Campaigns of the Civil War
Abner Doubleday
CHAPTER,
V.
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-THE SECOND DAY.
The
ridge upon which the Union forces were now assembling has already been partially
described. In two places it sunk away into intervening valleys. One between Culps Hill and
Cemetery Hill; the other lay for several hundred yards north of Little Round Top, as the
lesser of the two eminences on the left was called to distinguish it from the higher peak
called Round Top.
At
1 A.M. Meade arrived from Taneytown. When I
saw him, soon after daylight, he seemed utterly worn out and hollow-eyed. Anxiety and want
of sleep were evidently telling upon him. At
dawn he commenced forming his line by concentrating his forces on the right with a view to
descend into the plain and attack Lee's left, and the Twelfth Corps were sent to
Wadsworth's right to take part in the movement. It seems to me that this would have been a
very hazardous enterprise, and I am not surprised that
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 157
army
would have fought behind Seminary Ridge, and we would have been exposed in the plain
below. Nor do I think it would have been wise strategy to turn their left, and drive them
between us and Washington, for it would have enabled them to threaten the capital,
strengthen and shorten their line of retreat, and endanger our communications at the
same time. It is an open secret that Meade at that time disapproved of the battle-ground
Hancock had selected.
Warren
and Slocum having reported an attack against Lee's left as unadvisable, Meade began to
post troops on our left, with a view to attack the enemy's right. This, in my opinion,
would have been much more sensible. Lee, however, solved the problem for him, and,
fortunately for us, forced him to remain on the defensive, by ordering an assault against
each extremity of the Union line.
There
has been much discussion and a good deal of crimination and recrimination among the rebel
generals engaged as to which of them lost the battle of Gettysburg.
I
have already alluded to the fact that universal experience demonstrates that columns
converging on a central force almost invariably fail in their object and are beaten in
detail. Gettysburg seems to me a striking exemplification of this; repeated columns of
assault launched by Leo against our lines came up in succession and were defeated before
the other parts of his army could arrive in time to sustain the attack. It realized the old fable. The peasant could not break the bundle of fagots,
but he could break one at a time until all were gone.
Lee's
concave form of battle was a great disadvantage, for it took him three times as long as it
did us to communicate with different parts of his line, and concentrate troops. His
couriers who carried orders and the reinforcements he
158 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
sent
moved on the circumference and ours on the chord of the are.
The
two armies were about a mile apart. The Confederates-Longstreet and Hill-occupied Seminary
Ridge, which runs parallel to Cemetery Ridge, upon which our forces were posted. Ewell's
corps, on the rebel left, held the town, Hill the centre, and Longstreet the right.
Lee
could easily have manoeuvred Meade out of his strong position on the heights, and should
have done so. When he determined to attack, he should have commenced at daybreak, for all
his force was up except Pickett's division; while two corps of the Union army, the Fifth
and Sixth, were still far away, and two brigades of the Third Corps were also absent.
The
latter were marching on the Emmetsburg road, and as that was controlled by the enemy,
Sickles felt anxious for the safety of his men and trains, and requested that the cavalry
be sent to escort them in. This
was not done, however. The trains were warned
off the road, and the two brigades were, fortunately, not molested.
There
has been a great deal of bitter discussion between Longstreet, Fitz Lee, Early, Wilcox,
and others as to whether Lee did or did not order an attack to take place at 9 A.M., and
as to whether Longstreet was dilatory, and to blame for not making it. When u battle is
lost there is always an inquest, and a natural desire on the part of each general to lay
the blame on somebody else's shoulders. Long street waited until noon for Laws' brigade to
come up, and afterward there was a good deal of marching and countermarching to avoid
being seen by our troops.There
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG---SECOND DAY.
159
his
attempt would fail. He had urged Lee to take up a position where Meade would be forced to
attack him, and was not in very good humor to find his advice disregarded. The rebel
commander, however, finding the Army of, the Potomac in front of him, having unbounded
confidence; ill his troops, and elated by the success of the first day's fight, believed
he could gain a great victory then and there, and end the war, and determined to attempt
it. He was sick of these endless delays
and constant sacrifices, and hoped one strong sword-thrust would slay his opponent, and
enable the South to crown herself queen of the North American continent.
By
9 A.M. our skirmish line, in front of the Peach Orchard, was actively engaged with that of
the enemy, who were making a reconnoissance toward the Emmetsburg road. No serious affair, however, occurred for some
hours. Meade, as stated, was forming his
lines on the right of the position he afterward occupied. The Fifth Corps, which came up
about 1 P.M. was posted, as a reserve, South of the Twelfth Corps, with a view to the
attack which has already been referred to. About
3 P.M. the Sixth Corps began to arrive from its long and toilsome march of thirty-four
miles, and its tired troops were placed on the Taneytown road in the rear of Round Top, to
reinforce the other corps in case our troops made an attack on the left. Lee, however, did not wait for Meade to advance
again,
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY 161
REFERENCES TO THE FIRST DAY'S Battle
Union Troops
MAJOR-GENERAL
O. O. HOWARD Commanding the First and
Eleventh Corps
FIRST CORPS
MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY commanding
FIRST DIVISION-MAJOR-GENERAL
JAMES S. WADSWORTH commanding
a. First Brigade. Colonel Henry A. Morrow,
24th Michigan.
b. Second Brigade. Brigadier-General Lysander
Cutler
SECOND
DIVISION-MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON
c. First
Brigade. Brigadier-General Gabriel R. Paul
d. Second
Brigade. Brigadier-General Henry Baxter
THIRD
DIVISION-BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOS. A. ROWLEY
e. First
Brigade. Colonel Chapman Biddle, 121st
Pennsylvania
f. Second Brigade. Colonel Roy Stone, 149th Pennsylvania
ELEVENTH CORPS
MAJOR-GENERAL CARL SCHURZ commanding
FIRST DIVISION-
BRIGADIER-GENERAL F.C. BARLOW, commanding
g. First
Brigade. Colonel Von Gilsa
h. Second
Brigade. Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames
FIRST DIVISION-
BRIGADIER-GENERAL F.C. BARLOW, commanding
k. First
Brigade. Colonel Von Arnsberg
l. Second
Brigade. Colonel Kryzanowski
m. Custer’s
Brigade, of Steinwehr’s Division
Confederate Troops
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
A.P. HILL Commanding 3rd Corps
MAJOR-GENERAL Henry
Heth commanding Division
1. Archer’s Brigade |
3. Brockenborough’s Brigade |
2. Davis’s Brigade |
4. Pettigrew’s Brigade |
MAJOR-GENERAL W.D.
PENDER commanding Division
6. McGowan’s Brigade |
8. Thomas’s Brigade |
7. Scales’s Brigade |
9. Lane’s Brigade |
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
BENJ. EWELL commanding 2nd Corps
MAJOR-GENERAL
R.E. RODES commanding Division
10. Daniel’s Brigade |
12. Iverson’s Brigade |
11. Ramseur’s Brigade |
13. O’Neill’s Brigade |
14. Dole’s Brigade |
|
MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY commanding Division
15. Gordon’s Brigade |
17. Hoke’s Brigade |
16. Hay’s Brigade |
18. Smith’s Brigade |
162 CHANCELLORSVILLE,
AND GETTYSBURG.
Longstreet's
attack was over before Ewell came into action and although Ewell succeeded in temporarily
establishing himself on our extreme right, it was due to an unfortunate order given by
General Meade, by which the
Hood,
who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps, complains that he was not
allowed to go past Round Top and flank us on the south, as he might have done, but was
required by his orders to break in at the Peach Orchard and drive Sickles's line along the
Emmetsburg road toward Cemetery Hill; but it seems to me, as he started late in the
afternoon, if he had made the detour which would have been necessary in order to attack us
on the south, he would have met Sedgwick in front, while Sickles and Sykes might have
interposed to cut him off from the main body.
Before
describing Longstreet's attack we will give the final disposition made by General Meade
when it became necessary to fight a defensive battle.
The ridge was nearly in the shape of a horseshoe. The
Twelfth Corps was on the extreme right ; next carne one division of the First Corps on
Culps Hill, then the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill, with two divisions of the First
Corps at the, base; next the Second Corps ; then the Third, and tile Fifth Corps on the
extreme left, the Sixth Corps being frosted in rear of hound Top as a general reserve to
the array. Sickles however, denies that any position was ever marked out for him. He was expected to prolong Hancock's line to the
left, but did not do so for the following reasons : First, because the ground was low, and
second, on account of the commanding position of the Emmetsburg road, which ran, along a
cross ridge oblique to the front of the line assigned him, and
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG---SECOND DAY.
163
which
afforded the enemy an excellent position for their artillery; third,
164 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
If
one side of the right angle lies behind a ridge where it cannot be enfiladed, a temporary
formation of this kind is sometimes permissible.
Sickles
claimed that he acted with the implied sanction of General Meade, who, however, censured
the movement afterward. As soon as Sickles took position, General Buford's division of
cavalry was sent to the rear at Westminster, to guard the trains there; and Kilpatrick's
division was ordered to Hunterstown to attack the rebel left.
Sykes's
corps-the Fifth-came up from the right about 5 P.M., soon after Longstreet's attack on
Sickles was fairly under way, and formed along the outer base of Little Round Top, with
Crawford's Pennsylvania reserves at their right and front.
There
had been a Council of War, or Conference of Corps Commanders, called at Meade's
headquarters, and it was universally agreed to remain and hold the position. As the Third
Corps, in answer to the guns of Clark's battery, was suddenly assailed by a terrible
concentrated artillery fire, General Sickles rode back to his command and General DZeado
went with him. The latter objected to Sickles's line, but thought it was then too late to
change it.
The
severe artillery fire which opened against the two sides of the angle at the Peach Orchard
was a prelude to a furious attack against Ward's brigade on the left. This attack soon
extended to the Peach Orchard. The fight became very hot against Birney's division from
the left to the centre, but the troops on the right of the centre-Humphreys's
division-were not at first actively engaged, and Humphrey reinforced Birney with one of
his brigades, and subsequently with a regiment.
The
battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines was so complicated that it is
hard to follow and dif-
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 165
ficult
to describe the movements of the contestants. Some
idea of it can probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram
It
will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A, and that one of them was
brought up to enfilade
Diagram of the Attack on Sickles and Sykes
the
side AB. The angle at A, attacked by
Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the west, was broken in. In consequence of this, several batteries on the
line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward and took the position DE.
166 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
The
Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade on the left, the latter
was forced back, and the exulting rebels advanced to seize Little Round Top. They attacked
the force there with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were ultimately
repulsed, and finally tools up the line GL. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps and one of
the Second Corps were sent in, one after the other, to drive back the, strong rebel force
posted from D to C, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked by the
rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to retreat, although each performed
prodigies of valor. Indeed, Brooks's
brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries, HI. The rebels gained the
position LG, confronting our main line and close to it ; but a fine charge made by
Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves, drove them farther back, and as part of
the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels gave up the contest for
the night as regards this part of the field.
The
attack against Humphreys's division which followed the breaking in of the angle at A will
be described further on. The general result was that Sickles's entire line, together with
the reinforcements sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to the
ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of Crawford's division which
maintained a somewhat advanced position.
The
details of this contest are full of incident, and too important to be wholly omitted.
About
3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left, by sending a flanking force
from Hood's division, formed in two lines, around to attack Sickles's left, held by
General J. Hobart Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches
to Little Round
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 167
Top;
Ward's line passing in front of the mountain, and his flank resting on a rocky depression
in the ground called the Devil's Den. The right extended to the minor spur or wooded ridge
beyond the wheat-field. The engagement was furious; commencing on the rebel right, it
extended to the left, until it reached the Peach Orchard, where it became especially
violent. This central point of Sickles's line
was held by eleven regiments of Birney's and Humphreys's divisions. Birney's two brigades,
commanded by Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought with Kearny
in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line was too attenuated to resist the
shock very long, and reinforcements became absolutely necessary to
sustain
that unlucky angle at the Peach Orchard. Sickles
had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps was resting from a long and fatiguing march,
but the latter wished his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them in;
and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the necessity for immediate
reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could hold on a while longer, and did not respond to
the call for three-quarters of an hour.
It
would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle was on the Emmetsburg pike,
and that the flank rested on the Peach Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's
division perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced line, and Sykes
the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought turning the Peach Orchard was turning
the Union left. With this idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg
road, and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor ridge was taken,
reported to Longstreet that he could not carry out these orders
168 CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND GETTYSBURG.
without
exposing his right flank to an attack from Sykes's Corps.
Ward
fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on the left, driving back two
attacks of the latter, but his line was long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the
front of nearly two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the ground
they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He attempted to strengthen his
force at the Devil's Den by detaching the Ninety-ninth Pennsylvania from his right, and,
although De Trobriand had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send
the Fortieth New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank. Egan arrived too late to perform the duty
assigned him, as Ward had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant
charge upon the rebel advance.
The
fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced on the left, we will
describe that part of the engagement first.
General
Warren, who was on Meade's staff' as Chief Engineer, had ridden about this time to the
signal station on Little Round Top, to get a better view of the field. He saw the long
line of the enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless
prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our
whole line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge ; so that this eminence
was in reality the key of the battle-field, and must be held at all hazards. He saw
Barnes's division, which Sykes had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go
to the relief of DeTrobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and who was sorely
beset. Without losing a moment he rode down
the slope, over to Barnes, took the
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG---SECOND DAY.
169
responsibility
of detaching Vincent's brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top. He then sent a staff officer to inform General
Meade of what he had done and to represent the, immense importance of holding this
commanding point.
The
victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a battery on Little Round Top,
and to another farther to the right; but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and
rushed eagerly up the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top which
seemed to be defenceless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the crest of a small spur
which juts out from the hill, and not having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in
time to save the height. The contest soon became furious and the rocks were alive with
musketry. General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in overwhelming
numbers, and Hazlett's regular battery, supported by the One Hundred and Fortieth New York
under Colonel O'Rorke of Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with great labor
to the crest of Little Round Top, and the One Hundred and Fortieth were posted on the
slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the
field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre, had driven back the
right. In advancing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer
who had just graduated at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men
thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In
doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General
Weed, who was on the crest with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as
Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also and he
169 CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND GETTYSBURG.
dropped
dead on the body of his chief. Colonel Rice of the Forty-fourth New York now took command
in place of Vincent. The enemy having been
foiled at the centre and right, stole around through the woods and turned the left of the
line; but Chamberlain's regiment-the Twentieth Maine-was folded back by him, around the
rear of the mountain, to resist the attack. The rebels came on like wolves, with deafening
yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over the crest; but they rallied and drove their
assailants back in their turn. This was twice
repeated and then a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed
over the hill. The Twentieth Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels from the
valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number of prisoners. Not a moment too
soon, for Chamberlain had lost a third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition.
Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five hundred men
prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms. Hill
in his official report says " Hood's right was held as in a vise."
We
will now return to the Peach Orchard. In
answer to a shot from Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries
opposite. Graham's infantry were
partially sheltered from this iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the
beginning, which were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under Major
McGilvery, were very much cut up ; and at last it became necessary to sacrifice one of
them-that of Bigelow-to enable the others to retire to a new line in rear. Graham still
held the Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's brigade on
the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west. A
battery was brought forward to enfilade Sickles's line on the Emmetsburg road, and under
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG--SECOND DAY 171
cover
of its fire Barksdale carried the position, but was mortally wounded in doing so.' Sickles lost a leg about this time (5.30 P.M.),
and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The command of the Third Corps now devolved upon
General Birney.
The
batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road below the Peach Orchard, were
very effective, but were very much shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time but was
driven off temporarily by a gallant charge of the One Hundred and Forty-first Pennsylvania
of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered by Major
McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to give the others time to form a new line. He fought
with fixed prolonge until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then retired with the
loss of three officers and twenty-eight men. Phillips's battery, which adjoined his, had a
similar experience. McLaws bears testimony to
the admirable manner with which this artillery was served.
He says one shell killed and wounded thirty men, out of a company of thirty-seven.
The
capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy directly on Humphreys's left
flank and De Trobriand's right. The disaster then became irremediable, because every force
thrown in after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and an enfilading
fire from the right.
While
the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity, which had a
general relation to the defence of Sickles's line. A little stream runs through a ravine
parallel to the cross road, and about five hundred yards
__________________________________________________________
1
Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a brave man, with dignity and
resignation. I had known him as an officer of
volunteers in the Mexican war. As a member of
Congress he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.
172 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
south
of it, and then turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing
through a rocky wooded coup. try, to empty in Plum Run. De Trobriand held the north bank
of this stream with a very insufficient force in front of two regiments and his contest
with Semmes's brigade in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into
the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very destructive. At the same time as Ward's
left was turned and driven back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand,
and occupied the wheat-field. Barnes'
division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to
his assistance. The former, by wheeling to
the left and retaining several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who
came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to give way. De Trobriand's two
regiments in front had a most determined fight, and would not yield the ground. When relieved by Zook's force they fell back
across the wheat-field. There Birney used them as a basis of a new line, brought up two
fresh regiments, charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone fence
which bounded it.
Caldwell's
division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the contest. Caldwell formed his men with
the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear. In the
advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed in both directions,
was soon so cut up that the rear line came forward in its place, Zook was killed, but
Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through the
supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second time to aid Brooks, but it
was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach
Orchard by this time was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was really
a disadvantage, for both his
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 173
flanks
were turned. Semmes's brigade, together with
parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades, rallied behind a stone wall, again came
forward, and succeeded in retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost. Caldwell,
under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy loss, for both Zook's and
Kelly's brigades were completely surrounded.
Then
Ayres,' who had been at the turning-point of so many battles, went in with his fine
division of regulars, commanded by Day and Burbank, officers of courage and long
experience in warfare. He struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who
would have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and drove them back to
the position Caldwell had left; but his line, from the nature of things, was untenable,
for a whole brigade with ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing
remained but to face about and fight his way home again.
This was accomplished with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in
killed and wounded. His return was aided
by the artillery on Little Round Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps. When the troops were all gone,
Winslow's battery still held the field for a time, and withdrew by piece.
The
enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's and Anderson's brigades, now swarmed in the front of our main
line between the wheatfield and Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, who
commanded a division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, was
ordered to drive them farther back. This
organization, which at one time I had the, honor to command, were veterans of the
Peninsula, and were
____________________________________________________________
1 General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced
with the first Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation of
the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its battles and minor engagements,
174 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
among
the most dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their
native State, and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors of one of
the regiments in his hand. The men went forward with an impetus nothing could withstand.
The enemy tools shelter behind a stone fence oil the hither side of the wheat-field, but
McCandless stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it was getting
dark, both sides rested on their arms. The other brigade of Crawford's division-that of
Fisher-had previously been sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the
slope of Little Round Top. The enemy retired before it, so that it was not engaged, and it
then took possession of the main Round Top on the left of Little Round Top and fortified
it.
As
Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevins and Eustis, formed
under Wheaton on the right and below Little Round Top. The sight of the firm front
presented by these fresh troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to
reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther advance.
The
enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and held a fortified line as
far south as the Devil's Den, in which rocky cavern they took shelter.
It
remains now to describe, the effect of the loss of the Peach Orchard and the wounding of
Sickles and Graham-- which took place soon after--upon the fate of Humphreys's division,
posted on the right along the Emmetsburg road. When Sickles lost his leg, Birney assumed
command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his left wing back to form a new
oblique line to the ridge, in connection with Birney's division. Humphreys, up to the loss
of the Peach Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely demonstrated
along his front; but now he was
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 175
obliged,
while executing the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend with
Barksdale's brigade of McLaws's division on his left at the Peach Orchard, and
enfilading batteries there also, while his entire front was called upon to repel a most
determined assault from Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and
which now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to the road. Four
regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that part of the line, but the attack was
so sudden and violent that they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys
received orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge itself. There he turned at bay.
Hancock, who had been placed in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was
indefatigable in his vigilance and personal supervision, “patching the line "
wherever the enemy was likely to break through. His
activity and foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture. Toward the last Meade
brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the right and sent them in to cover
Sickles's retreat. Humphreys was followed
up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright-about the best fighting material in the
rebel army. Perry was driven back by the
fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between the other two, his retreat left each
of them in a measure unsupported on the flanks.
Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as soon as the others became actively
engaged, but failed to do so, and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not
move forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would have been ruinous
to us if followed up, was fruitless of results.
Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached the crest with
his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of
the Second
176 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
Corps. Webb gave them two staggering volleys from behind
a fence, and went forward with two regiments.
He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned it upon them. Wright, finding
himself entirely isolated in this advanced position, went back again to the main line, and
Wilcox did the same. On this occasion Wright
did what Lee failed to accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, for he
pierced our centre, and held it for a short time, and had the movement been properly
supported and energetically followed up, it might have been fatal to our army, and would
most certainly have resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was but another illustration of
the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a central force. Lee's divisions
seemed never to strike at the hour appointed. Each came forward separately, and was beaten
for lack of support.
Wright
attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him. The latter was closely
followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops rushed in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily in extricating himself from
his advanced position. Wilcox claims to have
captured temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight.
As
they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped off. The last gun was
delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line of muskets pointing at him within a few
feet, deliberately drove off the field. The Georgians manifested their admiration for his
bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at him.' I
regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's name.
__________________________________________________________
1 As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire
to state that this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian, a
relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright. Wood fell struck by six
bullets but recovered.
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 177
In
the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as Chief of Artillery, rode
along the entire crest from Little Round Top to Culps Hill to make himself familiar with
the lines. As he passed my headquarters he
noticed some now troops, the Second Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed
part of my command. They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up in close
column by division, ready to go to any part of the field at a moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps
178 CHANCELLORSVILLE
AND GETTYSBURG.
victory
of the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to be located in that
part of the field.
It
is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position Hood's division would
have turned our left, have forced us from the shelter of the ridge, and probably have
intervened between us and Washington. The movement, disastrous in some respects, was
propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted all their strength and
valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which after all was of no particular benefit to
them. They were still outside our main
line. They pierced the latter it is true, but
the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood triumphantly on that
crest were obliged to retire because the divisions which should have supported them
remained inactive. I must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these
supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command exerted a benumbing
influence on the second day.
It
is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance against Little Round Top
in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's corps coming into line he gave up the idea of
capturing the heights as impracticable. This eminence should have been the first point
held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of the field, but no special
orders were given concerning it, and nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it
from falling into the hands of the enemy.
Meade
was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had pierced our centre. He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him orders
to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of the army. Indeed, in an article on the " Secret History of Gettysburg," published
in the " Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey, of the
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 179
Confederate
army, he states that the movement to the rear actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets
heard and reported that artillery was passing in that direction. After a short time the noise of the wheels ceased. He also says that in a conversation he had with
Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond,
he was told that while the battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a
Confederate scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which the former
wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the presence of a large Union force at
City Point. Dahlgren
said a retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he looked upon it as a
sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and perhaps thinking it would not do to
supplement the probable capture of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac,
countermanded the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General Meade, told
one of his division commanders that the army would probably fall back on Westminster.
General Pleasonton testifies that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M.
in occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat of the army.
Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such a movement was contemplated.
Although
it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union army should be assailed at
the same time, while the intermediate forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move to attack the right of our line
at Culps Hill until Longstreet's assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it
to the fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two brigades up the York
road. There is always some reason why columns never converge in time. Johnson's division,
which was on the extreme left of the rebel
180 CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
army,
and had not been engaged, made their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail
the right at Culps Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and that part of
the line still farther to the right where Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was
posted.
In
his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the conflict with Longstreet,
General Meade made the sad mistake of ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position
on the right and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum, sensible
that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the enemy were advancing on his
front, and begged permission to keep Geary's division there to defend the position.
General Meade finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and thus it
happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the extreme right of our line
defenceless, had nothing to do but walk in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to
detach this large force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades should
not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.
Johnson's
division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek about half an hour before sunset.
It suffered so severely from our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in
disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however, advanced against Wadsworth, and
Greene on his right; but as these generals had their fronts well fortified, the attack was
easily repulsed. Nevertheless, the left of
Johnson's line, not being opposed, took possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M., and thus
endangered our communications.
Gregg's
division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's position saw this movement of
Johnson. Gregg opened fire on the column with his artillery and sent out his
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 181
men
dismounted to skirmish on the flank of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to
meet him, and the contest continued until after dark. Greene, in the meantime, swung his
right around on the edge of a ravine, perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to
avoid being flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having graduated second
in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what ought to be done and how to do it. He held on strongly, and as it was dark, and
the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or where our troops were posted, they
waited until daylight before taking any further action. Yet
they were now but a short distance from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy
reach of our reserve artillery. A night attack on the
rear of our army, in conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's
front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have succeeded.
During the night Ewell sent
Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson. Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or
report to Sykes, and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as the
battle was over in that part of the field. There was a mystery about his movements which
needs to be cleared up.
To
supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent reinforcements from being sent
there, Early's division was directed to carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it
advanced, a vigorous artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's
Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on Cemetery Hill, which were
partially sheltered by earthworks, replied and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then
Early's infantry moved forth, Hays's brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left,
under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve. It was
182
CHANCELLORSVILLE AND
GETTYSBURG.
supposed
Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while Rodes's and Ponder's divisions
would come forward in time to prevent any attack against his right. The enemy first struck
Von Gilsa's brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to its left, at the base
of the hill, was Ames's brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's batteries on
higher ground above. Stewart's, Reynolds's and Stevens's batteries, which had been a good
deal cut up on the first day, were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel
Wainwright, Chief of Artillery to the First Corps, gave them orders not to attempt to
retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last.
The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by Stevens's
battery. Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the approaching line energetically.
The rebel left and centre fell back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses
and undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von Gilsa's brigade, and
driving it up the hill, through the batteries.
In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible
slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of Ricketts's guns were spiked. The
enemy, in making this movement, exposed their left flank to Stevens's battery, which
poured a terrible fire of double canister into their ranks. The Thirty-third Massachusetts also opened a
most effective oblique fire. The batteries
were penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the
gun he serves, and these brave men fought ]land to hand with handspikes, rammer, staves,
and even stones. They shouted,
" Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose our guns." Hancock, all this time
should have been kept busy on his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Ponder, but
as
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 183
they
did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great danger that Howard would lose
Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue.
Carroll was joined by the One Hundred and Sixth Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from
Schurz's division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous silence and then the
tramp of our infantry was heard. They came
over the hill and went in with a cheer. The
enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their
assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said that out of 1,750 men of the
organization known as " The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned. Hays attributes his defeat to the fact that Gordon
was not up in time to support him.
The
failure to carry the Hill isolated Johnson's division on our extreme right. As it could
only be reached by a long circuit it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without
unduly weakening other parts of his line. That Rodes's division did not reach Cemetery
Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to any lack of zeal or
activity on the part of that energetic officer. He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg
by the flank, then change front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and
by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been repulsed.
The
day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to
continue his efforts. He could not bear to retreat
after his heavy losses, and acknowledge that he was beaten. He resolved to reinforce
Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's troops, the elite of his
army, who
184 CHANCELLORS VILLE AND GETTYSBURG.
had
not been engaged, against our centre. He
hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in front and Johnson in rear, would yet win
those heights and scatter the Union army to the winds.
Kilpatrick, who had been resting the tired men and horses of his cavalry division
at Abbotsford after the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle
around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown. This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden
arrival of Stuart's cavalry from its long march. They reached that part of the field about
4 P.M. After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and Caster's brigades and Estes's
squadron were principally engaged against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body,
darkness put an end to the fight. Kilpatrick
then turned back and bivouacked at Two Taverns for the night.
Gregg's
division of cavalry left Hanover and at noon took post opposite and about three miles east
of Slocum's Corps on the right. There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the
attack and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own skirmish line and
advanced against the one they threw out to meet him. At 10 P.M. he withdre and took post
on the Baltimore pike where it crosses Cress, Run, near Rock Creek. By so doing he guarded the right and rear of the
army from any demonstration by Stuart's cavalry.
At
night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously voted to stay and fight it
out. Meade was displeased with the result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he
said angrily, " Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to fight
a battle in." The fact that a portion of the enemy actually prolonged our line on the
right and that our centre had been pierced dur-
BATTLE
OF GETTYSBURG-SECOND DAY. 183
ing
the day, made him feel far from confident. He thought
it better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing all.
____________________________________________________________
1
Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in the public; prints as to
whether General Meade did or did not intend to leave the field. So far as the drawing up
of an order of retreat is concerned, it was undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it
is the duty of a general to he prepared for every emergency. It is easy to criticize, and say what should have
been done, after a battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid down
on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in official reports; but amid the
doubt and confusion of actual combat, where there fit; been great less of men and
material, it is not always so easy to decide Oil
the night of the 2d the state
There
is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to. General Meade did desire to
retreat, and expressed fears that his communications with Taneytown might be endangered
by remaining at Gettysburg.
It
has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton objected to our position
at Gettysburg, but this is an error. They merely recommended some additional precautions
to prevent the enemy from turning our left at Round
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