8
"On to Richmond?"
74
Nearly nine hundred strong,[1]
the Bucktails hopefully marched to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, glad to be
on the way
again regardless of the direction or mode of transportation. Over three weeks had been
spent at Alexandria in
ignorance
and uncertainty, while topside made up its mind. The regiment piled into box cars. That
is, all but Company E
which drew
platform cars. To add to this company's woes, a storm of half sleet and half snow had
started. The old engine
wheezed and
snorted, and seemed barely able to pull the train at a snail-like pace. At every water
tank a stop was made. The sleet and ice continued and Company E was wet to the bone. At
one of the frequent water stops Major Stone got the company a sheet iron stove, which, one
boy said, kept them from freezing to death. The train had gone fourteen miles in seven
hours, when, with one last combined wheeze, snort, and groan, it gave out entirely about
dark. Finally, another engine picked up the train and pulled it into Manassas at 3 A.M.
One fellow, who rode a platform car, wryly observed
with slight,
but pardonable, exaggeration, that on the first day of the advance from Pierpont they had
marched nearly
to Manassas,
and now, after being sidetracked at Alexandria for over three weeks, they had finally
arrived. He added an
even more
caustic comment concerning the Army's waiting until the weather was at its worst to ship
them there.
75
While at
Manassas a few of the Wildcats were able to pilfer some consigned to the division medical
director. It was so good that they went back for more. By mistake in the dark a couple of
them got laudanum instead of liquor. The Bucktail casualty return of the next day had to
list two dead.
Apparently the news of the slow rail
trips from Alexandria found its way to corps headquarters. On April l 1, McDowell
wired McCall to send the rest of the division on.by foot. The corps commander had decided
that even in bad weather the men could march faster than the O. and A. could travel. [2]
The First Rifles had been transferred
from Meade's Second Brigade to the First under the command of Brigadier
General John
F. Reynolds. Reynolds had formed a good impression of the Bucktails and spoke well of
them. The Bucktails would again serve under Meade. In a little more than a year, Meade
and Reynolds and the Bucktails, now two little known Pennsylvania brigadiers and just
another Pennsylvania regiment, would help to make history at a little Pennsylvania
town. Each would reach the rendezvous at different times. Each would play a different
role. Reynolds would bring about the greatest battle of the war. Meade would be the
commander of the victorious Union Army. As for the Bucktails, it would be another bitter
battle.
By irregular and comparatively easy
marches the First Brigade reached Falmouth across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg, on
April 28. The plan still was for McDowell's First Corps to advance beyond Fredericksburg
and form the right of the Union Army before Richmond.
At this time Mcdellan was temporarily stalled at Yorktown, a few
miles up the
Peninsula.
A fine camp site was chosen about a
mile and a half from
76
Falmouth.. A
row of cedars bordered the parade grounds. The site was high and dry. The soldiers
decorated the camp with evergreens. There were evergreen arches over every company
street.and a bower of evergreens at the entrance of each tent. The First Rifles had their
own special evergreen decoration a huge buck, all green but the tail, which was the real
thing. While they waited for the war, the men would enjoy a little fun and beauty. There
was just one thing to mar this pleasant spot. The beef tasted of leeks. Civil War armies
when possible carried their beef supply on the hoof. Prior to slaughter the animals were
permitted to graze and leeks grew in abundance around Falmouth. The Wildcats came from
lush leek territory, and many of the boys were fond of this wild vegetable, but not in
their beef.
Replacing lost, stolen, or wornout
bucktails was usually somewhat of a problem for the men. No one wanted to be for long
without the regimental insignia. Deertails were hard to come by in a Virginia army camp.
No doubt the regiment
would turn
out to a man to help a comrade whose bucktail had been pilfered by a member of some other
outfit. Intra
regimental
larceny of the insignia was considered no great misdeed.
Anyway, the Bucktails in the early
years of the war seemed always to be writing home for bucktails. One Potter County soldier
hit the jackpot after he had penned home a fervent plea for just one copy of the outfit's
sacred symbol. Pleased indeed was this boy when he opened the crate which had been sent
him from the Wildcat District of Pennsylvania. It was full of bucktails! The soldier
peddled them out to his buddies at. a quarter each and, for a while, he became the
sutlers' best customer.
The northern Pennsylvania soldiers
who proudly displayed the "bucktail" of course knew that all those deertails
77
which the
home folks sent them were not "bucktails." However, none ever considered
himself a "doetail."
The prices of the sutlers and the few
Falmouth merchants were high, but some of the Bucktails struck a real bargain with a Rebel
miller. These men had acquired eleven hundred dollars in bogus Confederate bills. These
bills sold in the North for a cent apiece, an early wartime curiosity. Apparently they
were a good imitation. Gradually the miller's entire stock of flour found its way to the
Bucktail camp in exchange for the worthless
paper.[3]
While the regiment was opposite
Fredericksburg, Colonel McNeil became ill with tyhoid fever and Kane.was again in command.
For months Kane had been devising a system of skirmish tactics peculiarly his own. Many a
day had seen the controversial lieutenant colonel drilling a battalion in his somewhat
unorthodox maneuvers. The drill plus Kane under his umbrella, which he was wont to carry
for a sunshade, was an unusual sight indeed, even in an army in which each colonel trained
his regiment as he saw fit. 4[4] A battalion composed of Companies C, G, H, and I
became Kane's favorite
for his
skirmish tactics. These three companies of Wildcats and the company of Chester County
Bucktails had given the
lieutenant
colonel his strongest support in his unsuccessful second bid for the colonelcy. The
regiment had been opposite
Fredericksburg
a month when on May 27 an order was received detaching Kane and his, battalion of rifles.
A new cavalry brigade, soon to be, known as the "Flying Brigade," had been
constituted under the command of Brigadier Gen
eral George
D. Bayard. It consisted of the First New Jersey Cavalry and the First Pennsylvania, and to
it was attached
Kanes Rifle
Battalion. It would soon be seeing service in the Shenandoah Valley against an outfit,
which had already
proven it
could "fly",led by Stonewall Jackson. .[5]
78
The news of Kane's detachment was
received by the Bucktails with somewhat varied emotions. There was considerable
resentment over the fact that the regiment was to be broken up even temporarily. The
explanation that the skirmishing of a rifle regiment constituted rather a special service
and made detachment of parts necessary at times satisfied many of the men. There was some
camp talk to the effect that Kane's money and influence got him the assignment, and that
McCall and Reynolds were opposed to it. The last was probably true as usually no officer
likes to see a part of his command taken from him. The extremist viewpoint was
illustrated by the language of one Wildcat who wrote home that "Colonel Kane had
seceded and taken with him . . . ."[6]
The Bucktails had little time to
lament their separation. After a month of comparative quiet in their evergreen camp
above the
Rappahannock things were beginning to happen. McClellan, after preparing for a siege at
Yorktown, found, it
unnecessary,
as the Confederates withdrew. Then "Little Mac" had slowly advanced up the
Peninsula, and by the end of May was close to Richmond. About the middle of the month
McDowell had been ordered to push on toward the
Confederate
capital as soon as he received the division of Brigadier General James Shields. Shields
had been with the
forces of
General Banks in the Shenandoah Valley. Shields had reached Fredericksburg, and McDowell
was all set to
advance on
May 25. On May 23, Stonewall Jackson erupted in the Shenandoah Valley and started driving Banks weak-
ened
command. Lincoln cancelled the order to McDowell to advance. Shields and McDowell, with the exception of Mc
Call's
Division, were sent toward the Valley in the hope of helping to bag Jackson. On May 21
McClellan's- forces
fought the battle of Fair Oaks (Seven Pines) almost
at the
79
outskirts of
Richmond. Everywhere there was action, except opposite Fredericksburg where the remaining
companies of the Bucktails were left with McCall's Division. The inactivity was not for
long.
McCall was staying at Falmouth as
ordered, but for a while on that hectic May 31 in Washington, Lincoln and the
War
Department somehow became afraid he was falling back. That evening the wire was hot
between the capital and Falmouth. The President started it in the late afternoon by A
short telegram indicating that he feared McCall's withdrawal contrary to orders. Secretary of War Edwin M.
Stanton got into the act with two messages, one, containing the words, "maintain
your position there as becomes a soldier and a General, and the other, Do not let an
discredit fall on your division." This was too much for the old soldier. McCall let
Washington know in no uncertain terms that he and his
Pennsylvania Reserves were staying where they had been ordered to stay. Probably mustering
all the restraint at his
command, the
general in one of his messages to Stanton added: "I trust that as yet no discredit
has fallen on the division none will be apprehended now." As a matter of fact
McCall was in no danger and he knew it. The First Brigade which had been on the right bank
of the Rappahannock for several days had been ordered back to Falmouth, on the 31st. This
was all the withdrawing McCall had done.. Heavy rains had caused the river to rise and the
move was a precautionary measure.[7]
Within the
next ten days things would quiet down in the Shenandoah. After some fast marching and
fighting Jackson would elude both McDowell and another force under the command of General
John C. Freemont, of "Pathfinder" fame. McClellan, stalled again after Fair
Oaks, had been asking for McCall's Division ever since April. On June 6 by di-
80
rection of
the President, Stanton issued the order. McCall's Division would leave at once for the
Peninsula-by water. At last, it appeared to-the six remaining companies of Bucktails, they
were headed for the real war, and this time they would go by boat.[8]
Seven miles below Fredericksburg wharves were built. The work continued all night long, and on the morning of June 9 the Bucktails and all the First Brigade boarded the transport South America, which had arrived during the evening of the day before. To the landlubber Wildcats the trip down tidewater was a pleasant voyage. Lumber rafts on the Susquehanna had been the extent of their nautical experience. They had marched to the newly constructed wharves on a lovely moonlit night in high spirits. Now they were sailing down the beautiful Rappahannock on a balmy day. If one would go to war, this was the way to go. The transport entered Chespeake Bay and then up the York River and into the winding Pamunkey. On June 11 the brigade stepped ashore at White House for the grim business ahead.[9]
[1] . O. R., 5, p. 715, Medical Report
showing mean strength of 889, with 67 sick.
[2] . Agitator, April 23, 1862; T. dr R.,
pp. 91-92; O. R., 51 (1), p. 570, McDowell to McCall.
[3] . O. R., 12 (3), p. 311, Organization
of the Dept. of the Rappahannock; Nichols, Toward Gettysburg, pp. 80, 84; T. dr R., p. 92;
Agitator, May 21, 28, 1862; Potter Journal, January 8, 1908, Mrs. Glen Kane, Bucktail
letters, Private collection, Westfield, Pa. as to replacing bucktails; E. M. Woodward,
History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve, MacCrellish & Quigley, Trenton, N.J., 1883,
p. 71 as to the bogus bills.
[4] As to McNeil's illness see T. dr R.,
p. 92; as to Kane's umbrella see Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 170; as to each colonel
drilling his regiment as he saw fit see Wiley, Life of Billy Yank, p. 53. References to
Kane's skirmish tactics appear in T. dr R., a note on p. 64 and pp. 84-85 and Agitator,
September 25, 1861. It appears that Kane could see that improved fire power had put an end
to close-order infantry attack. Kane's men were instructed to pick their targets, to
scatter, and to take full advantage of whatever cover was available. Glenn Tucker, High
Tide at Gettysburg, Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. New York, 1958, p. 117. Kane wrote a monograph
which he called "Instructions for Skirmishers." It has been described as in the
nature of a protest against the accepted European tactics. Kane is said to have claimed
that under his method larger bodies of men would be effectively deployed and then brought
together again more readily than by the prevailing system. The monograph found its way
to_McClellan, who was sufficiently impressed to suggest that Kane form a battalion to be
drilled by him exclusively in his system. Samuel P. Bates, Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania,
T. H. Davis & Co., of Philadelphia, 1876, p. 892. Inquiries directed to descendants of
Kane and the National War College failed to locate a copy of the monograph. A search of
the War Department records in the National Archives revealed several references to the
monograph, but no copy has been located. For a brief description of what Kane called-the
"Indian drill" see "Fighting Them Over," The National Tribune,
September 24, 1891.
[5] . O. R., 51 (1), p. 639, Schriver to
McDowell; O. R., 12 (3), p. 311, Organization of the Dept of the Rappahannock.
[6] . Agitator, June 4, September 17,
1862.
[7] O. R., 12 (3), pp. 305-307, various
messages; T. dr R., p. 93; Agitator, June 11, 1862. Lincoln and Stanton were so perturbed
about Fredericksburg that they dispatched post-haste to the scene, Thomas A. Scott, the
capable Assistant Secretary of War. Scott arrived at 4:30 A.M., June 1. He immediately
wired Washington that all was well at Fredericksburg. He also suggested that another
telegraph instrument placed at McCall's headquarters would speed up communications and
prevent a recurrence of the false alarm of the day before, when messages were not coming
through as speedily as they should have been. O. R.,12 (3), pp. 318-319, Scott to Stanton.
[8] O. R., 51 (1), p. 578, McClellan to
Lincoln; O. R., 12 (3), p. 347, Stanton to McDowell.