14
From the Plains
to the Mountain
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On the morning of August 30 four
miles of Confederate line faced the Union Army of John Pope. Jackson was pretty much in
the same position he had occupied the previous day. To his right was Longstreet, south of
the turnpike, facing east, and hidden. The Bucktails, still tired and hungry, started
another tough day by getting in some men wounded in the previous day's battle. The brigade
of John P. Hatch had been unable to bring in its wounded, and Meade wanted to know what
was on the other side of the ridge on his front. The skirmishing Bucktails, if they were
lucky, could do both jobs. Porter's Corps was finally up, and Reynolds' Division was to go
in on his left, when Porter would start an attack down the pike. So McNeil's men started
out on their dual mission. They found between twenty and thirty of Hatch's wounded,
victims of Rebel bullets in King's unsuccessful attack of the evening before, who had lain
all night on the field. These were rounded up and sent back, while the First Rifles moved
cautiously on toward the ridge ahead of them. The morning was one of comparative calm
after the noise and carnage of the previous day, but as McNeil reached the crest he
encountered a lively musketry fire as well as artillery. The galling fire of hidden Rebels
kept the little Bucktail outfit pinned down most of the forenoon. If the front was to be
cleared, they must have help. Reynolds sent the Fifth
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Regiment to
their left and the Second and Third in support. With these reinforcements the Union line
commenced to move, but there was considerable resistance. Reynolds rode out to see for
himself. Massed Confederates were getting ready for an attack. They very definitely were
not in retreat as Pope had supposed.
The
Reserves were facing west on the south side of the Warrenton-Centreville Turnpike. East of
them to their rear was Henry House Hill and just west of that famous hill, also south of
the pike, was little Bald Hill. When Reynolds reported to McDowell the true situation of
the Confederates south of the road, McDowell immediately pulled Reynolds' Division nearly
a mile back to Bald Hill. Porter's attack down the pike would have to go it alone without
support on the left. Back from the skirmish line came the Bucktails, glad to have a quick
respite from the fire of a Rebel battery that had just started to enfilade them. Soon
Porter's front started to give way. Pope ordered the Reserves off their little hilltop to
the support of their former corps chief who was in serious trouble. Difficult terrain,
retreating broken columns of Heintzelman's Corps falling back from the Union right, and
the general hub-bub of battle doing badly combined to pre vent Reynolds from carrying out
this order. The First and Second Brigades and a battery succeeded in getting off the hill,
but the Third with the remaining batteries was caught where it was.. With other scattered
troops the Third stayed and tried to fight off the waves of Longstreet now rampaging up on
the left.
With
the Federals being pushed off Bald Hill and falling back on the right, there was just one
place left to make a stand. This was Henry House Hill. If the swiftly advancing
Confederates were not stopped there, the Union route of retirement across Bull Run would
be cut off. An order went
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from Pope to
Reynolds to make for Henry House Hill with his two remaining brigades and battery. General
George Sykes' Division was also directed there for the all-important last stand. The
oncoming Southern troops soon overcame the Union defense on Bald Hill. Longstreet's attack
on Henry House Hill would come in from the south-southwest. The Reserves formed their
positions on the hill accordingly, with the Bucktails on the right of the First Brigade.[1]
Down
the side of Bald Hill and across the Sudley Springs Road came the Confederate infantry.
The battery of D. R. Ransom gave forth with all it had. So did the guns from other
scattered units which had been brought to the hill. Back on Bald Hill were the captured
guns of Kerns and the caissons of Cooper. They had done noble work, but were now very much
out of the fight. The rifle fire of the Reserves was steady, but the Rebel pressure was
heavy and relentless. The Bucktails were firing their Sharps so rapidly that the barrels
became as hot as the battle. The First and Second Regiments, bearing the brunt of the
enemy charge, began to buckle. Reynolds grabbed the colors of the Second an rode along the
line shouting encouragement to the men. Somehow, possibly inspired by Reynolds' example,
the two almost beaten brigades pushed the gray tide back down Henry House Hill and back
across the Sudley Springs Road. As the night lowered and the battle died away, the two
battered brigades stayed on the road until relieved by a brigade of regulars. The retreat
route had been kept open and Pope's badly punished army was retiring in good order across
the Stone Bridge and the fords of Bull Run. The troops of Sykes and Reynolds had done an
important job and they a done it well.[2]
As
would be expected, the intrepid Thomas L. Kane would get into the act, even while his men
were doing guard
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duty at corps headquarters. His opportunity came as General McDowell crossed Bull Run
after darkness had set in. Noting that the bride was unguarded, the corps commander
directed the eager Kane to collect some artillery and place it on the left bank. This was
done and the "brave little battalion" of Bucktails remained at the bridge into
the night and until all the troops had crossed. They then destroyed the bridge and
followed the rest of the Army.[3]
Second
Bull Run was over. Like the first battle, it had not been a Union victory, but in at least
one other way it was different. Instead of raw recruits running back over the Stone Bridge
in panic on the night of August 30, 1862, battle-tired, but battle-tried veterans merely
slogged back across the creek. They had been licked again. Pope would go, McDowell would
go, and Porter would go. But the men would go on fighting. In that confident summer of the
year before the First Rifles had been disappointed to have missed First Bull Run. If any
pangs of regret had still remained in any stout Bucktail heart, they were gone by the end
of that August day.
As
usual the officers would sit down when the opportunity afforded to compose their reports.
Many officers were wont to specifically commend each unit under their command, especially
when the fighting had been hard. The entire First Brigade of the Reserves had fought hard
and well. Only one outfit was singled out by Brigadier General George G. Meade in his report a few days after the battle. Commending
generaly officers and men under his command Meade added: "At the same time, the
nature of the services required of them, viz, picket duty and skirmishing, have placed
more prominently before me the First Rifles (Bucktails), whose coolness and steadiness
under fire, when led by their commander, Col. Hugh W McNeil, attracted my at-
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tention, and
deserves, in my judgment, particular notice."[4]
The
day after the battle was a dismal and rainy one. The Bucktails were marched to Centreville
and then back to Cub Run, but at last rations were available so they could overlook a
little unnecessary marching. They were getting used to it by now. The Bull Run Campaign,
coming so soon after the Seven Days, had been hard on the Pennsylvania Reserves. There had
been too little time to rest and refit between the two encounters. Bull Run had been
tough, rugged work, but the Bucktails had been luckier in their casualties than during the
fighting on the Peninsula: five killed, nineteen wounded, three missing. The Kane
Battalion was now back. Everyone was happy over this. The regiment again was all together,
albeit they were now ten rather thin-ranked companies.[5]
Thomas
Leiper Kane was about to leave the regiment he had organized for higher rank and command.
He would soon be a brigadier and before the next year passed he would be brevetted major
general. Even as Kane was preparing to leave his Bucktails for new honors and glory, the
local gazettes back in the Wildcat District were accusing him of playing politics for
personal preferment and trading on the family fame. There were the old accusations of
rashness. One paper indicted him for lack of judgment at Cedar Mountain, a battle in which
Kane did not even fight. The regimental historians spoke well of Kane, but not with the
enthusiasm and laudatory rhetoric used to describe some of the other officers. When Biddle
had resigned the men's letters home reflected keen regret. When within a few days McNeil
would be killed at Antietam their letters would express deep sorrow. When Kane left it was
difficult to know just how the Bucktails felt. Feelings and opinions were bound to differ.
He had been a controversial character since the Camp
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Curtin days.
In spite of his faults and regardless of what his detractors might say against him, the
Bucktails had been brought into existence by Thomas Leiper Kane. A regiment composed
largely of men from the Wildcat District had been his idea. He had given it its colorful
name and insignia. Its skirmish tactics were Kane's contribution to the art of warfare.
While not all the Bucktails loved him, none could deny his contribution to the regiment.[6]
It
was early September and the division was in camp for a few days near Arlington. For the
reunited Bucktail outfit there was just time enough for those who had fought in the Valley
to learn the details of the Peninsula battles and for those who had fought under Stone to
find out about the fight under Kane.[7]
In those brief days between battles homesick Bucktails would remember that early September
was one of the best times of the year in the Wildcat District. The leaves would not quite
be turning to remind one of the rigors of an approaching winter. The days would still be
warm like summer and the nights cool like fall. The cornfields would still be green with
possibly a touch of faint yellow before the first frosts. Every little farm in the Wildcat
District had its cornpatch. Most of the lumbermen had been raised on those farms, and as
boys had helped to plant the corn in the late spring and to harvest it in the autumn. The
Bucktails were about to start out again. This time it would be for Maryland and two little
cornfields, one on a mountaintop an one by a small stream called Antietam.
Robert
E. Lee, fresh from his success against Pope, was on his way north. An invasion of Maryland
at this time, if successful, might do much for the cause of the Confederacy. The Northern
Army of Virginia had been defeated and was now merged with the Army of the Potomac.
McClellan was back in command. By the time September was a week old
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Lee had
crossed his Army of Northern Virginia over the Potomac near Leesburg and had headed into
Maryland toward Frederick. McClellan proceeded to follow. The Union Army reached Frederick
on the 12th shortly after Lee had left. It was here that one of the most famous freak
incidents of the war occurred. Two blue-clad soldiers, lazing about their camp (previously
used by the Rebels), found some cigars which a Southern officer although he had carefully
tried to preserve them had lost. Wrapped around the smokes was a copy of Special Orders
No. 191 of General R. E. Lee, dated September 9. By September 13 General George B.
McClellan knew as much about his Southern opponent's plans as Lee himself did.
It
all had to do with that strategic spot called Harpers Ferry. Located at the junction of the Shenandoah River
with the Potomac, this little village which John Brown had catapulted into fame a few
years before, was hemmed in on all sides by mountains. Once the surrounding heights were
taken Harpers Ferry was indefensible. When Lee had started into Maryland, the Union high
command had not all seen eye to eye on the question of withdrawing the Federal garrison at
Harpers Ferry. The Baltimore and Ohio was an important rail artery and at Harpers Ferry
there was an important bridge. When the Confederates reached Frederick, Colonel Dixon S.
Miles and his command of about twelve thousand men were still at the Ferry. A little
farther west at Martinsburg, also on the B. & O., was another Union force. Lee had
hopes of reaching Pennsylvania, and to invade the Keystone State with two Northern forces
sitting on his line of communications up the Shenandoah Valley just would not do.
So
Lee had issued Special Orders No. 191. It had been lost and was now found. Both sides knew
what Lee planned to
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do. He would move his forces west from Frederick over South Mountain (an extension of the
Blue Ridge north of the Potomac). There, behind the protection of the mountains, Lee would
divide his troops. One half would again be divided and pushed back to approach Harpers
Ferry from three directions. When the Federal garrisons in its rear were cleaned out the
Southern Army would be reunited somewhere around Hagerstown for a possible jump off into
Penn
sylvania. Jackson would be in command of the largest of the three forces sent toward
Harpers Ferry. Lee with Longstreet and D. H. Hill would remain between Boonesboro and
Hagerstown, and, with cavalry thrown out in the passes of South Mountain, would keep a
look-out for McClellan. "Little Mac" jubilantly studied the order and laid his
plans to capitalize on his big break in the grim game he was playing with
"Bobbie" Lee.
South
Mountain is much more than the name implies. It is a range of rugged mountains reaching
from the Potomac into Pennsylvania. To reach the now widely scattered parts of the
Confederate Army, McClellan had to get his forces from Frederick over the mountain range. Two passes in South
Mountain were conveniently available. The National Road, leading west from Frederick,
crossed the mountains through Turner's Gap, and then went on to Boonsboro and Hagerstown.
This was the route for the main part of the Federal Army to follow. It would bring it
against Lee's forces which had been left behind when the Harpers Ferry expeditions
started. A few miles south of Turner's Gap was Crampton's Gap. Through Crampton's led a
road which forked off the National Road east of the mountains and emerged on the western
side close to Harpers Ferry. Convenient, too, for McClellan was General Franklin's Sixth
Corps in a good position to follow the Crampton's Gap
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route. If it moved rapidly enough it could rescue
Harpers Ferry and defeat at least one of the detached Southern forces. There would be
enough time to take care of the other detachments after McClellan had crushed Lee's forces
west of Turners Gap. These briefly were the plans. McClellan knew Lee's. Shortly Lee would
begin to divine McClellan's.[8]
The
Pennsylvania Reserves got a new commander for the new campaign. Ever vigilant for the
defense of his state, Governor Curtin became alarmed for Pennsylvania when Lee entered
Maryland. The Reserves had been formed for just such an emergency, but they had long been
in the Federal Army. Unable to obtain Federal troops, Curtin argued that the least
Washington could do would be to give him a good general who might be able to do something
with the
raw militia he had collected. No one had a very high opinion of this militia. How about
Brigadier General John F. Reynolds? The Pennsylvania governor knew what Reynolds had done
for and with the Reserves. McClellan did not want to give up Reynolds, but Andy Curtin
knew his way around official Washington. The Pennsylvania Reserves lost their commander to
the governor of Pennsylvania. Reynolds left for Harrisburg amid the enthusiastic cheers of
the division and the Reserves were turned toward South Mountain under Meade. There was a
reshuffling of regiments. The old Second Brigade became the new First. To this brigade the
Bucktails were attached. They were now brigaded with the First, Second, Fifth, and Sixth
Regiments, under General Seymour.[9]
The
reorganization of the Union Army after Second Bull Run gave McDowell's First Corps to
Hooker. So the Reserves, with a new division commander who had been one of their brigade
skippers for a long time, had a new corps chief also. General Meade had been with the
division long enough
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to know that the Reserves were a good, solid fighting organization. At this time that was
something Joseph Hooker did not know. Just a few weeks before on a swampy peninsula in
Virginia "Fighting Joe" had seen a part of the Pennsylvania troops panic and
run. Hooker knew what he had seen, but there was much about the incident he did not know.
As he started his corps for South Mountain, General Hooker had one division whose conduct
in a previous fight had him thoroughly disgusted. In a few days he would change his mind
about the fighting qualities of this division.
