early on the morning of the 17th, and A. P. Hill's, which arrived after noon of that day.

 

***************************************************************************************************************************

 

72

 

The night before the battle passed quietly, except for some alarms on Hooker's front, and most of the men in both armies probably got a good sleep. The morning broke gray and misty, but the mists disappeared early, and the weather for the rest of the day was perfect. As a great bat­tle cannot be described in detail except at immense length, and even then must be described imperfectly, there seems to be no better plan than to state the parts into which a par­ticular action is divisible, and then to give reasonable de­velopment to the description of those parts. Of the battle of the Antietam it may be said that it began with the attack made by the First Corps under Hooker upon the Confeder­ate left.  The next stage 'was the advance of the Twelfth Corps under Mansfield to the support of Hooker.  The next was the advance of the Second Corps, under Sumner, and this again must be divided into three parts, as Sumner's three divisions went into action successively, both in time and place. The division that first became engaged was fur­thest to the Federal right, the next was to the left, and the last still farther to the left.  The fourth stage was the slight

 

THE ANTIETAM.            73

 

use of a few troops from the centre, mostly Franklin's, made as late as one o'clock or thereabouts, and the fifth and last was the fighting of the Ninth Corps on the extreme right of the Confederate position.

It will be remembered that McClellan had virtually told Lee where he proposed to attack. That the notice given by him was comprehended by the enemy is shown by the lan­guage of Colonel Wofford, commanding a brigade in Hood's division, who says: “It was now evident that the enemy had effected a crossing entirely to our left, and that he would make the attack on that wing early in the morning, moving his forces over and placing them in position during the night." Colonel Wofford's judgment was correct in the main, although he gave McClellan credit in advance for carrying out his own plan more thoroughly than he did.[5] At a very early hour the skirmishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves, Meade's division of the First Corps, advanced, and their advance was followed by that of the whole corps-Meade's division in the centre, Doubleday's on its right, and Ricketts's on its left. The advance was impetuous, and the Confederate re­sistance was obstinate.  The Federal advance was aided by the fire of the batteries posted by McClellan on the east side of the Antietam, which, Jackson says, enfiladed his line, and proved severe and damaging, and it received some assistance from the batteries of the corps, but they do not seem to have been used with remarkable skill or dash. Some of the guns were very roughly handled by Confederates who crept around through the corn and behind rises of ground, and the chief of artillery of one of the Federal divisions

 

74            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

seems to have wanted judgment as well as audacity. The batteries most mentioned were I, of the First New York Artillery ; B, of the Fourth Artillery; D, of the Rhode Island Artillery; a battery of the First New Hampshire Artillery; F, of the First Pennsylvania, and the Independent Pennsylvania Battery. It was upon Jackson that the blow fell, and he met it with his front line, composed of the brigades of Jones and Winder, of the Stonewall division, and those of Lawton and Trimble, and probably Hays, of Ewell's division. He had also not less than six batteries in action, and more or less aid from Stuart, whose command consisted of cavalry and horse artillery,[6] from S. D. Lee's guns, from Hood and D. H. Hill, and from " a brigade of fresh troops," which Early says came up to the support of Lawton and Hays, but soon fell back.  It is impossible to tell what number of troops on each side was engaged in this opening struggle, the more so that Jackson himself says that "fresh troops from time to time re­lieved the enemy's ranks," which seems to indicate that Hook­er's men were not all used at once. As far as can be made out from the various reports, which are singularly wanting on both sides in clear topographical indications, the fighting began not far from the western edge of the East Woods, and resulted, after very severe losses on both sides, in the gradual with­ drawal of the Confederates to the West Woods. The story might be told with far greater fulness and completeness, but for the defective character of the reports in the particular to which allusion has been made.They are very numerous, and many of them are not short, but they hardly ever tell to what point of the compass the faces of the troops were turned,

 

THE ANTIETAM.            75

 

and the indefinite article is constantly used.    A lane, a road, a fence, a wall, a house, a corn-field, a piece of woods, such are the constantly recurring phrases which constantly baffle and disappoint the curious student.

To go a little more into detail. Hooker's command seems to have passed the night of the 16th about a mile and a half north of Sharpsburg, and in the neighborhood of the point on the Hagerstown pike where the Williamsport road branches off.  A signal station was established that night, close to the Hagerstown pike, and near Hooker's headquar­ters. Hooker's forces seem to have been vastly less than the 14,856 accorded to him in McClellan's Report. He had ten brigades. Ricketts, who commanded his Second Divi­sion, comprising three of them, says he took into action 3,158 men. Phelps, who commanded the First Brigade of the First Division, says he had 425 men.     If we take the average strength of these four brigades, and compute the strength of the corps from it, Hooker's infantry will fall below nine thousand men. Doubleday's division was formed astride of the turnpike; Gibbon's brigade, supported by Patrick's, advanced along the west side of the Hagerstown pike, while Hoffman's right just reached the pike. Gibbon's front line contained the Second and Sixth Wisconsin; but the resistance he encountered as he advanced caused him to bring forward around his right the Seventh Wisconsin and the Nineteenth Indiana, which obtained to some extent a flank fire along his front.  Patrick supported him, and Phelps formed up on his left, and the line was con­tinued to the left by Hoffman. 11leade formed Hooker's centre, and Ricketts his left.  The Federal troops gained some ground, and as they advanced Hooker's line seems to have gradually advanced its left, until it came nearer to being parallel to the pike than at right angles to it.  His right

 

76            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

gained ground but little, but gradually his left and centre drove the Confederates into the West Woods, of which Ricketts even claims to have gained the edge. Ricketts ad­vanced with his Third brigade in the centre, and the First and Second in echelon to the rear, to the right and left respectively.  The advance had been stubbornly contested throughout, but when the command approached the West Woods, a more terrible struggle took place.   The Confederates appear to have then brought into action the whole of Jackson's two divisions, with the exception of Early's bri­gade, and to have used Stuart's cavalry and artillery both. The two lines almost tore each other to pieces. Ricketts lost a third of his division, having 153 killed and 898 wounded.  Phelps's brigade lost about forty-four per cent. Gibbon's brigade lost 380 men. On the Confederate side the carnage was even more awful. General Starke, com­manding the Stonewall division, and Colonel Douglas, commanding Lawton's brigade, were killed. General Lawton, commanding Ewell's division, and Colonel Walker, commanding a brigade, were severely wounded. More than half of the brigades of Lawton and Hays were either killed or wounded, and more than a third of Trimble's, and all the regimental commanders in these brigades, except two, were killed or wounded.[7] No better evidence of the exhaustion of both sides need be given than Jackson's own statement: "Jackson's division and the brigades of Lawton, Hays, and Trim­ble retired to the rear, and Hood, of Longstreet's command, again took the position from which he had before been relieved."[8]  Hood had but two brigades, and Jackson's two divisions and Hooker's three must have been nearly anni­hilated, if Hood could take the place of the one and make        

 

THE ANTIETAM.            77

 

head against the other. If Jackson's and Hooker's had been the only forces present, there would have been a lull from necessity, and probably an end of the battle, but D. H. Hill, with five brigades, was close to Jackson's right, McLaws, with four, was coming up in his rear, and several other Con­federate brigades were near or hastening toward his part of the field, while Mansfield's Twelfth Corps was near Hooker. If troops moved as chessmen are moved, if corps and divisions went into action as complete wholes, the story of a battle could be told with more precision, but it is not only not so, but as far as possible from being so. The com­binations of a battlefield are almost as varying, and far less distinctly visible and separable than those of a kaleidoscope. A supporting force sends forward a regiment, or a battery, or a brigade, or a division, or sends detachments to various points to fill gaps and strengthen parts of the line which are especially threatened, or it advances as a whole, but even in the last case the accidents of the ground, the superior discipline or enthusiasm or handling of the men, or the more or less controlling fire of the enemy, make the advance of a large body irregular. General Patrick, commanding the Third Brigade of the First Division of Hooker's corps, says that the Twelfth Corps came in in succession and at consid­erable intervals. It is probably not known, and not knowa­ble, at what hour or at what point the First Corps received its first assistance from the Twelfth.

It has already been stated that Mansfield's Twelfth Corps passed the latter part of the night of the 16th September about a mile in rear of Hooker. There are various state­ments as to the time when Mansfield was ordered forward, but it is quite clear that his whole corps was engaged by, if not before, 7.30 A.M.            Before he reached Hooker's position he received information that Hooker's reserves were all en-

 

78            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

gaged, and that he was hard pressed.  He himself was killed during the deployment of his corps, while examining the ground in front. General Williams succeeded to the command. There were in the Twelfth Corps two divisions. Of the first, Crawford now took command. He had the brigades of Knipe and Gordon. Greene commanded the second division, composed of the brigades of Tyndale, Stainrook, and Goodrich. The reports of the Twelfth Corps division and brigade commanders make it plain that it went into action with only about seven thousand men, instead of the ten thousand odd with which McClellan credits it.[9] Very early in the advance, one brigade of Greene's division was sent to the right to Doubleday.  In the deployment, the First Division was to the right and front, with Knipe's brigade on the right and Gordon's on the left. Greene's division was on the left of the First Division. The attack was opened by Knapp's, Cothran's, and Hampton's batteries. The divisions moved together, but the First Division was somewhat earlier in getting into action.  As the First Division advanced, it found Hooker's men badly cut up and slowly retreating from the historic cornfield, which lay between the pike and the East Woods, and the Confederates occupying almost all the cornfield.  There are good grounds for believing that the Twelfth Corps received no assistance,

 

THE ANTIETAM.            79

 

or next to none, from the First Corps. The admirable troops of Gordon's brigade, which contained the Second Massachusetts, Third Wisconsin, and Twenty-seventh Indiana, succeeded in clearing the cornfield, apparently with some aid from Greene's men, who would seem to have obtained an enfilading fire along their front.    Knipe's brigade was less successful, but Greene did well on the left. He seems to have found some of the enemy so far to the east as the East Woods, though this is not easy to believe, but whatever force he encountered he succeeded in driving back, and entering open ground, partly covered with corn, and moving to his left and front, he overcame all opposition and entered the woods near the Dunker Church at about eight o'clock. There is no doubt that the fighting of this second stage of the battle was between the Federal Twelfth Corps and the remains of the First Corps, and Hood's Confederate division and such other troops as could then be got together on their left and right. The Federal pressure had caused all of the Confederate line which was to the left of D. H. Hill to fight nearly or quite at right angles to his line. It may have been at this time and place that the disparity of numbers was greatest. The usual difficulty of determining just what troops are engaged at a particular time is illustrated by the contradiction between Hood and Jackson.   Jackson, as has been stated, speaks of Hood's going to the front when his own division and the three brigades of Ewell's division retired to the rear. Hood, on the other hand, says:[10] "At six o'clock I received notice from Lawton that he would require all the assistance I could give him. A few minutes after, a member of his staff reported to me that he was wounded, and wished me to come forward as soon as possi­

 

80            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

ble.       Being in readiness, I at once marched out on the field, in line of battle, and soon became engaged with an immense force of the enemy, consisting of not less than two corps of their army."   If Hood is right---and he is corroborated by his brigade commander, Wofford, who says: "Our brigade was moved forward at sunrise to the support of General Lawton,"---Jackson met Hooker with over two thousand men more than he has been credited with, and the fif­teen brigades of the First and Twelfth Corps encountered the divisions of Jackson, Ewell,[11] and Hood, with such aid as Stuart from their left and D. H. Hill[12] from their right could give them. It also appears that G. T. Anderson's brigade of D. R. Jones's division was there.[13]

The general result of the second stage of the battle seems to have been that by nine A.M. the Federals held parts of a line extending from the woods near Miller's house on their right to the Dunker Church on the left, though Knipe on the extreme right does not seem to have had a firm hold on his ground. The Federals had gained a good deal of ground, but they were about fought out, and if they could hold what they had gained, it was probably the utmost they could do, especially as their leaders had failed to see and appreciate the importance of seizing and holding a height to the west of where Hooker's right had rested, the possession of which would have enabled them to take in flank and partly in reverse the whole of the wooded and rocky ground which they had thus far failed to carry, and which was to remain in possession of the enemy till the close of the battle.

 

***************************************************************************************************************************

 

146

 

A very sharp experience befel a part of Hall's (Third) brigade of the Second Division, immediately after the first of the upper bridges was completed. The Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, which had crossed in boats, belonged to his command. As soon as the first of the upper bridges was completed, the three re­maining regiments of his brigade crossed by it.  It was growing dark, Howard's division, to which Hall's brigade belonged, was coming across, and the troops were crowding into an unmanageable mass near the bridgehead. Hall sent back urgent requests to have the column halted the

 

 

FREDERICKSBURG. 147

 

other side of the river, to give time (as he said) to fight the enemy in his own way, but was ordered to push ahead. He ordered Captain Macy, commanding the Twentieth Massa­chusetts, to clear the street leading from the bridge at all hazards. What follows is taken from his official report: °° I cannot presume to express all that is due the officers and men of this regiment for the unflinching bravery and splen­did discipline shown in the execution of the order. Pla­toon after platoon was swept away, but the head of the col­umn did not falter. Ninety-seven officers and men were killed or wounded in the space of about fifty yards." Be­sides Howard's division of the Second Corps, one brigade of the Ninth Corps, also of Sumner's command, crossed the river above, and a brigade of Franklin's Grand Division did the same below, and the town was occupied before daylight on the 12th.

The 12th was a foggy day.  Sumner's and Franklin's di­visions crossed over and took position on the south bank. Nineteen batteries, of one hundred and four guns, passed the river with Sumner's command, but most of them could not be used, and were left in the streets of Fredericksburg or ordered back across the river. Of all the nineteen, seven were wholly or partially engaged the following day.

Twenty-three batteries, of one hundred and sixteen guns, crossed the river at the lower bridges; all but one of these batteries were engaged, and many of them were engaged very severely. The general position of the troops which crossed was as follows: the Second Corps at the town, on the right, the Ninth Corps next, then the Sixth Corps, and then the First. All these troops, excepting two divisions of the First Corps, were formed parallel to the river. Meade's division of the First Corps was formed at right angles to the rest of the army, facing southeast, his right touching the

 

148            A.NTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

left of Gibbon of the same corps, and his left resting on the river near Smithfield. Doubleday's division of the same corps was in reserve, formed in column on the bank of the river in rear of Meade's left. It could be seen that the Confederates occupied with artillery and infantry the crests of the opposite heights, and the woods and railroad cuts opposite the Federal left with a line of skirmishers extend­ing from the heights to a ravine and some houses on the river bank, opposite the extreme crest of hills on the Federal left. These dispositions of the Federal troops were made without material interruption. The fog was dense, and the Confederate artillery could only be used with effect when the occasional clearing of the mist rendered the Fed­eral columns visible.Hooker's division was retained on the left bank of the river to support either the right or the left, or to press the enemy in case either command should suc­ceed in moving him.

Lee's forces were arranged with Longstreet on the left, with Anderson's division resting upon the river, and the divisions of McLaws, Pickett, and Hood extending to the right, in the order named. Ransom's division supported the batteries on Marye's and Willis's hills, at the foot of Which Cobb's brigade, of McLaws's division, and the Twenty-fourth North Carolina, of Ransom's brigade, were stationed, protected by a stone wall. The immediate care of this point was committed to General Ransom.  The Washington artillery, under Col­onel Walton, occupied the redoubts on the crests of Marye's Hill, and those on the heights to the right and left were held by part of the reserve artillery, Colonel E. P. Alexander's battalion, and the division batteries of Anderson, Ransom, and McLaws.  A. P. Hill, of Jackson's corps, was posted between Hood's right and Hamilton's Crossing on the railroad. His front line, consisting of the brigades of Pender, Lane,

 

FREDERICKSBURG     149

 

and Archer, occupied the edge of a wood. Lieutenant­Colonel Walker, with fourteen pieces of artillery, was posted near the right, supported by the Thirty-fifth and Fortieth Virginia regiments, of Field's brigade, commanded by Colonel Brockenbrough. Lane's brigade, thrown forward in advance of the general line, held the woods which here projected into the open ground. Thomas's brigade was stationed behind the interval between Lane and Pender, and Gregg's in rear of that between Lane and Archer. These two brigades, with the Forty-seventh Virginia regiment and Twenty-second Virginia battalion of Field's brigade, constituted A. P. Hill's reserve. Early's and Taliaferro's divisions composed Jackson's second line, D. H. Hill's division his reserve. Jackson's artillery was distributed along his line in the most eligible positions, so as to command the open ground in front. General Stuart, with two brigades of cavalry and his horse-artillery, occupied the plain on Jackson's right, extending to the Massaponax River.

According to Burnside's report, Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker showed by their morning reports of December 13th, about one hundred and thirteen thousand men present for duty. These were either across the river or able to cross it upon the receipt of orders. Lee's morning report showed his present for duty on December 10th to be upward of seventy­eight thousand men. Not to insist upon the considerations heretofore presented to show that the Federals habitually took into action a vastly less number of men in proportion to their morning reports than the Confederates, 113,000 against 78,000 was not a great disparity of forces for an army which proposed to attack troops of at least equal calibre in a position of their own choosing, strong by nature, and im­mensely strengthened by art.

As far as can be ascertained, Burnside's plan of attack, so

 

150            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

far as he had one, was formed on the night of December 12th. He says himself By the night of the 12th the troops were all in position, and I visited the different commands with a view to determining as to future movements." This in itself is sufficiently singular, but it may be urged with some slight show of plausibility that a general commanding a great army could not definitely determine his plan till he came into the immediate presence of the enemy. Unfortunately for Burnside's reputation, however, there is nowhere a word said about reconnoissances after crossing the river, not a word to indicate that he either sought or ob­tained a particle of information which he did not possess before crossing the river.   General Franklin on the left had had placed under his command more than half of Burnside's army, comprising the First and Sixth Corps, two divisions of the Third Corps, Burns's division of the Ninth Corps, and Bayard's cavalry, and he asserts positively that at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 12th, General Burnside came to his headquarters, where he met, besides himself, General Smith, commanding the Sixth Corps, and General Reynolds, commanding the First Corps.  He says: " The subject of conversation was a proposed attack upon the enemy on the following morning, when I strongly advised General Burnside to make an attack from my division upon the enemy's right, with a column of at least thirty thousand men, to be sent in at daylight in the morning." He also says that he told General Burnside that in order to make such an attack, two divisions of Hooker's command, then on the north side of the river, near Franklin's bridges, must be crossed during the night.  He says that he reiterated his request that he should receive his orders as early as possible, that he might make the necessary dispositions of the troops before daylight. He also says that Burnside left him at about 6 p.m.,

 

FREDERICKSBURG. 151

 

and promised him that he should have his orders within two or three hours, or in any event before midnight, and that at midnight he sent an aide to ask for them, and received the reply that they were preparing and would be sent forthwith. It is admitted that he received no orders till half past seven on the morning of the 13th, and these orders came by the hand of General Hardie, of General Burnside's staff. They will be given presently. The night had passed without orders, and General Hooker's two divisions had remained on the farther (Northern) side of the river.

It is a pitiful picture, but is probably a true one, that Burnside passed the evening of the 12th riding about, not quite at his wits' end, but very near it. As far as can be made out, he finally came to the conclusion that he would attempt to do something, he did not quite know what, with his left, and if he succeeded, to do something with his right.   He says: "Positive information had reached me that the enemy had built a new road in rear of the ridge or crest, from near Hamilton's to the telegraph road. . . . I decided to seize, if possible, a point on this road near Hamilton's, which would not divide the enemy's forces by breaking their line, but would place our forces in position to enable us to move in rear of the crest, and either force its evacua­tion or the capitulation of the forces occupying it.  It was my intention, in case this point had been gained, to push Generals Sumner and Hooker against the left of the crest, and prevent, at least, the removal of the artillery of the enemy, in case they attempted a retreat." That is to say, operating with forces practically equal, used as they were to be against an enemy in an extremely strong position, he proposed to himself a difficult and doubtful enterprise, and intended, if that succeeded, to divide his forces in the im­mediate presence of a powerful enemy, concentrated and

 

152            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

strengthened by the very success he hoped for. It is perfectly plain that if Franklin had planted himself solidly at the lower end of the ridge, near Hamilton's Crossing; Lee would still have had at least nine chances in ten of success. A lodgment there would have made Sumner's attack on the right no easier, and if Burnside had undertaken to pass his troops round the point of the ridge at Hamilton's Crossing, with a view either to attacking Lee in rear, or to a direct movement upon Richmond, he would in either case have ex­posed his flank at the outset, and still have had to attack difficult heights with a divided army if he had chosen the former course.

But bad and vague as the plan was, the orders issued were worse and more vague. The orders which reached Franklin at 7.30 A.M. of the 13th, after he had passed a night of "sleepless anxiety" in his tent, were as follows:

 

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF POTOMAC,

December 13,1862-5.55 A.M.

 

MAJOR-GENERAL FRANKLIN, Commanding Left Grand Division Army of Potomac:

 

General Hardie will carry this despatch to you, and remain with you during the day. The General Commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open.    He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from General Sumner's command up the plank road, to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding those two heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points.  I make these moves by columns distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of

 

FREDERICKSBURG  153

 

our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hooker's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports.

Copies of instructions given to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon.

You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once, as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be " Scott."

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. G. PARKE,

Chief of Staff.

 

This order is exceedingly hard to understand, even at this distance of time, and with all the light which has been thrown upon it. General Franklin says that in the state of facts existing when it was received, " General Burnside's order, though incongruous and contradictory on its face, admitted of but one interpretation, viz., that he intended to make an armed observation from the left to ascertain the strength of the enemy-an interpretation also given to it by both of my corps commanders."  Without assenting un­reservedly to this interpretation, two propositions seem to be safe, viz.: that the order meant

First.-That Franklin was to keep his whole command in readiness to move, and that the direction o£ the movement was to be down the old Richmond road.

Second.-That the seizure of the heights near Captain Hamilton's was hoped for, but not counted upon, as the lan­guage is " to seize, if possible," and the force told off for this task is to be kept well supported, with its line of retreat open.

Under this order it was not open to Franklin to engage his whole command. The minor enterprise, the seizure of the heights, might have required that, but the order showed

 

154            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

that that enterprise was considered one of doubtful issue, as he was ordered to keep the line of retreat of the attacking force open. But the dominant feature of the order was the injunction, twice repeated, to keep his whole command in position and in readiness. It is idle to say that a general could obey this order and yet engage his whole command. When a general puts his troops in, it passes his and all human knowledge to know what the result will be, but it is absolutely and unqualifiedly true that he cannot both en­gage his whole command and at the same time hold his whole command in readiness to move anywhere or in posi­tion to do anything.

General Franklin was practically ruined as a soldier by the battle of Fredericksburg and his connection with it, but so far as the accessible evidence enables one to judge, he was most unjustly blamed. If there were a particle of evidence that any discretion was left to him, if we read any­where that Burnside had said, "Now, Franklin, I have given you a large force, and I leave you to use your best discretion as to operations on my left," or anything nearly or remotely like it, he might justly be held liable to the grave charge of having lost the battle by his own inaction. But upon the evidence the charge is not sustained.  More than that, the charge cannot be reconciled with the orders given. The fault was in the orders, and not in any failure on Franklin's part to understand them or obey them. This conclusion would be inevitable if the orders were the only evidence in the case, but, besides the orders, we have Franklin's statement of what he said to Burnside the night before, in the presence of Smith and Reynolds, which is very im­portant, and also the series of despatches, twelve in number, sent to Burnside by his own staff officer who carried the orders to Franklin, and was instructed to remain with him

 

FREDERICKSBURG. 155

 

during the day, at short intervals from 7.40 A.M. to 2.15 p.m. These despatches tell completely, and with very consider­able detail, just what Franklin was doing, and there is abso­lutely not a suggestion in them that Hardie thought that Franklin had misapprehended his orders, or that his conduct was in any way or degree unsatisfactory. When we couple with this fact the other fact that not one word of disap­proval or disappointment was sent back from Burnside to Franklin for six or seven hours, the conclusion is irresisti­ble that Burnside, at the time, was satisfied with Franklin's construction and execution of his orders. The obscurity of Burnside's own language, both in the orders sent to Franklin and in his report of the battle, is such that it is difficult to determine what his expectations were, but it seems to be certain that he expected that Franklin's movement upon the heights near Hamilton's would be a movement upon the extreme right of the Confederates.    If such was his expectation, he was all wrong, as will presently be made to appear.

The general position of Franklin's Grand Division has already been stated.  Smith's Sixth Corps was formed on the right, with Brooks's division on the right and Howe's on the left, and Newton's in reserve.  Brooks held the Richmond road and Deep Creek with one line in front of the creek, while Howe occupied the crest of a hill over which the Richmond road ran, his right at a sharp turn of Deep Creek.    Gibbon's division of the First Corps formed on the left of Howe, and Meade's division, also of the First Corps, was formed facing to the left of the general position, his right joining nearly at right angles with the left of Gibbon, and his left resting on the river near Smithfield.  The remaining division of the First Corps, Doubleday's, was formed on the bank of the river in rear of Meade's left. The position of Smithfield is not easy to identify. It is not

 

156            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

marked upon the best maps.   It was probably a Virginia estate, and situated on the Rappahannock, about a mile above the mouth of the Massaponax.  These dispositions of the Left Grand Division were made, Franklin says, in compli­ance with the directions of the commanding general, and the very fact that they were made; is evidence that he was not confident, when he issued them, that such an attack as Franklin was ordered to make was to be an attack upon the extreme right of the Confederates.  To form en potence so strong a force as two divisions, showed plainly that some solicitude was felt as to possible attacks from the direction of the Massaponax. The sequel showed that these apprehensions were well founded. It soon appeared that the Confederates had both artillery and infantry on Franklin's left as well as in his front. This fact is of very great importance. It is not to be lost sight of for a moment in considering either Burnside's plan or Franklin's action. It reduced Burnside's plan to two distant and isolated attempts to pierce the enemy's line, and it paralyzed, pro tanto, Franklin's action.It increased immensely the difficulty of the difficult, not to say impossible, task assigned him, to seize a strong point, keep the attacking force well supported and its line of retreat open, and to keep his whole command in readiness to do another and quite different thing.

Franklin informed Reynolds that his corps would make the attack indicated, and he ordered Meade's division to the point of attack, with Gibbon in support. He thought it impracticable to add Smith's Corps to the force detailed for the attack, and he also considered Reynolds's three divisions sufficient to carry out the spirit of the order, the words of which were “a division at least."

The point indicated for Meade's attack was near the (Fed­eral) left of the ridge, where it terminated in the Massa,

 

FREDERICKSBURG. 157

 

ponax Valley. The Confederates occupied the wooded heights, the railroad in front of them, and the woods in front of the railroad. On receiving its orders, the division moved down the river for nearly half a mile, then turned sharp to its own right, and crossed the old Richmond (or Bowling Green) road. The column of attack was formed between nine and ten o'clock, some time having been devoted to removing fences, and to bridging the drains on each side of the road, to admit of the passage of the artillery. As Meade's formation was completed, the Confederates opened on him from guns which reached his command from the left and rear, and there was so much strength developed by the Confederates still further to his left and rear in the neighborhood of the Massaponax, that Doubleday's division was advanced in that direction and did a good deal of fighting and gained some ground. As soon as the firing on the left and rear had been controlled, and the woods and heights in front had been smartly shelled, Meade attempted to advance again, but again a sharp artillery fire burst out from the heights on his extreme left, and it took rapid firing from three batteries for thirty minutes to silence it. The “incomparable Pelham " had charge of at least a section of the Confederate guns which checked Meade's progress by firing upon his left.

At last the Confederate guns were silenced, or silent, and Meade advanced. The first brigade succeeded in pene­trating the woods, driving the enemy from the railroad beyond, and finally crossed the crest of the hill beyond, and reached open ground on the other side. With great gallantry and ardor, they had pressed back the troops in front of them, and made or found an interval between the bri­gades of Archer and Lane of A. P. Hill's division, and forced two regiments of the former and the whole of the latter to

 

158            ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG.

 

give way.  The second brigade divided as it followed the first up the hill, to meet a sharp fire which assailed it on both flanks, but only a small portion of it reached the same point as the first brigade. One of its regiments took prisoners and a color. The Third Brigade was checked by a destructive fire from the battery on the left, its commander was killed, and it accomplished little. Meade's division fared as Pickett's division fared at Gettysburg. Having made a most brilliant advance, and penetrated the hostile line more deeply than Pickett's did, it was enveloped by fire closing in upon it from every direction, and compelled to withdraw. But it seems to have been better commanded and better supported than Pickett's division was, and instead of losing seventy-five per cent., as Pickett's division did, it lost only forty per cent., and it captured several standards and over three hundred prisoners. A brigade from Birney's divi­sion on the left and one from Gibbon's division on the right aided materially in the withdrawal of Meade's line.  It is not quite clear why Gibbon, on the right of Meade, did not accomplish more. The wood was so dense that the connection between his line and Meade's could not be, or was not, kept up. At least that reason is assigned by Franklin, but as Gibbon himself says that the left of his leading brigade was thrown into confusion by the fire of the enemy posted behind the railroad embankment, and that all (except the Twelfth Massachusetts) of the brigade then ordered up in support and posted on the left "soon fell into confusion, and most of it retired in disorder," it is evident that a large part of his troops were poor, and that the failure of his attack was mainly owing to the inferiority of his men. After all of Lyle's brigade, and all of Taylor's except the Ninety­seventh New York and Eighty-eighth Pennsylvania, had given away, Root's brigade was ordered up. The Twelfth

 

FREDERICKSBURG. 159

 

Massachusetts and some remnants joined it, and the force advanced gallantly and took the embankment and some prisoners. But the embankment was a long way from the coveted point, and a brigade and a regiment cannot cover the ground or do the work of three brigades.  Gibbon's division failed to give substantial support to Meade, and Meade's enterprise was too much for a single division. The Confederate troops engaged in this repulse were A. P. Hill's division, with the aid of a large part of Early's division (for­merlyEwell's), and a small part of Taliaferro's (formerly Jack­son's). The reported loss of Gregg's South Carolina brigade, of the second line, was 41 killed and 295 wounded, out of about fifteen hundred. Gregg himself received a wound of which he died the following day.

Meade and Gibbon were driven back by 2.15 P.m.     After an unsuccessful attempt to reform Meade's division further to the front than the old Richmond (or Bowling Green) road, it was marched to the ground occupied the night before, and there held in reserve.   Gibbon's division, under Taylor, Gibbon having been wounded near the wood, also fell back to its original position.