Miller, William J. [1]"Life on the Skirmish Line: Through the War With the Pennsylvania Bucktails."  Civil War Regiments Vol. 1, Number 3

          They sat about in shirt sleeves, lounging outside tents or in the short, dusty shadows of barracks. It was mid-day - the sun was at its hottest - and the red-skinned recruits in Camp Curtin were broiling in their own perspiration.[2] As the principal training center for Pennsylvania volunteers, the camp usually bustled with activity, but on this afternoon, June 21, 1861, movement had all but ceased. Everywhere, the volunteers sought refuge from the sun, one man writing home that "the weather was never so hot, the dust never so deep, and shade trees never so scarce as at present ... if we can only get under the shade of a board, we have not the ambition to be anything but satisfied."[3]
      Into this milieu of lethargy charged a lathered horse, its rider bearing a message from Governor Andrew Curtin: two regiments must immediately be armed and shipped out for Maryland, where Federal troops needed reinforcement. The camp commandant, Colonel Charles J. Biddle, ordered two infantry regiments and an artillery battery to fall in for arms and equipment - they would leave at once.
      The news tore through the camp like lightning, jolting the sweaty volunteers from their drowsy retreats. The men of Biddle's own regiment, informed that they had been selected for the expedition, were wild with excitement and charged upon headquarters intent upon getting their long awaited guns. The regiment was known by several names, but by far the most common was the Pennsylvania Bucktails - many of the men, as a public proclamation of their skill with a rifle, wore the tail of a deer as a trophy affixed to their caps. [4]
        Wagons brought boxes of weapons to the camp from the nearby Pennsylvania Arsenal, and officers began distributing the arms to the high-spirited Bucktails. They were, for the most part, backwoodsmen from the wildest portions of Pennsylvania. They had grown up with guns in their hands and had marched off to war more than a month ago with their own rifles on their shoulders. In Harrisburg, however, they had been told they would be given rifles by the government - the finest, most modem weapons available, they had been told - so they must send their guns home. Reluctantly, the Bucktails parted with their familiar old pieces and, perhaps feeling somewhat naked, anxiously awaited the arrival of the new government rifles. Now at last the day had arrived, and the men cried with glee as the shiny weapons were pulled from the crates and thrust into their waiting hands. But the joy soon turned to disillusionment, and then to anger. Shouts of rage filled the warm, still air of Camp Curtin. These were not the minie rifles they had been promised. These were smoothbore muskets, ancient flintlocks converted to accept percussion caps. Each gun was stamped "Harpers Ferry, 1837." The Bucktails were outraged - the guns were relics older than the men themselves, far inferior to those they had sent home weeks before. The men were insulted - they felt they had been lied to - and many shouted that they would not accept the muskets. One onlooker from another regiment recorded the scene with wry amusement tinged with apprehension, "the yells and oaths which came from the buck-tail Regiment might have gladdened the heart of His Satanic Majesty. ... it was the opinion of some that there would be a mutiny in the camp.[5]
      Before long, Biddle appeared from headquarters to quell the mutinous talk. He was a lawyer, a graduate of Princeton and a gentleman from one of the finer families of Philadelphia. Forty-two years old, he was a small man, just over 100 pounds, but he had the respect of the men, and when he spoke they listened. He stood before them in the heat and told them they had reason to be angry after being promised modem rifles, but he added that they had not been misled. They would be armed with rifles, he would see to that, but in this crisis they must advance with whatever arms were at hand. The angry feelings among the Bucktails subsided, and the men accepted the muskets, consoling themselves with the knowledge that they would someday get their rifles. They boarded trains and headed for Maryland.[6]
        From their organization in June 1861 to their discharge in June 1864, the men of the Pennsylvania Bucktails would remain proud, independent and disdainful of authority; in an army where breaches of discipline were common, the Bucktails would become well known for their wildness.[7] But far from being a collection of rabble, the Pennsylvania Bucktails were generally responsible, self-reliant men, and they would become some of the more effective fighters in Union blue. No other regiment in the Army of the Potomac came to the war so imbued with requisite combat skills. Most of the men were outdoorsmen from mountainous, heavily forested regions where farming was difficult, so game was a staple of their diet. Hunting in all seasons was a way of life, and the men were accustomed to surviving in harsh weather. They were, out of necessity, marksmen. Perhaps more important to the Bucktails' success in the war was that the brigade and division commanders who controlled them in combat (all were Pennsylvanians) had the good sense to use them whenever possible in ways that allowed the men to call upon their instinctive hunting skills. Throughout the war, the Bucktails served primarily as brigade skirmishers and scouts.[8]
        The character of the Bucktails began forming in late April 1861 in the remote village of Smethport, Pennsylvania. Immediately after the firing upon Fort Sumter, Thomas Leiper Kane, a wealthy lawyer and adventurer from Philadelphia who had left the city to live in the wilds of northwestern Pennsylvania, began recruiting volunteers to serve in a battalion of rifleman. The concept of a rifle regiment or battalion dated back to before the American Revolution when rifles were rare and only the best marksmen would be armed with them. Kane knew well that the men of Pennsylvania's upper tier were exceptional marksmen, and he believed they would make excellent fighters.[9]
        With headquarters in Smethport, Kane began recruiting in the mountains and forests of a three-county area. The major industry in the region was lumber (Pennsylvania led all states in lumber production in 1860), so most of the men Kane enlisted were either loggers from the timber camps or raftsmen who moved the logs down river to saw mills. Sixty-seven such men joined Kane at Smethport, where, while preparing to move down state to Harrisburg, the Bucktails got their name. Outside a butcher shop hung the carcass of a whitetailed deer. One of the boys cut off the tail and attached it to the front of his hat. The idea caught on and others carved up the deer, affixing strips of hide to their caps. By the time the men reached Harrisburg, they were commonly known as the Bucktails.[10]
      Kane led three companies into Harrisburg in late April. These 315 men formed a nucleus around which the regiment would be built. An observer in the capital remembered the appearance of Kane's Bucktails as they disembarked at the train depot and stalked into the city. They wore "high-topped boots, pants tucked inside the boots, a woolen shirt (usually red), a large neckerchief loosely tied, a loose blouse, and a soft felt hat often so misshapen that the crown was peaked . . . [they were] ragged, undisciplined, ununiformed save the singular ornament that surmounts their headgear.[11]
      Governor Andrew Curtin informed Kane that his men would not be accepted for United States service since the state had already filled its quota of volunteers. The Bucktails were angry and disappointed, but Curtin offered an alternative. The governor proposed a reserve force of state troops that could protect Pennsylvania from invasion or be offered to the Federal government in times of crisis. The Pennsylvania legislature approved of the idea and created the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, a force of 12 regiments of infantry, one rifle regiment, one of cavalry and one of artillery. The Bucktails were officially known as both the Ist Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment and the 13th Regiment of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps.
        In Camp Curtin, Kane's three companies had been joined by four more companies from the Wildcat District and three companies from more settled but still rural counties.[12] On June 12, the regiment was organized with the following companies and officers:

Company A - the Anderson Life Guards from Tioga County, Captain Philip HollandCompany B - the Morgan Rifles from Perry County, Captain Langhorne Wister
Company C - the Cameron County Rifles, Captain John A. Eldred
Company D - the Raftsmen's Guard from Warren County, Captain Roy Stone
Company E - the Tioga Rifles from Tioga County, Captain Alanson E. Niles
Company F - the Irish Rifles from Carbon County, Captain Dennis McGee
Company G - the Elk County Rifles, Captain Hugh McDonald
Company H - the Wayne Independent Rifles from Chester County, Captain Charles                           Frederick Taylor
Company I - the McKean County Rifles, Captain William T. Blanchard
Company K - the Raftsmen's Rangers from Clearfield County, Captain Edward A. Irvin

        The Bucktails elected Thomas Kane colonel and Charles J. Biddle lieutenant colonel. Kane was embarrassed by this because he had no real military experience, while Biddle had served as a captain in the Mexican War and had been commended for bravery. Kane felt that Biddle was better qualified to command the regiment, so he resigned his position in favor of Biddle, who immediately accepted the colonelcy. Kane filled the vacancy at lieutenant colonel. The switch pleased everyone involved. The men elected Captain Roy Stone major, and Hugh McNeil succeeded to command of Company D.
        While in Camp Curtin, the Bucktails earned a reputation as incorrigibles. They regularly broke guard to drink and brawl in Harrisburg.[13] They were glad to leave Camp Curtin in June 1861, however, even if they did so with the ancient smoothbores issued to them. They, with the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves and Battery A, Ist Pennsylvania Light Artillery, moved to Cumberland, Maryland, in the last days of the month. The emergency for which they been summoned proved far less severe than it had been painted, and the Bucktails spent the next month marching, drilling, scouting and occasionally skirmishing in Maryland and just across the Potomac in Virginia. After the Federal defeat at the First Battle of Bull Run, the Bucktails returned to Harrisburg and thence moved on to join the rest of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, which the Federal government had summoned to Washington. [14]
        The Bucktails spent the autumn camped around the capital, scouting, foraging, drilling and suffering through bouts of boredom and disease. In November, they were stunned by the resignation of Colonel Biddle, who had been elected to Congress by his neighbors in Philadelphia. Biddle was very popular in the regiment, and his departure caused much unhappiness.
        In December 1861, some of the Reserves, including the Bucktails, were ordered to disperse a Confederate foraging party reported nearby. The Reserves found the Confederates near Dranesville, Virginia, on December 21, and both sides went into battle willingly. The Confederates were commanded by Brigadier General J.E.B. Stuart, who sent in his infantry and artillery with vigor, attacking the Reserves from south of the Leesburg Pike. Stuart had four regiments of infantry and one battery to oppose the 6th, 9th, 10th, 12th Reserves and the Bucktails, supporting Easton's Battery. The fight lasted more than two hours before a charge by the 9th Reserves and the Bucktails broke the Confederate lines and forced Stuart to withdraw.[15] Three Bucktails were killed and 26 others wounded, including Kane and Captain Alanson Niles of Company E. Far from being put off by the carnage on the battlefield, the Bucktails were in high spirits and seemed to have been invigorated by the fight. "The boys," wrote Private William Clark of Company D, "are ready for another fight the first opportunity.[16]

Miller, William J. "The Bloody Road to Spotsylvania: Pennsylvania Bucktails, Part Two."  Civil War Regiments 1/3

The spring of 1862 brought great changes for the men of the Army of the Potomac as their commander, Major General George B. McClellan, prepared to move them south to the Virginia Tidewater for a campaign on the Confederate capital of Richmond. McClellan wished to move his army westward up the peninsula formed by the James and York Rivers and attack Richmond from the east. A portion of his army was to remain at Fredericksburg, Virginia, between Richmond and Washington, where it might either support McClellan or fall back and defend Washington, as circumstances dictated. The Bucktails, now under the command of Colonel Hugh McNeil, formerly captain of Company D, who had been elected by the men in January to replace Biddle, were among the troops at Fredericksburg.

In late May, news burst upon the regiment "like a thunderclap": The Bucktails were being split up.17 A Bucktail, writing home of the startling news, reported, ". . Col. Kane has 'seceded,' and taken with him four companies, H, 1, C, and G. . . Col. McNeil is very much opposed to this division, . . Gens. Reynolds,18 and McCall,19 are also opposed to it, but Kane has money, and money always commands political friends. Col. Kane is now in Gen. Bayard's  brigade20. . . . We do not know, whether the division is permanent . . .21"

Kane's battalion joined Bayard's Brigade in the Shenandoah Valley, and the rest of the regiment, commanded by Major Stone after McNeil became ill, soon moved to the Peninsula to join McClellan.

Kane's Bucktails went into action very soon after reaching the Valley. Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson and his Confederates were winding up a historic campaign in which they had thrashed several times their number. On June 6, 1862, Jackson was moving southward to evade pursuing Federals when Bayard's Brigade caught a portion of Jackson's force south of Harrisonburg, Virginia. The Bucktails were sent to relieve the 4th New Jersey Cavalry, which had been ambushed in some woods. Kane, his battalion numbering just 104 men, led the Bucktails into the woods, where they learned they were greatly outnumbered.22 In a fight that Confederate General Richard Ewell described as "close and bloody," the four Bucktail companies held their own against two Confederate regiments - the 58th Virginia and the 1st Maryland. The Southerners were led by the renowned Confederate cavalryman Turner Ashby, who was killed leading a charge against the Bucktail line. Kane was twice wounded, and command of the battalion devolved upon 22-year-old Captain Charles Frederick Taylor of Company H.23 The Bucktail's thin line inevitably gave way, and Taylor was captured trying to rally the men for what he described as "one good volley." The Confederates also captured Kane. Altogether, the little battalion lost seven killed, 39 wounded and five captured in the fight - almost half their number.24 Notwithstanding the loss, the Bucktails had fought well earning praise from their superiors. The two Confederate regi­ments opposed to the Bucktails, the 1st Maryland Infantry and the 58th Vir­ginia, suffered a total of 70 casualties, mostly wounded.

Two days later, June 8, the Bucktails went into action a25gain at Cross Keys, Virginia. The battalion, commanded by Captain Hugh McDonald of Company G, supported Buell's Battery C, 1st West Virginia Light Artillery, and lost several men to Confederate artillery fire. Fighting alongside the 27th Pennsyl­vania, the Bucktails faced a charge of the 13th and 25th Virginia regiments, which were supported by the 21st Georgia, the 16th Mississippi and the 15th Alabama. The Pennsylvanians, using the bayonet, repelled the charge, but withdrew immediately thereafter. The Bucktails suffered one man killed and seven wounded.26 Cross Keys marked the end of the Valley Campaign for the Bucktail battalion, which now numbered just 40 men.

Meanwhile, Major Stone and his six companies sat in camp on the banks of the Chickahominy River near Mechanicsville, Virginia, just a morning's march from Richmond. Stone's Battalion, with the Pennsylvania Reserve Division, was part of Major General Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps deployed north of the Chickahominy while much of McClellan's army sat south of the river. Confederate commander General Robert E. Lee planned an attack that he hoped would destroy Porter before McClellan could reinforce him. Lee attack­ed on June 26, 1862, just as the Bucktails went on picket.

"On the morning of the 25th of June," wrote Private Orrin B. Stone of Company E, "we received orders to be ready to go on picket at 3 o'clock next morning. Accordingly, on the morning of the 26th, we left our tents and arrived at our lines about daybreak." The Bucktails, with the 5th Pennsylvania Reser­ves, waited in rifle pits throughout the morning, picketing Meadow Bridge, a key span over the Chickahominy. "We remained at our posts," continued Private Stone, "until about one or two o'clock p.m., when our scouts came in with the news that the enemy were advancing in superior forces up the Rail Road running from Fredericksburg to Richmond [the Virginia Central]. . . ."27 McCall ordered Stone to send three companies to support retreating Federal cavalry scouts, and the major led Companies B, D and K toward the advancing Confederates. Stone deployed Company K on the road leading from Meadow Bridge to Atlee's Station, and he sent Company D down a second road toward Crenshaw's Bridge. Company B remained at the intersection where the two roads diverged.

Company D met Confederate infantry almost immediately and fired two volleys before the Southerners could reply. Meanwhile, the guard at Meadow Bridge had pulled back when confronted with Confederates in overwhelming numbers. The Federals, including Companies A, E and F of the Bucktails, withdrew to prepared positions a few miles to the rear at Beaver Dam Creek. The Southerners streamed across Meadow Bridge, cutting off the three Bucktail companies with Stone. Company B at the road intersection, tried to hold off the Confederates advancing from Meadow Bridge, for if the intersection were lost, Companies D and K, north of the junction, would be surrounded. Captain Wister, in command of Company B, held on as long as he could before finally being forced from the intersection. Stone assisted in the company's withdrawal, then turned his efforts toward saving Companies D and K. He found the men of D Company and, with the situation becoming more chaotic every minute, managed to lead them by a round-about route to Beaver Dam Creek.28 Captain Irvin of Company K did not attempt to withdraw until it was much too late, and his men, completely surrounded, were forced to hide in swamps. They were without food but gamely tried for five days to work their way back to receding Federal lines. On July 1, virtually the entire company was captured and sent on to Richmond.29

The other five companies of Bucktails reached the rifle pits at Beaver Dam Creek just minutes before the Confederates. One Bucktail remembered that Stone told them to "give them h-I when they came up, or get it ourselves." The Confederates came forward with spirit, but had to attack entrenched troops across a swampy stream. It was a slaughter. "We did not fire a shot until they came up within 100 yards of us," wrote Bucktail Enos Bloom of Company K. "Then we gave them what the Major told us to give them. We piled them up by the hundreds, making a perfect bridge across the swamp.30 The fighting was ferocious. "I laid in our rifle pits right under the mouth of one of our own cannons," wrote Private Cordello Collins of Company D. "Sometimes I thought I should go entirely deaf. Four shells came into our pits where our company was; three of them we flung out before they bursted; the other went into the bank behind us and exploded, . . The enemy charged bayonets on us three times, but we cut them down ... I fired until my gun got so hot that I could barely hold it in my hands. . . . “31

The firing continued until well after dark. During the night, the Bucktails were ordered to cover the withdrawal of the division the next morning. Company B was to destroy the bridge over Beaver Dam Creek while the rest of the Bucktails provided covering fire, The fighting resumed at dawn, and though the Bucktails held on for a short time, the Confederates were advancing in numbers too large to resist. "Our deadly fire could not keep back the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. . ." wrote Private Orrin Stone, "when we were ordered out . . . Every man was for himself in the general rush, and all escaped that could."32 The Bucktails thus closed what is commonly known as the Battle of Mechanicsville, the battalion having lost 95 officers and men killed, wounded and missing. 33

But the Bucktails had much work ahead of them that day, June 27, 1862. They would help defend Federal positions at Gaines' Mill, entering the fight with just 6 officers and 125 men (many Bucktails were scattered through the woods between Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines' Mill, some were dead, some wounded, others prisoners and still others lost and trying to rejoin the regiment).34 Fighting in the woods with their comrades of the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves,35 Stone's men sniped at Confederate artillerymen and repelled Confederate infantry assaults until early evening, when an attack by the Texas Brigade broke the Federal line to the left of the Bucktails. As the other regiments fell back, so did the Bucktails. Major Stone reported that he lost one officer and 25 men in the fighting at Gaines' Mill, but those figures do not begin to tell the loss of the regiment on June 27th. At least 85 Bucktails were lost covering the retreat from Beaver Dam Creek.36

The battalion spent two days marching and scouting. On the morning of June 30, the Pennsylvania Reserves were deployed just east of the crucial road junction at New Market Cross Roads. The Federal army was in retreat toward Harrison's Landing on the James River, and the Reserves were to cover the retreat. If New Market Cross Roads (also called Glendale) were lost to the Confederates, so would be much of the Federal supply train. Stone had five officers and 150 Bucktails present for duty that morning. 37

The Bucktails, with the other regiments of their brigade, were in reserve behind the main line as the Confederate attack began at about 2 p.m. The weary Pennsylvania Reserves stopped the initial Southern attacks, but McCall perceived a shifting of troops behind the Confederate line of battle. Expecting an attack on his flank, McCall called up his reserve brigade and ordered it to charge the massing Confederates. McCall ordered Stone to hold the Bucktails in reserve behind the attack. The brigade, led by Colonel Seneca Simmons of the 5th Reserves, charged successfully, but Simmons was killed and the attack broke down in confusion. The Confederates counter-attacked and drove the Reserves back. Stone, seeing the retreat but unwilling to give ground, had his en lie down until the fleeing brigade had passed over them to the rear. The Bucktails then rose and delivered a steady fire that checked the Confederate advance and allowed some of the broken regiments to reform. The Bucktails then withdrew some 400 yards and Stone rallied stragglers and portions of other regiments into a small, makeshift brigade.

The Southerners continued their assaults and soon overran the Federal artillery, The Pennsylvania Reserves, worn down by five days of fighting and marching, began to crumble, but Federal reinforcements arrived to shore up the lines and defend the crucial crossroads. McClellan's trains completed their retreat to the James.

It had been another hard day for the Bucktails; Stone reported at the close of the fighting that he had but 3 officers and 60 men left. Frayser's Farm had cost the ravaged Bucktails 60 percent of their number.38

The armies fought again the next day, July 1, 1862, at Malvern Hill, but the Bucktails were not engaged. The end of the fighting that day marked the close of the campaign; McClellan had failed to take Richmond. The Bucktails had lost heavily in the unsuccessful campaign: 247 men killed, wounded or missing in less than a week's fighting.39 In early July, Colonel McNeil, recuperated from his bout with Typhoid fever, rejoined the regiment, and was stunned by the losses. He had been absent for a little over a month, and when he had taken sick his regiment had included about 800 men. Now, just 64 riflemen were present for duty, and looking upon them, McNeil wept, "My God, where are my Bucktails? Would that I had died with them."40

By August, the focus of the fighting had moved away from Richmond toward northern Virginia. Lieutenant Colonel Kane recovered from his Harrisonburg wounds and was exchanged in time to participate in the summer campaigns. He and his battalion were attached to the headquarters of Major General John Pope's Army of Virginia, and the Bucktails were able to relax with relatively light duty in rear areas. Unfortunately, the Confederate cavalry was well led and active, and rear areas were not as secure as Kane's men believed. On August 22, 1862, Major General J.E.B. Stuart led 1,500 Confederate troopers in a night raid against Pope's wagon park and depot at Catlett's Station on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The Bucktails, part of the baggage train guard, were caught as unprepared as everyone else at the station. Stuart's troopers surprised and overpowered Lieutenant Thomas Winslow and his pickets of Company G, The Confederates then attacked the main camp around the train depot, where the Bucktails were bunking. Many of Kane's men were captured immediately, but most grabbed their weapons and slipped into the night. Kane rallied 68 Bucktails and led them toward what he guessed was the main Confederate objective, the railroad bridge over nearby Cedar Run. As a terrific thunderstorm broke over the chaos, Kane deployed his men to cover the bridge, and they did fire at and turn back some Southerners attempting to burn the wooden span.41 John Singleton Mosby, who was with Stuart as an aide, believed that the Confederate efforts would have proved futile anyway, "in such a storm they might just as well have tried to burn the creek."42 The storm saved the Federal's from suffering greater losses that night since Stuart had to cut short the raid to make good his escape across fast-rising streams and rivers between him and his army. The Bucktail battalion lost five men wounded and 19 missing.43

The attack at Catlett's Station was prelude to a larger Confederate movement. Lee took the offensive and was taking the war back toward Washington. "Stonewall" Jackson executed a brilliant flank march to strike at Pope's main supply base at Manassas Junction, and Pope was in frantic pursuit. But Jackson seemed to disappear after destroying the depot, and Pope's Federals began groping for signs of the elusive Confederates. Colonel McNeil had led his battalion northward from the Peninsula, and by June 28 his Bucktails were marching eastward with the Pennsylvania Reserves on the Warrenton Turnpike toward Centreville, Virginia. When the column was a little over a mile from the cross roads of Groveton, Confederate artillery on heights north of the road opened fire. Meade's Brigade was in the lead, and McNeil, under Meade's orders, deployed the Bucktails as skirmishers. Companies B, D and K spread ut north of the pike, Companies A, E and F south of the road in some woods. The Bucktails moved forward to develop the enemy position, skirmishing lightly with Confederates (who were under orders to avoid bringing on a general engagement). General Reynolds, now in command of the division, personally ordered Captain Irvin of Company K to scout northward on a road leading to Sudley Springs. Both parties of Bucktails encountered enemy pickets and scouts, but before they could report their findings, they were recalled; the division was drawing off and continuing its march to Manassas Junction. So began three days of chaotic fighting in which the Bucktails were almost continuously engaged as skirmishers. The Federal movements were so confused that, after a night of marching, the Bucktails would the next day be right back where they started, skirmishing in those same fields and woods along the Warrenton Turnpike -except they were now advancing in the opposite direction, westward.

The Battle of Second Bull Run ended in defeat for Pope's army, and only a firm stand by the Pennsylvania Reserves prevented the rout from being even worse. McNeil's Bucktails were in line with the Reserves on the slopes of Henry House Hill to stunt the Confederate advance on the afternoon of August 30. In the fighting at Groveton and Second Bull Run, Stone's six companies of Bucktails lost five men killed, 19 wounded and three missing.44 When the last of the Federals had retreated from the field, marching eastward toward Washington, Kane's Battalion destroyed the stone bridge over Bull Run to impede a Confederate pursuit.45

 The Battle of Second Bull Run holds a special place in the history of the Bucktails, for it was there that the men fought for the first time with the modem rifles they had been promised more than a year before. On August 9, McNeil's six companies received Sharps rifles, among the finest weapons in the world.46 After putting them.to the test at Manassas, the men were delighted; one of them wrote home with glee: "We are now armed with Sharpe's [sic] breech loading Rifle, a beautiful, and if one may judge from the increased confidence which the boys feel in their invincibility a most serviceable weapon. 47

On September 2, McNeil's weary battalion shuffled into some woods near Arlington House, Robert E. Lee's former home, overlooking Washington. There the tired Bucktails rejoined their comrades of Companies C, G, H and I after a three-month separation. The companies of the First Pennsylvania Rifles were together again, and would remain so for the duration of the war. But on the eve of a new campaign, one notable Bucktail took leave of the regiment never to return. Lieutenant Colonel Kane was promoted to brigadier general early in September.

The Bucktails next went into action at South Mountain, Maryland, on September 14, 1862. The riflemen, advancing as brigade skirmishers picked their way up the rugged slopes north of Turner's Gap, suffering heavy casualties before the Confederates hiding behind trees and stone walls. Fifty Bucktails fell on the slopes of South Mountain.48 Two days later, the regiment crossed Antietam Creek as part of Major General Joseph Hooker's First Corps. The Bucktails assumed their usual place on the skirmish line in advance of the brigade, and, late in the afternoon of the Keith, they struck the skirmishers of Lee's army north of what was known as the East Woods. The Confederate fire was heavy and accurate, compelling the Pennsylvanians to lie down. The Federals crept forward to within about 75 yards of the Southerners when McNeil suddenly jumped up and shouted, "Forward, Bucktails, forward." An instant later he fell dead. "A mad fury seized his men," remembered one Bucktail, and the skirmish line leapt forward and drove the Confederates into the East Woods. As the Bucktails gained the edge of the trees, more of the Reserves charged forward to solidify the position. The firing continued past sunset, the Southerners not relinquishing the woods until well after dark. The fighting resumed the next morning, and the Bucktails went forward into Miller's Cornfield with the rest of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The division was nearly exhausted by fighting and marching; the men had eaten nothing since noon on the 16th, and the Bucktails were Dearly out of ammunition. Fortunately, troops of the Second and Twelfth Corps came up to relieve the Reserves, and the Bucktails remained in reserve for the rest of the battle. The Bucktails lost six men killed, including their colonel, 23 men wounded, and 10 missing. 49

Antietam reduced the regiment to a shambles: barely 200 men were present for duty, many of them nursing minor wounds and virtually all of them exhausted by more than a month of continuous fighting and marching. All the field officers were gone. Only two captains remained - McDonald of D and McGee of F, but both deferred to Lieutenant W. Ross Hartshorne, regimental adjutant, who effectively commanded the remnant of the Bucktails. 50

Exhausted though they were, the surviving Bucktails were proud of their performance, and they had good reason to be. "Our division," wrote Sergeant Robert Hall of Company D, "has done as much fighting as any other troops in the field, and is greatly reduced ... But we are ready to go wherever we are needed, the 'rebs' know us well. They call us the 'Flying Division.' They call our regiment 'McClellan's Bloodhounds."' 51

In November, Captain Taylor finally returned to the regiment (after capture at Harrisonburg, he had remained an unexchanged prisoner of war for more than four months). Though only 22, he was the senior captain in the regiment and he assumed command. Just weeks later, he led the regiment into battle at Fredericksburg, Virginia, December 13, 1862.

The Reserves were deployed on the southern portion of the battlefield, about two miles below Fredericksburg. When division commander Meade received orders to launch his attack, he personally ordered the Bucktails forward, and the regiment joined the Reserves in the only successful Federal assault of the day. Captain Hugh McDonald of Company G described the fighting. "The order was given to Gen. Meade to charge the woods in front - Gen. [David] Bimey with his division to support. Had this been done we would have carried the woods. But instead, Bimey never moved, consequently the Reserves52 had to fight it alone and were all cut to pieces ... The rebels fired grape, canister, shells, railroad iron, and parts of plough shares. Finally we reached the [Richmond and Fredericksburg] railroad about 35 rods from their batteries. We kept up our fire 1 1/2 hours, but no support coming, were obliged to fall back, leaving the most of our dead in the hands of the rebels. Our loss is 210. We went on the field with 310 and have 100 left . . . When we rallied, I found myself in command of what was left."53 Captain Taylor had been wounded twice and had a horse killed beneath him. The intensity of the fire the Bucktails faced can be seen in the experience of Sergeant Andrew I Deming of Company D, who was struck three times in less than 30 seconds. As his hometown newspaper reported, "First a rifle shot passed plump [sic] through his right arm just above the elbow, then a grape shot struck the ground a foot or two ahead of him, and rose again sufficiently to rake the top of his foot as he was turning around, while almost at the same instant another shot struck his cartridge box, tearing it open and scattering its contents in every direction."54

The Battle of Fredericksburg cost the Bucktails 19 killed, 135 wounded, 29 missing for a total of 161.55 On December 19, Meade reported the Bucktails' strength to be 289 officers and men present for duty, with another 290 absent (sick, on leave, missing, etc.).56

In February, the Bucktails moved north to the defenses of Washington, where they were to rest, recruit and regroup. The only episode of note occurred on March 8, 1863, when the regiment was camped around Fairfax Court House to serve as pickets. Guerilla leader John S. Mosby slipped into Fairfax that night and captured Brigadier General Edwin Stoughton while he slept. The Bucktails set a trap for Mosby the next day, but the elusive Confederate and his raiders were already long gone from the vicinity of Fairfax. 57

By late spring, the inactivity of rear-area duty began to chafe newly promoted Colonel Taylor. The 23-year-old rejoiced when the Bucktails were finally ordered out of their camps in late June. Lee was moving north and seemed intent on invading Pennsylvania. Taylor was ready for a fight. "I presume we shall have a stirring campaign," he wrote his brother. "I am very glad of it. We have been here long enough."58

About noon July 2, the Bucktails arrived behind Union lines south of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where the two armies had been fighting since the previous morning. Taylor's men had marched 35 miles in the last day and a half, covering 10 miles that morning on three hours of sleep. Around 4 p.m., Confederates attacked the extreme left of the Union line. When initial Confederate attacks shattered Federal defenders, the Fifth Corps, including the Pennsylvania Reserves, was sent to defend a key hill called Little Round Top.

The five regiments of Colonel William McCandless' Brigade, including the Bucktails, took a partially concealed position near the northern crest of the hill. As the Confederates drew near, the Pennsylvanians opened fire, fixed bayonets and charged. 59

The Bucktails charged obliquely across the foot of the hill toward some boulders called Devil's Den. Private Richard Beeby of Company H recalled that though he had a reputation as a sprinter, he could not keep up with Colonel Taylor, who led the regiment across the boggy valley to a stone wall bordering some woods. Beeby saw Taylor, waving his sword in encouragement, vault over the wall and disappear into the Rebel-infested trees. The Bucktails followed, drove off the Confederates then lay down behind the wall.60

On the left, near Devil's Den, Captain Samuel Mack of Company E took two men, neither from his own company, and entered the woods to scout. They discovered about 100 Confederates moving across their front. The three men hid and were just then joined by half a dozen of their comrades. While Mack weighed the options, Taylor strode up from the wall. Taylor impetuously wished to attack. "Why don't you fire?" he asked reproachfully. Mack replied that he did not think they were strong enough.

Accounts of what followed vary. One version states that Taylor agreed with Mack and said he would order up more men, but was just then seen by the enemy. Another account states that Taylor shouted to the Confederates to surrender, In any case, the Southerners opened fire, and Taylor was shot in the chest.61 Private Aaron Baker of Taylor's old Company H, was with the colonel when he fell. "He seemed to want to say something," wrote Baker to Taylor's sister, "all I could understand was 'Mum,' 'Mum.' I do not think that he lasted over two minutes."62

With Taylor dead and Lieutenant Colonel Alanson Niles wounded, Major Hartshorne assumed command. He consolidated his scattered regiment at the stone wall, and there the Bucktails remained until the next morning. While most of the action of July 3 was centered on the northern end of the battlefield, the Bucktails spent the day skirmishing in the woods around the wheatfield.

The regiment lost 48 officers and men killed and wounded in the two days of fighting, including their colonel. The loss of Taylor was painful: Sergeant William Rauch of Company F thought that "Probably no officer of the Buck tails was ever better or more generally loved than Colonel Taylor.”63 Major Hartshorne would command the regiment until the end of its service. The Bucktails participated in the Mine Run campaign in November 1863, but suffered only one man wounded. Still, the regiment's strength had been much reduced: returns of December 5 showed 380 Bucktails present for duty and 169 officers and men absent.64

When campaigning resumed in May 1864, the Bucktails, along with most of the Reserves, had just over three weeks remaining on their three-year enlistment. Those eventful weeks began with the Battle of the Wilderness May 5 and 6. The Bucktails advanced as skirmishers before their brigade to the vicinity of Parker's Store and later fought closer to the center of the Federal line. When the officers counted heads on May 7, three Bucktails had been killed, 31 wounded and three others missing.65

Hartshorne's short-timers were repeatedly engaged in the following two weeks near Spotsylvania Court House, losing between May 8 and May 21, 81 officers and men, 64 of them being wounded.66 The Bucktails fought at the North Anna River and, on May 29, at the Totopotomy River. The regiment's three-year term expired on that day, but the army could not spare the riflemen just yet. They fought the next day at Bethesda Church. In the last week of their war, from the North Anna to Bethesda Church, the Bucktails lost one man killed, two wounded and one missing.

On the morning of May 31, the Bucktails volunteered to scout in some woods near Bethesda Church. They drove off some sharpshooters and then at last turned their backs to the enemy. They came in off the skirmish line and marched to the rear. The career of the Pennsylvania Bucktails was over. 67

The Bucktails had not only been one of the more effective fighting units in the Union army,68 but they had played a significant role in the development of modern infantry tactics. Along with a number of sharpshooter regiments and a very few other regiments using rifles and rifle tactics, the Bucktails became the precursors of American rifle companies of later wars. When in 1890, former Bucktail Captain John P. Bard of Company K spoke of the tactics used by the Bucktails on the skirmish line, he might have been describing the advance of a rifle company across France in 1944 or through the Mekong Delta in 1967.

When exposed to heavy fire the Bucktails were instructed to scatter, and at all times were required to take advantage of whatever cover the ground afforded. If any part of the line was better protected than another, the men in that location would push forward and vigorously engage the enemy, under cover of their fire the more exposed part of the line would rush forward. Great responsibility was thrown upon the individual soldier. They were taught to take care of themselves and to take advantage of every opportunity for an advance of the line. In many instances the men had, of their own accord, without orders, rushed forward when under heavy fire and gained important advantage. They were taught to estimate distances on various formations, the estimates being proven by actual measurements, and, except when in general line of battle, to fire only when they had an object fairly in the sights of their rifle. In addition they were skilled marksmen and were constantly practicing at long range, from two hundred to one thousand yards. To their peculiar tactics, constant practice, individual responsibility and good marksmanship, can be credited the fearful punishment inflicted upon the enemy in every action in which they were engaged, without a proportionate loss to them. 69