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"But the
Field Was Not the Battle"
92
The
Reserves' respite from fighting would be short. The battle of the previous day had not
gone to the liking of R. E. Lee. Today he would have another opportunity. Before the
setting of the sun the Southern commander's great military reputation would be well
started.
During
the hot, still morning the Bucktails were able to snatch a little rest in the comparative
coolness of a little woods which separated McCall's Division from the front line. Early
afternoon brought to the weary men the sound of the beginning of another battle. A. P.
Hill was at it again. This time it was with the full blessing of Lee. Attacking across
difficult terrain, which included a stream known as Boatswains Swamp, Hill tried for two
hours to break the Federal line without success. About four o'clock Longstreet was
advanced against the Union left. A little later Stonewall Jackson and D.H. Hill started in
on the right. The greater part of the Army of Northern Virginia was pitted against the
divisions of Morell and Sykes. Only General Henry W. Slocum's Division was on its way from
south of the Chickahominy. The Pennsylvania Reserves were in reserve no longer. These
seemed to be needed all along the Union line.[1]
The
Bucktails, the First, Fifth, and Eighth were sent to the center of the line where the
divisions of Morell and Sykes joined. The Fifth was to the left of the 150 remaining
93
Bucktails.
These two outfits had liked each other ever since their little expedition to Cumberland
the previous summer, when, they now knew, they had been only playing war. Now, side by
side, they lay behind some hastily dug entrenchments and slugged it out for a couple of
hours with the enemy infantry concealed in woods and a Rebel battery plainly visibIe only
five hundred yards away. Tired as they were, the Bucktail fire was accurate. After
changing position several times, the enemy battery became silent. Ammunition was now
running low both in the Fifth and First Rifles. As the Union fire slackened, the gray-clad
troops came out of the woods and formed for a charge. At the command of their doughty
major, almost a solid sheet of flame shot from the Bucktail rifles. Immediately the Fifth
rushed forward to within 150 yards of the
Confederates and poured another volley into the Rebels before they could recover from the
accurate Bucktail fire. The enemy staggered back into the woods. However, this was about
the end.
The threat to the immediate front of the two
little Union regiments was at least temporarily thwarted. But on both sides the badly
sagging Federal line was giving way. .Lee's
concentration of troops was about to pay a rich dividend. To the left of the Fifth the
Union line was falling back. To the right of the Rifles there came an enfilading fire
which caught both Union outfits. Stone tried to change his front to meet it, but it was of
no use. His men were now exactly in range of Union batteries. With one last defiant
volley, the two regiments fell back with the general retreat. The Bucktails later found
out that a Texas regiment of General John B. Hood had broken through on the Union left and
that after that, the battle had been as good as over.[2]
The sun was going down as the Battle of Gaines'
Mill was ended. There was nothing for Porter to do but to get his
94
battered
corps across the Chickahominy. Two more brigades had come up from south of the river, but
they were too late now.[3] The various units of
McCall's Division had been sent in piecemeal, a regiment or two here or there, wherever a
gap had to be plugged. For this reason the Reserves regiments struggling back in the early
twilight had difficulty in finding each other. The fighting had been confused. The
confusion was to continue.
Wagons,
ambulances, guns, and caissons were all in a jumble at the approaches to the bridges.
Walking wounded, stragglers from a score of regiments, remnants of detached units milled
around in an unorganized mass of humanity. General Reynolds had been cut off. He would be
captured the next morning. Stone and Captain Wister set about the chore of collecting as
many of the Reserve Corps as could be rounded up. The Bucktail chaplain, W. H. D. Hatton,
could offer a good rousing prayer when necessary. He was also handy at passing the
ammunition. On this occasion be bent his efforts to helping open the traffic jam at the
bridge approaches. No doubt wincing as much at the curses of the mule drivers as at the
cries of the wounded in the ambulances, Hatton persisted until the wagons were at last
moving over the Chickahominy in some semblance of order. Meanwhile Stone and Wister had
succeeded in bringing together about two thousand of the Pennsylvania division. About 2
A.M. the next morning they too crossed south side of the river.[4]
Comparative
calm prevailed on June 28. McClellan had his Army of the Potomac headed for the James.
Harrison's Landing was to be the new base The Northern Army was beginning to stretch out
the entire distance between the Chickahominy and Harrison's Landing, much handicapped in
its retreat because of the poor condition of the roads and
95
ignorance
of the existence of alternate routes that would speed the movement. Of the thousands of
wagons that had to be gotten over White Oak Swamp and on to the new base some were started
by the afternoon of the 28th. Among the vehicles left was a park of reserve artillery
under the command of General H. T. Hunt. McCall's Division was assigned the job of seeing
to it that this artillery got through the swamp. There were guns, caissons, battery
wagons, thirteen batteries in all. The column was put in motion a little after dark. The
night was black and rainy. The slow march lasted all night long. In the morning Savage
Station was reached. Behind a row of little white buildings in a field enclosed by a white
picket fence was a field hospital. It was full of wounded who did not know that they would
be left behind when the Army moved on. The Bucktails searched anxiously among the wounded
for missing comrades. Then it was on again across White Oak Swamp, where the artillery was
left on firm ground south of the swamp.
Relieved of the artillery burden McCall was alerted by McClellan as to a possible
Confederate attack from the west. The Reserves spent the afternoon waiting for this attack
which never came. At 5 P.M. the march was resumed and continued on into the night. At
midnight the column halted near a little crossroads. The rest of the Fifth Corps had gone
on to the James. McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves remained to fight another battle. They never could quite get the names of those
little cross-roads straightened out. But they
would never forget the place.[5]
Gaines'
Mill had been a smashing victory for Lee against Porter. However, McClellan was getting
away but in which direction Lee did not at first know. By the early morning of June 29 the
Confederate commander was practically certain that "Little Mac" was making for
James River and not back
96
down the
Peninsula. Lee wanted to smash the Northern Army while it was strung out across the swampy
neck of land. While McCall's Division had been on the alert south of White Oak Swamp
during the afternoon of the 29th, a battle had been fought north of the swamp near Savage
Station. It was a part of Lee's plan to roll up the Army of the Potomac. Things had not
gone as the Southern commander had hoped. There was still time to try again. For June 30
R. E. Lee had another ambitious plan for the convergence of all his forces to wipe out the
Northern Army on its retreat. Although the plan would not work, the remnant of Bucktails
and the rest of the decimated Pennsylvania Reserves, at their little cross-roads bivouac,
would feel the effects of that ambitious plan.[6]
The
morning was calm and cloudless when McCall received his orders. Stay where you are,
protect the vast train of wagons hurrying toward the James, repel any attack. The
retreating train was moving south along the Quaker (Willis Church) Road. From the
northwest led the Charles City Road which joined the Quaker Road at Riddell's Shop. The
two roads formed an obtuse angle. Running nearly due east at this point from the direction
of Richmond was a third road, known as the Long Bridge Road, which bisected the angle, and
continued on to the northeast. The country to the west was mostly flat, except to the
south of the Long Bridge Road where it became very uneven. On both sides of the road were
woods, bogs, and underbrush. Here and there were small farmhouse clearings, the largest
known as Frayser's Farm.[7]
The
hot calm of the morning was broken by heavy cannonading back in the direction of White Oak
Swamp. McCall had advanced some cavalry up the Long Bridge Road. When Meade and Seymour
informed him of the discovery
98
of enemy
pickets on this road, the First and Third Regiments were advanced in that direction. The
artillery fire in the rear kept up until noon, but McCall was satisfied that the enemy
would come from the west.[8]
The men in the ranks had fully
expected to follow the bulk of the Army down the Quaker Road to the James, and rest a
little. But there was to be no rest today for the battle tired Reserves. Facing West in a
line perpendicular to the Long Bridge Road, McCall's Division, now reduced to less than
six thousand formed a line of battle. The Second Brigade was placed on the right, the
Third on the left, and the First, now commanded by Colonel Seneca G. Simmons, slightly in
the rear in reserve. Enough Bucktails had now found their way back to their outfit so that
Stone still had 150 men after his losses at Gaines' Mill. With the Bucktails were their
comrades of a few days before at Mechanicsville, the Berdan Sharpshooters now numbering
only eighty -four. In front of the infanty batteries were placed from right to left:
Lieutenant Alanson Randol's and Captain James Thompson's (U.S. Artillery), all
twelve-pounders, then Cooper's, and then Lietitenant Frank P. Amsden's with four extra
guns. On the extreme left were two "Dutch" batteries of Morell's Division
(Captains Otto Diedericks and John Knieriem), each four guns of twelve-pounder Parrotts.[9]
On
each side of McCall were other Union divisions. After the Battle of Savage Station the day
before, the Third Corps (Samuel P. Heintzelman), the Sixth (William B. Franklin), and the
Second (Edwin V. Sumner) had all succeeded in withdrawing over White Oak Swamp. General
Philip Kearny's Division (Third Corps) was to the right of McCall across the Long Bridge
Road. John Sedgwick's Division of the Second Corps was to the rear of McCall and Kearny.
Over to the far left, west of the Quaker Road, was another
100
division of
the Third Corps under General Joseph Hooker. On the extreme right faced up the Charles
City Road was Henry W. Slocum's Division of the Sixth Corps. As on the day before,
McClellan was not present. No one had overall command. There was much confusion. Even the
locations of the other commands were not known to all of the division commanders. It was
under these conditions that McClellan's divisions awaited the big push of General Robert
E. Lee along those sandy roads where the marine shells which the men called coral seemed
to be more abundant than elsewhere on the Peninsula.[10]
Through
the morning hours, each one becoming hotter than the one before, the Bucktails waited for
their third battle within less than a week. Tired now almost to numbness they waited. Noon
passed, but still no sign of the inevitable struggle. In the woods in front there must be
gray coated troops. They seemed almost reluctant to start anything. Finally, late in the
afternoon, the skirmishers came in and artillery on both sides started to bark. It was
Longstreet's men this time who were advancing on both sides of the Long Bridge Road. On
McCall's left was the Twelfth Regiment. Seymour had placed six companies of this outfit in
a log house and behind a rail breastwork, where they would command the enemy approach.
Back of the six companies were the "Dutch" batteries, attached to McCall no one
quite knew how or why. The remaining four companies of the Twelfth were to the rear of the
batteries. In a little ravine still farther to the rear, Colonel James H. Childs had two
squadrons of his Fourth Pennsylvania Cavalry dismounted. Rebel artillery had found the
range and shot and shell were being poured into the Twelfth. Out of the underbrush near
the Long Bridge Road came Kemper's Virginians. The Twelfth tried to pick them off but on
they came
101
on the
double-quick. The "Dutch" batteries had been firing with little effectiveness.
Suddenly the "Dutch" abandoned their guns and made for the rear. With the Rebel
yell on every lip, the advancing infantry took three volleys from the six barricaded
companies. One column headed toward the ravine in the rear. They had the house and
barricade nearly surrounded. It was either run or be captured. These Virginians could not
be stopped. So the Twelfth ran.
Back
in the ravine Childs' cavalry was encountering some of the musketry fire. Childs gave the
order to mount, but before this could be done the men of the Twelfth came scrambling back
so fast that they frightened the horses. Before the troopers could get their mounts under
control they found that they, too, had joined the rapid rearward movement. With the
animals finally calmed down, it was a disgusted cavalry colonel who vainly searched for a
superior who could give him orders.[11]
McCall
soon discovered that there was serious trouble on the left. The Fifth, together with the
little Bucktail-Sharp-shooter Battalion, was ordered up diagonally to the left, picking up
a part of the Tenth. With Stone's little force in the rear, the Fifth and Tenth charged
into the flank of the Confederates. For a while they met with some success, but the Union
ranks, too, had become broken, and before they could be reformed, another gray line was
tearing in upon them. Stone, still in the rear, could see the Fifth and Tenth buckle and
start to give way The Bucktail major, who had led his men somewhat farther to the left,
now turned them to the front. To the rear was a crowded, confused group of Union soldiers,
of what outfits Stone did not know. Ahead of him were the Fifth and the Tenth being
swiftly driven back. Caught in this position, Stone ordered his men to lie flat on their
bellies. As the badly battered regiments ran
102
over
his own men, Stone shouted to the retreating soldiers to reform back of the Bucktail
Sharpshooter line. It was no use; all that was left to face the oncoming Rebels was
Stone's thin line. Young Philip Holland, erstwhile school teacher and now senior Bucktail
captain, was steadying his own men and shouting to the confused mass in the rear to come
up in support. He caught a rebel ball and died instantly. Bucktails and Sharpshooters,
this time without any stout entrenchments, were giving out volley after volley. Stone
looked about. He knew he could not hold out. If they stayed they would be taken, and that
soon, assuming that there were any left in the face of the murderous fire. He gave the
order to fall back. The Confederates did not bother to pursue such an insignificant,
albeit stubborn, little force but immediately turned to their left for bigger game.[12]
While
his left was being driven back on Hooker's Division, General McCall was having serious
trouble elsewhere. His point of the Union line seemed to be the target for all of the
initial Confederate assaults. The Third Reserves started the battle well enough with an
impetuous advance, but they came under the fire of their own artillery. Changing position,
they next encountered fire from a Union regiment behind them. This was too much for the
exhausted men. They bolted for the rear. The Fourth, which was in support of the Third,
repulsed the first attack in nice shape. Then the Rebels started to drive them, but they
rallied, only to be forced back again by the determined enemy. Suddenly the Fourth gave
way entirely. Their honest colonel, Albert L. Magilton, had to report that it was not
until the next morning that he could collect about two hundred of them.[13]
With
the evaporation of the Third and Fourth Regiments, Captain Randol had no support for his
battery. Randol had kept up a stubborn fire from the very first. His guns
103
became
masked by Federal soldiers and the Rebels were on top of them. Rallying a few companies,
Randol charged his own battery now in enemy hands .Soldiers clubbed each other with rifle
butts and ran each other through with bayonets. This animal-like fighting recovered the
battery, but a fresh wave of gray soldiers was coming on. Randol withdrew, carrying off as
much of the battery as the few men left with him could handle. This artillery captain on
McCall's right was probably just as disgusted with the conduct of foot soldiers as a
certain cavalry colonel on the left had been. Thompson's Battery had been previously
ordered to leave the field when it was found impossible to move up the limbers of the
caissons.[14]
McCall
also was having a trying time with his center. Here, too, the artillery ammunition
situation had been bungled. Amsden had opened a good fire with his own and the four extra
guns of Kerns. Shortly it was discovered that all caissons had been sent to the rear.
Frantically the lieutenant, time and time again, sent his buglers back to find them. They
could not be found. With his limbers empty, Amsden took his battery to the rear by order
of McCall himself. The Ninth Regiment, in support of Cooper's Battery, early in the fight
had been ordered toward the left when McCall learned that things were going to pieces
there. While the Ninth was probing for the enemy, Cooper's Battery was taken. Back came
the Ninth and drove the Rebels off into some woods, recovering Cooper's guns. The
Ninth followed the Confederates into the woods
where the fighting at once became confused. C. F. Jackson, the Ninth's skipper, became
separated from his men, who floundered around in the woods apparently completely losing
their identity as a fighting unit. Another wave of Southern soldiers overran Cooper's
guns.[15]
104
As
McCall's right and center gave way the burden of filling up the wide gaps in the line fell
upon Sedgwick's Division. The brigade of General William W. Burns was sent in and later
two other brigades. The Confederate charges appeared to concentrate on Kearny for a time
Then it seemed to General Sumner, who had been watching the battle closely, that the
Southern attacks would alternate between Hooker and Sedgwick.[16]
Major Stone with his Rifles and Sharpshooters found a regular melee about four
hundred yards to the rear of the spot they had tried to hold until overpowered by the
sheer force of the advancing Rebels. The major saw parts of six regiments milling around.
All the men seemed to want was someone to take charge of them. Whatever panic they had
previously felt was now gone, and they were just a beaten-up mass of soldiery, still with
some fight left in them, looking for a leader. Bearded, grizzled Colonel Seneca Simmons,
whose features always had borne a warlike cast, was dead, killed leading the charge.
Meade, soon to be wounded, and Seymour had their hands full elsewhere. So Stone took it
upon himself to provide the leadership which the men seemed so earnestly to crave. Major
Stone was only of medium height, but his erect carriage, crop of jet black hair, and dark
eagle eyes gave him a commanding appearance. Using the Bucktails and Sharpshooters as a
nucleus, the doughty major set about the task of rounding up the men. Luckily Stone came
upon Lieutenant Charles B. Lamborn. Lamborn was Reynolds' aide. After his general was
captured, the lieutenant had attached himself to Meade. He had been able to keep an eye on
the confused fighting and knew where the various units were.
Stone's
only remaining officers were Captain Wister and Lieutenants William Allison Company B and
Charles Bit-
105
terling,
Compan F. These men, with Lamborn, set to work to help Stone bring some organization out
of the confusion. It took some time, but as the sun was sinking behind the woods toward
Richmond, Stone started his column up the Long Bridge Road. Six regimental colors were in
the line. Enemy shot and shell was still coming over. Soon they were back among the
wrecked batteries on the original line. There General McCall came up, wounded and alone.
It must have warmed the proud old soldier's heart to see this remnant of his command,
whipped as they had been, back on the old line ready for more of the same if necessary. It
was now nearly dark. The artillery fire having stopped no one knew where the enemy was or,
in fact, if he was still
there. McCall and Stone rode ahead up the road. Rounding a bend, they almost ran into a column of Confederates
which filled the road ahead of them. Brigadier General George A.
McCall ended this most bitter of all days by becoming a prisoner. Not so Major Roy Stone.
At the command, "Halt dismount," he wheeled his horse and galloped back down the
road. A Rebel ball struck him in the hand as he turned. The major formed a company across
the road and started looking for a cannon to sweep the front. But it was too dark to
fight. The Battle of Frayser's Farm was over.[17]
The
Army of Northern Virginia had won the field. "But the field was not the battle . .
." Now McClellan would have the night-time hours in which to get the rest of his army
to the James. A sad George McCall was headed for a Richmond prison. Robert E. Lee must
also have been sad. His grand scheme of convergence had again failed. Most of the blame
would have to go to his own generals, Jackson, Magruder, and Holmes. Sad George McCall
could have taken
some consolation, if he had then known that the next morn-
106
ing General
Longstreet would put a goodly portion of the blame for Lee's failure on the Union so iers
who bore the brunt of Longstreet's initial attack, the division of General George A.
McCall.[18]
[1] . For details of the Confederate
attack see D. S. Freeman, R.
E.Lee, Charles
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1984, Vol. 2, Ch. 18.
[2] . O. R.,
11 (2), p. 401,
Seymour's Report; T. dr
R., p. 118; O. R.,
11,(2), pp. 416-417,
Stone's Report.
[3] .
O. R., 11 (2),
p. 226, Porter's Report.
[4] . O.
R.,
11 (2),
p. 417, Stone's Report; as to Chaplain Hatton see T.
dr R., pp. 85,
119, 252.
[5] O. R.,
11 (2), p. 389,
McCall's Report; T. dr
R., pp. 122-124; Williams, Lincoln
Finds a General, Vol. 1, p. 236; O. R.,
11 (2), p. 402,
Seymour's Report. It appears that McCall's Division was left where it was quite by
accident. The division got on the wrong road during the night, and the rest of Porter's
Corps went on. Life
and Letters of Meade, Vol. 1, p. 283. To the
same effect is Richard Meade Bache, Life
of General George Gordon Meade, John C. Winston
Co., Philadelphia, 1906, pp. 125-126. Sypher, pp. 254-255, puts the blame on Porter.
[6] Freeman,
Lee,
Vol. 2,
pp. 166-167, 175-176, 192.
[7] .
Ibid., pp. 179,
184-185'; O. R.,
11 (2),
p. 389, McCall's Report; p. 228,
Porter's Report.
[8] O. R.,
11 (2),
p. 389, McCall's Report; p. 402, Seymour's Report.
[9] Ibid.,
p. 391,
McCall's Report; pp. 402-403. Seymour's Report; p.
417, Stone's Report.
[10] Williams,
Lincoln
Finds a General, Vol. 1, pp. 235-237;
O. R.,
[11] O.R.., 11(2),
p. 111, Hooker's Report; as to marine shells see History
o f Third Pennsylvania Reserve, p. 77.
11.
O. R., 11 (2),
p. 403, Seymour's Report; p. 428, Taggart's Report; p.
407, Child's Report; see also Freeman, Lee,
Vol. 2,
p. 186, for Kemper's charge; various times are given for the start of the artillery fire
and the Confederate infantry attack.
[12] O. R.,
11 (2),
p. 390, McCall's Report; p. 403, Seymour's Report, p.
425, Kirk's Report; p. 417, Stone's Report.
[13] Ibid.,
p. 420,
Sickel's Report; p. 421, Magilton's Report.
[14] . Ibid.,
pp. 255-256,
Randol's Report. Apparently the Third and Fourth
Reserves in their impetuous charge masked Randol's guns. Porter was severe in his
criticism in Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War, Thomas
Yoseloff, Inc., New York, 1956, Vol. 2, p. 4153.
[15] O. R.,
11 (2),
p. 412, Amsden's Report; p. 4253, Jackson's Report.
[16] Ibid.,
p. 51,
Sumner's Report; p. 92, Burns' Report; p. 81, Sedgwick's Report; p. 175, Robinson's
Report; pp. 162-164, Kearney's Report.
[17] Agitator,
September
10, 1862, as to Stone's physical appearance; O.
R., 11 (2),
pp. 417-419. Stone's Report; p. 425, Kirk's Report; pp. 404-405, Seymour's Report; C. A.
Stevens, Berdan's
U.S. Sharpshooters of the Army of the Potomac, Price-McGill
Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1892, pp. 151-187; a somewhat different account of McCall's capture
appears in Battles
and Leaders, Vol. 2,
p. 402 note.
[18] The
quotation is from Freeman, Lee,
Vol. 2,
p. 192; see also pp. 193-195; O. R.,
11 (2),
p. 897, Letter of N. F. Marsh, submitted with McCall's Report.