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12
Utterly Used Up,
Except the Bucktails" [1]
114
The events which took place in the
Shenandoah Valley in late May and early June 1862 were an obbligato to the action around
Richmond. What happened in the Valley had a direct effect upon what happened on the
Peninsula. The Bucktails, divided as they had been, played their little parts in both
places.
Bayard's
Brigade with Kane's four companies of First Rifles had already left Fredricksburg in the
direction of Richmond when the news of Stonewall Jackson's doings in the Shenandoah came
over the wires. The Administration was out to catch Jackson if possible. Kane's four
companies were to have a hand in the chase. On May 28 General Bayard started his cavalry,
Kane's Bucktails, and a little battery of mountain howitzers for the Shenandoah Valley.
The Bucktail Battalion, 264 strong, which headed for Front Royal via Catlett's Station and
Rectortown, was a small part indeed of the forces Lincoln and Stanton were endeavoring to
bring against Lackson.[2]
It
had all started at Front Royal on May 23 when Stonewall surprised a little Federal
garrison there. The next day Jackson started to drive Union General Banks down the
Shenandoah from Strasburg toward the Potomac. Washington ordered General Fremont, whose
arm was in the mountains west of the Valley, to move to Harrisonburg Mc-
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Dowell, with Shields' Division (which had just come from the Valley) in advance, was
directed to move toward Front Royal. The idea was to have all these forces in front of
General T. J. Jackson when he should start back up the Shenandoah again after pursuing
Banks.
Instead
of moving to Harrisonburg, Fremont started north in the direction of Strasburg by the last day of May, Shields had reached Front
Royal, where he learned that Jackson had slipped through Strasburg ahead of both him and
Fremont, and was headed back up the Valley. Bayard's cavalry and the Bucktails were now
up, and McDowell decided that the least that could be done would be to attack the
Confederate wagon trains, which should be hurrying up the Valley turnpike behind the Rebel
Army. On June 1 Bayard and the First Rifle Battalion drew this assignment. They proceeded
cautiously toward Strasburg. As expected; the train was protected by cavalry. It was
protected by artillery, too, and a strong force of infantry! The enemy lobbed a few shells
in his direction, and Bayard wisely decided that a cavalry brigade and a handful of
riflemen should have no business with such a force as was covering the hurrying wagons.
However, he waited around until nightfall and then withdrew back across the Shenandoah
River. The Bucktails spent the night guarding a railroad bridge across the river.[3]
Strasburg is at the northern end of a little range
of rugged mountains by the name of Massanutten. This range divides the broad Shenandoah
Valley as far south as Harrisonburg. Jackson was hastening up the Valley on the turnpike
on the western side of the Massanuttens. McDowell sent Shields' Division along the eastern
side of the mountains in the hope of intercepting Jackson at the other end of the range.
Bayard and the Bucktails were to go through Strasburg and
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along the
western side of the Massanuttens. This would be the course Fremont would follow.
On
the morning of June 2 when Bayard's New Jersey cavalry and the Bucktails approached
Strasburg, they found that Old Jack's train had completely cleared the town. General
Fremont had at last arrived. With Bayard's troopers in advance, the pursuit of Jackson was
at last started. By 10 A.M. the Confederate rear guard was encountered. It was a series of
little, delaying actions on the part of the Rebels all day long. General Turner Ashby,
Jackson's favorite cavalry commander, was handling the rear of the swiftly moving
Confederates, and doing a good job. The Bucktails were struggling to keep up with Bayard
and his troopers. A rainy night ended the pursuit at Woodstock, only about ten miles south
of Strasburg. The only fighting had been done by the cavalry with a little skirmishing by
the First Rifle Battalion. Fremont just could not bring up his infantry. Jackson had been
too fast for him.[4]
The
next day it was more of the same with the First Pennsylvania Cavalry of Bayard's Brigade
in the lead. The swollen Shenandoah (North Fork) at Mount Jackson was reached just in time
for the advance Union units to see the last of the flames which had consumed the bridge
across the brimming stream. Jackson by burning this bridge could gain a few more hours
while a pontoon bridge was being thrown across the unfordable river. It was the afternoon
of June 6
before Bayard's Brigade, with the Bucktails trailing a bit behind, reached Harrisonburg.
Bayard ordered the tired New Jersey horsemen
beyond the town to look for enemy troopers. At first proceeding cautiously, the New Jersey
troopers suddenly became bolder. Before they knew what had happened they ran into one of
Ashby's regiments with two more close by. Fire came from
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the front
and both flanks. Wearied Federal cavalrymen fell everywhere. Their colors were captured.
The men practically panicked. The entreaties of their officers were in vain. Their
colonel, Percy Wyndham, was wounded and captured and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Karge',
upon whom command devolved, said, "I was left alone among a headless mass of men and
horses."[5]
When
the battered New Jersey regiment got back with the news of what had happened to them,
Colonel Kane decided that the wounded should be rescued and that his Bucktails were just
the ones to do it. What conversation took place between General Bayard and the impetuous
Kane about what the Bucktails should do is clouded in contradiction. However, the First
Pennsylvania Cavalry and the Bucktails were advanced. Ashby, suspecting something just
like this was preparing a reception committee in the form of two infantry regiments so
placed as to effect an ambush in flank. Kane led his one hundred-odd First Rifles ahead of
the cavalry and into some woods. Meeting the Fifty-Eighth Virginia Infantry, the
Pennsylvania riflemen gave them such an accurate volley that the Virginians started to
fall back. Kane realized, however, that he was greatly outnumbered. Wounded in the leg,
Kane leaned against a tree, kept one eye on his left where he could see a flank attack
forming, and told his men to "give them hell!" Ashby, his horse shot from under
him, raised his sword and ordered the infantry to charge. Just then a Bucktail drew a
bead. Ashby fell dead. Kane had now been shot again, in the chest this time, and as
Colonel Bradley T. Johnson's First Maryland Regiment came tearing in on the flank, even
Kane knew that his Bucktails had had enough.
Under
Captain Charles F. Taylor, Company H, the First Rifles fell back from the hornet's nest
they had stirred up. Taylor then went back for Kane, and they were both cap-
118
tured.[6]
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Kane, of the Union Bucktails, unknowingly pronounced the
first eulogy for the late Brigadier General Turner Ashby, C. S. A. Kane told his captors
of his admiration for the valiant Confederate officer. He also told them how he had saved
Ashby's life just that afternoon when he had stopped three of his men from picking the
cavalryman off as he was sitting his horse a short distance from the Bucktails not
realizing his danger Said Kane: "Ashby is too brave to die in that way."[7]
It
appears to have been a useless little fight. Colonel Percy Wyndham, British and somewhat
of an adventurer, in command of the New Jersey cavalry, had accomplished nothing.
Certainly the lieutenant colonel of the Bucktails did nothing but display his own personal
bravery and give his men a chance to demonstrate theirs, all to no end. Bayard had
advanced his Pennsylvania cavalry when the First Rifles had become seriously involved but
was driven back by Confederate artillery. Bayard was not the type of officer to withdraw
before a few shells if going ahead would accomplish anything. Possibly Bayard revealed his
opinion as much by what he left unsaid as by what he said next day in his terse report.
Without mentioning Kane, except to say he was wounded and captured, the brigade commander
wrote: "The Bucktails fought splendidly."[8]
The
Bucktails had fought splendidly, and many of them had fallen. Of the 104 men that Kane led
into the woods, seven were killed, thirty-nine wounded and five captured. including Kane,
Captain Taylor and Captain William T. Blanchard, of Company I. Had Major General R. S.
Ewell known the size of the Bucktail Battalion that opposed his regiments that day, one
can be certain that he would not have seen fit to issue his General Orders No. 30. This
order authorized Colonel Johnson's First Maryland Regiment,
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which had
caught the First Rifles in flank and driven them, to append a captured bucktail to their
color staff. Surprised indeed was Bradley T. Johnson, when he learned many years after the
war from an ex-corporal of the Bucktail Company G, that there were only about one hundred
Union riflemen trying to hold off the two Confederate regiments. Johnson estimated that
there were about five hundred Rebel soldiers in the two outfits.[9]
A
few miles south of Harrisonburg at a little cross-roads known as Cross Keys, a division of
Jackson's army under Ewell was waiting to see what Fremont would do. The rest were at Port
Republic about four miles away, awaiting the approach of General Shields. At last the two
Union forces were getting close together, although it was not until June 8 that Fremont
and Shields each found out the location of the other.[10]
Ewell
had a strong position on a ride commanding the crossroads. Fremont did not know the
country and was without good maps or guides. For fear that Ewell would get across the
Shenandoah (South Fork), burn the bridge, and help Jackson knock out Shields, while
Fremont was reconnoitering, Fremont decided to attack as quickly as he could. He would
concentrate on the Confederate right. If he were successful there, he thought he could get
on Ewell's line of retreat. The Bucktails were to be a part of the command of Brigadier
General Julius Stahel, whose brigade was to form the Union left. Stahel ordered Captain
Hugh McDonald, now in command of the First Rifles, to support a battery on the extreme
left commanded by a Captain Buell.
The
Bucktails and the battery waited in a little woods as Stahel moved his infantry out along
a road in open country toward the wooded ridge where the Confederates waited. Shortly
after the Union brigade started up the woody ridge,
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McDonald began to hear the clatter of small arms fire. Soon the battery was ordered
forward, and with it the Bucktails advanced amid considerable shelling from the Rebel guns
posted on the ridge. Using a little ravine as cover, the battery and battalion were able
to duck the shells and get the battery in position. Before the guns were unlimbered it was
discovered that the position was too vulnerable to Union fire, so there was another
scramble farther along the hollow to the left. Here Buell opened fire while the Bucktails
watched the show from behind the protection of a bank. So far this Sunday afternoon battle
was a lot better for the Bucktails than their experience of a couple of days before.
However,
the situation rapidly changed. McDonald could hear the musketry fire rapidly coming
closer. This could mean but one thing. Stahel was being forced back. Once again the
battery would change position. This time it would be into a clump of woods. The
Twenty-Seventh Pennsylvania Regiment, a part of Stahel's command which had gotten too far
to the right to help much in the attack, suddenly appeared. The Bucktails and the
Twenty-Seventh dashed into the woods followed by the battery. There they found a
Mississippi regiment dead set on taking the guns. After one Confederate volley, it was
bayonet against bayonet for a time. Then both lines seemed to recoil. Two pieces of the
battery unlimbered and got in a little canister, but the fighting was too close for Buell
to do much for fear of hitting Union soldiers. More gray-clad troops were now coming in to
support the Mississippians. At the first lull in the fighting, the battery wihdrew
followed by the Twenty-Seventh and the First Rifles. It was an orderly retirement and all
the wounded were brought away. One Bucktail had been killed and there were seven wounded.[11]
That
was the Battle of Cross Keys as the Bucktails saw it.
121
They entered
the fight hungry and with empty haversacks. Fremont made certain that they obtained
rations, and, having eaten, the First Rifles felt better, even though they knew that it
had not been a Union victory. Today Ewell had forced Fremont to give up his pursuit.
Tomorrow Jackson would do the same to Shields at Port Republic. Stonewall would soon head
for eastern Virginia. Orders were about to come from Washington for both Fremont and
Shields to call it quits. The Valley Campaign was over.
While
the experts still debate its exact net effect upon the Peninsula fighting, the Valley
Campaign did much to enhance the military reputation of General Thomas Jonathan Jackson
and his "foot cavalry." There were some Union outfits, too, which had done some
pretty fast marching. The Bucktails, for example, had not performed too badly. They had
kept up with Bayard's troopers all the way from Strasburg to Harrisonburg. They had
encountered storms, floods, skirmishing, and a fight south of Harrisonburg---all on short
rations. After Harrisonburg the cavalry had been worn out and left behind to rest up, but
the Bucktails kept on going.
When
two days after Cross Keys the Bucktails were ordered back to General McDowell and directed
to march to Luray, some of them were no doubt convinced that they had proved a theory of
Lieutenant Colonel Kane. It had become Kane's contention that a good infantry outfit could
always wear out cavalry. The troopers might call them "coffee boilers," but the
Bucktails had done a bit of marching and were entitled to all the coffee they could boil.[12]
[1] O. R., 12
(1), p. 676, Bayard to Breck, June 7, 1862: "We are utterly used up except . . . the
Bucktails."
[2] O. R., 51
(1), p. 639, Schriver to McCall; O. R., 12 (3), p. 283, all messages; pp. 283-284, Breck
to McDowell.
[3] As to the
Shenandoah Valley Campaign in general see Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, Vol. 1, pp.
171-182, 187-195; as to the Bucktails see O. R., 12 (1), p. 677, Bayard's Report.
[4] O. R., 12
(3), p. 315, McDowell to Stanton; O. R., 12 (1), pp. 677678, Karge's Report; p. 677,
Bayard's Report; p. 651, Fremont to Stanton; O. R., 12 (3), p. 324, Fremont to McDowell,
McDowell to Stanton.
[5] O. R., 12
(1) pp. 697-680, Karge's Report; p. 681, Jone's Report; pp. 731-732, Munford's Report; T.
dr R., p. 152. An exaggerated account of the Harrisonburg fight, entitled "About the
Bucktails," is in The National Tribune, January 7, 1886.
[6] T. dr R.,
pp. 153-156, which contains contradictory statements as to Kane's orders. Bayard did not
refer to Kane's orders in his short report cited in note 4 and Kane filed no report. See
also O. R., 12 (1), p. 681, Jones' Report; p. 732, Munford's Report; p. 712, Jackson's
Report; G. F. R. Henderson, Stonewall Jackson, Longmans, Green & Co., New York, 1949,
p. 275.
[7] Henry Kyd
Douglas, 1 Rode with Stonewall, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1940, p. 80.
[8] O. R., 12
(1), p. 732, Munford's Report; p. 676, Bayard's Report; see also p. 799, Trimble's Report,
wherein the Southern brigadier, referring to the Bucktails being cut to pieces, stated
that their gallantry deserved a better fate.
[9] T. dr R.,
pp. 158, 160; O. R., 51 (2), p. 570.
[10] Williams,
Lincoln Finds a General, Vol. 1, p. 203.
[11] O. R., 12 (1), pp. 19-21, Fremont's
Report; pp. 675-676, McDonald's Report; p. 665, Return of Casualties.
[12] T. dr R.,
pp. 166-167; O. R., 12 (1), p. 676, Bayard's Report; p. 655, Thomas to Fremont; as to the
infantry being called "coffee boilers" see Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 187.