GENERAL
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY--CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED
CONFEDERATE' OFFICERS.
There
was an interval of full a mile between Hill and Longstreet, and the plain was swarming
with fugitives making their way back in disorder. He hastened to get ready to resist the
counter-charge, which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind which the
fugitives could rally. He also made great
personal exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in. He did not for a moment imagine that Meade would
fail to take advantage of this golden opportunity to crush the Army of Virginia and end
the war.
The
most distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they were in at this time, and
express their surprise that they were not followed up.
The
fact is, Meade had no idea of leaving the ridge. I
conversed the next morning with a corps commander who had just left hire. He said: "Meade says he thinks ho can hold
out for part of another day here, if they attack him."
This
language satisfied me that Meade would not go forward if he could avoid it, and would
not impede in any way the rebel retreat across the Potomac. Lee
began to make
GENERAL
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY.
205
preparations
at once and started his trains on the morning of the 4th. By
night Rodes's division, which followed them, was in bivouac two miles west of Fairfield. It was a difficult task to retreat burdened with
4,000 prisoners, and a train fifteen miles long, in the presence of a victorious enemy,
but it was successfully accomplished as regards his main body. The roads, too, were bad
and much cut up by the rain.
While
standing on Little Round Top Meade was annoyed at the fire of a rebel battery posted on an
eminence beyond the wheat-field, about a thousand yards distant. He inquired what troops
those were stationed along the stone fence which bounded the hither side of the
wheat-field. Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps, he
directed that they be sent forward to clear the woods in front of rebel skirmishers, who
were very annoying, and to drive away the battery, but not to get into a fight that would
bring on a general engagement. As Crawford unmasked from the stone fence the battery
opened fire on his right. He sent Colonel Ent's regiment, deployed as skirmishers, against
the guns, which retired as Ent approached. McCandless, who went forward with his brigade,
moved too far to the right, and Crawford ordered him to change front and advance toward
Round Top. He did so and struck a rebel
brigade in flank which was behind a temporary breastwork of rails, sods, etc. When this brigade saw a Union force apparently
approaching from their own lines to attack there in flank, they retreated in confusion,
after a short resistance, and this disorder extended during the retreat to a reserve
brigade posted on the low ground in their rear. Their flight did not cease until they
reached Horner's woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched themselves.
These brigades belonged to Hood's division, then under Law.
206 CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND GETTYSBURG.
GENERAL
RETREAT OF THE ENEMY.
Longstreet
says, "When this (Pickett's) charge failed, I expected that, of course, the enemy
would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff
officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of
batteries as the only support that I could give them."
.
.
.
I knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the
enemy." .
.
. "For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage."
Longstreet
always spoke of his own men as invincible, and stated that on the 2d they did the best
three hours' fighting that ever was done, but Crawford's1 attack seemed to show that they
too were shaken by the defeat of Pickett's grand charge.
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